

The Hellenistic philosophers

VOLUME 2

Greek and Latin texts
with notes and bibliography

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Introductory note

This second volume of *The Hellenistic Philosophers* is strictly ancillary to the translations and commentaries which appear in vol. 1. Whereas vol. 1 is designed to be usable on its own, vol. 2 provides the sort of supplementary information required by readers familiar with Greek and Latin. It is not designed to be read in isolation.

The principal object of vol. 2 is to supply the originals of the texts which are translated in vol. 1. These are sometimes presented here in longer excerpts than appear in vol. 1, and in such cases the additional portions are marked by smaller print. Occasionally an entire extra text is added, also in smaller print, and designated with a lower case (instead of the usual upper case) bold letter.

The texts are accompanied by notes. These do not attempt systematic or exhaustive commentary, but offer cross-references, information on context and on further relevant texts, and discussion of obscure or controversial points of interpretation, particularly where this is required in order to justify the translations and interpretations proposed in vol. 1. If our coverage at times seems uneven, that is because we have found that some texts demand extensive elucidation, while others seem able to speak adequately for themselves.

We have not, with one or two special exceptions, attempted to obtain readings of the original manuscripts, but have relied principally on a standard edition of each work. These editions are listed in the Index of sources appended to vol. 1. Although we do not always follow their precise readings or punctuation, we do adopt their systems of sigla in our apparatus criticus, so that readers requiring technical information on the manuscript and editorial traditions can consult them directly. We do not attempt to supply exhaustive information on the textual tradition, but we have tried to give full information at least in all cases where a philosophical interpretation might depend on the reading chosen. Our use of bracketing and other such conventions is standard. However, readers should be warned that some of our texts are papyrological or epigraphic, and that square brackets in such texts enclose editorial *fillings* for lacunae, whereas square brackets in other texts indicate editorial *deletions*, or, if their content opens with 'sc.', editorial glosses.

References in bold are to our own texts. If the final figure is not in bold, e.g.

Introductory note

70E 2, it refers to the line number in the vol. 2 text. If it is in bold, e.g. **70E 2**, it refers to a subsection of the text, as in vol. 1.

In the notes we have found it hard, for reasons of space, to do justice to all the relevant scholarship. In partial recompense, the bibliography, which is designed for use in company with the notes, often serves as our vehicle for referring to and evaluating the range of existing interpretations. Numbered references in square brackets, e.g. 'Pohlenz [298]', are to entries in the bibliography.

AAL

Cambridge, June 1986

DNS

1 Scepticism

A Diogenes Laertius 9.61–2 (Caizzi 1A, 6, 7, 9)

(1) Πύρρων Ἠλείος Πλειστάρχου μὲν ἦν υἱός, καθὰ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἱστορεῖ·
ὥς φησι δ' Ἀπολλόδαμος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, πρότερον ἦν ζωγράφος, καὶ
ἤκουσε Βρύσανος τοῦ Στίλπωνος, ὥς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς, εἴτ'
Ἀναξάρχου, ξυνακολουθῶν πανταχοῦ, ὥς καὶ τοῖς γυμνοσοφισταῖς ἐν
Ἰνδία συμμῖξαι καὶ τοῖς Μάγοις. (2) ὅθεν γενναιότατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, 5
τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίης καὶ ἐπιυχῆς εἶδος εἰσαγαγών, ὡς Ἀσκάσιος ὁ Ἀβ-
δηρίτης φησὶν. (3) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτε
δίκαιον οὔτ' ἀδίκον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ
δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τότε ἢ τότε
εἶναι ἕκαστον. (4) ἀκόλουθος δ' ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρέπόμενος μηδὲ 10
φυλαττόμενος, ἅπαντα ὑφιστάμενος, ἀμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ κρημνοὺς καὶ
κύνας καὶ ὄλους μηδὲν ταῖς αἰσθησέσιν ἐπιτρέπων. σὺζέσθαι μέντοι, καθά
φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον, ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν παρακολου-
θούντων. Αἰνεσιδήμος δὲ φησι φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐποχῆς
λόγον, μὴ μέντοι γ' ἀπροοράτως ἕκαστα πράττειν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὰ 15
ἐνενηκόντα ἔτη κατεβίω.

3 Βρύσανος Ménage c Suda: δρύσανος codd τοῦ codd: ἡ Niczsche, Rupert ὡς-διαδοχαῖς om
F 6 Ἀσκάσιος codd.. Ἑκαταῖος Müller 12 ὄλους Cobet Suda codd.: Suda (ταυταῦτα) Stephanus
ἐπιτρέπων BP: ἐπιτρέπων F 14 τῆς om BP

Context: the opening of Diogenes' life of Pyrrho. The life is a patchwork of various sources and periods, extending from the near-contemporary Antigonos, 13, and Erasosthenes (D.L. 9.66) down to at least the first-century B.C. Aenesidemus, 14.

1 On the sources, Diocles, Apollodorus and Alexander. cf. Mejer [32].

2 **ζωγράφος** This early career, embellished in **B** 1–3 and by Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.27), fits Pyrrho's subsequent scepticism suspiciously well; cf. σκηνογραφία, **D** 4.

3 **Βρύσανος τοῦ Στίλπωνος** A notorious crux, cf. Giannantonio [62], 26–30. Pyrrho cannot have been taught by any son of Stilpo's, since he and Stilpo were of much the same age; and Stilpo is named as Timon's first teacher (D.L. 9.109). The mention of Bryson and Stilpo is an attempt by the 'succession' writers to connect Pyrrho with the Megarians and perhaps thereby to Socrates; cf. Suda s.v. *Σωκράτης*.

an entry which gives Pyrrho a further Socratic pedigree via the local Elean school of Phaedo (note too the connexions drawn between Phaedo, Stilpo and Menedemus at D.L. 2.105). The Socratic succession for Pyrrho was a rival to his Eleatic-Democritean pedigree, as in Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.17.10. Megarian influence on Pyrrho's scepticism has often been posited (cf. Brochard [52], 52 n. 1; von Fritz [71], col. 93; Bertu [75], 75), but too uncritically. There are striking similarities between the Megarian Stilpo's Cynic style of moralizing and Timon; cf. Long [69], 71-3. But Timon seems to distance Pyrrho from any interest in Megarian metaphysics; and note his contemptuous dismissal of all Socratics including Megarians, 3D. On Timon himself, see notes on 3I m.

4 **Ἀναξόρχου** Material in 72 DK, and cf. von Fritz [71], cols. 94-5. Timon's one reference to him is partly pejorative, fr. 832, but this should not count against his having had decisive influence on Pyrrho. **γυμνοσοφισταῖς** Described by Megasthenes and the Cynic Onesicritus at Strabo 15.1.59-65; and cf. Plutarch, *Alex.* 64. Pyrrho's astounding imperturbability (cf. B-C) can certainly be compared with the reported anecdotes on Indian asceticism and indifference to conventional values.

5 **ῥῶν** The scope of the conjunction probably extends back only to the Indian sages. On γενναῖότητα φιλοσοφῆσαι as a characteristically Cynic commendation of Pyrrho's mental and moral pre-eminence, cf. Brancacci [83], 219-30.

6 **τὸ . . . εἰσαγαγόν** As technical terms, ἐποχή and ἀκαταληψία probably postdate Pyrrho, originating with Zeno and Arcesilaus; see 68 and cf. Cousin [73], 381-6. But F and G entitle us to attribute concepts of suspension of judgement and non-cognition to early Pyrrhonism, though these should not be assimilated to the use of ἐποχή and ἀκαταληψία in Stoic-Academic debates; cf. Caizet ad loc. **Ἀσκάνιος** Otherwise unknown, and hence emended by C. Müller, *FHG* II p. 384 n., to 'Hecataeus' of Abdera, a pupil of Pyrrho (D.L. 9.60) and a historian best known for his ethnography. However, the postulated corruption is hard to account for.

7-10 Democritus had contrasted the conventionality (νόμῳ) of secondary qualities (γλυκύ, πικρὸν etc.) with the reality of atoms and void (cf. KRS 549, and vol. 1, 57) and is also credited with saying that 'truth is in the depths', 68A 2. Pyrrho's claim is that νόμος and ἔθος account for all predication and grounds for action (cf. I), since 'nothing exists in truth'. The complete generality of Pyrrho's thesis, as stated here, accords with F. But his particular concern with outlawing objective values is evident in the priority given to καλόν, πῖσχρόν, δίκαιον, ἡδίκον. For the Democritean background of οὐ μᾶλλον, cf. De Laey [80]; Graeser [81].

10-15 The picture of Pyrrho's consistent refusal to make conventional discriminations resembles Aristotle's account of how someone (counterfactually) would behave who really rejected the principle of non-contradiction, *Metaph. Γ.4*, 1008b12-26; cf. Long [57], 94-7, and see further note on F 12-14. However fanciful, the picture goes back to Antigonus in the 3rd century B.C., in contrast with Aenesidemus' much later claim that Pyrrho's suspension of judgement *qua* philosopher did not make him careless in daily life.

B Diogenes Laertius 9.62-4 (Caizzi 10, part, 28, 11)

Ἀντίγονος δὲ φησιν ὁ Καρύσιος ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Πύρρωνος* τὰδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδελφός τε ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σῶζεσθαι τε αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἑλλάδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ λαμπαδιστὰς μετρίως ἔχοντας. (1) ἔκπατεῖν τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρημάζειν, σπανίως ποτ' ἐπιφανιόμενον τοῖς οἴκοι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἀκούσαντα Ἰνδοῦ τινος ὀνειδίζοντος Ἀναξάρχῳ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἑτερόν τινα διδάξαι οὗτος ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸς αὐλὰς βασιλικὰς θεραπεύων. αἰεὶ τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καταστήματι, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ τις αὐτὸν καταλίποι μεταξὺ λέγοντα, αὐτῷ διαπεραίνειν τὸν λόγον. . . (2) καταληφθεὶς δέ ποτε καὶ αὐτῷ λαλῶν καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔφη μελετᾶν χρηστὸς εἶναι. ἐν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἐξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν ὅθεν καὶ Ναυσифάνην ἤδη νεανίσκον ὄντα θηραθῆναι. ἔφασκε γοῦν γίνεσθαι δεῖν τῆς μὲν διαθέσεως τῆς Πυρρωνεῖου, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν αὐτοῦ. ἔλεγέ τε πολλάκις καὶ Ἐπίκουρον θαυμάζοντα τὴν Πύρρωνος ἀναστροφὴν συνεχὲς αὐτοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. οὕτω δ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος τιμηθῆναι ὥστε καὶ ἀρχιερέα καταστήσαι αὐτὸν καὶ δι' ἐκείνου πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀτελεῖαν ψηφίσασθαι.

1 ἐν Πύρρωνος οἴκῳ. F 10 τὸ (καὶ δι)ἐξοδικῶς Κύπρ 15 καταστήσαι H² τιμηθῆναι I

Context: immediately following A.

3 μετρίως ἔχοντας 'Well proportioned' (cf. Plato, *Thea.* 191d), not 'indifferent' (Hicks in Loeb ed.) ἔκπατεῖν A characteristic of other philosophers in Diogenes; cf. 1.112, 4.19, 9.3

4-6 The Indian's reproach to Anaxarchus recalls Diogenes the Cynic's contempt for Bactery; cf. his fr. 422 3 Giannantonio [36].

6 αἰεὶ . . . καταστήματι Cf. 2B-D.

9 μελετᾶν Cf. Epicurus' advice to Menoecaeus, 25A 3 and 23] i. Pyrrho's pupil Philo was described by Timon as τὸν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτόσχαλον αὐτολαλήτην (11.1. 9.69).

10 ἐξοδικῶς . . . ἐρώτησιν These expressions seem to imply that Pyrrho was equally effective in extended or rhetorical discourse (ἐξοδικῶς) and in dialectic (πρὸς ἐρώτησιν); cf. S.E., *M.* 2.6 (= SVF 2.294). On Timon's evidence, however (cf. 2C-D), Pyrrho's philosophical stance was one of indifference to conventional styles of argument or inquiry.

10-14 The atomist Nausiphanes' interest in Pyrrho is made the more credible by his scepticism about empirical knowledge (Seneca, *Ep.* 88.43-5). On the philosophical significance of Epicurus' admiration for Pyrrho, cf. Sedley [104], 136-7, and Gigante [106], 37-49.

14-15 For discussion, cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc.

C Diogenes Laertius 9.66-7 (Caizzi 15A, 16, 51, 20, part)

(1) καὶ κυνός ποτ' ἐπενεχθέντος διασοβθέντα εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον, ὡς χαλεπὸν εἶη ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκδύναί τὸν ἄνθρωπον διαγωνίζεσθαι δ' ὡς οἶόν τε πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ γε λόγῳ. φασὶ δὲ καὶ σπητικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τομῶν καὶ καύσεων ἐπὶ τινος

ἐλκούς αὐτῷ προσεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μὴδὲ τὰς ὀφρὺς συναγαγεῖν. καὶ ὁ 5
 Τίμων δὲ διασαφεί τὴν διάνθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθωνα διέειπεν. (2) ἀλλὰ καὶ
 Φίλων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, γνώριμος αὐτοῦ γεγονώς, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἐμέμνητο
 μάλιστα μὲν Δημοκρίτου, εἰτα δὲ καὶ Ὀμήρου, θαυμάζων αὐτὸν καὶ
 συνεχὲς λέγων "οἷ περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν" . . . προφέρεσ- 10
 θαι δὲ καὶ . . . ὅσα συνετείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ
 παιδαριώδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

2 τὸν nm. F

Context: life of Pyrrho.

1-2. The same story, with minor modifications, is cited by Aristocles on Antigonos of Carystos' authority at Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.26 (Caizzi 158) **ἐκδύ-
 ναι**. Cf. ἐκδύσιν in Timon 2C 3, and the uses of ἀπεκδύνεσθαι cited by Caizzi [64] in
 her note on the latter passage.

3-4 **ἔργοις** . . . **λόγῳ**. Not flinching at extreme pain, 4-5, presumably
 exemplifies *διαγωνίζεσθαι* . . . *ἔργοις*, and back-up by *λόγος*, if one does succumb,
 should involve reflection on the complete indifference of everything, A 7 10. Cf. the
 involuntary reactions of the Stoic wise man, which do not command his assent, 65Y.

6 **Πύθωνα**. G is quoted from this work, on which see Ferrari [88], 208.

6 11. Aristocles, probably following Antigonos of Carystus, elaborates Pyrrho's
 relation to Democritus into 'an encounter with Democritus' books' (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.*
 14.18 27), a characteristic biographical touch (cf. D.L. 7.2 on Zeno of Citium). For
 interesting suggestions about what Pyrrho found so attractive in Democritus, cf.
 Caizzi [82]. Sextus also records and elaborates Pyrrho's love of Homer, *M.* 1 272, 281.
 On the quotation of Homer, *Il.* 6.146, and the other Homeric lines omitted here, cf.
 Conche [72], 26. On the Cynic resonance of the terms *ἀβέβαιον* . . . *παιδαριώδες*,
 and on Timon's *Silloi* as the source of such characterizations of Pyrrho, see Long [69],
 69.

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.87-8

οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ ἦσαν, ὡς προείπον, οἱ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Μητροδώρον καὶ 5
 Ἀνάξαρχον ἔτι δὲ Μόνιμον φήσαντες ἀννηρηκέναι τὸ κριτήριον, ἀλλὰ
 Μητροδώρον μὲν οἷ εἶπεν "οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν
 ἴσμεν", Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ καὶ Μόνιμον ὅτι σκηνογραφία ἀπέεικασαν τὰ ὄντα
 τοῖς τε κατὰ ἔνους ἢ μανίαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα ὁμοιωσθαι ὑπέλαβον.

Context: doxography of the criterion of truth.

For Metrodorus of Chios see 70 DK, and for Monimus of Syracuse, *fr.* 1-5
 Giannantonio [36]. Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.19.8, after citing a version of Metrodorus'
 dictum, comments: ἦτις εἰσβολὴ κακῶς ἔδωκεν ἀφορμὰς τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένῳ
 Πύρρῳ. The Cynic Monimus was probably somewhat younger than Pyrrho; his
 affinity with early Pyrrhonism is evident in S.E., *M.* 8.5: τὰχα δὲ καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων
 [sc. *μηδὲν εἰναί φησιν ἀληθές*], *τύφον* εἰπὼν τὰ πάντα. On *τύφος* as a favourite
 Cynic term for self-importance and self-deception, and its use by Timon and later
 Pyrrhonism, cf. Long [69], 74-5, and the wide-ranging study by Caizzi [84].

4 **σκηνογραφία**. Cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc.

E Diogenes Laertius 9.60

οὗτος [sc. Ἀναξάρχος] διὰ τὴν ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν τοῦ βίου Εὐδαιμονικὸς ἐκαλεῖτο· καὶ ἦν ἐκ τοῦ ῥάστου δυνατὸς σωφρονίζειν.

Context: life of Anaxarchus.

1 ἀπάθειαν See note on 2F 5–7.

F Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.1–5; Caizzi 53)

(1) ἀναγκαίως δ' ἔχει πρὸ παντὸς διασκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν γνώσεως· εἰ γὰρ αὐ μὴδὲν πεφύκαμεν γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκοπεῖν. ἐγένοντο μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν παλαι τινὲς οἱ ἀφέντες τῇδε τὴν φωνῇ, οἷς ἀντεῖρκεν Ἀριστοτέλης. (2) ἰσχυσε μὲν τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ Πύρρων ὁ Ἑλλεῖος· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ καταλέλοιπεν, ὁ δέ γε 5 μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσῃν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅποια πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δέ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακείσθαι· τελευταῖον δέ, τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι. (3) τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀσάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα· (4) διὰ τοῦτο μῆτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις 10 ἡμῶν μῆτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μὴδέ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι, περὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν. (5) τοῖς μέντοι γε διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν, 15 Αἰνυαῖδῃμος δ' ἡδονήν. (6) τὰ μὲν οὖν κεφάλαια τῶν λεγομένων ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

2 αὐτὸν Diels 4 μὲν τοιαῦτα P^b· μέντοι ταῦτο ON 3 δέ γε P^b· δέ ON 10 ἀνεπίκριτα ON· ἀνεπίκριτα P^b διὰ τοῦτο codd.: διὰ τὸ Zeller 12 ἐνὸς ON om P^b 14 ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν om P^b

As the richest single item of evidence for Pyrrho's philosophy, this extract requires careful scrutiny. We need to determine first its value as historical testimony, and secondly the nature of the inferences in section 4, which answer the second question in section 2.

Eusebius' main purpose in *Pr. ev.* 14 is to contrast Greek philosophers' disagreements with the consistency of the Hebrews (14.2.7ff.). From 14.16.13 to 14.21.7 he deals with philosophers' discrepant views on epistemology, structuring his polemical surveys around the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness they ascribe to sense-perception. Five groups of philosophers are treated: (a) Eleatics (including Xenophanes) and Megarians, 14.17.1–9; (b) Pyrrhonian Sceptics, 14.18.1–30; (c) Cyrenaics, 14.18.31–14.19.7; (d) 'Those who say bodily sensations are entirely trustworthy', including Protagoras and Metrodorus of Chios, 14.19.8–14.20.12; (e) Epicureans (presented as an offshoot of Cyrenaics), 14.20.13–14.21.7. Nearly all this material purports to be virtually verbatim quotation from Aristocles of Messene's *On philosophy* (probably book 8, so *Pr. ev.* 14.16.13 in most codd.). Eusebius begins his extract from Aristocles on Pyrrho by saying one can learn to refute such opinions ἀπὸ τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγράμματος ὡδέ πῃ πρὸς λέξιν ἔχοντος. Many of his quotations

are given this 'verbatim' authorization (e.g. 11.10.16, 11.18.26, 11.23.12), and the independent survival of some of the cited texts (e.g. 11.26 3ff = Plato, *Alc.1*) justifies the claim.

F, then, should be regarded as an authentic excerpt from Aristocles, a Peripatetic philosopher recently redated by Moraux [14], 83–92, from the late second century A.D. to a period not later than the early first century A.D. Aristocles was bitterly hostile to all the groups of philosophers for whom Eusebius quotes him; in *Pr. ev.*, 14.18.5–7, immediately following F, he refutes the Timon passage (F 5–15) at length, and then passes to objections to Pyrrhonism closely based on Aristotle, *Metaph.* Γ.5–6, returning to Pyrrho and Timon at 14–19, 26–8. He cites Timon's *Pyrho* at 14.18.14 and his *Silloi* at 14.18.16ff., and Antigonus of Carys's life of Pyrrho at 14.18.26. Aenesidemus is mentioned at F 16, and Aristocles also refers to his *Υποσώψεις* (14.18.11) and his *Μακροὶ στοιχειώσεις* (14.18.16). In his conclusion he speaks of Pyrrhonism as 'only recently' revived in Alexandria by Aenesidemus (14.18.29), a remark which speaks strongly in favour of the new chronology of Aristocles' life proposed by Moraux [14], 89.

Aristocles' knowledge of Aenesidemus seems extremely sketchy (cf. Krüger [87], 112–13), and his refutations of Pyrrhonism recall Sextus Empiricus very little (contrast 71D). He never uses the standard terms ἐποχή and φαivόμενον, and his list of Aenesidemus' nine (iii) Modes is defective and garbled (14.18.11). All this tends to suggest that Aristocles' report of Timon is based upon an authentic document of early Pyrrhonism, and is little if at all contaminated by later scepticism. The vocabulary of the text supports this conclusion: Sextus does not use ἀσάθευτος, ἀκλυτής or ἀκράδαντος, all of which words are pre-Hellenistic; cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc. (Timon's *Pyrho* would be a highly appropriate work in which to report Pyrrho's revelation of the sources of happiness; cf. C 6 and Ferrari [88], 208.)

None of these suggestions implies that Aristocles' report of Timon should be regarded as quotation rather than paraphrase; cf. Stopper [63], 271, but Stopper, 273, is unduly suspicious when he suggests that ἡ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὐτε ἔστιν οὐτε οὐκ ἔστιν, F 13–14, may be an Aristotelian importation by Aristocles. See below.

§ 14. In vol. 1, 16–17, we opt for the metaphysical interpretation of lines 9–11 proposed by Caizzi [64], 225–7, instead of the narrowly epistemological reading fashionable since Zeller [1]. Conceivably Pyrrho argued thus: (a) If the world has a determinate nature, it will be truly or falsely describable by a definite theory. (b) But all existing definite theories about the world conflict with one another in such a way that there is no reason to prefer one such theory to another. (c) Nor is it possible to think of some other definite theory T* which is immune to this absence of preference. (d) Therefore there is no reason to think that the world is truly or falsely describable by a definite theory. (e) But (d) contradicts (a). (f) Therefore the world does not have a determinate nature. (g) And a world which does not have a determinate nature is not something which can be truly or falsely perceived or opined. (h) Therefore our perceptions or opinions are neither true nor false. (Some support for step (b) in this argument may be found in Aenesidemus' report of Pyrrho at 71A.1.)

12–14. The striking similarity between what the Pyrrhonist should say about each thing and Aristotle's characterization of the ἀφασία of someone who denies the principle of non-contradiction, *Metaph.* Γ.4, 1008a30–5, is pointed out by Long [57], 91–3, and Reale [74], 315–21. The triadic structure of 6–14 (cf. Ferrari [78], 362) goes

against Stopper's suggestion (see above) that the second and third disjuncts in 13–14 are importations by Aristotle from Aristotle. But Stopper is probably right to object to any formal rejection of the principle of non-contradiction by Timon's Pyrrho. These expansions of the οὐ μᾶλλον formula are best interpreted as indications of the utterly non-committal language that the Pyrrhonist recommends.

16 ἡδονῇ For discussion of this unexpected term, see Caizzi [64] ad loc.

G Diogenes Laetius 9.76 (Caizzi 54, part)

σημαίνει οὖν ἡ φωνή [sc. "οὐ μᾶλλον"], καθά φησι καὶ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Ἰϋθῳ "τὸ μηδὲν ὀρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀπροσθετεῖν."

For οὐ μᾶλλον in later Pyrrhonism, cf. 71C 6–7. ἀπροσθετεῖν, a *hapax*, expresses the opposite of προστίθεσθαι in its familiar sense, 'vote for', 'assent to'. προσθεῖς and προστιθεσθαι are found in sceptical texts as synonyms for συγκατάθεσις and συγκατατίθεσθαι, which, by Chrysippus' date, are the standard Stoic expressions for 'assent'. See 69A 7, and, for the combination of both words, S E., M. 7.225. Timon's use of ἀπροσθετεῖν rather than ἐπέχειν vel sim. probably indicates the absence of any fixed sceptical terminology at this time.

H Diogenes Laetius 9.104–5 (including Caizzi 55, 63A)

πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ φασιν καὶ τὸν βίον αὐτοῖς ἀναιρεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐξ ἡν ὁ βίος συνέστηκεν. οἱ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι φασιν αὐτούς· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὄραν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς ὄραν ἀγνοεῖν. (1) καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα, οὐχ ὥς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν· καὶ ὅτι τὸ πῦρ καλεῖ αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικὴν ἐπέχομεν. καὶ ὅτι κινεῖται τις βλέπομεν, καὶ ὅτι φέρεται· πῶς δὲ ταῦτα γίνεται οὐκ ἴσμεν. μόνον οὖν, φασίν, ἀντιστάμεθα πρὸς τὰ παρυσιστάμενα τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀδῆλα, καὶ γὰρ ὅτε τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξοχὰς λέγομεν ἔχειν, τὸ φαινόμενον διασαφίζομεν· ὅταν δ' εἴπωμεν μὴ ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξοχὰς, οὐκέτι ὁ φαίνεται ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν. (2) ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Ἰϋθῳ φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει "ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σθένει οὐπερ αἶν' ἔλθῃ." (3) καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰσθησέων φησι, "τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθῃμι, τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ."

2 ἀναρεῖν Dgt ἀναρεῖ BFP 5 οὐκ οὐκ F 6 πάντῃ I Caizzi. De dogmate pub. 1. 2. 8 7 81 Kuhn· παντὶ BP et S E. M. 7 30 11 μέλι Cöber μένιν Dgt

Context: Diogenes is reporting later Pyrrhonist replies to the objection by doctrinaire philosophers that scepticism makes life impossible, cf. S E., PH 1.13, 19–24, 92.

Anecdotes such as A 4 and C 1 imply that such charges were already being advanced against Pyrrho, with Timon answering them as here. Cf. 2D for Pyrrho's ease of action. Note that in the gallery of philosophers who make life impossible, Timon's Epicurean contemporary Colotes (cf. note on context of 68H) includes the Academic sceptics but not the Pyrrhonists. Is this due to Epicurean sympathy for Pyrrho (cf. B 2), which may have led them, like Cicero, to emphasize his moral stance rather than his scepticism?

11 σθένει The verb has an archaic and poetic ring; cf. Aeschylus, Ag. 296;

Euripides, *Hec.* 49. οὐπερ ἄν' ἔλθῃ For οὐ = of in later Greek, cf. LSJ s.v. ὅς A b.2. It is odd to write of 'the appearance' as going anywhere; perhaps take an unexpressed τίς to be the subject of ἔλθῃ, or suppose a personal subject to have been indicated in the previous line.

11–12 The only surviving reference to this work, which may have dealt with the kind of material found in Aenesidemus' third mode; cf. 72D. In any case Sextus repeats Timon at *PH* 1. 19–20. At Aristotle, *Metaph.* Γ.4, 1008b20 'sweet or not sweet' exemplifies the kind of opinions that anyone who 'does anything' must have. It is conceivable that the interpretation we give in vol. 1 imputes to Timon too much of later Pyrrhonism. Instead of adumbrating the use of τὸ φαινόμενον as a practical criterion, he might be simply registering the admission that, notwithstanding the complete indeterminacy of nature, things do manifest themselves to human beings in a determinate way; cf. Caizzi [79], 93–5.

1 Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.140 (Timon fr. 844, Caizzi 64)

μόνος οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην [sc. ἀσχηρίαν], εἰ ὑποδείξαιμι τῷ παραττομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγὴν ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διουξιν, ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν τι φύσει ἔστι οὔτε κακόν, "ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόμῳ κέκριται", κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

1 νόμῳ Hirzel: νόμῳ codd

Context: Sextus is concluding an argument that mental disturbance is caused by efforts to pursue the good and avoid the bad. Timon's pentameter line is quoted in support of the non-naturalness of anything good or bad. It probably comes from his *Indalmoi*, the only one of his works known to have been written in elegiacs.

3 Hirzel's emendation is widely accepted, and fits A 3 very well.

J Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.85 (Caizzi 69t)

haec [sc. Stoicorum, Epicuri, Hieronymi etc.] sunt sententiae quae stabilitatis aliquid habeant; nam Aristonis Pyrrhonis Erilli non nullorumque aliorum evanuerunt.

Context: doxography of *bonum*.

For Cicero's grouping of Pyrrho, Aristo and Herillus, see notes on 2G–H.

K Seneca, *NQ* 7.32.2 (Caizzi 71)

itaque tot familiae philosophorum sine successore deficiunt: Academici et veteres et minores nullum antistitem reliquerunt; quis est qui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis?

Context: the decline of philosophy as a sign of general degeneration.

Glucker [42], 340, takes Seneca to know of Aenesidemus' revival of Pyrrhonism at Alexandria, and also to know of it as 'already extinct after the death of Aenesidemus and his pupils'. But this presumes too much. Even if neo-Pyrrhonism was not a formal school, the list of Aenesidemus' successors at D.L. 9.116 speaks against such an extinction, which Glucker posits, it seems, in order to justify his belief in Seneca's

knowledge of Alexandrian philosophy. There were many contemporary developments in philosophy of which Seneca makes no mention. Unlike Cicero, however, Seneca does associate Pyrrhonists with scepticism; cf. *Ep.* RB.44.

2 Tranquillity and virtue

A Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.17; Timon fr. 782, Caizzi 57, part)

εἰ δ' οὐδὲν ὀφελὸς ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων, τί ἡμῖν ἐνοχλοῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὴν Τίμων φησὶν· "οὐκ ἂν δὴ Πύρρωνι γ' ἐρίσ(α)ειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος;"

ε ἡμῖν Stephanus: μὴν codd

Context: Aristocles confronts the Pyrrhonists with a dilemma: either their λόγοι are intended to improve us, in which case they are not sceptical; or their λόγοι are useless, and it is pointless for Timon to hold up Pyrrho for admiration.

Timon's line is a parody of Homer, *Il.* 3.223: οὐκ ἂν ἐπειτ' Ὀδυσσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος.

B Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.19; Timon fr. 783, Caizzi 58, part)

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰκεῖνο φαίη τις ἂν, ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεδοίκασι καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι· πῶς γὰρ οἷ γε ἀπαθείς καὶ ἀτάραχοι, καθάπερ αὐτοὶ φασιν, ὄντες; ὃ γέ τοι Τίμων ταῦτα καὶ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Πύρρωνος·

ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἶδον ἢ δ' ἀδάμαστον
πᾶσιν ὅσοις δάμνανται ὅμως ἄφατοι τε φατοὶ τε,
λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν' ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα
ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.

3

4 ἀλλ' οἷον (1N, ἄλλοιον B) 5 δάμνανται ὅμως Wachsmuth δάμνουται βροτῶν B 6 βαρυνόμεν' Stephanus βαρύνομεν B βαρυνόμενος 1N

Context: continuation (cf. A) of Aristocles' criticism of Pyrrhonism.

4 ἀλλ' οἷον and ἶδον indicate the Homeric Nekyia as the model of Timon's parody, as in 3F; cf. *Od.* 11.519, 568 etc. ἄτυφον Pyrrho is immune to the τυφός characteristic of people in general, as too is the Stoic wise man (*D.L.* 7.117), though not the school's founder in Timon's satire, 3F; see note on 1D. ἀδάμαστον Of Hades in Homer, *Il.* 9.158.

5 ἄφατοι τε φατοὶ τε So Hesiod, *Erg.* 3.

6 λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα Cf. Homer, *Il.* 13.495 and Parmenides, 28 v 6.7 DK.

7 εἰκαίης νομοθήκης Epicurus condemns 'legislation' in cosmology, 18C 3, a passage whose language has much in common with Pyrrhonism. For εἰκαίης, cf. 3G; the Stoics made ἀνεικαίότης a dialectical virtue, 31B 3.

C Diogenes Laertius 9.64 (Timon fr. 822, Caizzi 60)

καὶ δὴ καὶ ζηλωτὰς εἶχε πολλοὺς τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Σάλλοις·

ὦ γέρον, ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἢ πόθεν ἐκδυσαι εὖρες
 λατρείης δοξῶν [τε] κενεοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν,
 καὶ πάσης ἀπάτης πειθοῦς τ' ἀπελύσας δεσμᾶ;
 οὐδ' ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι, τίνες αὖραι
 Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὃ τι κύρει ἕκαστα.

3 ἐκδυσαι BV: ἐκλύσαι FP(corr.) 4 κενεο- Usenp. τε κανο- codd. 6 οὐδ' ἔμελεν P: οὐδε μέλε B:
 οὐδέ μέλει F μεταλλῆσαι Wachsmuth: μεταλλῆσαι P(corr): μετάλλοι B: μεταμελλῆσαι F τί-
 νει Cobet: τινόν (τίνος F) codd.

Context: life of Pyrrho.

1 ἀπραγμοσύνης Contrast the σοφισταί of 3A; Pyrrho's indifference to science recalls Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates.

3-4 Cf. Timon's characterization of two of Pyrrho's disciples (D.L. 9.69): he calls Eurylochus πολεμιώτατος τοῖς σοφισταῖς, and Philo indifferent to δόξα and ἐριδές.

6-7 We follow Diels [68], fr. 48 note, in taking these lines to refer to speculation on meteorology and cosmology (for πόθεν . . . ἕκαστα, cf. Simplicius' account of Anaximander, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις τοῖς οὐσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, 12 B i DK). Lloyd-Jones/Parsons [66] ad loc. favour taking αἶραι to refer to currents of philosophical opinion, and perhaps reading ἐκάστη (Wilamowitz) for ἕκαστα.

D Diogenes Laertius 9.65, Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.1, 1.305 (Timon fr. 841, Caizzi 61)

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἰμείρεται ἦτορ ἀκούσαι,
 πῶς ποτ' ἀνὴρ διάγεις ῥῆστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
 αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταῦτά
 μὴ προσέχων δύνoις ἡδυλόγου σοφίης,
 μούνος δ' ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις,
 ὅς περὶ πᾶσαν ἐλὼν γαίαν ἀναστρέφεται,
 δεικνὺς εὐτόρrou σφαίρης πυρκαῦτορα κύκλον.

1 ἀνὴρ διάγεις Caizzi: ἀνὴρ δὴ ἀγεις vel sim. codd. 4 δύνoις Nauck: δειλοῖς codd. 5 δ' Sextus:
 ἐν Diogenes ἡγεμονεύεις Sextus: ὡν Diogenes 6 ἐλὼν Stephanus: ἐλῶν codd. 7 σφαίρης
 Diels: σφαῖρας codd.

Lines 1, 2, 5 are cited by Diogenes from Timon's *Indolmoi*; line 2, ῥῆστα to end of 4, by Sextus at *M.* 11.1, and 5-7 at *M.* 1.305. For discussion of the language, cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc. Timon's description here of Pyrrho's equiprimise, together with other such descriptions (cf. Timon fr. 838), may well be the source of such biographical embellishments as D.L. 9.62-3, 66-8; cf. Long [69], 69.

6-7 With Timon's sun comparison, cf. Lucretius 3.1043-4, on Epicurus. Epicureans and Pyrrho could derive support for their supreme evaluation of tranquillity from such accounts of Democritus as are recorded at D.L. 9.45.

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.19-20 (Timon fr. 842, Caizzi 62)

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποστάσεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
 καὶ οὐδετέρων ἱκανοὶ πῶς εἰσιν ἡμῖν ἀγῶνες πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς· κατὰ

δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχασθεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον
προσαγορεύειν, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδοῦλοις εἶκε δηλοῦν,
ὅταν φῇ·

5

ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὁρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
ὥς ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ τε φύσις καὶ τὰ γαθοῦ αἰεὶ
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότητος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

4 Ἰνδοῦλοις Fabricius: συνδήσεις vel sim. codd. 6 ἡ Gen.: ἡ N: ἡ LE 8 ὥς ἡ codd.: ὥς ζῇ
Bury αἰεὶ Gen.: αἰεὶ codd.: ἔχει Naturp. comma post αἰεὶ del. Burnyeat

6-9 These lines are plausibly taken to be Pyrrho's answer to Timon's question in D, i.e. they explain the source of his extraordinary equipoise (cf. ἰσότητος, 9). Traditionally, it was generally supposed that 8 is a complete sentence, meaning 'that the nature of the divine and the good exists for ever'; but the omission of any verb was always found difficult. In vol. 1, 21, we accept the radically different interpretation proposed by Burnyeat [77], whereby the verb to be understood is a predicative *ἔστι* and no comma should be placed at the end of the line. On this construal 9 tells us what the nature of the divine and the good consists in/has as its source, and no claims about an everlasting nature are made. The great advantage of this interpretation is its ridding Pyrrho of 'an independent and eternally existing nature' (Burnyeat, 88). Undeniably, Pyrrho offers a positive rule of life, though qualified by 'how it appears to me', but one he advances as a truth about himself (cf. the divine equipoise attributed to him in D) and in such a way that it is also applicable to any man.

Reale [74], 308-9, has challenged this interpretation. None of his objections to Burnyeat seem to us decisive. However, Reale's own positive suggestions deserve consideration, especially his observation of close parallels between Parmenides' characterization of 'what is' and Pyrrho's equipoise. Reale's thesis in turn is criticized by Stopper [63], 270-1, who advances the radical suggestion that 9 did not originally follow directly after 8, so that we have no idea of what Timon's Pyrrho said about the divine and the good.

9 ἰσότητος Note the rarely quoted epitaph of the Pyrrhonist Menekles, dating from perhaps the 1st century A.D., and found at Ali-Aga in Phocaea. We cite it from Peck's *Griechische Vers-Inschriften* 1.603. ὁ τὰς ἀοιδίαις ἀγεμὼν ἂν Ἑλλάδα | ὁ παντάπασιν ἐξισώσας τὰν λόγῳ | καὶ τὰν ἀτάραχον ἐν βροτοῖς θεύσας ὁδὸν | Πυρρωνιστᾶς Μενεκλέης ὁδ' εἴμ' ἐγώ.

F Cicero, *Acad.* 2. 130 (Caizzi 69A)

hoy [sc. Etretnacis et Elos] si contemnimus et iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despiciere debemus. Aristonem, qui cum Zenonis fuisset auditor re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum nisi virtutem nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium; in mediis ea momenta quae Zeno voluit nulla esse censuit. huic summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae ἀδιαφορία

5

ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae ἀπάθεια nominatur.

6 ἀπάθεια Asconius? ap. codd.

Context: part of Cicero's refutation of Lucullus' defence of Stoic/Antiochian ethics, indicating all the schools' disagreements.

Cicero invariably couples Pyrrho with Aristo (cf. also Caizzi 69b–M), and frequently with the Stoic Herillus. This appears to be due to the Academic tradition, according to which these three philosophers' views on the *summum bonum* failed to fit the *Carneadea divisio* (64E) because none of them specified any natural objective for the mind's primary impulse (cf. G–H). For Aristo and Herillus, cf. 58F–G, 1, with notes.

5–7 ἀδιαφορία is applied to Pyrrho by D.L. 9.66, and ἀπάθεια by Aristocles (ap. Euseb., *Pr. ev.* 14.18.18). Aristotle refers to ἀπάθεια and ἡρεμία as virtues (EN 11.3, 1104b24); Pohlenz [76], 25, took these to allude to Pyrrho, but this is unconvincing; cf. Democritus ap. D.L. 9.45. ἀπάθεια seems to begin its main ethical life with the Cynics (cf. Polystratus, *De contemptu* 21), thereby entering Stoicism (cf. SVF 1.449, 3.144, 448 etc.). By the time of Cicero ἀπάθεια could be used interchangeably with ἀραπαξία. Hirzel [30], 15–19, tried to argue that only ἀραπαξία expresses Pyrrho's ethical end, while Brochard [52], 38–9, defended ἀπάθεια as well. There is no reason to exclude any of these terms: ἀδιαφορία, as the attitude of acknowledging no differences of value; ἀπάθεια, as the absence of all emotional attachment; and ἀραπαξία, as the resulting freedom from disturbance.

G Cicero, *Fin.* 2.43 (Caizzi 69b, part)

quae [sc. quae prima natura approbavit] quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione expoliarent nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt.

1 quod Madvig: cum codd

Context: survey of ethical ends.

For the originally Stoic concepts deployed here, see vol. 1, 357–9. If it is not historically accurate to call Pyrrhonian tranquillity *virtus*, the error is understandable in the light of E; and cf. 1B 5, 9.

H Cicero, *Fin.* 4.43 (Caizzi 69c, part)

itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis; Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquit; deinde

Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret.

Context: Cicero's Atticochean criticism of Stoic ethics.

4-5 On Aristo's doctrine, cf. Ioppolo [346], 179-83.

I Athenaeus 337A (Timon fr. 845, Caizzi 65)

παγκάλως δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἔφη· “πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα κακῶν ἐπιθυμία ἐστί.”

Context: Athenaeus probably found this line in a gnomologium (cf. Caizzi ad loc.); Timon's *Indalmoi* (cf. E) would be suitable for its original context, and similarly for that of the half-line in J. See Burnyeat [77], 89-92, for discussion of the conceptual connections between I-J and E.

The harmfulness of *ἐπιθυμία* is a stock theme both of popular morality (cf. Dover, *Greek popular morality*, 208-9) and of Greek philosophical ethics. In particular, early Pyrrhonism could invoke the support of Democritus (cf. 68 & 70, 223, 236, 284 DK) and the Cynics (cf. Diogenes frs. 152-246 Giannantonio [36]).

J Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.164 (Timon fr. 846, Caizzi 66, part)

ὁπὸ τυράνῳ ποτὲ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος ἢ οὐχ ὑπομινεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐκούσιον ἐλείπει θάνατον, ἢ φεύγων τὰς βασιάνους ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι “ἀφυγῆς καὶ ἀναίρετος ἔσται” κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλείπει, τοῦ δ' ἀποστήσεται.

Context: Sextus is stating the objection to Pyrrhonism that suspension of judgement is inconsistent with the firm choices the victim of a tyrant would make. Cf. 58F 4 for Aristo's rejoinder to the tyrant case.

3 Timon's polemics

A Diogenes Laertius 9.111 (Timon fr. 775)

τῶν δὲ Σιλλῶν τρία ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ὡς αὖ σκεπτικός ὢν πάντας λυιδροεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικούς ἐν παρωδίας εἶδει. ὦν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοδιήγητον ἔχει τὴν ἐρμηνείαν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διαλόγου σχήματι. φαίνεται γοῦν ἀνακρίνων Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἐκάστων, ὃ δ' αὐτῷ διηγούμενός ἐστι· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν ὑστερίων· ὅθεν δὴ αὐτῷ τινες καὶ Ἐπίλογον ἐπέγραψαν. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ταῦτά περιέχει πράγματα, πλὴν ὅτι μονοπράσωπός ἐστιν ἢ ποιήσεις· ἀρχὴ δ' αὐτῷ ἦδε· “ἔσπετε νῦν μοι ὅσοι πολυπράγμονές ἐστε σοφισταί.”

Context: life of Timon

4 Xenophanes is the subject of Timon frs. 833-4.

8-9 The pejorative invocation of all ‘intellectuals’ is a parody of Homer, *Il.* 2.484, and Hesiod, *Theog.* 114.

9 πολυπράγμονες Contrast Pyrrho's ἀπραγμοσύνη, 2C 1.

B Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18 28; Timon fr. 785, Caizzi 48A, part)

αὐτός [σ. Πύρρων] δ' ὕστερον τοῦτον τὸν τύπον περιβαλλόμενος καὶ καλῶν ἄτυφοι ἐαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ κατέλιπον. ἐγένετο δὲ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων Φλιάσιος, ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἰχόρευεν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ἔπειτα δ' ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ συνέγραψεν ἀργαλέαν παρωδίας καὶ βωμολόχους, ἐν αἷς βεβλασφῆμηκε πάντας τοὺς πώποτε φιλοσοφήσαντας. οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τοῦς Σίλλων γράψας καὶ λέγων· "σχέτλιοι ἄνθρωποι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον, ἰταίων 5 ἐκ τ' ἐρίδων ἐκ τε στοναχῶν πέπλασθε" καὶ· "ἄνθρωποι κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἐμπλεοὶ ἄσκοί."

1 παρωδίας ON. παρωδίας P

Context: polemical account of Pyrrho and Timon.

5-6 **σχέτλιοι** . . . **πέπλασθε** = Timon fr. 784, with the second line a virtual quotation of Empedocles 31 B 124.2 DK

6 **κενεῆς οἰήσιος** Cf. 1C 10; 2C 4, and for further instances of **κενός** in Timon, fr. 794-5. **ἄσκοί** Cf. Lloyd-Jones/Parsons [66] ad loc.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9 57 (Timon fr. 779)

μέμνηται δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Σίλλων ταῦτα διεφερχόμενος:

〈τό〉τε καὶ μετέπειτα σοφιστῶν
οὐτ' ἀλιγυγλώσσω οὐτ' ἀσκόπων οὐτ' ἀκυλίστω
Πρωταγόρῃ· ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράμματα θεῖναι,
ὅτι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὐτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
ὅπποιοί τινες εἰσι καὶ εἴ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικεΐης. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἱ
χραίσματα, ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπαιέτο, ὅφρα μὴ οὕτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότοι 'Αἶδα δύνῃ. 10

1 ὥστε LEABR. ὃς τε V; ἔσθητε N. <πάντων πρωτίστων τό〉τε Diels 1 συγγράμματα Fabricius -ti codd. 2 γ· εἰ Bekker: αἰ codd 10 'Αἶδα Μέγαρο: -δι codd. 11 δὴν Meiseke: δὴν codd

For the anecdote and its context, cf. D L. 9.51 2. In Timon fr. 821 Protagoras is described as ἐριζόμενα ἐν εἰδώς; cf. B 6, D, and contrast Pyrrho at 2C D.

D Diogenes Laertius 2.107 (Timon fr. 802)

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα φησι Τίμων, προσπαταρούων καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Σωκρατικούς:

ἀλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου
οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος ὅτις γένετ', οὐδ' ἐριδάντεω
Εὐκλείδew, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἐμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ. 3

4 ὅτις γένετ' Diels: ὅστις γε τ' vel iam codd

Context: Euclides' logic-chopping

3 **φλεδόνων** Also applied to Antisthenes, Timon fr. 811. Such consistency in

debunking followers of Socrates may be Timon's way of dissociating them from Pyrrho's pedigree (see note on 1A 3). This line parodies Homer, *Il.* 6.450. Timon had a precedent for his parodic criticism of the Megarians in the Cynic Crates' lines on Stilpo, D.L. 2.118; cf. Long [69], 75, on Crates as a model for the *Silloi*.

E Diogenes Laertius 4.42 (Timon fr. 808)

εἰς δὲ τὸ διαβαλλόμενον αὐτοῦ [sc. Ἀρκεσίλαου] φίλοχλον καὶ Τίμων τὰ τ' ἄλλα φησίν,
ἀτὰρ δὴ τούτων τὸν τρόπον

ὡς εἰπὼν ὄχλοιο περίστανιν εἰσκατέδυνεν.
οἱ δέ μιν ἤτε γλαῦκα πέρι σπίζαι τερατοῦντο
ἡλέματον δεικνύντες, ὁθύνεκεν ὄχλοᾶρεσκος.
οὐ μέγα πρῆγμα, τάλας· τί πλατύνει ἡλίθιος ὥς;

5

4 σπίζα codd., υπε. H. Iunius 5 ὄχλοᾶρεσκος dt: ὄχλοᾶρέσσης P ἔχλον ὁρέσκει Bt

Timon presumably wanted to contrast Arcesilaus, as a rival sceptic, with Pyrrho. But Diogenes proceeds to indicate how ἀτυφός Arcesilaus really was. Note Timon's description of Heraclitus as ὄχλολοῖδορος, fr. 817. For Timon on Arcesilaus, see also 68E 2.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.15 (Timon fr. 812)

ἦν δὲ [sc. Ζήνων Κιτιεύς] καὶ ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος· ἦθεν καὶ ὁ
Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις φησὶν οὕτω

καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἶδον λιχνόγραυν σκιερῷ ἐνὶ τύφῳ
πάντων ἱμεῖρουσαν· ὁ δ' ἔρρει γυργαθὸς αὐτῇ
σ μικρὸς ἑὼν· νοῦν δ' εἶχεν ἐλάσσονα κινδαψοῖο.

5

3 ἶδον B ἰδών Biont.; εἶδον Plutarch F 4–5 αὐτῇ σ μικρὸς Diels: αὐτῆς μικρὸς codd. 5 κινδαψοῖο Diogenes σκινδαψοῖα Suda

1–2 These lines support Diels' interpretation, [68] ad loc., of 3–5 as a satirical representation of Zeno's attempt to win followers (fish) by means of his logical priggishness (the fine mesh of his basket or net). Stomachs are extensively covered in the extant fragments of the *Silloi*; cf. Aristo (780, 814), Cleanthes (815), Dionysius of Heraclea (791), and in general (787–8, 813, and possibly 830–40).

5 κινδαψοῖο Our vol. 1 translation of this word by 'string of twaddle' is an attempt to do justice both to its earliest usage as a stringed instrument (σκινδαψός LSJ, s.v.) and its philosophical usage, perhaps invented by the Stoics, as a nonsense word like βλῆτιμα; cf. 33A 3.

G Diogenes Laertius 5.11 (Timon fr. 810)

ἀλλὰ καὶ Τίμων αὐτοῦ [sc. Ἀριστοτέλους] καθήσату εἰπὼν· "οὐδ' ἄρ' Ἀριστοτέλους
εἰκαισιόνης ἀλεγεινῆς."

We may understand οὐ μοι μέλει vel vim., as in D 3, and cf. fr. 809. With εἰκαισιόνη, a *hapax*, cf. 2B 7. Homer, *Il.* 23.701 is the line parodied.

H Diogenes Laertius 9.23 (Timon fr. 818)

Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον,
ὅς ῥ' ἐκ φαντασίης ἀπάτης ἀνεείκατο κώσεις.

1 μεγαλόφρονος d BP (αὐτόφρονος); μεγαλόφρονα τήν FP (corr.); 2 ὅς BP: ὡς F ἐκ φαντασίης A A Long: ἀπό φαντασίης Wachsmuth: ἐπὶ φαντασίης codd

Timon's praise of Parmenides recalls his eulogy of Pyrrho in 2C; cf. Long [69], 86 n. 37.

I Diogenes Laertius 9.25 (Timon fr. 819)

περὶ τούτου καὶ Μελίσσου Τίμων φησὶ ταῦτα:

ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένης οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν
Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτουρας ἡδὲ Μέλισσον
πολλῶν φαντασμῶν ἐπάνω, παύρων γε μὲν ἦσσαν.

3 πάντων Plutarch, *Pericl.* 4, 1 ii: πλάτων codd. Μέλισσον Meusnier: -ου codd.

2 ἀμφοτερογλώσσου Another neologist, probably a reference to Zeno's dilemmas (cf. Plutarch, *Pericl.* 4) and/or to the tradition that he invented dialectic; so Wachsmuth [67], 98–9. The comment on Melissus may be inspired by 30 B 8 DK.

J Diogenes Laertius 9.40 (Timon fr. 820)

ὅν γε [κ. Δημόκριτον] καὶ Τίμων τοῦτον ἐπαινίσας τὸν τρόπον ἔχει

οἷον Δημόκριτόν τε περίφρονα ποιμένα μύθων,
ἀμφίνοον λεσχῆνα μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἀνέγκων.

3 λεσχῆνα Meusnier: λέσχην d codd.

2 A close parody of Homer, *Il.* 1.263.

3 ἀμφίνοον Probably coined by Timon to express Democritean 'doubt' (cf. ἀμφινόω, Sophocles, *Ant.* 376) like ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος of Xeniophanes, fr. 833, and ἀμφοτερογλώσσου in I. Caizzi [82], 16ff., argues for 'ambiguous', suggesting that Timon was also drawing attention to the positive and negative ways in which Democritus' philosophy could be interpreted.

K Diogenes Laertius 10.2 (Timon fr. 825)

καὶ τὸν Τίμωνα φάσκειν περὶ αὐτοῦ [κ. Ἐπικούρου]

ὑστατος αὐ φυσικῶν καὶ κύντατος ἐκ Σάμου ἐλθὼν
γραμμαδοδασκαλῶδης, ἀναγωγότατος ζώντων.

5 γραμμα- BF (corr.) P: γραμμα- F, Athenaeus 535a

Context: cited by Diogenes as corroboration of Hermippus' claim that Epicurus was a schoolteacher before he encountered Democritus' books and turned to philosophy.

On the hostile biographical tradition concerning Epicurus, see Sedley [104].

I Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 3.1–2

ἐπεὶ οἱ γεωμετρίαι συνορμύντες τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπακολουθεύοντων αὐτοῖς ἀπορμῖν εἰς ἀκίνδυνον εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς πρᾶγμα καταφεύγονσι, τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αἰτεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς, καλῶς ἂν ἔχει καὶ ἡμᾶς τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιρρήσεως ἀρχὴν τίθεσθαι τὴν περὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως λόγον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Τίμων ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς τοῦτο ὑπέλαβε δεῖν ἐν πρώτοις ζητεῖν, φημί δὲ τὸ εἰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι ληπτέον. διόπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνῳ στοιχοῦντας τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεξόδῳ.

ἐξ ὑποθέσεως is one of the five modes of the later Pyrrhonist Agrippa (S.E., *PH* 1.68; D.L. 9.88), and frequently used by Sextus to attack the doctrinaire philosophers for beginning their argumentum from arbitrary assumptions. The issue was familiar enough before Timon: Aristotle often criticizes those who demand a proof for everything (cf. *Metaph.* *G*.5, 1011a8–10, etc.), a point repeated by Sextus' doctrinaire opponents, *M* 8.367 ff. Sextus' report of Timon's challenge to the φυσικοί is thus entirely credible, and the more interesting because of the prominent place given to it in the opening of his refutation of the geometers. It does not show that Timon was already adumbrating the modes, but that is not impossible. Much of the material formally incorporated in them is as old as, or older than, Plato and Aristotle; cf. Long [57] 85–91. For detailed discussion of I, cf. Claizzi [79], 96–101.

III Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.197: 6.66

[10.197] ἐν ἡμερῇ γὰρ χρόνῳ οὐδὲν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι μεριστόν, ὥς φησι Τίμων, οἷον τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθεῖρεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὁ τοῦτοισι δοκεῖν. [6.66] ἐν ἡμερῇ [sc. χρόνῳ] μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται γίνεσθαι μεριστόν, ὥς φησι Τίμων, οἷον τὸ γίνεσθαι, τὸ φθεῖρεσθαι.

These reports reinforce the impression given by I of Timon's interest in contemporary philosophical debates. Sextus cites Timon in contexts where he is demonstrating that time is non-existent, whether we make it divisible or indivisible, and Timon's support is invoked against the latter. The position attributed to Timon recalls Aristotle's arguments in *Physics* vi.2, 232b20–233a12, on the impossibility of time's being indivisible if magnitude is divisible, or vice versa. Diodorus Cronus' theory of ἡμερῇ (see 11i) may have influenced Timon; cf. Sedley [11], 84–9; Long [69], 72; Caizzi [79], 101–5.

PHYSICS

4 The principles of conservation

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 38–9

(1) ταῦτα δὲ διαλαβόντας συνορᾶν ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντός ἐγίνεται ἂν σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. (2) καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς αὐτὸ διελύετο. (3) καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν οἷον νῦν ἐστι, καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται. (4) οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει. (5) παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν οὐθὲν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιο.

1 διαλαβόντας (δεῖ) Attdi 6 μεταβάλλει codd. μεταβάλλει φ. μεταβαλεῖ Usener

Context: immediately following the letter's opening methodological pronouncements at 17C.

1 No need to insert *δεῖ*, with the majority of editors. It can be understood as carried over from the previous sentence (= 17C 7–10). See Bollack [122], 173.

4–7 For the doctrine, cf. e. 14H 1, and ps.-Plutarch, *Strom.* 8 (381,17–21 Diels, *Dox.*). Despite a partial Democritean parallel at 68 A 39 DK, Epicurus' most immediate model for the whole passage appears to be Empedocles 31 B 17 30–3 DK.

6 Much light has been shed on this part of the argument by Brunschwig [192]. The two occurrences of *γάρ* are co-ordinate, introducing two separate arguments for the preceding statement: see Denniston, *The Greek particles*, 64–5, and Brunschwig, 147–8, and cf. 13A. The interpretation of the first clause suggested in vol. 1, 27, 'since there is nothing into which it passes and thus changes', might be paralleled by such pregnant uses of the preposition as *θεωρεῖν εἰς*, 'to go to . . . and watch'. It seems, at any rate, safer than Brunschwig's suggestion that *μεταβάλλει* should be translated 'transports itself', for which he is able to cite the use of this verb in the sense 'migrate' in Aristotle, *HA* viii.12: *τὴν* in 7 shows that the 'change' mentioned there is the same as the 'change' already mentioned in 6, and *hosh* must therefore refer back to the qualitative variation denied in 4–5.

B Lucretius 1.159–73

(1) nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu' rebus
omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.

- (2) e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri
 squamigerum genus et volucres erumpere caelo;
 armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum,
 incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent,
 nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent, 165
 sed mutarentur, ferre omnes omnia possent.
- (3) quippe ubi non essent genitalia corpora cuique,
 qui posset mater rebus consistere certa?
- (4) at nunc seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur,
 inde enascitur atque oras in luminis exit 170
 materies ubi inest cuiusque et corpora prima;
- (5) atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni,
 quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas.

Context: see vol. 1, 26.

C Lucretius 1.225–37

- (1) praeterea quaecumque vetustate amovet aetas, 225
 si penitus peremit consumens materiem omnem,
 unde animale genus generatum in lumina vitae
 reducit Venus, aut reductum daedala tellus
 unde alit atque auget generatim pabula praebens?
 unde mare ingenui fontes externaque longe 230
 flumina suppeditant? unde aether sidera pascit?
- (2) omnia enim debet, mortali corpore quae sunt,
 infinita aetas consumpse anteacta diesque.
- (3) quod si in eo spatio atque anteacta aetate fuere
 e quibus haec rerum consistit summa relecta, 235
 immortalis sunt natura praedita certe.
- (4) haud igitur possunt ad nilum quaeque reverti.

Context: see vol. 1, 26.

D Lucretius 1.665–71

- quod si forte alia credunt ratione potesse 665
 ignis in coetu singui mutareque corpus,
 scilicet ex nulla facere id si parte reparet.
 occider ad nilum mininum funditus ardor
 omnis et (e) nilo fient quaecumque creantur.
 nam quodcumque suis mutatum finibus exit, 670
 continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante.

665 *alia* Lachmann. *mia* OQG: *ulla* Marullus 668 *ardor* O²Q¹. *amor* O *arbor* QG

Context: criticism of Heraclitus for the doctrine that fire is the sole element.

670–1 These lines recur at 1.792, 2.753, 3.519.

nec rerum summam commutare ulla potest vis;
 nam neque, quo possit genus ullum material
 effugere ex omni, quicquam est <extra>, neque in omne 305
 unde coorta queat nova vis irumpere et omnem
 naturam rerum mutare et vertere motus.

305 <extra> Munro omne Matullus: omnes OQ

Context: after expounding the laws of atomic motion (2.62–293), Lucretius comments that the relative quantities of body and void in the universe do not alter, since no part of them increases or perishes; therefore the patterns of atomic motion are invariable (294–302). He then, in the above lines, adds a further reason for this invariability, that atomic motion cannot be disrupted by anything's departure from, or arrival in, the universe. The denials of generation, annihilation, subtraction and addition correspond closely to A, but the lesson drawn from them exceeds the brief of A, where atoms and void are as yet unheard of.

5 The basic division

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 30–40

(1) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ <σώματα καὶ κενόν>· (2) σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς
 ἐστὶν, αὐτὴ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον
 τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥστερ προεῖπον. (3) τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν κενὸν
 καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῇ φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν
 οὐδὲ δι' οὐ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα. (4) παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐθέν 5
 οὐδ' ἐπινόηθῃναι δύναται οὔτε περιληπτῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπ-
 ταῖς ὡς καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τοιῶν συμπτώματα
 ἢ συμβεβηκότα λεγόμενα.

1 <σώματα καὶ κενόν> Gaietodt: <σώματα καὶ τόπος> Usener 3 ὥστερ προεῖπον. τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ
 ἦν, ὃν κενόν Usener: ὥστερ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν. εἰ (δέ) μὴ ἦν ὃ κενόν αὐτὸ ὥστερ προεῖπον τὸ
 πρόσθεν εἰ μὴ ἦν ὃν κενόν FP: ὥστερ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν. εἰ μὴ ἦν ὃ κενόν B (corr.): ὥστερ προεῖπον
 τὸ πρόσθε εἰ μὴ ἦν ὃν κενόν B 5 αὐτὴ Usener: αὐτὴ codd

Context: immediately following 4A

3 In defence of the readings and supplements adopted, see Sedley [196], 183–4, where the reading of B *ante correctionem* for line 3 is reported in favour of Usener's inspired conjecture.

6–7 For περιληπτός, cf. 11D 2.

7 8 συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα Cf. 7. The expression has helped to foster the impression that these two terms are mutually exclusive, but see vol. 1, 36. Epicurus has no technical term for permanent attributes, and the phrase should be taken to mean 'accidents or attributes in general'. Cf. 15A 30, with note.

B Lucretius 1.419–44

(1) omnis, ut est igitur per se, natura duabus

- constitit in rebus; nam corpora sunt et inane, 420
 haec in quo sita sunt et qua diversa moventur.
 (2) corpus enim per se communis dedicat esse
 sensus; cui nisi prima fides fundata valebit,
 haud erit occultis de rebus quo referentes
 confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus. 425
 (3) tum porro locus ac spatium, quod inane vocamus,
 si nullum foret, haud usquam sita corpora possent
 esse neque omnino quoquam diversa meare;
 id quod iam supera tibi paulo ostendimus ante.
 (4) praeterea nil est quod possis dicere ab omni 430
 corpore seiunctum secretumque esse ab inani,
 quod quasi tertia sit numero natura reperra.
 (5) nam quodcumque erit, esse aliquid debebit id ipsum
 augmine vel grandi vel parvo denique, dum sit.
 (6) cui si tactus erit quamvis levis exiguusque, 435
 corporis augebit numerum summamque sequetur.
 (7) sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
 rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
 scilicet hoc id erit, vacuum quod inane vocamus.
 (8) praeterea per se quodcumque erit, aut faciet quid 440
 aut aliis fungi debebit agentibus ipsum
 aut erit ut possint in eo res esse gerique.
 (9) at facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res
 nec praeherere locum porro nisi inane vacansque.

433 aliquo OQ: aliquo Bockemüller

434 post 435 transulit Lachmann

Context: shortly after 6A.

419 *omnis . . . natura* = ἡ τοῦ πάντος φύσις; cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1112f.

433–6 Most editors since Lachmann have accepted the transposition of 434 and 435. The sense is then: 'For whatever shall exist, must needs be something in itself; and if it suffer touch, however small and light, it will swell the sum of body by an increase great or maybe small, provided it exist at all, and be added to its total' (Bailey). They hope to find in *esse aliquid . . . id ipsum* a translation of Epicurus' ὡς καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα (A 7). We prefer to take *augmen*, probably Lucretius' own coinage, as 'extension' (cf. 14D 268, and *actu* at 12C 482, and 5.1171). The dilemma posed in 435–9 would indeed be invalid without the premise that existence in the proper sense is spatially extended existence. Otherwise the second horn (437–9) would fail to exclude alleged incorporeals other than void, e.g. Platonic Forms.

C Aetius 1.20.2 (Usener 271)

Ἐπικούρου ὀνόμασι [πᾶσιν] παραλλάττειν κενὸν τόπον χώραν.

† πᾶσιν del. Usener

Context: comparison of Stoic and Epicurean views on space.

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.2 (Usener 271)

διὸ προληπτέον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τῆς ἀναφύς καλουμένης φύσεως τὸ μὲν τι ὀνομάζεται κενὸν τὸ δὲ τόπος τὸ δὲ χώρα, μεταλαμβάνομένων κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτῆς φύσεως ἔρρημος μὲν καθεστηκυῖα παντὸς σώματος κενὸν προσαγορεύεται, καταλαμβάνομένη δὲ ὑπὸ σώματος τόπος καλεῖται, χωρούντων δὲ δι' αὐτῆς σωμάτων χώρα γίνεται, κοινῶς μὲντοι φύσις ἀναφύς εἴρηται παρὰ τῷ Ἐπικουρῷ διὰ τὸ ἐστερηθῆαι τῆς κατὰ ἀντίβασιν ἀφύς.

Context: introduction of the notion of place.

In the immediately following passage, 49B, Sextus distinguishes these Epicurean definitions from a Stoic set of definitions, whose chief difference is that *χώρα* is defined as space which is partly empty and partly filled. This is still very close to the Epicurean account, and indeed another source (Aetius 1.20.1, in the ps.-Plutarch version) attributes it to the Stoics and Epicurus jointly. But the present text, the only one to explain ἀναφύς φύσις, is by far the most helpful in making sense of Epicurus' own usage.

e Aristotle, *Phys.* iv.6, 213a15–19

οἷον γὰρ τόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀγκύριον τὸ κενὸν τίθεσιν οἱ λέγοντες, δοκεῖ δὲ πλήρες μὲν εἶναι, ὅταν ἔχῃ τὸν ὄγκον αὐτοκτικῶς ἔστω, ὅταν δὲ στερηθῇ, κενόν, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ἂν κενὸν καὶ πλήρες καὶ τόπον, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτοῖς αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν.

Context: introduction of the notion of void for refutation.

f Aristotle, *Phys.* iv.8, 216a26–b16

καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ σκοποῦσιν φανεῖν ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα κενὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κενόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴαν ἐν ὕδατι τιθῇ τις κύβον, ἐκστήσεται τοσούτον ὕδωρ ὅσος ὁ κύβος, αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἀέρι· ἀλλὰ τῇ αἰσθηθεῖ ἀδύνατον. καὶ αἰεὶ ὅτ' ἐν παντὶ σώματι ἔχοντε μεταστάσιν, ἐφ' ὃ πέφυκε μεθίστασθαι, ἀνάγκη, ἂν μὴ συμπληρῇται, μεθίστασθαι ἢ κάτω αἰεῖ, ἢ κάτω ἢ φορὰ ὥσπερ γῆς, ἢ ἀνω, εἰ πῦρ, ἢ ἐπ' ἀμφω, [ἢ] ὅποιον ἂν τι ἢ τὸ ἐντιθέμενον· ἐν δὲ δὴ τῷ κενῷ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον (οὐδὲν γὰρ σῶμα), διὰ δὲ τοῦ κύβου τὸ ἴσον διαστήμα διελθελυθέναι, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῷ κενῷ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ὕδωρ μὴ μεθίστατο τῷ ξυλῶν κύβῳ μὴδ' ὁ ἀῆρ, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ διήεσαν δι' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁ κύβος γε ἔχει τοσούτον μέγεθος, ὅσον κατέχει κενόν· ὁ εἰ καὶ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἔστιν ἢ βαρὺ ἢ κοῦφον, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔτερον τῷ εἶναι πάντων τῶν παθημάτων ἐστί, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστόν· λέγω δὲ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ξυλῶν κύβου. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ χωρισθεῖ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καὶ μῆτε βαρὺ μῆτε κοῦφον εἴη, καθέξει τὸ ἴσον κενόν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται τῷ τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῷ τοῦ κενοῦ μέρει ἴσῳ ἑαυτῷ· τί οὖν διαίρει τὸ τοῦ κύβου σῶμα τοῦ ἴσου κενῷ καὶ πύπου; καὶ εἰ δύο τιμὰτα, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ὀπισθοῦσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται; ἔν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο ἀπικνὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ κύβος ἔξει καὶ μεθιστάμενος, ὁ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σῶματα πάντ' ἔχει. ὥστ' εἰ τοῦ τόπου μὴδὲν διαφέρει, τί

δεῖ ποιεῖν τόπον τοῖς σώμασιν παρὰ τὸν ἐκάστου ὄγκου, εἰ ὁππῶθές ὁ ὄγκος; αὐδὴν γὰρ συμβάλλεται, εἰ ἕτερον παρὶ αὐτὸν ἴσον διάστημα τοιοῦτον εἴη

Context. refutation of the notion of void.

8-17 Having shown in 1-8 why void when entered must operate as place, Aristotle resumes his earlier attack (211b14-29) on this idea of place as the interval occupied by a body

12, 13-14 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ Since this must mean 'in the same place', Aristotle appears to be overlooking his own demonstration (iv.3) that a place cannot itself be in a place.

6 Proof of the existence of void

A Lucretius 1.334-97

{1} quapropter locus est intactus inane vacansque.
 quod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri 335
 res possent; namque officium quod corporis exstat,
 officere atque obstat, id in omni tempore adesset
 omnibus; haud igitur quicquam procedere posset,
 principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res.
 at nunc per maria ac terras sublimaque caeli 340
 multa modis multis varia ratione moveri
 cernimus ante oculos, quae, si non esset inane,
 non tam sollicito motu privata carerent
 quam genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent,
 undique materies quoniam stipata quiescet. 345
 {2} praeterea quamvis solidae res esse putentur,
 hinc tamen esse licet raro cum corpore cernas.
 in saxis ac speluncis permanat aquarum
 liquidus umor et uberibus flent omnia guttis.
 dissipat in corpus sese cibus omne animantium. 350
 crescunt arbusta et fetus in tempore fundunt,
 quod cibus in rotas usque ab radicibus inis
 per truncos ac per ramos diffunditur omnis
 inter saepta meant voces et clausa domorum
 transvolitant, rigidum permanat frigus ad ossa, 355
 quod, nisi inania vint, qua possent corpora quaeque
 transire, haud ulla fieri ratione videres.
 {3} denique cur alias aliis praestare videmus
 pendere res rebus nilo maiore figura?
 nam si tantundem in lanae glomere quantum 360
 corporis in plumbo est, tantundem pendere par est.
 corporis officium quoniam premere omnia deorsum,
 contra autem natura manet sine pondere inanis.

ergo quod magnumst aequè leviusque videtur,
 nimirum plus esse sibi declarat inanis; 365
 at contra gravius plus in se corporis esse
 dedicat et multo vacui minus intus habere.
 est igitur nimirum id quod ratione sagaci
 quaerimus admixtum rebus, quod inane vocamus.
 (4) illud in his rebus ne te deducere vero 370
 possit, quod quidam fingunt, praecurrere cogor,
 cedere squamigeris latices nitentibus aiunt
 et liquidas aperire vias, quia post loca pisces
 linquant, quo possint cedentes confluere undae,
 sic alias quoque res inter se posse moveri 375
 et mutare locum, quamvis sint omnia plena.
 scilicet id falsa totum ratione receptumst.
 nam quo squamigeri poterunt procedere tandem,
 ni spatium dederint latices? concedere portio
 quo poterunt undae, cum pisces ire nequibunt? 380
 aut igitur motu privandumst corpora quaeque
 aut esse admixtum dicendumst rebus inane
 unde initum primum capiat res quaeque movendi.
 (5) postremo duo de concursu corpora lata
 si cita dissiliant, nempe aer omne necessest, 385
 inter corpora quod fiat, possidat inane.
 is porro quamvis circum celerantibus auris
 confluat, haud poterit tamen uno tempore totum
 compleri spatium; nam primum quemque necessest
 occupet ille locum, deinde omnia possideantur. 390
 quod si forte aliquis, cum corpora dissiluerit,
 tum putat id fieri quia se condensat aer,
 errat, nam vacuum tum sit quod non fuit ante
 et repletur item vacuum quod constitit ante,
 nec tali ratione potest densari aer. 395
 nec, si iam posset, sine manu posset, opinor,
 ipse in se trahere et partis conducere in unum.

367 *varus* Pontanus: *vacuum* vel *vacuum* *cod.*

380 *quemque* Pontanus: *quisque* *cod.*

Context: shortly after the proof, at 1.265–328, that microscopic bodies exist.

335–45 For the Eleatic counterpart of this argument, see Melissus 30 B 7.7 DK.

370 83 For the *divisibility* theory attacked here, cf. Empedocles 31 A 35. B 17.34 DK. and ap. ps.-Ar. *MXG* 976b22–9; Plato, *Tim.* 80c; Aristotle, *Phys.* iv.7, 214a29–32; Strato, fr. 63 Wehrli; and Barnes, *The Presocratic philosophers* (1979), chapter 19.

384–90 Experiments of this type were widely discussed in the 16th century, and

opponents of void held that two perfectly flat contiguous surfaces would be impossible to separate.

391-7 These are difficult lines to interpret in detail, but the general point intended seems to be as follows. It may be alleged that the occupation of the newly created gap by air (*id.* 392) occurs *simultaneously* with the opening of that gap (*rum.* 392), because there is already compressed air between the two bodies, which has merely to expand as they separate. But against this, (a) you cannot compress air in this way [experiments, e.g. with inflated wineskins, would easily suggest this], and (b) if you could, the only explanation would be that prior to compression the air contained void gaps.

7 Secondary attributes

A Lucretius 1.445-82

- | | |
|---|------------|
| (1) ergo praeter inane et corpora tertia per se
nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui,
nec quae sub sensus cadat ullo tempore nostros
nec ratione animi quam quisquam possit apisci. | 445 |
| (2) nam quaecumque fluent, aut his coniuncta duabus
rebus ea invenies aut horum eventa videbis. | 450 |
| (3) coniunctum est id quod nusquam sine permixti
discidio potis est seungi seque gregari,
pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquar,
tactus corporibus cunctis, intactus mani. | |
| (4) servitium contra paupertas divitiaeque,
libertas bellum concordia, cetera quorum
adventu manet incolumis natura abitoque,
haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare. | 455 |
| (5) tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis
consequitur sensus, transactum quid sit in aevo,
tum quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur.
nec per se quemquam tempus sentire fatendum est
semotum ab rerum motu placidaque quiete | 460 |
| (6) denique Tyndaridem raptam belloque subactas
Troïgenas gentis cum dicunt esse, videndum est
ne forte haec per se cogant nos esse fateri,
quando ea saecula hominum, quorum haec eventa fuerunt
irrevocabilis abstulerit iam praeterita aetas.
namque aliud terris, aliud regionibus ipsis
eventum dici poterit quodcumque erit actum.
denique materies si rerum nulla fuisset
nec locus ac spatium, res in quo quaeque geruntur,
numquam Tyndaridis forma conflatus amore | 465
470 |

ignis Alexandri Phrygio sub pectore gliscens
 clara accendisset saevi certamina belli, 475
 nec clam durateus Troianis Pergama partu
 inflammasset equus nocturno Graiugenaarum;
 perspicere ut possis res gestas funditus omnis
 non ita uti corpus per se constare neque esse.
 nec ratione cluere eadem qua constet inane, 480
 sed magis ut merito possis eventa vocare
 corporis atque loci, res in quo quaeque gerantur.

480 cluere Q¹. fluere O. luere QG

Context: see vol. 1 commentary.

449 *quaecumque cluere* might appear misleadingly to include body and void themselves, but the phrase is presumably meant to represent *ὅσα . . . κατηγορεῖται σώματος*, B 2.

coniuncta These are argued in vol. 1 to be equivalent to Epicurus' τὰ ἀέδιον συμβεβηκότα (or παρακολουθούντα) in B. It remains a possibility that, as usually held, it translates just *συμβεβηκότα*, and that he takes this to mean permanent attributes. But if so, we have to choose between Lucretius' and (C) Demetrius' interpretations of Epicurus' terminology, and Lucretius' would be less consistent both with Epicurus' usage in B and with the term's regular Greek meaning. Lucretius is quite capable of coining a precise term where his Greek source lacks one (cf. *animus*, 14B, F), and it is fairer to guess that *coniunctum* is such a case: note that whereas for *eventum* (= *σύμπτωμα*) he tells us that this is the standard term (458), there is no comparable indication for *coniunctum*. See also note on 5A 7–8.

464–82 Cf. Furley [168], 13–14. There is no good evidence to connect the conclusion opposed by Lucretius with any ancient school's doctrine. Furley rightly rejects a Stoic origin, and his own comparison with the Platonist argument for Forms reported at Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.9, 990b14–15 provides at best a very tenuous parallel. Indeed, treated as a doctrine of the continued *per se* existence of historical events like the Trojan War, it sounds sophistical, and one might wonder why Epicurus did not simply reply that the Trojan War does *not* exist now. However, treated (as in vol. 1, 37) as claiming continued existence for *facts about* the past, it presents a serious philosophical point. Its source could be either an adversary or an inquiring mind within Epicurus' own school. Facts about the past confront Epicurus with a more serious challenge than other facts, because present facts can easily be analysed as attributes of existing aggregates, and there are perhaps no facts about the future (see 20H–I).

469 Either the whole world, contrasted with specific locations like Troy and Mycenae, or perhaps the world *qua* body, contrasted with places *qua* space. Cf. Wellesley [199].

B Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 68 73

(1) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται σώματος ὡς αἰεὶ συμβεβηκότα – ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς

ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὐτοῖς γνωστοῖς – οὐθ' ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι
 φύσεις δοξαστέον (ὃν γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο)· οὐθ' ὁλως ὡς οὐκ
 εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερ' ἅττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ σώματι· οὐθ' ὡς μόρια
 5 τούτου, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν <ἐκ> τούτων πάντων τὴν
 ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδίου οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι, συμπεφορμημένων ὡσπερ ὅταν
 ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀγκων μείζον ἄθροισμα συστήῃ τοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ
 ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδε τινας ἐλαττόνων, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὡς λέγων ἐκ τούτων
 10 ἀπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδίου. (2) καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίας
 πάντα ταυτὰ ἐστί καὶ διαλήψεις, συμπαρακολουθοῦντος δὲ τοῦ ἀθρόου καὶ
 οὐθαμῇ ἀποσχιζομένου, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σώματος
 κατηγορίαν εἰληφότος. (3) καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῖς σώμασι συμπύπτει πολλάκις
 καὶ οὐκ αἰδίου παρακολουθεῖ ἃ οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις ἔσται οὔτε αὐώματα.
 ὥστε δὴ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φορὰν τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμενοι φανερά
 15 ποιοῦμεν τὰ συμπτώματα οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν, ὁ συλλαβόντες
 κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν, οὔτε τὴν τῶν αἰδίου παρακολου-
 θούντων ὧν ἄνευ σῶμα οὐ δυνατόν νοεῖσθαι. (4) κατ' ἐπιβολὰς δ' ἂν τινας
 παρακολουθοῦντος τοῦ ἀθρόου ἕκαστα προσαγορευθεῖη, ἀλλ' ὅτε δῆποτε
 ἕκαστα συμβαίνοντα θεωρεῖται, οὐκ αἰδίου τῶν συμπτωμάτων παρακο-
 20 λουθούντων. (5) καὶ οὐκ ἐξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ταύτην τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὅτι
 οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ᾧ συμβαίνει, ὃ δὴ καὶ σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν,
 οὔδε τὴν τῶν αἰδίου παρακολουθούντων. οὐδ' αὖ καθ' αὐτὰ νομιστέον –
 οἷδ' ἐ γὰρ τοῦτο διανοητὸν οὐτ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδίου συμ-
 25 βεβηκότων. ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται συμπτώματα πάντα τὰ σωματίων
 νομιστέον, καὶ οὐκ αἰδίου παρακολουθόντα οὐδ' αὖ φύσεως καθ' ἑαυτὰ
 τάγμα ἔχοντα. ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ αἰσθησις τὴν ιδιότητα ποιεῖ
 θεωρεῖται. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ τάδε γε δεῖ προσκατανοῆσαι σφιδρῶς. τὸν γὰρ
 δὴ χρόνον οὐ ζητητέον ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὅσα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ζητοῦμεν
 ἀνάγοντες ἐπὶ τὰς βλεπομένας παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς προλήψεις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 30 ἐνάργημα καθ' ὃ τὸν πολὺν ἢ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀναφωνοῦμεν, συγγενικῶς
 τοῦτο περιφέροντες, ἀναλογιστέον. καὶ οὔτε διαλέκτους ὡς βελτίους
 μεταληπτέον, ἀλλ' αὐταῖς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις κατ' αὐτοῦ χρηστέον· οὔτε
 ἄλλο τι κατ' αὐτοῦ κατηγορητέον ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχον τῷ ιδιώματι
 τούτῳ – καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσὶ τινες – ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ συμπλέκομεν τὸ
 35 ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ παραμετροῦμεν μάλιστα ἐπιλογιστέον. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὐκ
 ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ, ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ
 συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ
 ταῖς ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν, ἴδιόν τι συμπτῶμα, περὶ ταῦτα
 πάλιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντες, καθ' ὃ χρόνον ὀνομάζομεν. 40

2 ὡς αἰεὶ συμβεβηκότα κληρικῶν ὡς ὅτις ταῦτα βεβηκότα codd. ὡσαύτῃ συμβεβηκότα Calesius ὡς
 ἂν αἰεὶ συμβεβηκότα Bignone 5 οὐθ' ὡς Caisenda ὡς οὐθ' codd. ἔτερα ἅττα Usener. ἕτερα τὰ
 codd. 6 μὲν <ἐκ> Meibom. ἐκ alii 7 τε codd. δι' Schaeidece συμπεφορμημένων BP οὐ
 FP(corr.) 14 παρακολουθεῖ κληρικῶν -θεῖ B -θεῖ FP -θεῖ, δ' α' Bignone ἔσται Usener καὶ
 codd. 25 σωματίων Sedley -τα codd. -τον Usener 34 ἔχον Usener ἔχοντος codd

Context: immediately following 14A.

2 *ὥς δέει συμβεβηκότα* Some emendation seems necessary, and the favoured *ὥσανεῖ*, 'as if', is scarcely appropriate. Bignone's, which we adopt here (apart from his superfluous *ἀν*), is greatly superior. Without it, this would be the only point in the passage at which the permanence of permanent attributes was not made explicit. Yet Epicurus can hardly expect the idea of permanence to be already implicit in *συμβεβηκότα*: not only is this at variance with Greek usage of the term, but he himself uses *συμβαίνειν* of impermanent attributes at 20 and 22.

3 *αὐτοῖς* may well be corrupt, but we have let it stand for lack of a plausible emendation.

6-10 *ἀλλ' ὥς κτλ.* should be read as qualifying *οὐθ' ὥς μόρια τούτου* by explaining in what sense a body does not (*καθόλου μὲν . . .*), and in what sense it does (*ἀλλὰ μόνον . . .*), consist of its permanent attributes. For this use of *ἀλλά*, cf. 33. Construct *οὐχ ὅσον τε εἶναι* (?) with *ἔχον* in 7 and 10, 'it is not able to have': for the construction, a regular one in Epicurus, cf. 10-11.

9 'only in the way I am describing' must principally refer forward to 11-13. Permanent attributes are conceptual parts, not material parts.

11 *τοῦ ἀθρόου* refers to the complex of permanent attributes (contrast *ἄθροισμα*, 8, an aggregate of material parts). For this usage, see S.E., *M.* 11.437, and cf. Plato, *Tim.* 157b-c. For Sextus' criticism of the idea, see *M.* 10.240.

36-7 For *ἐπιλογισμός*, see note on 21V1.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.219-27

(1) *Ἐπίκουρος δέ, ὡς αὐτὸν Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων ἐξηγεῖται, τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων εἶναι λέγει, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξί καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμπτώματά ἐστι τισὶ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ ὁ χρόνος πᾶσι τούτοις συμπαρεπόμενος εἰκότως ἂν λεχθεῖ σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων.* (2) *καθόλου γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἀνωθεν προλάβωμεν εἰς τὴν ταῦ λεγομένου παρακολούθησιν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν τινὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτῃς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστωσι θεωρεῖται. καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκεν πράγματα οἷον αἱ οὐσίαι (ὡς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κενόν), περὶ δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστωσι θεωρεῖται τὰ καλούμενα παρ' αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότα.* (3) *τούτων δὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκεν, τὰ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι τούτων πέφυκεν. ἀχώριστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκεν ὥσπερ ἡ ἀντιτυπία μὲν τοῦ σώματος, εἰς τὸ τοῦ κενοῦ οὔτε γὰρ σῶμα δυνατόν ἐστί ποτε νοῆσαι χωρὶς τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὔτε τὸ κενὸν χωρὶς εἴξεως, ἀλλ' αἰδιον ἑκατέρου συμβεβηκός, τοῦ μὲν τὸ ἀντιτυπεῖν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ εἴκειν.* (4) *οὐκ ἀχώριστα δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκε καθάπερ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονή. τὰ γὰρ συγκατακτὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὐτε κινεῖται διὰ παντός ἀνηρεμήτως οὐτ' ἀκινήτῃ διὰ παντός, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν συμβεβηκυῖαν ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν μονήν, καίπερ τῆς ἀτόμου, ὅτε καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐστίν, ἀκινήτου καθεστώσης. ἡ γὰρ κενὴ πελάζειν ὀφείλει ἢ σώματι· εἴτε δὲ κενὴ πελάξοι, διὰ τὴν εἴξιν φέρεται δι' αὐτοῦ, εἴτε σώματι, διὰ τὴν*

ἀντιτυπῖαν ἀποπαλτικῶς ποιεῖται τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν. (5) συμπτώματα
 οὖν ταῦτ' ἔστω οἷς χρόνος παρέπεται, φημί δὲ τὴν τε ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα καὶ
 ὥραν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀπαθείας, κινήσεις τε καὶ μονάς. ἥ τε γὰρ ἡμέρα
 καὶ νύξ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος εἰσὶ συμπτώματα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα κατὰ τὸν
 ἐξ ἡλίου φωτισμὸν συμβαίνει, ἡ δὲ νύξ κατὰ φωτισμοῦ στέρησιν τοῦ ἐξ
 ἡλίου ἐπιγίνεται. ἡ δὲ ὥρα ἦτοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἢ τῆς νυκτὸς μέρος
 καθεστηκυῖα πάλιν σύμπτωμα γίνεται τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ
 νύξ. ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται δὲ πάσῃ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ πάσῃ νυκτὶ καὶ ὥρᾳ ὁ χρόνος·
 παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν μακρὰ τις ἢ βραχεῖα λέγεται ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ, φερομένων
 ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ταύτη συμβεβηκότα χρόνον. τὰ τε πάθη καὶ αἱ ἀπάθειαι ἦτοι
 ἀλγηδόνες ἢ ἡδοναὶ ἐτύγχανον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ οὐσίαι τινὲς καθεστῆκει-
 σαν, ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα τῶν πασχόντων ἦτοι ἡστικῶς ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, καὶ
 συμπτώματα οὐκ ἄχρονα. πρὸς τοῦτοις καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἔτι δὲ ἡ μονή, ὡς
 ἥδη παρεστήσαμεν, τῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ συμπτώματα καὶ οὐ χωρὶς χρόνου·
 τὴν γοῦν δξύτητα καὶ βραδυτητα τῆς κινήσεως, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πλείονα καὶ
 ἐλάττωνα μονὴν χρόνῳ καταμετροῦμεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι ὁ
 Ἐπίκουρος ἀσώματον οἶεται τὸν χρόνον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ παραπλησίων δὲ τοῖς Στωικοῖς·
 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέλεκται, ἀσώματόν τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοούμενον ὑπεστήσαντο τὸν χρόνον,
 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συμβεβηκός τιον.

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Context: does time exist? Cf. *PH* 1.337. For Sextus' counterargument, see *M.* 10.238–47.

1 ἐξηγείται. All of 1–37 is clearly Demetrius' exegesis of Epicurus. The tentative language of 5 shows that σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων is his proposed interpretation of Epicurus, not a verbatim quotation, and the rest is in effect an exegesis of B in support of the same interpretation.

37–40. Sextus' own comment, tying this passage up with the preceding one, 27D. For the Stoics, see note on 51F 5.6.

D Polystratus, *De contemptu* 23.26–26.23

(1) ἢ δοκεῖ τ[αῖ] | τ[ι]ς αἶνσαι ἐκ | τ[ῶν] προειρημένων λόγων οὐ | κα[κο]πα-
 θεῖν ὁ λέγομεν, | ἀλλὰ μάλλον π[ε]ρὶ θ[ε]ῶν λαβεῖν, ὡς ψευδῶς νομίζεται τὰ
 καλὰ κ[αῖ] αἰσχροῖα | καὶ ὅσα νομίζεται | ποτ' ἄλλα, ἐπειδὴ οὐ[χ]
 ὥσπερ | χρυσὸς καὶ τὰ τοῖς αὐτὰ | πανταχοῦ ἔστιν ταῦτά· | (2) ἐμποδῶν
 γὰρ ἐκάστωι | δῆπαι συνορᾶν, ὡς οὐδὲ | μείζον καὶ ἐλαττο[ν] | τὸ αὐτὸ
 πανταχοῦ | κ[αῖ] πρὸς | πάντα τὰ μεγέ[θ]η ὁράτα[ι], οὐδ' | ὥσαύ[τ]ως τὸ
 ἥδὺ | καὶ τὸ ἀηδές | . . . | ὥσαύτως | [δὲ καὶ ἐ]πὶ τῶν | βαρυτέρων καὶ
 κουφωτέρων συμβέβηκεν, | καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπ[ῶν] | δ' ἀπλῶ[ς] | δυνά-
 με[ν] | τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει. οὔτε γὰρ ὑγεινὰ | ταῦτα πᾶσαν ὑπάρ-
 χει | οὔτε θρεπτικά ἢ φθαρτικά οὔτε τὰ τοῦτοις | ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 τοὺς | μὲν ὑγιάζει καὶ ρέθει, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τ[ῶν] ἐ[ν]αι[τι]ῶν διατίθουσιν. (3)
 ὥστε ἡ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα φατέρον ψευδὴ εἶναι, ἃ περιφανῶς ἕκαστος
 θεωρεῖ δ' | ἐργάζεται, ἢ, μὴ βουλομένων ἀναισχυρτεῖν | καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς
 φανείροις, οὐδὲ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ | αἰσχροῖα ἀρτέον ὡς ψευδῶς | νομιζόμενα,

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ὅτι οὐ πᾶσι ταῦτά ἐστιν ὥσπερ | λίθος ἢ χρυσός | ἢ {ἀλλ}ο | τι τῶν 15
 τοιούτων . . . (4) τ[ι]ὰ πρὸς τ[ι] κατηγ[ορου]||μενα οὐ τ[ῆ]ν αὐτῇν [χ]ώραν
 ἔχει τοῖς κατὰ τ[ῆ]ν | ἰδίαν φύσιν λεγ[ο]μένοις | | καὶ μὴ πρὸς | τι, οὐδὲ
 τὰ | μὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχει, | τὰ δ' οὐ. ὥστε τὸ ἀξιοῦν | ταῦτά ταύτοις
 συμβεβηκέναι || εἰ | | ἐϋθηες, ἢ τὰ | μὲν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μὴ | καὶ | οὐθὲν
 δια|φέρει ἀπὸ τῶν|δε τάδε ἀνασκευάζειν | ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν|δε τάδε. ἀλλ' | 20
 ὁμοίως ἐϋ|θηος ὁ νομίζων δεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ βαρύτερον ἢ
 λευ|κότερον καὶ γλυκύτερον τῶς ἐστ[ι] | μείζον, | τῶς δὲ ξ[ι]λ[α]ττον καὶ
 βα|ρύτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὡσαύτως, καθ' αὐτὸ | δὲ τοῦτω|ν οὐθὲν
 πέ|πονθεν ὅπ[ε]ρ π[ρὸς] ἄλλο, οὕτω | καὶ τὸν [λ]ίθου|ν κα[ὶ] τὸν χρυσόν καὶ
 τὰ | τοιαῦτα δεῖν, | εἴπ[ε]ρ κατ' ἀλή|θειαν [ἦν, | τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν] 25
 ἐπ[ὶ]β[ο]λα γίνεσθαι, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσι | | καὶ πανταχοῦ εἶναι λ[ι]θ[ο]ν, καὶ
 πρὸς μὲν τι|να χρυσόν, πρὸς δ' ἄλλον | τι|νὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν φύ|σιν ἔχειν,
 ἐπεί δ' οὐκ ἔχει | οὕτως, ψευδῶς ἤδη φάσ|κων ταῦτα νομίζεσθαι | | οὐκ
 | ὄ]ντα.

(For full apparatus, see Indelli's edition)

Context: an attack on the use of moral relativism to eliminate all ordinary conceptions of value.

The identity of the opponents is a matter of debate (see introduction to Indelli's edition), but we favour an exclusively Academic target (see Sedley [142]), which, in view of Polystarchus' mid-third-century date, would mean the circle of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. For Epicureans on moral relativism, cf. also 22N 6-7. On the present passage, see especially Striker [640].

1-2 κα[κο]παθεῖν δ' λέγομεν i.e. to be upset by the perversity of the doctrine described, and distrusted by one's fellow men.

8 Atoms

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 40-1

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ 5
 συγκρίσεις πεποῖνται. (2) ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα – εἴπερ
 μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρῆσθαι ἀλλ' ἰσχύοντα ὑπομενεῖν ἐν ταῖς
 διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων – πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπῃ ἢ
 ὅπως διαλυθῆσεται. ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων 5
 φύσεις.

4 διὰ καὶ Meinhold: ὅταν codd.

Context: immediately following 5A.

1-2 Imitated at Lucretius 1.483-4: *corpora sunt porro partim primordia rerum | partim concilio quae constant principiorum*. But Epicurus' own formulation has greater elegance and strength. He starts with the undeniable existence of compounds, proceeds to the notion of components, which that of compounds seems to entail, then sets out the necessary conditions for being a *bona fide* component. Lucretius, while

superficially echoing Epicurus' words, in fact starts out with an undefended and dogmatic assertion about compositus.

B Lucretius 1.503–98 (with omissions)

- (1) principio quoniam duplex natura duarum
dissimilis rerum longe constare repertast,
corporis atque loci, res in quo quaeque geruntur, 505
esse utramque sibi per se puramque necessest.
nam quaecumque vacat spatium, quod inane vocamus,
corpus ea non est; qua porro cumque tenet se
corpus, ea vacuum nequaquam constat inane.
sunt igitur solida ac sine inani corpora prima . . . 510
- (2) haec neque dissolui plagis extrinsecus acta
possumi nec porro penitus penetrata retexi
nec ratione queunt alia temptata labare; 530
id quod iam supra tibi paulo ostendimus ante.
nam neque collidi sine inani posse videtur
quicquam nec frangi nec findi in bina secando
nec capere umorem neque item manabile frigus
nec penetralem ignem, quibus omnia conficiuntur. 535
et quo quaeque magis cohibet res intus inane,
tam magis his rebus penitus temptata labascit.
ergo si solida ac sine inani corpora prima
sunt ita uti docuit, sint haec aeterna necessest.
- (3) praeterea nisi materies aeterna fuisset, 540
antehac ad nilum penitus res quaeque redissent
de niloque renata forent quaecumque videmus
at quoniam supra docui nil posse creari
de nilo neque quod genitum est ad nil revocari,
esse immortalis primordia corpore debent, 545
dissolui quo quaeque supremo tempore possint,
materies ut suppetit rebus reparandis,
sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate
nec ratione queunt alia servata per aevum
ex infinito tam tempore res reparare . . . 550
- (4) denique iam quoniam generationi reddita finis
crescendi rebus constat vitamque tenendi, 585
et quid quaeque queant per foedera naturae,
quid porro nequeant, sanctum quandoquidem exstat,
nec commutatur quicquam, quin omnia constant
usque adeo, variae volucres ut in ordine cunctae
ostendant maculas generalis corpore inesse. 590

immutabili materiae quoque corpus habere
debet nimirum. nam si primordia rerum
commutari aliqua possent ratione revicta,
incertum quoque iam constet quid possit oriri,
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haecens,
nec totiens possent generatim saecula referre
naturam mores victum motusque parentum.

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Context: shortly after 7A.

331 This probably qualifies the whole argument of 328–35, and refers back to 1.22f 4.

9 Minimal parts

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 36 9

(1) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δεῖ νημίζειν ἐν τῷ ὠρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους
ὄγκους εἶναι οὐδ' ὀπηλίκοις οὖν. (2) ὥστε οὐ μόνον τὴν εἰς ἀπειρον τομὴν
ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον ἀναιρετόν, ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῇ ποιῶμεν καὶ ταῖς
περιλήψεις τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀναγκάζόμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες
καταναλίσκειν. (3) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς
ὠρισμένοις εἰς ἀπειρον μὴδ' ἐξ ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον. (4) οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν
ἀπαξ τις εἶπη ὅτι ἀπειροὶ ὄγκοι ἐν τινὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἢ ὀπηλικοί οὖν, ἔστι
νοῆσαι. (5) πῶς τ' ἂν ἐτι τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ μέγεθος; πηλικοί γάρ
τινες δῆλον ὡς οἱ ἀπειροὶ εἰσιν ὄγκοι καὶ οὗτοι· ἐξ ὧν, ὀπηλικοί ἂν πυτε
ᾤσιν, ἀπειρον ἂν ἦν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος. (6) ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος τοῦ
πεπερασμένου διαληπτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ
καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἧς τούτῳ τοιούτῳ νοεῖν καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ἐξ ἧς εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν
βαδίζοντα εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τοσούτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ.
(7) τὸ τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει δεῖ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὔτε τοιούτον ἔστιν
οἶον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον οὔτε πάντῃ πάντως ἀνόμοιον, ἀλλ' ἔχον μὲν
τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν, διέληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον· ἀλλ' ὅταν διὰ
τὴν τῆς κοινότητος προσεμφέρειαν οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαι τι αὐτοῦ, τὸ μὲν
ἐπιτάδε, τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα, τὸ ἴσον ἡμῖν δεῖ προσπίπτειν. (8) ἐξ ἧς τε
θεωροῦμεν ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καταρχόμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ
μέρεσι μερῶν ἀπτόμενα, ἢ ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῇ ιδιότητι τῇ ἐαυτῶν τὰ μεγέθη
καταμετροῦντα, τὰ πλείω πλείον καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττον. (9) ταύτῃ τῇ
ἀναλογίᾳ νομιστέον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεχρησθαι· μικρότητι
γὰρ ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὡς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν θεωρουμένου,
ἀναλογία δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται. ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἀτομος,
κατὰ τὴν <τῶν> ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν κατηγορήσαμεν, μικρόν· τι μόνον
μακρὰν ἐκβαλόντες. (10) ἐτι τε τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ πέρατα δεῖ νομίζειν
τῶν μηκῶν τὸ καταμέτρημα ἐξ αὐτῶν πρώτων τοῖς μείζουσι καὶ ἐλάττοσι

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παρασκευάζοντα τῇ διὰ λόγου θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων. (11) ἡ γὰρ κοινότης ἢ ὑπάρχουσα αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μετὰβολα ἰκανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου συντελέσαι, (12) συμφόρησιν δὲ ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἐχόντων οὐχ οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι. 30

4 ἀθρόων B¹: ἀτάμων F 6 μὴδ' ἔ(πι) Γασσενδ 9 ἐξ ὧν om B 10 ἔχοντος Γασσενδ -es codd. 13 κατὰ τοσούτων Sedley. κατὰ τοιούτων codd.: καὶ τὸ τοιούτων Muhl: κατὰ τούτων Furley: κατὰ <τὸ> τοιούτου Schneider 23 <τῶν> Usener 24 μακρὸν Usener: μακρόν ridd. ἀμεγλή codd.: ἀμεγρή Astut 29 μετὰβολα Furley ἀμετὰβολα codd.

Context: immediately after 12A.

2-5 Some scholars see an argument for minima here, perhaps encouraged by the 'conceptual' connotations of ταῖς περιλήψεις in 3-4 to expect 'theoretical' indivisibility. But this latter expression, although convenient, has no counterpart in the ancient discussions of divisibility. τομή must be that which ἄτομα do not admit, and the argument that follows merely repeats the one for atoms at 8A.

4 τῶν ἀθρόων See 7B 11, with note.

6 οὐτε Best taken as co-ordinate with τ' in 8 and with τε in 10, providing three arguments for theoretical indivisibility. ὅπως Σε μετὰβολας ἂν γένοιτο, i.e. alluding back to 5-6 rather than forward to ἀπειροὶ ὄγκοι κτλ. in 7. Only on this reading can 6-7 add anything new – effectively the Zenonian dichotomy argument against motion.

9 B's omission of ἐξ ὧν, endorsed by most editors, was natural once καὶ had been taken to start a new sentence. But the repunctuation adopted here is the easier option, and ἐξ ὧν, 'consisting of which', adds to the clarity of the argument.

13 κατὰ τοσούτων Muhl's καὶ τὸ τοιούτων would yield 'arrive in thought at the infinity of even a thing of this kind' (viz. something finite), which would make the argument a mere restatement of 8-10, as well as involving an unfamiliar use of ἀφικνεῖσθαι. 'Reach infinity' must surely be retained, to provide a distinct argument. Schneider's κατὰ <τὸ> τοιούτου might mean either 'in such a way', which would merely repeat the sense of οὕτω (12), or 'by means of that which is of this kind', echoing τοιούτου at 12, for which one would rather expect κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Furley's κατὰ τοῦτον, 'according to this opponent', referring back to τις in 7, is more attractive. But the reading adopted above requires even less alteration to the text and introduces a qualification, 'to that extent', which might well be added by way of apology for the extravagant phrase 'reach infinity'.

14-24 The suggestion that Diodorus (fr. 9 Gassmancon) had anticipated Epicurus' use of the sensible minimum in this context (Sedley [11], 86-7, Denyer [209], 36-7) is convincingly opposed by Sorabji [22], 345-7.

18-21 How do minima combine? Konstan [206] has suggested that the question is meant to be an illegitimate one because minima are only conceivable as parts in the first place. So C 1 appears to say, but that cannot be Epicurus' point here because the claim is being explained with regard to sensible minima, which are separable (28-30). The interpretation adopted in vol. 1, that it is ἐξ ἧς which expresses the way in which minima combine, is in most essentials that of Sorabji [22], 372-5 (although it may be doubted whether he is right that S.E., M. 10.120 shows Diodorus to have anticipated the theory). If Epicurus is conceding that minima do not 'touch' in the technical Aristotelian sense, he should strictly have no place for touch between separate bodies.

They could only touch if *their* extremities touched, and for Epicurus extremities are minima. This would have the advantage of answering a notorious puzzle, why two atoms should not coalesce simply by becoming perfectly adjacent with no intervening void: mere juxtaposition could never cause them to share an extremity in the way in which, say, the two halves of an atom do; an extremity is essentially and inseparably the extremity of some body (C 599ff.; cf. Konstan [206], 407). However, the tangible/intangible antithesis for body and void (see 5) may suggest that he was not prepared to dispense with the notion of touch in all contexts. (*On touch* is the title of one of his lost works, D.L. 10.28, although it may have dealt with touch as a *sense*.)

24–6 The reference is to 12D 1. There size is attributed to atoms without explicit argument but implicitly because it is one of the inseparable characteristics of body, as analogy with sensible body might be held to show. Furley [204], 23–4 sees the reference as being to 12B 1 and 12A, but these give arguments which only concern the *variety* of atomic shapes and sizes, and which cannot be called analogical.

26 ἀμειρή Those who emend to ἀμειρή may well be right. τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμειρή is, for example, Diodorus' standard expression for his minima (cf. 11i). On the other hand, ἀμειρή, while a standard term in the doxographers (cf. 11F, G), occurs nowhere else in Epicurus' own text. And the transmitted reading is not too inappropriate to retain: minima must, as a matter of fact, be uncompounded as well as partless. πέρατα This should not, as often, be taken predicatively, 'think of the minima . . . as limits'. Whatever point is being made here is established by the analogy with the sensible minimum, as 28–30 reminds us, and sensible minima are *not* necessarily limits. They have nowhere been said to be so, and they differ from real minima precisely in their capacity for independent movement (28–31; see further, vol. 1, 43, and cf. note on B).

30 1 Konstan [206], 403 7, suggests that this point is borrowed from Aristotle, *Phys.* vi.1, which he takes to have shown that partless items, although properly regarded as parts of magnitudes, cannot *become* parts. But Aristotle's emphasis there is, we think, rather that partless items, although properly regarded as parts of magnitudes, cannot be *constituent* parts of them; and Epicurus is committed to opposing that contention. The interpretation offered in vol. 1, 43–4, where the thesis is connected instead with *Phys.* vi.10, may raise the objection that Epicurus adopted an alternative account of a minimum's motion from the same chapter, that it 'has moved' but never 'is moving', and that he would hardly need both solutions. But that doctrine is not in evidence in *Ep. Hdt.*, and probably represents a later development in Epicurus' thought under the influence of Diodorus: see vol. 1, 51 2.

B Lucretius 1.746–52

- (1) deinde quod omnino finem non esse secundis
corporibus faciunt neque pausam stare fragori
- (2) nec prorsum in rebus minimum consistere quicquam;
cum videamus id extremum cuiusque cacumen
esse quod ad sensus nostros minimum esse videtur.

conicere ut possis ex hoc, quae cernere non quis
extremum quod habent, minimum consistere (in illis).

752 (in illis) Munro: (mens) Furley

Context: criticism of the four-element theory of Empedocles and his 'inferior' successors.

746-8 The distinction between physical indivisibles (atoms) and minima is exactly that made in **A** 2-3.

749-52 This is the one piece of evidence to suggest that the analogy with the sensible minimum is an independent proof of the actual existence of the 'minimum in the atom' (cf. vol. 1, 42). Perhaps in Lucretius' Epicurean source the analogy was cited not as the principal proof but as a confirmatory illustration (cf. 17), and it will then be Lucretius' selectivity that has given it this false emphasis. (Cf. his misleading selection of arguments at 5.546-91, as compared with Epicurus, *Ep. Pyth.* 91, on which see Sedley [105], 48-52.) What the analogy primarily offers is a clear conception of how minima could perform the function which the Zenonian arguments of **A** 4-6 and **C** 3 show they must perform. Lucretius' word *conicere* (751) may even show some grasp of the point: his only other comparable use of it is at 2.121, where it is used precisely of conceiving by analogy with the perceptible some independently proven fact about the microscopic.

The passage also differs from **A** in making the sensible minimum explicitly an 'extremity' or 'limit'. This is not problematic. Normally in dividing a sensible magnitude into visible minima one will indeed isolate the first of these as an extremity of it, and that is all that the present passage requires. The difference is just that a sensible minimum is not, like a real minimum, *essentially* the extremity of something else: cf. **A** 26, with note.

C Lucretius 1.599-634

- (1) cum porro quoniam est extremum quodque cacumen
corporis illius quod nostri cernere sensus 600
iam nequeunt, id nimirum sine partibus exstat
et minima constat natura nec fuit umquam
per se secretum neque posthac esse valebit,
alterius quoniamst ipsum pars primaque et una,
inde aliae atque aliae similes ex ordine partes 605
agmine condense naturam corporis explent,
quae quoniam per se nequeunt constare, necessest
haerere unde queant nulla ratione revelli
(2) sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate
quae minimis stipata cohaerent partibus arte, 610
non ex illorum conventu conciliata,
sed magis aeterna pollentia simplicitate,
unde neque avelli quicquam neque deminui tam
concedit natura reservans semina rebus.
(3) praeterea nisi erit minimum, parvissima quaeque 615

corpora constabunt ex partibus infinitis,
 quippe ubi dimidia pars pars semper habebit
 dimidiam partem nec res praefiniat ulla.
 ergo rerum inter summam minimamque quid escit?
 nil erit ut discet; nam quamvis funditus omnis 620
 summa sit infinita, tamen, parvissima quae sunt,
 ex infinitis constabunt partibus aequae.
 quod quoniam ratio reclamat vera negatque
 credere posse animum, victus fateare necessest
 esse ea quae nullis iam praedicta partibus exstent 625
 et minima constant natura. quae quoniam sunt,
 illa quoque esse tibi solida atque aeterna fatendum.
 (4) denique si minimas in partis cuncta resolvi
 cogere consuesset rerum natura creatrix,
 iam nil ex illis eadem reparare valeret 630
 propterea quia, quae nullis sunt partibus aucta,
 non possunt ea quae debet genitalis habere
 materies, varios conexus pondera plagas
 concursus motus, per quae res quaeque geruntur.

Context: immediately after BB, continuing the arguments for the atomic nature of body.

It may be suspected that Lucretius has himself appended these arguments to the section about atoms rather than devote an entire separate section to so technical a subject as minima. Their relevance to atoms lies in the proper Epicurean principle (A 30-1) that minima cannot exist in isolation. However, the correct conclusion from this would be that no process of fragmentation can yield a body smaller than, say, two minima. Lucretius appears to be overstating his case in 609-14 when he maintains that any cohesive group of minima will be inseparable.

599-601 Munro, expecting to find here an argument from the sensible minimum to the 'minimum in the atom', indicates a lacuna after 599, to be filled out roughly as follows: (*corporibus, quod iam nobis minimum esse videtur, | debet item ratione pari minimum esse casum*). But that expectation is questionable (cf. vol. 1, 42, and note on B 749-52): in A 28-31, the inseparability of minima is distinguished as one point which cannot be established by analogy with the sensible. The text as it stands is quite intelligible. All the properties of the minimum listed in 601-4 are deduced from its status as the extremity of a body: if it were not minimal but had parts, one of its parts would have a better claim to be the extremity; and if it were separable it would not be essentially the extremity of something else.

605 *ex ordine* This translates ἐξ ἑξ, cf. A 18.

611 Cf. A 30-1

615-22 Cf. ps.-Aristotle, *Lat. insect.* 968a2ff., and Furley [204], 36-8.

633 *varios* As Furley shows [204], 38-40, it is the lack of variety among minima that is seen here as ruling out their standing as primary elements (hence *quapropter* at 635, introducing the similar argument against Heraclitus beginning at 645).

d Aristotle, *Phys.* vi.1, 231a21–b10

εἰ δ' ἐστὶ συνεχὲς καὶ ἀπτόμενον καὶ ἐφεξῆς, ὡς διωρίζεται πρότερον, συνεχὴ μὲν ὦν τὰ ἔσχατα ἔν, ἀπτόμενα δ' ὦν ἅμα, ἐφεξῆς δ' ὦν μὴδὲν μεταξὺ συγγενές, ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων εἶναι τι συνεχές, οἷον γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν, εἴπερ ἡ γραμμὴ μὲν συνεχές, ἡ στιγμὴ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον. οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν στιγμῶν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἔσχατον τὸ δ' ἄλλο τι μόριον τοῦ ἀδιαίρετου), πῦθ' ἅμα τὰ ἔσχατα (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τοῦ ἁμιρούς οὐδέν· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐ ἔσχατον). ἔτι δ' ἀνάγκη ἦτοί συνεχεῖς εἶναι τὰς στιγμὰς ἡ ἀπτομένας ἀλλήλων, ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀδιαίρετων, συνεχεῖς μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἶεν διὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον· ἀπτεται δ' ἅπαν ἡ ὅλον ὅλον ἢ μέρος μέρους ἢ ὅλον μέρος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἁμέρες τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀνάγκη ὅλον ὅλου ὁπτεσθαι. ὅλον δ' ὅλον ἀπτόμενον οὐκ ἐστὶν συνεχές. τὸ γὰρ συνεχές ἔχει τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τὸ δ' ἄλλο μέρος, καὶ διαίρεται εἰς οὕτως ἕτερα καὶ τόπων κεχωρισμένα, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶν στιγμὴ στιγμῇ ἢ τὸ νῦν τῷ νῦν, ὥστ' ἐκ τούτων εἶναι τὸ μήκος ἢ τὸν χρόνον· ἐφεξῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὦν μὴδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ συγγενές, στιγμῶν δ' αἰεὶ (τὸ) μεταξὺ γραμμῇ καὶ τῶν νῦν χρόνος.

Context: analysis of the continuum.

8–10 Cf. A 18–20 and 50C 6 for the influence of these lines in Hellenistic debate.

11–14 As Sorabji points out ([22], 367–8), Aristotle's argument against ἀμερῇ 'in sequence' works only for points and instants, not for partless *magnumes*, thus leaving Epicurus with a loophole which his ἐξῆς in A 8 may be exploiting.

e Aristotle, *Phys.* vi.10, 240b8–241a6

ἀποδεδειγμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἁμέρες οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους τῷ ἐνυπάρχειν, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ τὸ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ κινεῖτο (ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πλοίου φορᾶς ἢ τὸ μέρος τῇ τοῦ ὅλου κινήσει (ἁμέρες δὲ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ πύσιν ἀδιαίρετον.) καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν μερῶν κινήσεις ἕτεραί εἰσι κατ' αὐτὰ τε τὰ μέρη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν. εἴθαι δ' ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῆς σφαίρας μάλιστα τὴν διεισφορᾶν· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τάχος ἐστὶ τῶν τε πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἄλλης, ὡς οὐ μείζων οὕσης κινήσεως. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, οὕτω μὲν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἁμέρες ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ καθήμενος τοῦ πλοίου θέοντος, καθ' αὐτὴ δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μεταβαλλέσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ AB εἰς τὸ BG, εἴτ' ἐκ μεγέθους εἰς μέγεθος εἴτ' ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος εἴτα κατ' ἀντίφασιν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ πρώτην μεταβάλλει ἐφ' οὗ Δ οὐκ οὖν ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ καθ' ὃν μεταβάλλει χρόνον ἢ ἐν τῷ AB εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῇ BG, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ δ' ἐν θητέρῳ· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μεταβάλλον οὕτως εἶχεν. ἐν ἑκατέρῃ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ· μεριστὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ BG· μεταβεβληκός γὰρ ἐστὶν, ὑπόκειται δὲ μεταβάλλειν. λέιπεται δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ AB εἶναι, καθ' ὃν μεταβάλλει χρίνουν. ἡρεμῇσι ἄρα· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι χρόνον τινὰ ἡρεμῇν ἦν ὥστ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἁμέρες κινεῖσθαι οὐδ' ὅπως μεταβάλλειν· μοναχικῶς γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἦν αὐτὸ κίνησιν, εἰ ὁ χρόνος ἦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν κεκυνημένοι ἂν ἦν καὶ μεταβεβληκός, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μὲν μηδέποτε, κακινῆσθαι δ' αἰεὶ. τούτῳ δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, δέδεικται καὶ πρότερον· οὕτε γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν οὐθ' ἡ γραμμὴ ἐκ στιγμῶν

οὐθ' ἡ κίνησις ἐκ κινήματων· οὐθ' ἐν γὰρ ἄλλα ποιεῖ ἢ τοῖτο λέγειν ἢ τὴν κίνησιν ἐξ ἀμερίων, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἢ τὰ μέγας ἐκ στίγμων.

It is suggested in vol. 1, 43–4 that **A 12**, where minima are denied the power of independent motion, represents Epicurus' acceptance of Aristotle's argument at 1–15. For this, and for Epicurus' response to 15–20, see on **A 30** 1, and vol. 1, 51–2.

¶ Cicero, *Acad.* 2.106

Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is posteaquam Epicuro adveniens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam quae sciebat oblitus est?

Context: Cicero's argument, on behalf of the New Academy, that memory does not depend on κατάληψις

Cf. **g**.

g Cicero, *Fin.* 1.20

in illud quidem physici, credere aliquid esse minimum; quod profecto numquam putavisset si Polyaeo familiari suo geometrica discere maluisset quam illum etiam ipsam dedocere

Context: general attack by Cicero on Epicurean physics.

At *Fin.* 1.72 the Epicurean spokesman rejects as false *all* the mathematical sciences, but it seems clear that Epicurus' rejection of geometry was the one given most publicity, and was connected with his doctrine of minima: on this and on Epicurus' relation with Polyaenus, cf. Sedley [105]; also Mueller [652].

10 Infinity

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 41–2

(1) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι. (2) τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἄκρον παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει· πέρας δὲ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. (3) καὶ μὴν καὶ τῷ πληθῆι τῶν σωμάτων ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κενοῦ. (4) εἴτε γὰρ ἦν τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον, τὰ δὲ σώματα ὠρισμένα, οὐθαμιῶν ἂν ἔμεινε τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ' ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα, οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ὑπερείδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀνακοπὰς. (5) εἴτε τὸ κενὸν ἦν ὠρισμένον, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ ἄπειρα σώματα ὅπου ἐνέστη.

1 δὲ FP γὰρ B 7 ἀνακοπὰν codd. ἀντακοπὰς Meibom

Context: immediately following **BA**. On the historical significance of the theory, see Forley [211].

4 τὸ πᾶν This has already been analysed as bodies plus void at **5A**

7 ἀνακοπὰς Meibom's emendation to Epicurus' regular term ἀντακοπὰς is attractive, but Usener ([133], 56) rightly cites the parallel of Plutarch, *De facie* 931H, οὐ παρέχων ἀνακοπὰς οὐδ' ἀντερείδων.

B Lucretius 1.958-97

- (1) omne quod est igitur nulla regione viarum
finitumsc; (2) namque extremum debebat habere.
extremum porro nullus posse videtur 960
esse, nisi ultra sit quod finiat; ut videatur
quo non longius haec sensus natura sequatur.
nunc extra summam quoniam nil esse fatendum,
non habet extremum, caret ergo fine modoque.
nec refert quibus adsistas regionibus eius; 965
usque adeo, quem quisque locum possedit, in omnis
tantundem partis infinitum omne relinquit.
- (3) praeterea si iam finitum constituatur
omne quod est spatium, siquis procurrat ad oras
ultimus extremas iaciatque volatile telum, 970
id validis utrum contortum viribus ire
quo fuerit missum mavis longeque volare,
an prohibere aliquid censes obstareque posse?
alterutrum fatearis enim sumasque necessest.
quorum utrumque tibi effugium praecludit et omne 975
cogit ut exempla concedas sine patere.
nam sive est aliquid quod probeat efficiatque
quominus quo missum est veniat finique loceat se,
sive foras fertur, non est a fine profectum.
hoc pacto sequat atque, oras ubicumque locatis 980
extremas, quavram quid telo denique fiat.
fiet uti nusquam possit consistere finis
effugiumque fugae prolatet copia semper.
- (4) praeterea spatium summa totius omne
undique si inclusum certis consisteret oris 985
finitumque foret, iam copia materiai
undique ponderibus solidis conflueret ad imum
nec res ulla geri sub caeli tegmine posset
nec foret omnino caelum neque lumina solis,
quippe ubi materies omnis cumulata iaceret 990
ex infinito iam tempore subsidendo.
at nunc nimirum requies data principiorum
corporibus nullast, quia nil est funditus imum
quo quasi confluere et sedis ubi ponere possint.
semper in assiduo motu res quaeque geruntur 995
paribus in cunctis infernaque suppeditantur
ex infinito cita corpora materiai.

Context: as in A, following the proofs of the atomic nature of body (8B), although Lucretius has inserted between the two passages a digression refuting rival theories of the elements (1.635–920).

Attempts have been made to establish a correlation between these arguments and those in A, but apart from that of A 1–2 with B 1–2 there seems to be little exact correspondence.

961–2 Bailey's 'so that there is seen to be a spot farther than which the nature of our sense cannot follow it' ([154], ad loc.), and the similar versions of other editors, seem to give sensation an inappropriate role in the argument. They are right to link *videtur* (960) and *videatur* (961) with Epicurus' *θεωρεῖται* (A 2), but this later term is one used to span the transition between simple seeing (*θεωρεῖν*) and conceptual viewing (*διὰ λόγου θεωρεῖν*, cf. 11D 4, E 12), and the same point should be intended here. From directly viewing (*videtur*, 960) the fact that everything with an extremity has something else to flank it, one can proceed to a conceptual view (*videatur*, 961) of the applicability of the same principle even beyond the range of actual vision (literally 'in where this kind of sensation no longer reaches', 962).

968–74 Cf. the similar examples used by Archytas, 47 A 24, DK, and the Stoics, 49E.

977–8 The translation 'and bring it about that it arrives not whither it was sped, nor plants itself in the goal . . .' (Bailey) takes *fini* (978) as an ablative, meaning 'in the target'. This involves an improbable change in the sense of *finis*, which elsewhere in the immediate context is 'limit', and introduces the utterly inappropriate idea that the exploratory spear was aimed at a target. It therefore seems better to take *finique locet se* (978) as co-ordinate with the subjunctives in 977, and *fini* as a predicative dative, 'and station *itself* as a limit'. If a body blocks the spear from passing the supposed limit of the universe, that body has a better claim to be called the 'limit' than the initially chosen boundary immediately adjacent to it: hence (979) 'what it started from was not the limit'.

983 Our translation is adopted from Gottschalk [212].

996–7 Lucretius has been arguing that the observed ubiquity of motion conflicts with the view that there is an absolute bottom to the universe. So the point added here is probably that this perpetual motion must exist even below us, where matter is likewise in motion (*uia*) 'from infinity' – either 'out of infinite space' (as at 1.1036, 6.666), or 'from infinite time past' (as at 1.1025, 2.255), perhaps more appropriately to the argument (cf. 995).

C Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 60

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτῳ ἢ κατωτάτῳ οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω, ὡς μέντοι τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς, ὅθεν ἂν στώμεν, εἰς ἀπείρον ἄγειν ὃν μηδὲ ποτε φανεῖσθαι τοῦτο ἡμῖν, ἢ τὸ ὑποκάτω, τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς ἀπείρον ἅμα ἄνω τε εἶναι καὶ κάτω πρὸς τὸ αὐτό. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον διανοηθῆναι. (2) ὥστε ἔστι μίαν λαβεῖν φοράν τὴν ἀνω νοουμένην εἰς ἀπείρον καὶ μίαν τὴν κάτω, ὃν καὶ μυριάκις πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τῶν ἐπάνω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν φερόμενον <εἰς> τοὺς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν τόπους ἀφικνῆται, ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν κάτω 3

φερόμενον' (3) ἡ γὰρ ὅλη φερά οὐθὲν ἦττον ἐκατέρα ἐκατέρα ἀντικειμένη ἐπ' ἀπειρον νοεῖται.

1 ἡ P. καὶ BF 2 οὐθὲν μέντοι Sedley. εἰς μέντοι P. ἴσμεν τοι B. μέντοι FP(corr.) 3 μηδέ ποτε Sedley. μηδέποτε codd. 7 (εἰς) Mühlh (ἐκ) Usener

Context: between 9A and 11E

For other readings of the passage, see especially Bailey [117] ad loc., Mau [205], Konstan [214]. The interpretation adopted here has much in common with the first two.

1-2 For μέν . . . μέντοι, cf. *Ep. Men* 134.

3 οὐθὲν is here taken as the participial form of ἔστι, 'it is possible', used in an accusative absolute construction (cf. Demosthenes 50.22).

3-4 Both instances of τοῦτο are best taken as having the same reference, namely the existence of an absolute top and bottom.

τοῦ νοηθέντος Partitive genitive, principally dependent on τὸ ὑποκάτω, 'the lower part of that which is conceived . . .'

6-9 Man takes the reference to those above and below us to be to situations within our world, e.g. multi-storey buildings; but the implication of the singular τὸ φερόμενον is that even a single trajectory might arrive ten thousand times at the feet of those above, which even allowing for some exaggeration, seems plausible only if multiple worlds are envisaged.

11 Atomic motion

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 43 4

(1) κινούνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ ἄτομοι (φησὶ δὲ ἐνδοτέρῳ καὶ ἰσοσταῶς αὐτὰς κινεῖσθαι τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἰς ἴσιν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κρυφιοτάτῃ καὶ τῇ βαρυτάτῃ) τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διεσπόμεναι, αἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν παλμὸν ἴσχυουσαι, ὅταν τύχωσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλειμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμεναι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν. (2) ἡ τε γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ φύσις ἡ διορίζουσα ἐκάστην αὐτὴν τοῦτο παρασκευάζει, τὴν ὑπέρεισιν οὐχ οὐα τε οὐσα ποιεῖσθαι. (3) ἡ τε στερεότης ἡ ὑπάρχουσα αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ, ἐφ' ὅποσον ἂν ἡ περιπλοκὴ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως δίδῃ. (4) ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, αἰδίων τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσῶν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ.

10

3 αὐτὰς Usener. αὐτοῖς codd. 4 ἴσχυουσαι Bricker. ἴσχυουσιν codd. τῇ περιπλοκῇ Usener. τὴν περιπλοκὴν codd. παρὰ dgr. περί cett. 9 αἰδίων Cassendi. αἰτίων codd.

Context: immediately following 12B.

1-2 The interpolated scholion refers to E.

3-4 For the role of this vibration in the production of simulacra, see 15A 8.

9-10 Cassendi's simple emendation is eminently plausible, but even if the MSS reading were retained, with Bailey ([117] ad loc., 'There is no beginning to these motions, because their cause is the atoms and the void'), the point made would be more or less the same.

(1) si cessare putas rerum primordia posse cessandoque novos rerum progignere motus, avus a vera longe ratione vagaris.	80
(2) nam quoniam per inane vagantur, cuncta necessest aut gravitate sua ferri primordia rerum aut ictu forte alterius. (3) nam <cum> cita saepe	85
obvia confluxere, fit ut diversa repente dissiliant; neque enim mirum, durissima quae sint ponderibus solidis neque quicquam a tergo ibus obstat.	
(4) et quo tactati magis omnia materiai corpora pervideas, reminiscere totius imum	90
nil esse in summa, neque habere ubi corpora prima consistant, quoniam spatium sine fine modoquest, immensumque patere in cunctas undique partis pluribus ostendi et certa ratione probatumst.	
quod quoniam constat; nimirum nulla quies est reddita corporibus primis per inane profundum.	95
(5) sed magis assiduo varioque exercita motu partim intervallis magnis confulta resultant, pars etiam brevibus spatiis vexantur ab ictu.	
(6) et quaecumque magis condense conciliatu exiguus intervallis convecta resultant,	100
indupedita suis perplexis ipsa figuris, haec validas saxi radices et fera ferri corpora constituunt et cetera <de> genere horum.	
paucula quae porro magnum per inane vagantur cetera dissiliunt longe longeque recursant in magnis intervallis, haec aera rarum	105
sufficiunt nobis et splendida lumina solis; multaque praeterea magnum per inane vagantur, conciliis rerum quae sunt reiecta nec usquam	110
consociare etiam motus potuere recepta.	
(7) cuius, uti memoro, rei simulactum et imago ante oculos semper nobis versatur et instat. contemplator enim, cum solis lumina cumque inserti fundunt radii per opaca domorum:	115
multa minuta modis multis per inane videbis corpora misceri radiorum lumine in ipso et velut aeterno certamine proelia pugnās edere turmatim certantia nec dare pausam, conciliis et discidiis exercita crebris;	120

conicere ut possis ex hoc, primordia rerum
 quale sit in magno iactari semper inani.
 dumtaxat rerum magnarum parva potest res
 exemplare dare et vestigia notitiae.

85 <cum> Lachmann 88. ergo ibi. Voss: *argutus* codd. 105 *paucula* L. *utera* (ex 106)
 Merrill 106 *cetera* OGG: *paucula* (ex 105) Merrill

Context: the opening stages of Lucretius' account of atomic motion.

80-1 Lucretius has just been explaining the continuity of natural processes as due to the reciprocal character of all motion and change in the world (2.67-79), and this leads him to note that if, contrary to his view, atoms could come to a halt, it would correspondingly be necessary to suppose that they could restart their motion from scratch.

89-96 Cf. 10B 4.

105-6 These lines have caused much difficulty (see Bailey [154] *ad loc.*), but the text is quite intelligible provided *paucula* is understood as 'few and far between', i.e. 'widely scattered', cf. 3.278, 4.71.

112-24 For this traditional atomist simile, cf. Democritus frs. 200-3, 206 Luria.

121-4 The analogy does not prove the perpetual motion of atoms, but offers a model to aid our conception of it, *notitiae* (124) probably translates *προλήψεως* (on which see 17).

C Lucretius 2.142-64.

- (1) nunc quae mobilitas sit reddita materiai
 corporibus paucis licet hinc cognoscere, Memmi.
 (2) primum aurora novo cum spargit lumine terras
 et variae volucres nemora avia pervolitantes 145
 aera per tenerum liquidis loca vocibus opplent,
 quam subito soleat sol ortus tempore tali
 convestire sua perfundens omnia luce.
 omnibus in promptu manifestumque esse videmus.
 at vapor is quem sol mittit lumenque serenum 150
 non per inane meat vacuum: quo tardius ire
 cogitur, aërias quasi dum diverberat undas.
 nec singillatim corpusecula quaeque vaporis
 sed complexa meant inter se conque globata;
 quapropter simul inter se retrahuntur et extra 155
 officiuntur, uti cogantur tardius ire.
 (3) at quae sunt solida primordia simplicitate,
 cum per inane meant vacuum nec res remoratur
 ulla foris atque ipsa suis e partibus unum
 unum in quem coepere locum conixa feruntur, 160
 debent nimirum praecellere mobilitate
 et multo citius ferri quam lumina solis

multiplexque loci spatium transcurrere eodem
tempore quo solis pervulgant fulgura caelum.

Context: shortly after B.

The comparison is, of course, between the speed of individual atoms and the perceptible speed of light. The individual atoms composing the light all travel at the uniform atomic speed, but in complex patterns of motion which retard their linear progress: cf. D 2, E 4.

D Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 46–7 (–15A 2)

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ φορὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψάντων γινομένη πᾶν μήκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινοσήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ. (2) βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους ἀντικοπή καὶ οὐκ ἀντικοπή ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει. (3) οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἅμα κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους αὐτὸ τὸ φερόμενον σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται ἄδιανόητον γάρ. (4) καὶ τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δῆποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἂν περιλάβωμεν τὴν φορὰν τόπου ἔσται ἀφιστάμενον. (5) ἀντικοπή γὰρ ὅμοιον ἔσται, κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀντικοπή ὅν καταλίπωμεν. (6) χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον.

5 αὐτὸ Muhl: κατὰ codd.: καὶ Usener. 8 τοσούτοι: Fl: τούτου B. 9 ἀντικοπή ὅν Sedley. ἀντικοπεῖν B? ἀντικοπτέον Fl(corr.): ἀντικοπτόμενον Meibom: ἀντικύπτου vel ἀντίκοπον Usener: ἀντικοπέν Muhl

Context: proof of the enormous speed of images (see 15A). The principle is presented by Epicurus as an entirely general one about atomic motion, although it is here, in the theory of vision, that its chief usefulness lies.

3–4 Cf. E 4.

4 τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους See on E 11–12.

5–8 These lines are problematic, and have been construed in a number of different ways. We suggest, at all events, that ἀδιάνοητον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο can hardly be taken together, as in the MSS and many editions, since in what precedes nothing else has been dismissed, even implicitly, as inconceivable. The compound συναφικνεῖσθαι, which occurs only here, ought to mean 'arrive jointly (with something else)', not 'arrive simultaneously (with its departure)': so presumably Epicurus is now talking about perceptible arrivals of atoms (cf. ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ), and chooses a verb which will allow for the fact that atoms only arouse sense-perception when arriving in aggregations like the images which cause vision.

E Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 61–2

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ ἰσοσταχεῖς ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι, ὅταν διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ εἰσφέρωνται μηθενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος. (2) οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα θάττον οἰσθήσεται τῶν μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, ὅταν γε δὴ μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῖς· οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μεγάλων, πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα, ὅταν μηθέν μηδὲ

ἐκείνοις ἀντικόπτῃ· (3) οὐθ' ἡ ἄνω οὐθ' ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων 5
 φορά, οὐθ' αἱ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν. ἐφ' ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχη
 ἐκάτερον, ἐπὶ τοσούτον ἄμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει, ἕως ἀντικόψῃ ἢ
 ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλῆξαντος δύναμιν. (4) ἀλλὰ 10
 μᾶλλον καὶ κατὰ τὰς συγκρίσεις θάπτων ἑτέρα ἑτέρας ῥηθήσεται τῶν ἀτόμων
 ἰσοταχῶν οὐδῶν, τῷ ἐφ' ἓνα τόπον φέρεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀθροίσμασιν 10
 ἀτόμους καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῆ χρόνον, εἰ μὴ ἐφ' ἓνα κατὰ τοὺς
 λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους· ἀλλὰ πυκνὸν ἀντικόπτουσι, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν
 αἰσθησθῶν τὸ συνεχές τῆς φορᾶς γίνηται. τὸ γὰρ προσδοκῶμενον περὶ τοῦ
 ἀοράτου, ὡς ἄρα καὶ οἱ διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ χρόνοι τὸ συνεχές τῆς φορᾶς ἔξουσιν, οὐκ 15
 ἀληθές ἐστι· ἐπὶ τῶν τοιαύτων· ἐπεὶ τό γε θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον
 τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐπτι.

6 αἱ BP: ἡ P (note) F 7 ἐκατέρων Ussid.: ἐκάτερον Usener

Context: immediately following 10C.

5-6 Strictly θάπτων αἰσθήσεται from 2 3 should be understood here, but by now the predicate to be supplied from the previous sentence can be taken simply as 'will differ in speed'. That explains the plural αἱ of the best MSS: it is important that the different types of motion listed do not differ in speed, but equally important that even within a single type, among downward motions themselves, one is not faster than another 'because of their individual weights' (cf H 3).

6-7 ἐκατέρων does not require the usual emendation to -ον, but can be taken as a partitive genitive with ἐφ' ὅποσον (for which see Ep. Pyth 110), 'to whatever distance of either ones', i.e. 'however far along either kind of trajectory', the reference of the plural ἐκατέρων being (a) upwards and sideways motions due to impacts, and (b) downward motions due to weights. κατίσχη (tentatively translated 'gets') is difficult: the only plausible parallel is at Herodotus 3.28, where κατίσχειν ἐπὶ . . . is used of a flash of light 'reaching' something.

11-12 The two kinds of time mentioned here are a subject of controversy, cf. Mau [203], 41ff. What is fairly clear is that 'times seen by reason' here and at D 4 are periods of time too short to be detected by the senses, as 15D 794 6 confirms. But there is no implication in the expression λόγῳ θεωρητός that the times are indivisible, as is widely held, and the uses to which they are put in these passages do not require that they be. (For indivisible times, see on G: it is suggested in vol. 1 that this element of the Epicurean theory postdates Ep. Hdt.) These imperceptible times most naturally contrast with perceptible times, as at D 4 6 and 15D 794-6, and the argument itself seems to require that 'the smallest continuous time' at 11 similarly be perceptible. The common-sense objection that Epicurus is imagining will be that, *to all appearances*, all the particles in a moving body move with the body and at the same speed as it. Mau's suggestion that 'the smallest continuous time' is still imperceptible (although not partless, as he takes the λόγῳ θεωρητοὶ χρόνοι to be) would rob the objection of any force; and besides, Epicurus' answer at 13-16 shows that he takes the objection to rest on a false inference from the visible to the invisible. So the 'smallest continuous time' ought to be a perceptible time. It is, presumably, not the shortest perceptible time, but the shortest timespan within which some continuity of motion can be detected. The

shortest perceptible time would be seen as partless, so that no change could be discerned during it (cf. 9A 7).

13-16 Cf. Furley [241], 614-16; Sedley [126], 24-5. Given the disparity, in this instance, between the macroscopic and the microscopic, the objector's error must lie in his analogical inference from the one to the other, and not in the macroscopic appearances themselves, which on Epicurus' epistemological theory must be true (see 16).

15 τὸ θεωρούμενον 'What is seen'. For κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ, see vol. 1, 90, on the 'focusing of thought into an impression'.

F Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 938,17-22 (Usener 277)

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν πᾶν μέγεθος διαιρετόν, οὐχ οἶόν τε ἦν τὸ βραδύτερον αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἑλαττον κινεῖσθαι τοῦ θάττονος· τὸ γὰρ ἄτομον καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τὸ θάττον διέρχεται καὶ τὸ βραδύτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἐν πλείονι, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἑλαττόν τι τοῦ ἀμεροῦς διελεύσεται. διὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἀρέσκει ἰσοταχῶς πάντα διὰ τῶν ἀμερῶν κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ τὰ ἄτομα αὐτῶν διαιρεύμενα μηκέτι ἄτομα ᾖ.

Context: commentary on *Physics* vi.2, 232a23ff.

Simplicius ignores the Epicurean technical distinction between a minimum partless entity and an atom (on which see 8-9).

G Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 934,18-30 (Usener 278, part)

ἐπάγει δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἄτοπον ἀκολουθοῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει, τὸ κενεῖσθαι τι μὴ πρῶτον κινούμενον, οἷον βεβαδεδίκεναι τι μὴ πρῶτον βαδίσαν. κείτῃς μὲν γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τὸ Ω τὴν ΔΕΖ κίνησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ΑΒΓ μεγέθους· οὔτε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α κινεῖται, κενεῖται γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Β, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Γ· τὴν ὅλην ἄρα κίνησιν κενεῖται ἔσται μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὴν πρότερον ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντῃ ἀπίθαιον ταύτῃν τέθεικε τὴν ἔνστασιν, δηλοῖ τὸ καὶ θέντος αὐτὴν καὶ διαλύσαντος τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ὁμῶς, ὕστερον γενομένουσιν οὕτως λέγειν τὴν κίνησιν γίνεσθαι. ἐξ ἀμερῶν γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ὅλου μεγέθους τοῦ ἐξ ἀμερῶν συνεσιώτους κινεῖσθαι λέγουσι τὸ κινούμενον, καθ' ἑκάστον δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀμερῶν οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ κενεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ εἰ τεθείη καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅλου κινούμενον, διαιρετὰ αὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι.

5 ἀπίθαιον codd.: πιθανόν Furley

Context: commentary on *Physics* vi.1, 232a1-17.

7-8 Indivisible units of time are represented as Epicurean only here, at S. E. M. 10 142, and at P. Herc. 698, fr 23 N (Scott [149], 296); the evidence for them in the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia, P. Herc. 1012, 48 1-15 is textually too insecure (see Sorabji [22], 373-6). Anyone adopting the staccato theory of motion might be tempted to include them, both because Diodorus had done so (fr 17-24) and because Aristotle had argued (*Phys.* vi.1, 231b18-232a22), if less than cogently (see Sorabji [22], 366-7), that either magnitude, time and motion all consist of indivisibles or none

do. But if Epicurus did indeed follow these leads, his precise reasoning does not survive. It could have been done by re-applying his arguments at 9A 1-6 against infinitely divisible magnitudes.

H Lucretius 2.216-50

- (1) illud in his quoque rebus cognoscere avemus,
 corpora cum deorsum rectum per mane feruntur
 ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme
 incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum,
 tantum quod momē mutatum dicere possis. 220
- (2) quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum,
 imbris uti guttae, caderent per inane profundum,
 nec foret offensus natus nec plaga creata
 principis: ita nil unquam natura creasset.
- (3) quod si forte aliquis credit graviora potesse 225
 corpora, quo citius rectum per mane feruntur,
 incidere ex supero levioribus atque ita plagas
 gignere quae possint genitalis reddere motus,
 avius a vera longe ratione recedit.
 nam per aquas quaecumque cadunt atque aera rarum, 230
 haec pro ponderibus casus celerare necessest
 propterea quia corpus aquae naturaeque tenuis
 aeris haud possunt aeque rem quamque morari,
 sed citius cedunt gravioribus exsuperata.
 at contra nulli de nulla parte neque ullo 235
 tempore inane potest vacuum subsistere rei,
 quin, sua quod natura petit, concedere pergat:
 omnia quapropter debent per inane quietum
 aeque ponderibus non aequis concita ferri.
 haud igitur poterunt levioribus incidere unquam 240
 ex supero graviora neque ictus gignere per se
 qui variant motus per quos natura gerat res.
 (4) quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necessest
 corpora; nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus
 obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet. 245
 namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,
 pondera, quantum in sest, non posse obliqua meare,
 ex supero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis,
 sed nil omnino <recta> regione viar
 declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese? 250

240 recte add. L. <nulla> Lachmann

Context: the laws of atomic motion.

For the same argument, see Cicero, *Fin.* 1.18–20, *Fat.* 22.

243 **etiam atque etiam** This may conceivably qualify *inclinare* 'atoms swerve again and again' (thus Kleve [257]), but it would be characteristic of Lucretius to mean 'again and again [say]', as at 1.295.

244 **minimum** This translates ἐλάχιστον. That the swerve is by exactly one minimum is also reported at 18G 6; Cicero, *Fin.* 1.19, *Fat.* 22, 46; Plutarch, *An. proc.* 1051C, *Soll. ap.* 964C.

§ Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.85–6, 97, 118–20

κομίζεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐμβριθὴς ὑπόμνησις εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπὸ Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, δι' ἧς παρίστησιν ὅτι κινεῖται μὲν οὐδὲ ἔν, κεκίνηται δέ. καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν, τοῦτο ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι ταῖς κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἡμερῶν ὑποθέσεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἡμέρῃς σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν ἡμερεῖ τόπω περιέχεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι (ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτὸν, δεῖ δὲ τόπον ἔχειν μέζονα τῷ κινησόμενῳ) μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κινήσῃ. ὥστε οὐδὲ κινεῖται. κεκίνηται δὲ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ θεωρούμενον, τοῦτο ἐν ἐτέρῳ νῦν θεωρεῖται τόπῳ· ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἐγγόνει μὴ κινήθηντος αὐτοῦ. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπαρήγγειν θελήσας τῷ οἰκείῳ δόγματι ἀποπῶν τι προσήκατο· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀποπῶν τὸ μηδενὸς κινουμένου λέγειν τι κενωθῆναι;

τοιαῦται μὲν αἱ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐνστάσεις, δοκεῖ δὲ Διοδώρου πρὶς τὴν πρώτην εὐθὺς ὑπηγηθέναι διδάσκειν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τῶν συνελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ἄντων τὰ ταύτων παρατακτικῶ ψευδῇ τυγχάνειν. ἔστιν γὰρ τίνα πρὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ γενναμιγνέσθαι καὶ ἔτιρον μετ' ἐνιαυτόν. οὐκ οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτων τὸ μὲν "οὗτοι ἐγγίμην" ἐξίωμα συνελεστικὸν ὃν ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, τὸ δ' "οὗτοι γαμοῦσι" παρατακτικὸν καθεστώσ ψεύδος ἐστίν· ὅτε γὰρ οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὕτω οὗτος ἐγάμει, καὶ ὅτε οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὐκέτι οὗτος ἐγάμει. τότε δ' ἂν ἦν ἀληθὲς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ οὗτοι γαμοῦσιν, εἰ ὁμοίως ἐγάμουσιν. δύναται οὖν τοῦ συνελεστικοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἄντης ψεύδος εἶναι τὸ ταύτων παρατακτικόν . . . ὅθεν τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας ἐπιχειρήσεις παρατηρεῖται, ἐκείνοις δὲ μάλιστα χρησιτέον τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, νῦν κινεῖται· εἰ νῦν κινεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται, ἐν ἡμερεῖ χρόνῳ ἄρα κινεῖται. εἰ γὰρ μερίζεται ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος, πάντως εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα μερισθῆσεται, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐνεστώτης. εἰ δ' ἐν ἡμερεῖ χρόνῳ τι κινεῖται, ἡμερίστους τύπους διέρχεται. εἰ δὲ ἡμερίστους τύπους διέρχεται, οὐ κινεῖται. ὅτε γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἡμερεῖ τόπῳ, οὐ κινεῖται· ἐπὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἡμερεῖ τόπῳ. ὅτε δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἡμερεῖ τόπῳ, πάλιν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ κεκίνηται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι.

Context: does motion exist?

8 οἰκείῳ δόγματι The staccato account of motion was, then, Diodorus' own doctrine (albeit with strong Aristotelian antecedents, cf. 9e), not just a dialectical ploy. It probably served his formally Eleatic stance, redeeming the sensible world by analysing motion as a succession of static positions (see Denyer [209]).

12–16 For further examples in support of Diodorus' logical thesis, see S.E., *M.* 10.98–102.

17–24 The passage contains no attribution to Diodorus, and indeed at 5 F., *M.* 10.143 Sextus shows that he himself does not know the thesis of indivisible units of time to be Diodorean. Nevertheless, a powerful case for a Diodorean origin is made by Denyer [209] and Sorabji [22], 19

21–2 A feature of the (presumed) Diodorean theory, not replicated in Epicurus' version, is the derivation of the existence of partless magnitudes from that of partless times (although there is no reason to doubt that Diodorus, like Epicurus in 9A 3. 6. C 3, also used arguments of a Zenonian nature against infinite divisibility). As Denyer [209] has shown, the derivation is valid provided Diodorus is allowed the further premise that an object moving from A to B must pass through all intervening places.

12 Microscopic and macroscopic properties

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 55–6

(1) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δεῖ νομίζειν πᾶν μέγεθος ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρῇ· (2) παραλλαγὰς δέ τινας μεγεθῶν νομιστέον εἶναι. βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ τούτου προσόντος τὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις γινόμενα ἀποδοθῆσεται. (3) πᾶν δὲ μέγεθος ὑπάρχον οὔτε χρήσιμόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ποιότητων διαφορὰς, ἀφίχθαι τε ἀμέλει 5
(ἔδει) καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰς ἀτόμους· ἢ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον, οὐθ' ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατῇ ἄτομος ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι.

1 δεῖ Casaubon: δεῖ codd. 4 ὑπάρχει codd: ὑπάρχει Usener 5 ἢ ἀμέλει (ἔδει) Sedley
ἀμέλει codd. 6 μ' ἔδει Usener 6 οὐθ' Usener: οὐθ' codd

Context: immediately following **D**.

For Epicurus' target, Democritus' supposition of very large atoms, see Democritus fr. 207 Luria. It is widely doubted that Democritus can have held such an outrageous view. But it is a natural outcome of his οὐ μᾶλλον principle, by which any upper limit would be judged arbitrary and indefensible. Our failure to observe large atoms would be easily explained by his thesis (fr. 295, 382–3 Luria, cf. fr. 316) that in the cosmic vortex the largest atoms sink to the bottom—far down beneath us. Enormous atoms would admittedly weaken atomism's resilience to Zeno's divisibility paradoxes; but the idea is reported as an innovation on Democritus' part (fr. 206 Luria), and may date from a period in which the Zenonian threat had receded from prominence and atomist cosmology was being explored in its own right.

B Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 42–3

(1) πρὸς τε τούτοις τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μεστά, ἐξ ὧν καὶ αἱ συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ᾗ διαλύονται, ἀπερίληπτά ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν γενέσθαι τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιελημμένων. (2) καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ σχηματίσιν ἀπλῶς ἀπειροὶ εἰσὶν αἱ ὁμοίαι, ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀπειροὶ ἀλλὰ 5
μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι (οὐδὲ γὰρ φησὶν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἀπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν. λέγει δέ, ἐπεὶ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται), εἰ μέλλει τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἀπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν.

6 λέγει Hermann: λέγει codd.: λέγει Usener

Context: immediately following **10A**.

6-7 The scholion is rightly ended at μεταβάλλονται by Mühlh; most editors include the words which follow, but these appear to be part of Epicurus' argument, cf. C 2. The scholion is a rather inefficient reference to D's argument that there must be something, viz. atoms, to survive all qualitative change. The emendation λήγει is irresistible—'it [division] comes to an end'—but there is no need to emend further to produce an infinitive, with Usener, since the scholiast is quite capable of shifting from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta* in this way, cf. *Ep. Hdt.* 44 fin.

7-8 The vagueness of this argument no doubt arises from the fact that it precedes, and hence cannot invoke, Epicurus' proofs of an upper limit to atomic size (A) and of minimal magnitudes (9A). In Lucretius (cf. C) the order has been suitably adjusted.

C Lucretius 2.478-531

- (1) quod quoniam docui, pergā conectere rem quae
ex hoc apta fidem ducat, primordia rerum
finita variare figurarum ratione. 480
- (2) quod si non ita sit, rursum iam semina quaedam
esse infinito debebunt corporis auctu.
namque in eadem una cuiusvis iam brevitate
corporis inter se multum variare figurae
non possunt: fac enim minimis e partibus esse 485
corpora prima tribus, vel paulo pluribus auge;
nempe ubi eas partis unius corporis omnis,
summa atque ima locans, transmutans dextera laevis,
omnimodis expertus eris, quam quisque det ordo
formae speciem totius corporis eius, 490
quod superest, si forte voles variare figuras,
addendum partis alias erit; inde sequetur,
assimili ratione alias ut postulet ordo,
si tu forte voles etiam variare figuras:
ergo formarum novitatem corporis augmen 495
subsequitur, quare non est ut credere possis
esse infinitis distantia semina formis,
ne quaedam cogas immani maximitate
esse, supra quod iam docui non posse probari.
- (3) iam tibi barbaricae vestes Meliboeaque fulgens 500
purpura Thessalico concharum tacta colore,
aurea pavonum ridenti imbuta lepore
saccla, novo rerum superata colore iacerent
et contemptus odor smyrnae mellisque saporēs,
et cynea mele Phoebeaque daedala chordis 505
carmina consimili ratione oppressa silerent,
namque aliis aliud praestantius exoriretur.

cedere item retro possent in deteriores
omnia sic partis, ut diximus in meliores.
namque aliis aliud retro quoque tætrius esset 510
naribus auribus atque oculis orisque saporī.
quæ quoniam non sunt, (sed) rebus reddita certa
finis utrimque tenet summam, fateare necessest
materiem quoque finitis differre figuris.
(4) denique ab ignibus ad gelidas hiemum usque pruinas 515
finitumst retroque pari ratione remensumst.
omnis enim calor ac frigus mediique tepores
interutrasque iacent explentes ordine summam.
ergo finita distant ratione creata,
incipiti quoniam mucroni utrimque notantur, 520
hinc flammis illinc rigidis infesta pruinis.
(5) quod quoniam docui, pergā coniectere rem quæ
ex hoc apta fidem ducat, primordia rerum,
inter se simili quæ sunt perfecta figura,
infinita cluere. etenim distantia cum sit 525
formatarum finita, necesse est quæ similes sint
esse infinitas aut summam materiai
finitam constare, id quod non esse probavi
versibus ostendens corpuscula materiai
ex infinito summam rerum usque tenere, 530
undique protelo plagatum continuato.

Context: following the illustrations at 2.381–477 (including F) of the explanatory value of atomic shape. But Lucretius intended to insert between the two passages a proof, corresponding to A, of the limited range of atomic sizes. He refers to such a proof implicitly at 481–2 and explicitly at 498–9. That it was meant to stand immediately before C can be inferred from 478–9, where *hæc* must refer to it, and not to the theme of 381–477.

485–96 See the helpful comments of Furley [204], 41–3.

528–31 The reference is to 10B.

D Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 54–5

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος συμφυῇ ἐστί. (2) ποιότης γὰρ πᾶσα μεταβάλλει· αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσιν, ἐπειδὴ περ δεῖ τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς 5
διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον, ὃ τὰς μεταβολὰς οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ποιήσεται οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις ἐν πολλοῖς, τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους. (3) ὅθεν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ μὴ μετατιθέμενα ὁφθαρτα εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ὄγκους δὲ καὶ σχηματισμοὺς ἰδίους (ταῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον)

ὑπομένειν. (4) καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μετασχηματιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν 10
 περιαίρεσιν τὸ σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται, αἱ δὲ ποιότητες οὐκ
 ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι, ὥσπερ ἐκείνο καταλείπεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ
 ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι. (5) ἱκανὰ οὖν τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα ταῦτα τὰς
 τῶν συγκρίσεων διαφορὰς ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ περ ὑπολείπεσθαι γέ τινα 15
 ἀναγκαῖον καὶ (μὴ) εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι.

7 μὴ del. Weil δὴ Usener μὲν Kochalsky 9-11 ταῦτα (εἰς) codd. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον
 ὑπομένειν Meibom 15 (μὴ) Aldobrandinus

Context: immediately following 15A.

1-2 In the remainder of the passage ποιότητες are secondary properties only; so also probably at A 5. The implication, here alone, that they include primary properties like shape may be the result of carelessness of expression.

7 μὴ is unjustifiably excised by all editors except Bollack [122]. Since it has been established (4-7, echoing 8A) that change can only be by transference of parts, it is a perfectly proper inference that *those things which do not admit of transference of parts*, the atoms, cannot change, and, more specifically, cannot change their mass or shape (7-10).

10-13 Cf. E 4.

13-15 Epicurus has maintained in 10-13 that in the process of pulverizing a sensible body a primary property like shape endures even when secondary properties – odour, for example – have vanished. But how do we know that the primary properties which are left (τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα ταῦτα) do not also perish as the process continues? That is, in effect, the question which the ἐπειδὴ περ ... clause answers: *something* must survive the process, if there is not to be destruction into nothing; and that something can only be the primary properties (which are in themselves sufficient to account for all macroscopic *explananda*).

E Lucretius 2.730-833 (with omissions)

(1) nunc age dicta meo dulci quaesita labore 730
 percipe, ne forte haec albis ex alba rearis
 principiis esse, ante oculos quae candida cernis,
 aut ea quae nigrant nigro de semine nata;
 nive alium quonvis quae sunt imbuta colorem,
 propterea gerere hunc credas, quod materiai 735
 corpora consimili sint eius tineta colore.
 nullus enim color est omnino materiai
 corporibus, neque par rebus neque denique dispar.
 (2) in quae corpora si nullus tibi forte videtur 740
 posse animi iniectus fieri, procul avius erras.
 nam cum caecigem, solis qui lumina numquam
 dispexere, tamen cognoscant corpora tactu
 ex ineunte aevo nullo coniuncta colore,
 scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse

verti in notitiam nullo circumlita fuco.	745
denique nos ipsi caecis quaecumque tenebris tangimus, haud ullo sentimus tineta colore . . .	
(3) praeterea si nulla coloris principis est reddita natura et variis sunt praedita formis, e quibus omne genus gignunt variantque colores, propterea magni quod refert semina quaeque cum quibus et quali positura contineantur et quos inter se dent motus accipiantque, perfacile extemplo rationem reddere possis cur ea quae nigro fuerint paulo ante colore, marmoreo fieri possint candore repente;	760 765
ut mare, cum magni commorant aequora venti, vertitur in canos candenti marmore fluctus. dicere enim possis, nigrum quod saepe videmus, materies ubi permixta est illius et ordo principis mutatus et addita demptaque quaedam, continuo id fieri ut candens videatur et album.	770
quod si caeruleis constarent aequora ponti seminibus, nullo possent albescere pacto. nam quocumque modo perturbes caerulea quae sint, numquam in marmoreum possunt migrare colorem . . .	775
(4) quin etiam quanto in partis res quaeque minutas distrahitur magis, hoc magis est ut cernere possis evanescere paulatim stinguique colorem; ut fit ubi in parvas partis discerpitur austrum: purpura poeniceusque color clarissimu' multo, filatim cum distractum est, disperditur omnis; noscere ut hinc possis prius omnem efflare colorem particulas quam discedant ad semina rerum.	830

Context: the start of the third main section of book 2, on the absence of secondary properties from atoms (For a similar argument, see Philodemus, *Sig.* 18.3-10.)

740 **animi iniectus** Probably: ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (see 17).

745 **notitiam** Probably = πρόληψιν (see 17).

F Lucretius 2.381-407

(1) perfacile est animi ratione exsolvere nobis quare fulmineus multo penetrabilior ignis quam noster fluat e caedis terrestribus ortus. dicere enim possis caelestem fulminis ignem subtilem magis e parvis constare figuris atque ideo transire foramina quae nequit ignis	385
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noster hic e lignis ortus caedaque creatus.
 (2) praeterea lumen per cornum transit, at imber
 respuitur. quare? nisi luminis illa minora
 corpora sunt quam de quibus est liquor altius aquatum. 390
 (3) et quamvis subito per columi vina videmus
 perfluere, at contra tardum cunctatur olivum,
 aut quia nimirum maioribus est elementis
 aut magis hamatis inter se perque plicatis,
 atque ideo fit uti non tam diducta repente 395
 inter se possint primordia singula quaeque
 singula per cuiusque foramina permanare.
 (4) huc accedit uti mellis lactisque liquores
 iucundo sensu linguae tractentur in ore;
 at contra caetra absinthii natura ferique 400
 centauri foedo pertorquent ora sapore;
 ut facile agnoscas e levibus atque rutundis
 esse ea quae sensus iucunde tangere possunt,
 at contra quae amara atque aspera cunctique videntur,
 haec magis hamatis inter se nexa teneti 405
 proptereaque solere vias rescindere nostris
 sensibus introituque suo perumpere corpus.

Context: in the section (2.333-477) on the wide variety of atomic shapes and sizes, which immediately precedes C.

13 Cosmology without teleology

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 43

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν, οἷθ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ καὶ οἱ ἀνόμοιοι. αἱ τε
 γὰρ ἄτομοι ἄπειραι οὔσαι, ὥς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη, φέρονται καὶ παρρηϊάτιμ.
 οὐ γὰρ κατανήλυνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἄτομοι, ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένηται κόσμος ἢ ὑφ'
 ὧν ἂν ποιηθεῖ, οὐτ' εἰς ἓνα οὐτ' εἰς πεπερασμένους, οὔθ' ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι 5
 οὔθ' ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις. ὥστε οὐδὲν τὸ ἐμποδοσατήσόν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν
 ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων.

i καὶ οἱ P καὶ BF

Context: shortly after 11A.

B Epicurus, *Ep. Pyth.* 88

κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχὴ τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ
 φαινόμενα περιέχουσα, ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ καταλή-
 γουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ οὐ λυομένου πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ
 σύγχυσις λήψεται καὶ λήγουσα ἢ ἐν περιεγομένῳ ἢ ἐν στάσει ἔχοντι καὶ

στρογγύλην ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ ὅταν δῆποτε περιγραφὴν πανταχῶς γὰρ 5
ἐνδέχεται τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ (ἐν) τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ,
ἐν ᾧ λήγον οὐκ ἔστι καταλαβεῖν.

2-3 κατα-secl. Mühl. 4 καὶ λήγουσα (Lewentz) καὶ λήγουσαν (Mühl.) 5 (ἐν) (Cobet)

Context: immediately following the *Letter to Pytharches*' methodological introduction at 18C.

2 'The infinite' is probably the infinite void (cf. 23m with note), and being 'cut off' from it may be no more than having firm boundaries. In a way that e.g. a free-falling shower of atoms (as in 11H) does not. Cf. the account of world formation attributed to Leucippus at D.L. 9.31 (67.4.1 DK, KRS 563): φέρεσθαι κατὰ ἀποτομήν ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου πολλὰ οὔματα . . . εἰς μέγα κενόν.

4 Cf. 18D and *Ep. Pyth.* 92: in our world we cannot tell whether what revolves is the heaven itself or just the heavenly bodies.

5-7 The multiple possibilities are all those mentioned in 2.5. All concern the outermost layer of a world – which in our own world is quite unavailable to inspection. For the 'non-contestation' methodology, see 18.

C Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 73-4

(1) ἐπὶ τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους δεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν 5
πεπερασμένην τὸ δημοιῶδες τοῖς θεωρουμένοις πυκνὸν ἔχουσιν νομίζειν
γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων
ἀποκεκριμένων καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων· (2) καὶ πάλιν διαλύεσθαι
πάντα, τὰ μὲν θάττον, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε, τὰ 5
δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε τοῦτο πάσχοντα.

Context: following 7B

3 γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου I.e. as in B 2, by being separated off from the infinite void.

4-6 For the mortality of worlds, see note on G.

D Lucretius 2.1052-1104 (with omissions)

(1) nullo tam pacto veri simile esse putandum est,
undique cum versum spatium vacet infinitum
seminaque innumero numero summaque profunda
multumodis volitent aeterno pericula motu, 1055
hunc unum terrarum orbem caelumque creatum,
nil agere illa foris tot corpora material . . .
(2) huc accedit ut in summa res nulla sit una,
unica quae gignatur et unica solaque crescat,
quin alicuius sit saeculi permultaque eodem
sint genere, in primis animalibus inique mentem: 1080
invenies sic montivagum genus esse ferarum,
sic hominum gentem prolem, sic denique mutas

squamigerum pecudes et corpora cuncta volantum.
 quapropter caelum simili ratione fatendumst
 terramque et solem lunam mare, cetera quae sunt, 1085
 non esse unica, sed numero magis innumerali;
 quandoquidem vitae depactus terminus alte
 tam manet haec et tam nativo corpore constant,
 quam genus omne quod hic generatimst rebus abundans.
 (3) quae bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur 1090
 libera continuo dominis privata superbis
 ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere experts.
 nam pro sancta deum tranquilla pectora pace
 quae placidum degunt aevum vitamque serenam,
 quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi 1095
 indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas,
 quis pariter caelos omnis convertere et omnis
 ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces,
 omnibus inve locis esse omni tempore praesto,
 nubibus ut tenebras faciat caelique serena 1100
 concutiat sonitu, tum fulmina mittat et aedes
 saepe suas disturbet et in deserta recedens
 saeviat, exercens telum quod saepe nocentis
 praeterit exanimatque indignos inque merentis?

1089 *hic* Bernays *generatimst* Munro: *his generatim* QV *abundans* O. *abundat* Marullus. *abundant* QV 1094 *aevum vitamque* Avancius: *aevum multamque* (Q)V

Context: digression, following the denial of secondary attributes for atoms at 2.730–1022 (including 12E).

E Lucretius 4.823–57

(1) illud in his rebus vitium vehementer avemus [822]
 te fugere, errorem vitareque praemetuenter, [823]
 lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata, 825 [824]
 prospicere ut possimus, et ut proferte queamus [825]
 proceros passus, ideo fastigia posse
 surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari,
 brachia tum porro validis ex apta lacertis
 esse manusque datas utraque <ex> parte ministras, 830
 ut facere ad vitam possemus quae foret usus.
 cetera de genere hoc inter quaecumque pretantur
 omnia perversa praepostera sunt ratione,
 (2) nil ideo quoniam naturamst in corpore ut uti
 possemus, sed quod naturamst id procreat usum. 835
 nec fuit ante videre oculorum lumina nata

nec dictis orare prius quam lingua creatast,
 sed potius longe linguae praecessit origo
 sermonem multoque creatae sunt prius aures
 quam sonus est auditus, et omnia denique membra 840
 ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam foret usus.
 haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causa.
 (3) at contra conferte manu certamina pugnae
 et lacerare artus fodareque membra cruore
 ante fuit multo quam lucida tela volarent, 845
 et vulnus vitare prius natura coggit
 quam daret obiectum parvae laeva per artem.
 scilicet et fessum corpus mandare quieti
 multo antiquius est quam lecti molha strata,
 et sedare sitim prius est quam pocula natum. 850
 haec igitur possent utendi cognita causa
 credier, ex usu quae sunt vitaeque reperta.
 (4) illa quidem sorsum sunt omnia quae prius ipsa
 nata dedere suae post notitiam utilitatis.
 quo genere in primis sensus et membra videmus; 855
 quare etiam atque etiam procul est ut credere possis
 utilitatis ob officium potuisse creati.

823 *avemus* Bernays *inhaurans* Marullus *invenit* OQ 824 *te fugere* Bailey, *effugere* OQ
Lachmann: via OQ [826] ante 822 *transiit* Q¹ 830 <ex> Lachmann

820 *quarimus*

Context: digression immediately following 15D.

F Lucretius 3.156–234

(1) dicere porro hominum causa voluisse parare
 praeclaram mundi naturam propterea
 allaudabile opus divum laudare decere
 aeternumque putare atque immortale futurum
 nec fas esse, deum quod sit ratione vetusta 160
 gentibus humanis fundatum perpetuo aeo,
 sollicitate suis illa vi ex sedibus unquam
 nec verbis vexare et ab imo evertere summa,
 cetera de genere hoc adfingere et addere, Memmi,
 desperest. (2) quid enim immortalibus atque beatis 165
 gratia nostra queat largiri et emolumenti,
 ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?
 quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
 illicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
 nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur 170
 cui veteres obsunt; sed cui nil accidit aegri

- tempore in anteactis, cum pulchre degeret aevum,
quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?
(3) quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
an, credo, in tenebris vita ac maerore iacebat, 175
donec diluxit rerum genialis origo?
natus enim debet quicumque est velle manere
in vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas.
qui numquam vero vitae gustavit amorem
nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum? 180
(4) exemplum porro gignendis rebus et ipsa
notities hominum divis unde insita primum est,
quid vellent facere ut scirent animoque viderent,
quoque modesti unquam vis cognita principiorum
quidque inter sese permutato ordine possent, 185
si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?
(5) namque ita multa modis multis primordia rerum
ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis
ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri
omniumque coire atque omnia pertemptare, 190
quaecumque inter se possent congressa creare,
ut non sit mirum si in talis disposituras
deciderunt quoque et in talis venere meatus,
qualibus haec rerum geritur nunc summa novando.
(6) quod (si) iam rerum ignorem primordia quae sint, 195
hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
confirmare aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa.
principio quantum caeli tegit impetus ingens, 200
inde avidam partem montes silvaeque ferarum
possedere, tenent rupes vastaeque paludes
et mare quod late terrarum distinet oras.
inde duas porro prope partis fervidus ardor
assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert. 205
quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
sentibus obducit, ne vis humana resistat . . .
praeterea genus horrifera natura ferarum
humanae genti infestum terraeque marique
cur alit atque auget? cur anni tempora morbos 220
apporant? quare mors immatura vagatur?
(7) tum porro puer, ut saevis proiectus ab undis
navita, nudus humi iacet, infans, indigus omni
vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras

nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit, 225
 vagiruque locum lugubri complet, ut aequumst
 cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum.
 at variae crescunt pecudes armenta feraeque
 nec crepitacillis opus est nec cuiquam adhibendast
 almae nutricis blanda atque infracta loquella 230
 nec varias quaerunt vestis pro tempore caeli,
 denique non armis opus est, non moenibus altis,
 qui sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia large
 tellus ipsa parit naturaque daedala rerum.

186 specimen *Prus. speciem* OQ 195 (u) *Macullus*

Context: immediately following 23L, on the gods' detachment

156 *hominum causa* Cf. G 5. This is a weakened version of the Stoic thesis (54N) that the world was created for the sake of gods and men. We know of no clear evidence for such a view among pre-Hellenistic philosophers. This constitutes a difficulty for Furley's generally plausible thesis [168], contested by Schmidt [169], that the Stoics are not among Lucretius' targets. But Xen., *Mem.* 4.3 comes close.

G Cicero, ND 1.18-24

tum Velleus fidenet sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re
 videretur, tanquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuro intermundus descendisset. (1)
 "audite" inquit "non futilis commenticiasque sententias, non opificem
 aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam
 Stoicorum Pronocarn, quam Latine heet Providentiam dicere. neque vero mundum 5
 ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum rotundum ardentem volubilem deum,
 portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium. (2)
 quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti
 operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit; quae molitio quae
 ferramenta qui vectes quae machinae qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt; quem 10
 ad modum autem obaedire et parere voluntati architecti aer ignis aqua terra
 potuerunt; unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur. apte cadentes
 ad animum afficiendum parandosque sensus? longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt ut optata
 magis quam inventa videantur: sed illa palmaris, quod, qui non modo natum
 mundum introduxerit sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore 15
 sempiternum. hunc censes primis ut dicitur labris gustasse physiologiam id est
 naturae rationem, qui quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse?
 quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis, aut quid est cuius principium
 aliquod sit nihil sit extremum? (3) Pronocae vero si vestra est Luceli eadem,
 requiro quae paulo ante, ministros machinas omnem totius operis dissignatio- 20
 nem atque apparatus; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem
 ad modum Platoniceus deus, sempiternum. (4) ab utroque autem sciscitor cur
 mundi aedificatores repente existerint, innumerabilia saecula dormierint; non

enim si mundus nullus erat saecula non erant (saecula nunc dico non ea quae
 dicunt nocturnumque numero annis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine
 mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore
 aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metuebatur, spatio tamen
 qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit ut fuerit
 tempus aliquod nullum cum tempus esset) – isto igitur tam immenso spatio quaero
 Halbe cur Pronoea vestra cessaverit. laboremne fugiebat? at iste neq. attingit deum nec erat ullus,
 cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum ignes terrae maria, parerent. quid autem erat quod
 concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? si ut deus ipse melius
 habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat post
 autem: varietate cum delectari putamus, quae caelum et terras exornatas videmus? quae ista
 potest esse oblectatio deo? quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset. (5) an haec, ut fere
 dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? sapientiumne? propter paucos
 igitur tanta est rerum facta molitio, an stultorum? at primum causa non fuit
 cur de improbis bene mereretur; deinde quid est adsecutus, cum omnes stulti
 sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt (miserius enim stultitia
 quid possumus dicere). deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea
 sapientes commodorum compensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia
 possint nec ferre praesentia. qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse
 dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam intelligentis in quam figuram cadere posset. de
 quo dicam equidem paulo post, nunc autem haeremus: admirabor eorum tarditatem qui
 animantem immortalem et eundem beatum futurum esse vident, quod ea forma neget ullam
 esse pulchriorem Plato: at mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel conis vel pyramidis videtur esse
 formosior. quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo? nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur cui
 per nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit
 insistere. quodque in nostro corpore si minima ex parte significetur molestum sit, cur hoc idem
 non habeatur molestum in deo? terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei;
 atqui terrae maximas regiones inhabitabilis atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum adpulso
 solis exarsit, pars oblique sit nix pruinaque longinquos solis abscessus; quae, si mundus est deus,
 quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partem ardentia partem refrigerata ducenda sunt . . .”

Context: the opening of the polemical introduction to Velleius' speech in defence of Epicurean theology.

The emphasis given to Plato and the Stoics here and at *ND* 1.36–41 contrasts with the cursory treatment at *ibid.* 1.25–35 of all the other Greek philosophers, including a brief attack on Aristotle (*ibid.* 33) based solely on his exoteric *De philosophia*. This supports our contention (vol. 1, 65) that Aristotle is not a major target for the Epicureans on this topic. As for Aristotle's related doctrine of the eternity of the world, it receives no direct Epicurean opposition (for a probable Stoic attack on the Aristotelian thesis, cf. 46J note). Instead, both Velleius here and Lucretius (5.235–415) treat it as uncontroversial that the world had a beginning, and reserve their criticisms for the allegedly Platonic thesis that it will never perish. (On the evidence of the present passage, the Epicureans must be numbered along with Aristotle among those who took the *Timaeus* as a literal chronological account of the creation.)

12 *quinque formae* At *Tim.* 53c–56c Plato assigns four of the five regular solids to each of the four standard elements listed in 11. The fifth regular solid, the dodecahedron, is said at *Tim.* 55c to have been used 'in the decoration of the whole'. This apparently alludes not to a further set of particles, but to the heaven itself, fitted out with the twelve signs of the zodiac. If so, Velleius' target here could be a deviant interpretation of the Platonic theory (see Pease [329] ad loc.) in which the dodecahedron was assigned to the particles of a fifth element, aether – whose first appearance in the Platonic corpus as a distinct element is at *Epinomis* 981c. On the other hand, that would leave it obscure why this fifth element is not added to Velleius' list at 11. It is perhaps safer to suspect a confusion.

23–9 Velleius is evidently rebutting or anticipating a possible reply based on the *Timaeus*: since time only began with the creation of the heavens (*Tim.* 37c–38b), no chronological questions can be asked about a pre-cosmic era. For the debate, see Sorabji [22], esp. chh. 15 and 17.

30 *Pronoea* ... *cessaverit* A somewhat distorted rendition of the Stoic doctrine at 280 4, 460.

44 *paulo post* See 23E 6.

H Cicero, *ND* 1.51–6

at quaerere a nobis Balbe soletis quae vita deorum sit quaeque ab is degatur aetas. ea videlicet
 qua nihil beatius nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. nihil enim agit, nullis
 occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet
 exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis tum in aeternis voluptatibus. (1) hunc deum rite
 beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. sive enim ipse mundus
 deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto temporis
 intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate: nisi quietum autem
 nihil beatum est; sive in ipso mundo deus inest aliquis, qui regat qui gubernet
 qui cursus astrorum mutationes temporum rerum vicissitudines ordinesque
 conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque tueatur,
 ne ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis. nos autem beatam vitam in
 animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. (2) docuit enim
 nos idem qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica,
 tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negetis sine divina posse
 solertia, ut innumerales natura mundos effectura sit efficiat effecerit. quod
 quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut
 tragici poetae cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis confugitis ad
 deum. cuius operam profecto non desideraretis, si immensam et interminatam in omnis partis
 magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se inciens animus et intendens ita late longeque
 peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimi videat in qua possit insistere. in hac igitur
 immensitate latitudinum longitudinum altitudinum infinita vis innumerabilium volitat
 atomorum, quae interiecto spatio cohaerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes
 continuantur: ex quo efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figurae, quas vos efficere prope sine ulla
 incudibus non putatis. itaque suppositis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem
 dies et noctes timeremus. quis enim non timeat omnia providentem et cogitantem et

animadvertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem curioſam et plenum negotiū deſectū? hinc vobis exiit primum illa fatalis neceſſitas, quam *ἀναγκή* dicunt, ut quicquid accadat id ex aeterna veritate cauſarumque continuatione fluxiſſe dicatis. quanti autem haec philoſophia aſſumendiſt, cui tamquam aniculis, et hiſ quidem indoctis, ſatis fieri videantur omnia, ſequitur *μαρτυρί* veſtra, quae Latine divinatione dicitur, qua tanta inbuemur ſuperſtitione ſi vos audere vellemus, ut haruſpices augures haruſti cates conſecti ſortes nobis eventū cōſulendi, hiſ terroribus ab Epicuro ſolati et in libertatem vindicati nec metuimus eis quos intellegimus nec ſibi fingere ullam moleſtiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie ſanctaeque colimus naturam excellentem atque praeſtantem.

Context: immediately following 23E

5-11 For theſe alternative Stoic views of god, ſee e.g. 54B.

18-20 Cf. Lucretius 1.72ff., and the arguments in 10.

26-8 Cf. 55L.

29-31 For Stoic approval of divination, ſee 42C-E

1 Lucretius 5.837-77

(1) multaſque tum tellus etiam portenta creare
conataſt mira facie membrisque coorta,
androgynem, interutrasque nec utrum, utrinque remotum,
orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicciſſim, 840
multa ſine ore etiam, ſine vultu caeca reperta,
vincſtaque membrorum per totum corpus adhaeſu,
nec facere ut poſſent quicquam nec cedere quoquam
nec vitare malum nec ſumere quod foret uſus,
cetera de genere hoc monſtra ac portenta creabat, 845
nequiquam, quoniam natura abſterruiſt auctum
nec potuere cupitum aetatis tangere ſtorem
nec reperire cibum nec iungi per Veneris reſ,
multa videmus enim rebus concurrere debere,
ut propagando poſſint procudere ſaecula; 850
pabula primum ut ſint, genitalia deinde per artus
ſemina qua poſſint membris manare remiſſa;
feminaque ut maribus coniungi poſſit, habere
mutua qui mutent inter ſe gaudia uterque.
multaſque tum interuiſſe ammantum ſaecula neceſſeſt
nec potuiſſe propagando procudere prolem.
(2) nam quaecumque vides veſci vitalibus auris,
aut dolus aut virtus aut denique mobilitas eſt
ex inſeunte aevo genus id tutata reſervans,
multaſque ſunt, nobis ex utilitate ſua quae 860
commendata manent, tutelae tradita noſtrae.
principio genus actu leonum ſaeuſque ſaecula

tutatast virtus, vulpis dolus et fuga leuvs.
 at levisomina canum fido cum pectore corda
 et genus omne quod est veterino semine partum 865
 lanigeræque simul pecudes et buccera sacula
 omnia sunt hominum tutelae tradita, Memmi.
 nam cupide fugere feras pacemque secuta
 sunt et larga suo sine pabula parva labore,
 quæ damus utilitatis eorum præmia causa. 870
 (3) at quis nil horum tribuit natura, nec ipsa
 sponte sua possent ut vivere nec dare nobis
 utilitatem aliquam quare pateremur eorum
 præsidio nostro pasci genus esseque tutum,
 scilicet hæc aliis prædæ luctroque iacebant 875
 indupedita suis fatalibus omnia vinclis,
 donec ad intentum genus id natura redegit.

861 multa OQ: multa Naugeriuss 852 tenuis Lahtiannus tenuiss codd

Context: the early history of the world.

This passage has been much admired for its apparent anticipation of some of the principles of Darwinism. Although it misses the crucial roles of heredity and gradual adaptation over centuries, it certainly exploits the notion of the survival of the fittest. For its possible indebtedness to Empedocles, see on J.

837 tellus According to Lucretius (2.1150-6, 3.791-825), the first living creatures sprang from the earth: even today the earth is fertile enough to generate plants, worms, insects etc., so in its prime it was quite capable of producing all manner of life forms.

J Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 371.27-372.14

διὰ τί γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀπόλλυται ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων μυσίων, ὡς λεῖπὸ τοῦ ῥήματος
 ἐπικαμνομένου λιμώττοντες, ἄλλα δὲ σφίζεται, εἰ μὴ ἐκ ταυτομάτου ταῦτα οὕτως
 συνέρχεται. καὶ ἂπου μὲν οὕτως πάντα συνέβη συνδραμεῖν, ὥστε καὶ εἰ ἐνεκά του ἐγίνετο,
 ταῦτα, κὰν ἐκ ταυτομάτου συνέστη, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιτηδείως συνέστη, διεσώθη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ
 οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται. (1) ὥστερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κατὰ τὴν τῆς φιλίας 5
 ἀρχὴν φησι γενέσθαι ὡς ἔτυχε μέρη πρῶτον τῶν ζώων, οἷον κεφαλὰς καὶ
 χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, ἐπεὶ τα συνέναι ταῦτα "βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπριωρα, τὰ δ'
 ἔμπαλιν ἐξαπατέλλειν", "ἀνδρογενῇ" δηλονότι "βούπριωρα", τοιούτεστιν ἐκ
 βοός καὶ ἀνθρώπου. καὶ ὅσα μὲν οὕτω συνέστη ἀλλήλοις ὥστε δύνασθαι
 τυχεῖν σωτηρίας, ἐγένετο ζῶα καὶ ἔμεινεν διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ἐκπληροῦν τὴν 10
 χρεῖαν, τοὺς μὲν ὀδόντας τέμνοντάς τε καὶ λεπίνοντας τὴν τροφήν, τὴν δὲ
 γαστέρα πέττουςαν, τὸ δὲ ἥπαρ ἐξαιματοῦν. καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 κεφαλὴ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώματι συνελθοῦσα σφίζεσθαι ποιεῖ τὸ ὄλον, τῷ δὲ
 τοῦ βοός οὐ συναρμόζει καὶ διόλλυται· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ κατὰ τὸν οἰκείον
 συνῆλθε λόγον, ἐφθάρη. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ νῦν πάντα συμβαίνει. (2) 15
 ταύτης δοκοῦσι τῆς δόξης τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων φυσικῶν ὅσοι τὴν ὕλην

ἀνάγκην αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν γινόμενων φασί, τῶν δὲ ὑστέρων οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι. ἡ δὲ πλάνη γέγονεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα τὰ ἑνὲκά του γινόμενα κατὰ προαίρεσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ λογισμόν, τὰ δὲ φύσει μὴ οὕτως ὁρᾶν γινόμενα.

Context: commentary on Aristotle, *Phys.* II.8, 198b16–34.

7–8 From Empedocles 31 B 61 DK = KRS 379.

16–18 That the Epicurean account, as represented in 3, was indebted to this theory of Empedocles' need not be doubted. However, it is probably a mistake to assume that Empedocles' own motivation was the defence of a non-teleological world view. Aristotle, by whom Simplicius is heavily influenced here, tends to treat the Empedoclean theory as a paradigm of anti-teleology because it was apparently the *only* model he could find in the work of his predecessors of what a non-teleological explanation of nature would look like. (He never reports any such theory from Democritus, for example.) This interpretation is consistent with the four-stage account of zoogony attributed to Empedocles by Aetius (5.19.5 = 31 A 72 DK; see KRS 375 and commentary), in which the random hybrids described in the present passage are preceded by a first stage where individual limbs exist in isolation. But it should be noticed that those solitary limbs were not themselves the product of accident, but of subtle design. The eye for example was devised by Aphrodite, like a lantern built by a lantern-maker for a preconceived purpose (31 A 86 + 84 DK, KRS 389). Even when allowance is made for an element of metaphor here, it is clear that Empedocles' zoogonical theory treated the origin of individual limbs and organs in a quite teleological way – entirely contrary to an Epicurean text like E. He perhaps introduced the subsequent stage of random combinations principally in order to explain the immense *diversity* of animal forms.

14 Soul

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 63–7

(1) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συνορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη· οὕτως γὰρ ἡ βεβαιωτάτη πίστις ἔσται – ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῆ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῆ δὲ τούτῳ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέρος πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἄθροισματι· (2) τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἰ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἰ εὐκίνησθαι καὶ αἰ διανοήσεις καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι θνήσκομεν. (3) καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν δεῖ κατέχειν· οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄθροισματος ἐστεγάζεται πως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνη τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετείληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτου συμπτώματος παρ' ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκτῃται· (4) διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν. οὐ γὰρ

αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρῳ ἅμα συγγεγεννη-
 μένῳ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν, ὃ διὰ τῆς συντελειοθείσης περὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμειος 15
 κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθύς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ ἀπιδίδου
 κατὰ τὴν ὁμοούρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ εἶπαν. (5) διὸ δὴ
 καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀππληαγμένου
 ἀναισθητήσκει· ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ ταύτης συναπλήηται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος
 εἴθ' ὅλου εἴτε καὶ μέρους τινός, εἴν περ διαμένη, ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν. τὸ 20
 δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα διημέρον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἔχει τὴν
 αἴσθησιν ἐκείνου ἀππληαγμένου, ὅσον ποτὲ ἔστι τὸ συντεῖνον τῶν ἀτόμων
 πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου
 ἄθροίσματος ἡ ψυχὴ διασπείρεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲ
 κινεῖται, ὥστε οὐδ' αἴσθησιν κέκτηται. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε νοεῖν αὐτὸ 25
 αἰσθανόμενον μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις
 χρώμενον, ὅταν τὰ στεγάζοντα καὶ περιέχοντα μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾖ, ἐν οἷς νῦν
 οὐσα ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις. (7) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε δεῖ προσκατα-
 νοεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἄσώματον λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὁνόματος
 ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἂν· καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ 30
 ἄσώματον πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται,
 ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥστ' οἱ λέγοντες
 ἄσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιίζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε
 πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη· νῦν δ' ἐναργῶς ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται
 περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ συμπτώματα. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα περὶ ψυχῆς 35
 ἀνάγκη τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύειν τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων, ἵκανῶς
 κατόφθαι τοῖς τύποις ἐμπεριειλημμένα εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ τούτων ἐξακριβοῦσθαι
 βεβαίως.

5 τὸ codd : 71 Woljer : δηλοῦσι Gaverndi δηλον codd 19 ἀναισθητήσκει Kuhn ἀναισθησκει B
 ἀναισθησία FP· ἀναισθητῆι Schneider ταύτης συν- Sedley. ταύτην ἐξω- codd. ταύτης ἐξω-
 Usener 20 ἔξει Usener ὅλῳ codd. ὡς Mühl. 25 μὴν τόδε σχολιασ (-i) 29 λέγεται
 Bignone: λέγει γὰρ codd... λέγομεν Mühl. λέγει ὁνόματος uschol excl Usener 34 διαλαμβάνεται
 Bailey: διαλαμβάνει codd

Context: between 11E and 7B.

3 **ἄθροισμα** Epicurus scrupulously avoids contrasting the soul with the 'body' in this context, since soul is also body. Hence the constant circumlocutions.

πνεῦματι It is obviously tempting to compare the identical term for the 'breath' which constitutes the soul in Stoicism (53G). Note, however, that Stoic πνεῦμα is warm breath, a universal life force, whereas Epicurean πνεῦμα is wind (at least on Lucretius' evidence: see also note on C 1-3), singled out for its motive power (C. D 4: cf. Lucretius 4.892-902) and kept quite distinct from the warmth-giving element (indeed, it contributes coldness at D 4). What really deserves comparison with Stoic 'breath' is the amalgam of wind and heat described here.

5-6 Kerferd [220] interprets as follows: 'The part (viz. the soul itself) has acquired great mobility as a result of the lightness of parts of just these things

(*πνεῦμα* and heat). But there are two reasons for preferring the more favoured interpretation of *παράλλαξήν* as 'difference', assumed in our translation 'But there is that part which differs greatly also from wind and heat themselves in its fineness of structure'. First, a comparison seems required here if *τοῦτω μᾶλλον* in 6 is to be intelligible, the genitive of comparison (*τούτων*) is well attested with *παράλλασσεν*, for which Epicurus' *παράλλαξήν εἰληθέναι* is merely a periphrasis. Second, by singling out *πνεῦμα* and heat as responsible for the soul's mobility, Kerferd's interpretation is letting these usurp the role which in Lucretius is fulfilled *par excellence* by the 'nameless' element. This would hardly leave enough common ground between *Ep. Hdt.* and Lucretius to justify speaking of the same theory underlying both. And if we were now, with Heinze [139] and Kerferd, to take *τὸ μέρος* as referring to the soul itself (cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda 37.3.9 10, *τὸ ψυχικὸν ἡμῶν . . . μέρος*), Epicurus would be saying that the soul, although resembling wind and heat, differs (*ἔστι . . . εἰληθὸς* as periphrastic perfect – Kerferd) from them both in its fineness: the unwelcome implication would be that the atoms characteristic of wind and heat are not present in the soul at all, contrary to all the other evidence. Hence caution and economy bring us back to the majority view that *τὸ μέρος* refers to the nameless soul-element of the Lucretian account. (This would have been clearer, as Kerferd rightly points out, had Epicurus put a *καί* before *τὸ μέρος*, but the *καί* before *αὐτῶν* already carries much of the same force, so that an additional *καί* would have read oddly.) On this account, then, *Ep. Hdt.* already picks out three of the eventual four soul-elements. The talk in 3–4 of soul resembling, rather than containing, wind and heat, does not count against their being in a sense ingredients, but is meant to allow for the fact that soul is a 'blend' in which the individual ingredients so recombine as to lose their separate identity. See further vol. 1, 71, and notes on **B C** below. Similar language is not required in the case of the nameless element, since it has no known separate identity in the first place. As for 'air', we must take it either that it had not yet at the relatively early date of *Ep. Hdt.* (cf. Sedley [105], n. 73) been added as a distinct element of the soul, or that *πνεῦμα* was understood as covering both 'wind' and 'air'. In favour of the latter alternative, see note on **C** 1.3.

As for the silence here about the mind–spirit distinction (cf. **B**, i), it need represent no more than Epicurus' choice of emphases, and not doctrinal incompleteness at the date of *Ep. Hdt.* It is, however, uncertain that the distinction was already in the system which he had inherited from Democritus (cf. Democritus frs. 68–9, 452–8 Luria).

13–17 The imperfects, and likewise the pluperfect, may be of the 'dialectical' kind (represented by 'we saw that . . .' in our translation), resuming points held already to have been established at 10–13; hence also *καθ' ὅπερ εἶπον*, 17. The present sentence is not, however, straight repetition, but expands the earlier account of the joint functioning of soul and body by describing its inception during the process of birth itself: this assumption seems to make the best sense of *κίνησιν* ('process') and *εὐθύς* in 16. Alternatively, the past tenses may have the same force as that in j 357.

17 *συμπάθειαν* Cf. 6, and note on **B** 168

17–23 Diogenes of Oenoanda, 37.1–4, expands on this evidence of the soul's having 'the greater share of the responsibility' (*τοῦ τῆς αἰτίας πλεονεκτήματα*; cf. 8–9) even a body severely reduced by disease or mutilation is often kept alive by the soul; whereas a perfectly intact body cannot retain sensation once the soul has been separated from it.

22 3 *συντίθεν* . . . *αἰς* This is rightly taken by Bignone [121] and Bailey [117] as 'contributing to . . . 'going to make up . . .', citing the parallels of *Ep. Hdt.* 79 and 80; see also *Ep. Pyth.* 84. Editorial importations of 'attunement' or 'tension' seem alien to the Epicurean theory. The point of the elaborate phrase will be to allow for the supposed fact that some soul atoms remain even in the dead body – see Lucretius 3.713ff.

25 *αὐτό* The use of the neuter to refer to soul must pick up *ἐκείνου* . . . *δοῶν* κτλ. at 22-3.

30-2 Cf. *SB* 8-9.

B Lucretius 3.136-76

- (1) nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri
inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,
sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto
consilium quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.
idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret 140
hic exsultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum
laetitiae mulcent; hic ergo mens animusque est.
cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus
paret et ad numen mentis mōmenque movetur.
(2) idque sibi solum per se sapit, (<id>) sibi gaudet, 145
cum neque res animam neque corpus commovet ulla
et quasi, cum caput aut oculus temptante dolore
laeditur in nobis, non omni coneructamur
corpore, sic atumus nonnumquam laeditur ipse
laetitiaque viget, cum cetera pars animae 150
per membra atque artus nulla novitate cietur.
verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens,
consentire animam totam per membra videmus
sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto
corpore et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri, 155
caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus,
denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus
saepe homines: facile ut quisvis hinc noscere possit
esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi
percussast, exim corpus propellit et icit. 160
(3) haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animae
corpoream docet esse. ubi enim propellere membra,
corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum
atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur,
quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus 165
nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendum est
corporea natura animum constare animamque?

practerea pariter fungi cum corpore et una
 consentire animum nobis in corpore cernis.
 si minus offendit vitam vis horrida telis
 ossibus ac nervis disclusis intus adacta,
 at tamen insequitur languor terraeque petitus
 suavis et in terra mentis qui gignitur aestus,
 interdumque quasi exsurgendi incerta voluntas.
 ergo corpoream naturam animi esse necessest,
 corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat.

145 (14) Wakefield 146 *ulla* codex Laurentianus 15 11 *una* OQV

Context: the opening of Lucretius' own account of soul, following rejection of the theory that soul is an attunement.

139 **animum mentemque** Lucretius is announcing that these terms will operate as straight synonyms in his discourse, as indeed they do. We have, therefore, to avoid confusion, adopted the single translation 'mind' for both.

141 For Stoic defence of the same view, see 34], 53U, 65H.

143 Lucretius curiously omits to provide a term for ψυχή, and *anima* often has to stand in for it (as explicitly from F 1 on).

168 **pariter fungi** = συμπάσχειν, cf. A 6, 17. The dominant sense is that of being affected in a comparable way by the same thing at the same time, but the alternative translation *mixta fungi* at 3.801 appears to add the idea of interaction between the two, as in the Stoic account of the συμπαθεῖν between soul and body (45C).

C Actius 4.3.11 (Usener 315)

Ἐπίκουρος [sc. λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν] κράμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ αἰρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονόμαστου· τοῦτο δ' ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ὅν τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ αἶρα ἡρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ' ἀκατονόμαστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν· ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἰσθησιν.

Context: doxography of physicalist theories of soul

1 **κράμα** 'Blend', the product of a κράσις, or 'blending' (cf. A 4). The importance of this technical concept is well brought out by Kerferd [220], 89–91. Alexander, *Mixta* 2.14, 28–215, 8 (Usener 290) is no doubt right to attribute to Epicurus this doctrine of true blending as the recombination of the individual atoms of the original substances into a new substance. But one may, following the lead of Todd [203], 297, doubt Alexander's belief that in this Epicurus was revising the existing Democritean position, and also wonder why the theory should, as Kerferd maintains, imply a doctrine of molecules. There seems to be no good evidence for Epicurean molecules (cf. Kerferd, 89), and Epicurus, even if he had thought of the possibility, might well have rejected it on the ground that patterns of atomic motion in a κράμα might range beyond any supposed molecular grouping, thus depriving 'molecules' of sufficient permanence.

1-3 These are the four Lucretian elements of the soul, exactly as listed also by Plutarch (Col. 1118E = Usener 314), except that Plutarch has the standard *θερμῶν* instead of *πυρρῶδους* (as does the present text itself at 4; see further on i below). It follows that the Greek term translated *ventus* by Lucretius is *πνεῦμα* (see further, note on A 3), which is indeed Epicurus' regular term for 'wind' in *Ep. Pyth.* The adjectival endings, *-ώδους* and *-κωδ* correspond to Epicurus' talk of resemblance in A 3ff., to emphasize that the elements air, etc. are not themselves present in the blend, but only their constituent atoms. The difference between 'wind' and 'air' remains problematic, and Lucretius does little to help at 3.231-6. One expects the two to consist of the same kind of atoms in different arrangements or patterns of motion -- thus Lucretius 6.685, *ventus enim fit ubi est agitando percussus aer*. But it is hard to see how this difference could survive, other than perhaps accidentally, in a *κράμα*, in which the constituent atoms are anyway recombined in new patterns. Presumably, then, there are only three kinds of soul atoms, with the 'airy' ones behaving sometimes like still air and sometimes like wind, thus accounting for rest as well as motion. If so, the four-element scheme is a simplistic overinterpretation by Epicurus' followers, and the threefold scheme of A begins to look the more correct of the two.

5-6 Cf. Lucretius 3.238-40.

D Lucretius 3.258-322

nunc ea quo pacto inter sese mixta quibusque compta modis vigeant rationem reddere aventem absrahit invitum patrii sermonis egestas;	260
sed tamen, ut potero summatim attingere, cangam (1) inter enim cursant primordia principiorum motibus inter se, nil ut secernier unum possit nec spatium fieri divisa potestas, sed quasi multae vis unius corporis exstant.	265
quod genus in quovis animantium viscere vulgo est odor et quidam calor et sapor, et tamen ex his omnibus est unum perfectum corporis augmen; sic calor atque aer et venti caeca potestas mixta creant unam naturam et mobilis illa	270
vis, intum motus ab se quae dividit ollis, sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus. (2) nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque, nec magis hac infra quicquam est in corpore nostro atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa.	275
quod genus in nostris membris et corpore toto mixta latens animi vis est animaeque potestas, corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creatast; sic tibi nominis haec expers vis facta minutis corporibus latet atque animae quasi totius ipsa	280
proporrost anima et dominatur corpore toto.	

- (3) consimili ratione necessest ventus et aer
et calor inter se vigeant commixta per artus
atque aliis aliud subsit magis emineatque
ut quiddam fieri videatur ab omnibus unum, 285
ni calor ac ventus sorsum sorsumque potestas
aeris interemant sensum diductaque solvant.
- (4) est etiam calor ille animo, quem sumit, in ira
cum fervescit et ex oculis micat acius ardor.
est et frigida multa comes formidinis aura 290
quae ciet horrorem membris et concitat artus.
est etiam quoque pacati status aeris ille,
pectore tranquillo qui fit vultusque sereno.
sed calidi plus est illis quibus acria corda
iracundaque mens facile effervescit in ira. 295
quo genere in primis vis est violenta leonum,
pectora qui fremitu rumpunt plerumque gementes
nec capere irarum fluctus in pectore possunt.
at ventosa magis cervorum frigida mens est
et gelidas citius per viscera concitat auras 300
quae tremulum faciunt membris existere motum.
at natura bonum placido magis aere vivit,
nec minus irai fax inquam subdita percut
fumida, suffundens caecae caliginis umbram.
nec gelidis torpet telis perfixa pavonis: 305
interutrasque sitas, cervos saevosque leones
- (5) sic hominum genus est. quamvis doctrina politos
constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit
naturae cuiusque animi vestigia prima.
nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst, 310
quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acris,
ille metu citius paulo tempetur, ac ille
tertius accipiat quaedam clementius aequo.
inque aliis rebus multis differre necessest
naturas hominum varias moresque sequaces; 315
quorum ego nunc nequeo caecas exponere causas
nec reperire figurarum tot nomina quot sunt
principiis, unde haec oritur variantia rerum.
illud in his rebus video firmare potesse,
usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui 320
parvula quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis,
ut nil impediatur dignam dis degere vitam.

Context: following the enumeration at 231–57 of the soul's four elements.

258 **ea** The four soul elements.

260 **patrii sermonis egestas** Kerferd [220], observing that at 1.832 this phrase signals Lucretius' apology for his inability to Latinize a Greek technical term, rightly suggests the same motive here – the lack of a technical vocabulary to convey *κράμα* at 262–87.

262 **principiorum** 'The elements', i.e. heat, air, etc., cf. C.6, *στοιχεῖων*. On this, see Kerferd [220], 90–1.

268 For a body as a 'complex' of its permanent properties, see 7B 2 3.

273–4 The spatial language describes not the location of the fourth element but its relative undetectability, as the analogy at 276–8 explains.

284 Although the three elements of wind, air and heat are thoroughly blended, some will be more prominent than others in the mix. This is presumably to prepare us for the explanation of differences of temperament at 288–322.

317–18 Lucretius' one hint that the account of the soul's composition may be a simplification.

E Lucretius 4.877–91

(1) nunc qui fiat uti passus proferre queamus,
cum volumus, quareque datum sit membra movere,
et quae res tantum hoc oneris protrudere nostri
corporis insuerit, dicant: tu percipe dicta. 880

(2) dico animo nostro primum simulacra meandi
accidere atque animum pulsare, ut diximus ante
inde voluntas fit; neque enim facere incipit ullam
rem quousquam, quam mens providit quid velit ante.
id quod providet, illius rei constat imago. 885

(3) ergo animus cum sese ita commovet ut velit ire
inque gredi, ferit ex tempore quae in corpore toto
per membra atque artus animai dissita vis est.
et facilis est factu, quoniam coniuncta tenetur.

(4) inde ea porro corpus ferit, atque ita tota 890
paulatim moles protruditur atque movetur

878 *quareque* Merrill *quareque* OQ¹ *quareque* ed. Veronensis 890 *ferit* Marullus *perit* OQ

Context: one in the series of vital functions whose mechanics are explained in book 4.

F Lucretius 3.417–62

(1) nunc age, nativos animantibus et mortalis
esse animos animasque levis ut noscere possis,
conquisita diu dulcique reperta labore
digna tua pergam disponere carmina vita. 420
tu fac utrumque uno sub iungas nomine eorum,

- atque animam verbi causa cum dicere pergam,
mortalem esse docens, animum quoque dicere credas,
quatenus est unum inter se coniunctaque res est.
- (2) principio quoniam tenuem constare minutis 425
corporibus docui multoque minoribus esse
principiis facram quam liquidus umor aquai
aut nebula aut fumus – nam longe mobilitate
praestat et a tenui causa magis icta movetur;
quippe ubi imaginibus fumi nebulaeque movetur. 430
quod genus in somnis sopiti ubi cernimus alte
exhalare vaporem altaria ferreque fumum,
nam procul haec dubio nobis simulacra geruntur –
nunc igitur quoniam quassatis undique vasis
diffluere umorem et laticem discedere cernis 435
et nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,
crede animam quoque diffundi multoque perire
ocius et citius dissolvi in corpora prima,
cum semel ex hominis membris ablata recessit.
quippe etenim corpus, quod vas quasi constitit eius, 440
cum cohibere nequit conquassatum ex aliqua re
ac rarefactum detracto sanguine venis,
aere qui credas posse hanc cohiberier ullo,
corpore qui nostro rarus magis incohibensquest?
(3) praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore et una 445
crescere sentimus pariterque senescere mentem.
nam velut infirmo pueri teneroque vagantur
corpore, sic animi sequitur sententia tenvis.
inde ubi robustis adolevit viribus actas,
consilium quoque maius et auctior est animi vis. 450
post ubi iam validis quassatum est viribus aevi
corpus et obtusis ceciderunt viribus artus,
claudicat ingenium, delirat lingua, <labat> mens,
omnia deficiunt atque uno tempore desunt.
ergo dissolui quoque convenit omnem animai 455
naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras;
quandoquidem gigni pariter pariterque videmus
crescere et, ut docui, simul aevo fessa fatisci.
(4) huc accedit uti videamus, corpus ut ipsum
suscipere immanis morbos durumque dolorem, 460
sic animum curas acris luctumque metumque;
quare participem leti quoque convenit esse.

444 *incohibensquest* Beigk. *incohibescit* CQV. *incohibens* ut Wülfert

451 <labat> Lachmann. <malet> Q¹

Context: the opening of Lucretius' long series of arguments for the mortality of the soul.

G Lucretius 3.624-33

praeterea si immortalis natura anima est
 et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro, 625
 quinque, ut opinor, eam faciundum est sensibus auctam.
 nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis
 possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare.
 pictores itaque et scriptorum saecula priora
 sic animas intro duxerunt sensibus auctas. 630
 at neque sorsum oculi neque nares nec manus ipsa
 esse potest animae neque sorsum lingua, neque aures;
 haud igitur per se possunt sentire neque esse.

625 *animae* Prus: *anima* OQ 635 *haud igitur* Lachmann: *audium* OQ

Context: argument no. 15 for the mortality of the soul.

H Lucretius 3.806-29

(1) praeterea quaecumque manent aeterna necessest
 aut quia sunt solido cum corpore respuere ictus
 nec penetrare pari sibi quicquam quod queat artas
 dissociare intus partes, ut materiae
 corpora sunt quorum naturam ostendimus ante, 810
 aut ideo durare aetatem posse per omnem,
 plagarum quia sunt experta, sicut inanest
 quod manet intactum neque ab ictu fungitur hilum.
 aut etiam quia nulla loet sit copia circum,
 quo quasi res possunt discedere dissoluique, 815
 sicut summarum summast aeterna, neque extra
 quis locus est quo diffugiant neque corpora sunt quae
 possint incidere et valida dissolvere plaga.
 (2) quod si forte ideo magis immortalis habendast,
 quod vitalibus ab rebus munita tenetur, 820
 aut quia non veniunt omnino aliena salutis
 aut quia quae veniunt aliqua ratione recedunt
 pulsa prius quam quid noceant sentire queamus,
 <...>
 praeter enim quam quod morbis cum corporis aegret,
 adventit id quod eam de rebus saepe futuris 825
 macerat inque merito male habet curisque fatigat
 praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent.

adde furorem animi proprium atque oblivia rerum,
adde quod in nigras lethargi mergitur undas.

820 *vitalibus* codd.: *letalibus* Lambinus post 823 *lacunam* und. Lambinus

Context: conclusion of the series of arguments for the mortality of the soul.

807-10 See B.

811-13 See S.

814-18 Cf. 4A 3-5 with notes.

820 *vitalibus* is very tentatively translated 'which affect life', with the understanding that this at least includes things which affect it adversely. If this is thought unacceptable, some comparable sense must be found, if necessary by emending, e.g. to Lambinus' *letalibus*. The favoured alternative of translating 'protected by its vital forces' is unbelievable, less because of the slight difficulties of understanding *munita* . . . *ab* in this way or of seeing what the theory would amount to than because it would make the first of the two alternative explanations of this protection, in 821, utterly inapposite. (Nor is it any help to read the explanatory clauses in 821-3 as giving a second and third reason parallel to that in 820: what then would be the difference between the first and third reason?) *munita tenetur* ' . . . it is permanently protected': for the construction, cf. B 136, E 889.

i Scholion on Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 66 (Usener 311)

λέγει ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων, πολλὰ
τεν διαφερασίαν τῶν τοῦ πυρὸς· καὶ τὴ μὲν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι
αἰματι· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θάρρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς. ὕπνου τε
γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν τῶν παρ' ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένον ἐγκατεχο-
μένον ἢ διαφορουμένων, εἴτα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς πορίμοις. τὴ τε σπέρμα ὁφ' ὅλων τῶν
σωμάτων φέρεσθαι.

1 πορίμοις Apelt: πορμαῖς codd.

Context: interpolation in A 28.

1-2 The 'very smooth and round' atoms could be either all those of the soul, cf. Lucretius 3.187-230, or those of the nameless element, cf. 3.241-4. The latter reading, which seems possible if καὶ in 1 is given due weight, would make the contrast with fire atoms more intelligible. On the former, we would have to suppose a significant disjunction in this context between heat and fire, contrary to the evidence of C. In either case, Heinze [159] and Bignone [121] are no doubt right that the remark's original context was a correction of Democritus' view (fr. 443a-451 Luria) that the soul consists entirely of fire atoms, the retort being that sensation is found in none of the named elements like fire (C).

2-3 τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λογικόν (also at Diogenes of Oenoanda 37.1.5-7) may well be Epicurus' standard terminology for what Lucretius calls *anima* and *animus* respectively, although *διάνοια* might be thought another candidate for *animus*.

3 Cf. B 1.

3-6 Cf. Lucretius 4.907-61. For exegesis, see Schrijvers [221].

j Lucretius 3.350-69

quod superest, siquis corpus sentire refutat 350
 atque animam credit permixtam corpore toto
 suscipere hunc motum quem sensum nominamus.
 vel manifestas res contra verasque repugnat.
 quid sit enim corpus sentire quis adferet umquam,
 si non ipsa palam quod res dedit ac docuit nos? 355
 at dimissa anima corpus caret undique sensu;
 perdit enim quod non proprium fuit eius in aëvo,
 multaque praeterea perdit cum expellitur aëvo.
 dicite porro oculos nullam rem cernere posse,
 sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis, 360
 difficilest, contra cum sensus ducat eorum;
 sensus enim trahit atque acies detruhit ad ipsas:
 fulgida praesertim cum cernere saepe nequimus,
 lumina luminibus quia nobis praepediuntur.
 quod foribus non fit; neque enim, qua cernimus ipsi, 365
 ostia suscipiunt illum reclusa laborem.
 praeterea si pro foribus sunt lumina nosstra,
 iam magis exemptis oculis debere videtur
 cernere res animum sublatus postibus ipsis

Context: the interdependence of soul and body. Cf. A 3-4.

350-8 That the body itself has sensation is a matter of common experience. It is not refuted by the fact that it loses it when the soul departs: that just shows that sensation is not an intrinsic (*proprium*) characteristic of body, but one that depends on the soul cf. A 13-17.

359-69 On the theory here opposed by Lucretius, see Furley [168]. Whoever its author, its significance for Lucretius lies in its dangerous implication that the soul's functions are independent of the body.

15 Sensation, imagination, memory

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 46-53

(1) καὶ μὴν καὶ τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμενες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσὶ, λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων. οὐτε γὰρ ἀποστάσεις ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι γίνεσθαι τοιαῦται οὐτ' ἐπιτηδευιώτητες πρὸς κατεργασίας τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ λεπτοτήτων γίνεσθαι, οὐτε ἀπόρροιαί τὴν ἐξῆς θέσιν καὶ βάσιν διατηροῦσαι, ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον· τούτους δὲ 5
 τοὺς τύπους εἰδῶλα προσαγορεύομεν. (2) [= IID] (3) εἰθ' ὅτι τὰ εἰδῶλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται, οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων· ὅθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει, πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς τῷ ἀπείροις αὐτῶν μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν.

πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις εὐθὺς ἀντικόπτειν τι. (4) πρὸς τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ 10
γένεσις τῶν εἰδῶλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ῥεύσει ἀπὸ τῶν
σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχῆς, οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει διὰ τὴν
ἀνταναπλήρωσιν, σφύζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῶν
ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον, εἰ καὶ ἐνίοτε συγχεομένη, καὶ συστάσεις ἐν τῷ 15
περιέχοντι ὀξείαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι, καὶ
ἄλλαι δὲ τρόποι τινὲς γεννητικαὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεών εἰσιν. (5) οὐθὲν γὰρ
τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ἂν βλέπη τις, τίνα τρόπον τὰς
ἐναργείας, ἵνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνοίσει. (6)
δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν
ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι. (7) οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶν 20
φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξύ ἡμῶν τε
κἀκείνων, οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων ἢ ὧν δῆποτε ῥευμάτων ἀφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς
ἐκείνα παραγινόμενων, (8) οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ
τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοχρῶν τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρμόττον
μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡκέως ταῖς φοραῖς χρωμένων, εἰτα 25
διὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁπλίαν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντος
καὶ τὴν συμπαθεῖαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σφιζόντος κατὰ τὸν ἐκείθεν
σύμμετρον ἐπηρεισμόν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεμνίῳ τῶν ἀτόμων
πάλλεως. (9) καὶ ἦν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς
αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφὴ ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ 30
στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ
εἰδῶλου. (10) τὸ δὲ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ
αἰεὶ ἐστίν. †ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι, εἰτ' οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρουμέ-
νου κατὰ τινα ἀκίνητον ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένῳ τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ 35
ἔχουσα, καθ' ἣν τὸ ψεύδος γίνεται.† (11) ἡ τε γὰρ ὁμοιότης τῶν φαντασμάτων
οἰοῖται ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένων ἢ καθ' ὕπνους γινομένων ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινεὶς
ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λυγρῶν κριτηρίων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς
οὐσι τε καὶ ἀληθεῖσι προσαγορευομένοις, εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς ᾧ
βάλλομεν. (12) τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν 40
καὶ ἄλλην τιὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένῃ μὲν διάληψιν δὲ
ἔχουσαν· κατὰ δὲ ταύτην [τὴν συνημμένῃ τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ,
διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσης], εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ
ψεύδος γίνεται· εἰ μὲν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές. (13)
καὶ ταύτην οὐν ἀσφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν ὁδὸν κατέχειν, ἵνα μήτε τὰ κριτήρια
ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας μήτε τὸ διημαρτημένον ὁμοίως 45
βεβαιούμενον πάντα συνταράττη. (14) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν γίνεται
πνεύματός τινος φερομένου ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνοῦντος ἢ ἠχοῦντος ἢ ψοφοῦντος ἢ
ὅπως δῆποτε ἀκουστικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζοντος. τὸ δὲ ῥεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς
ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, (15) ἅμα τινὰ δισπῶζοντα συμπάσειαν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐνότητα ἰδιότροπον, διατείνουσιν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαιν 50
καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιούσαν, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τὸ
ἔξωθεν μόνον ἐνδηλον παρασκευάζουσιν· (16) ἀνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης

τινὸς ἐκείθεν συμπαθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἢ τοιαύτη ἐπαίσθησις. (17) οὐκ αὐτὸν οὖν δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν ἀέρα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι πολλὴν γὰρ ἔνδειαν ἔχει τοῦ πάσχωιν ὑπ' ἐκείνης – ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τὴν γινομένην πληγὴν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν φωνὴν ἀφίωμεν, τοιαύτην ἐκθλίψιν ὀγκῶν τινῶν ρεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει. (18) καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὁσμήν νομιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ ὀγκοὶ τινὲς ᾗσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν, οἳ μὲν τοιοῦτοι τετραγ- μένως καὶ ἀλλοτρίως, οἳ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες.

1 πρὸς Usener: τοῦς BP: τίς FP (corr.). τῆς Bailey 9 τῷ ἀπείρῳ Sedley. τῷ ἀπείρῳ codd.: τῷ (τῇ) ἀπείρῳ Meibomius: τὸ ἀπείρῳ Mühll 12 τῇ μειώσει Usener: ἡ μειώσει T. σημειώσει BP 14 πρὸς συγχεομένη, ὑπάρχει add F in marg 17 ὑπρ', Brieger 18 ἐναργείας Cassendi ἐνεργείας codd. 20 ἂν ἐναποφραγίσαιτο Cobet: ὁ μὲν ἀποφραγίσαιτο codd. 24 ὁμοχρόνι: Rown ἀπὸ χρόνῳ codd. 26 ἀποδιδόντας codd. ἀποδιδόντων Usener 29 πάλας δτ: πλάσιος cett. 30 ἂν δι: 31 ἡν ἀνα- cett. 31 ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ 2 Usener: 31 ἐγκαταλείμματος It: ἐγκαταλείμματος B (corr.). ἐγκαταλήμματος P 38 ἂ F: ἂ cett. 40 (τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ) pos. μὲν Usener 41-2 secl. Usener 45 ἐναργείας Cassendi ἐνεργείας codd. 47 πνεύματος] βεῖματος Cassendi 49 διασφίζοντας P (corr.): -οντα BP: -οντα F 55 πάσχωιν B (corr.): -ον BF 57 ἐκθλίψιν Brieger ἐκλήθην B: ἐκλήθην P: ἔκ FP (corr.) τινῶν FP (corr.) τινὲς B 61 πρὸς τὸ F πρὸς BP

Context: following 13A, on the infinite plurality of worlds. The superseded introduction to Lucretius 4 (45-53) shows that he too originally meant to give the theory of sensation this position – directly after book 2, which itself concludes with the infinity of worlds – but later moved it to follow book 3's account of the soul. The early positioning had the authority of Epicurus' original exposition in *Nat.*, which had reached this topic by the end of book 2 (= 24 Arrighetti [119]).

1-18 The emphasis throughout is on the non-contestation of the theory: for details of the arguments that this involved see Lucretius 4.54-268, and for the methodology see 18.

2 ἀποστάσεις See Usener [133] for parallels. The term is clearly chosen to distinguish emitted images from *αὐστάσεις* (14), self-formed images.

10 πολλαῖς As Mühll notes, the probable explanation of the *infinite* is that one is to understand *ἀτόμους*. These, however, we take to be not the atoms in the images, but those in ordinary compounds, whose high collision rate is *contrasted* with the relatively unobstructed travel of the incomparably diffuse atoms in the images.

12-13 Constant emission of images does not diminish the size of objects, because the flow is ubiquitous and losses are compensated by new arrivals. cf. Usener 282.

14 συγχεομένη Cf. 16E 2-4.

18 On the punctuation adopted here (with Bollack [122]), ἀναφέρῃ is to be supplied in the *ἵνα* clause, understood from ἀνοίσει. The expression *συμπάθειαν ἀναφέρειν* is guaranteed by 52-3, but the phraseology is a little suspect and there is some temptation to excise *ἵνα*, with Mühll.

20-3 The *air* account sounds like Aristotle's. It is often said to be that of Democritus, but fits him poorly: air has an unclear role in his theory (Theophrastus, *Sens.* 50), certainly a minor one (Aristotle, *De an.* 11.7, 419a15-17), and in most respects he comes close to Epicurus' own account. Nor is the 'ray' theory that of

Empedocles, but rather of Plato in the *Timaeus* and perhaps of Archytas (47 A 25 DK) see D. O'Brien, *JHS* 90 (1970).

24-5 **κατὰ-διάνοιαν** See D 2.

30 I.e. 'of shape, or of properties in general', cf. 5A 7-8, with note.

31 2 **κατὰ-εἰδῶλου** A much debated phrase. The safest reading probably remains to take ἐξ ἧς πύκνωμα as the succession of images which builds up a single cinematographic impression (cf. Augustine, *Ep.* 118.30, C), and the ἐγκατάλειμμα as the continuing mental effect of the single image which (D 2 4) can suffice to stir the imagination. But see Avonius [223] and Asmis [225], 126ff. for the theory that images enter the eye piecemeal and are reassembled, which, even if its presence in this passage is open to doubt, is clearly important to the full Epicurean account.

32 **προσδοξαζόμενῳ** Cf. D 816, Lucretius 4.465, 468.

33 5 This jumble of terminology has been variously emended in the hope of extracting a coherent scholion from it. But although it was no doubt mistakenly copied into the text of *Ep. Hdt.* along with the various scholia (141, etc.), it looks this time more like a reader's marginal jottings, of which neither great erudition nor grammatical coherence should be expected. Thus ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι ἐπιμαρτυρουμένου at 33-4 may just be a misguided gloss on προσδοξαζόμενῳ, wrongly taking this rare word to be equivalent to προσδοκωμένῳ, the annotator has speculated that error is being said to lie in that which is expected 'to be attested or uncontested - there then being no attestation', adding at 34 5 a reference to the 'movement' with which error is linked at 39 41 (Usener's emendation τινὰ κώπῃσιν for τὴν ἀκύνῃσιν is probably right, but perhaps the remaining irregularities and ellipses should be left).

40-1 Cf. Epicurus, *Nat.* 31.16.5-9, 36.16.2-6. For ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς and διάληψιν, cf. vol. 1, 86. At 20B 5 the self and its non-physical processes differ κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον διαληπτικόν from the atomic mechanism: see vol. 1, 109-10.

41-2 A gloss, trying to show how this sentence relates to the previous one. The first five words probably gloss τούτῃ, while the last three gloss the ensuing account of attestation and contestation, which the annotator somewhat implausibly takes to expand on διάληψιν at 40.

47 **πνεύματος** Needlessly emended to βεύματος by most editors - cf. 37.

49 **ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους** Paraphrased by Actius (4.19 2) as 'fragments of similar shape'.

51, 53 For ἐπαίεσθαι see on 16B 7

B Lucretius 4.230-8

praeterea quoniam manibus tractata figura	230
in tenebris quaedam cognoscitur esse eadem quae	
cernitur in luce et claro candore, necessest	
consimili causa tactum visumque morari.	
nunc igitur si quadratum temptamus et id nos	
commovet in tenebris, in luci quae poterit res	235
accidere ad speciem quadrata, nisi eius imago?	

esse in imaginibus quapropter causa videtur
cernendi neque posse sitie his res ulla videri.

Context: part of the argument at 4.217-68 (the beginning is lost) corresponding to **A** 6.

C Lucretius 4.256-68

- (1) illud in his rebus minime mirabile habendumst.
cur, ea quae feriant oculos simulacra videri
singula cum nequeant, res ipsae perspiciantur.
(2) ventus enim quoque paulatim cum verberat et cum
acre fluit frigus, non privam quamque solemus 260 [261]
particulam venti sentire et frigoris eius, [260]
sed magis unorsum, fierique perinde videmus
corpore tum plagas in nostro tamquam aliquae res
verberet atque sui det sensum corporis extra.
(3) praeterea lapidem digito cum tundimus, ipsum 265
tangimus extremum saxi summumque colorem.
nec sentimus eum tactu, verum magis ipsam
duritiem penitus saxi sentimus in alto

Context: as **B**.

258 **res ipsae perspiciantur** Contrary to Bailey's note ad loc., this entirely proper usage is correct Epicurean doctrine. Cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fr. 5.2.9-14: τὰ οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ῥέοντα εἰδωλὰ, ἐνπερίπτοντα ἡμῶν ταῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, τοῦ τε ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς τὰ ὑποκείμενα αἴτια γίνεσθαι . . .

D Lucretius 4.722-822

- (1) nunc age quae moveant animum res accipe, et unde
quae veniunt veniant in mentem percipe paucis.
(2) principio hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari
multa modis multis in cunctas undique partis 725
tenvia, quae facile inter se iunguntur in auris,
obvia cum veniunt, ut aranea bratteaque auri.
quippe etenim multo magis haec sunt tenvia textu
quam quae percipiunt oculos visumque lacessunt,
corporis haec quoniam penetrant per rara cunctaque 730
tenvem animi naturam intus sensumque lacessunt.
(3) Centauros itaque et Scyllarum membra videmus
Cerberaeque canum facies simulacraque eorum
quorum morte obita tellus amplectitur ossa;
omne genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur, 735
partum sponte sua quae fiunt aere in ipso.

partim quae variis ab rebus cumque recedunt et quae confiunt ex horum facta figuris. nam certe ex vivo Centauri non fit imago, nulla fuit quoniam talis natura animantis,	740
verum ubi equi atque hominis casu convenit imago, haerescit facile extemplo, quod diximus ante, propter subtilem naturam et tenuia texta. cetera de genere hoc eadem ratione creantur.	
(4) quae cum mobiliter summa levitate feruntur, ut prius ostendi, facile uno commovet ictu quaelibet una animum nobis subtilis imago; tenuis enim mens est et mire mobilis ipsa.	745
(5) haec fieri ut memoro, facile hinc cognoscere possis. quatenus hoc simile est illi, quod mente videmus atque oculis, simili fieri ratione necesse est.	750
nunc igitur docui quoniam me forte leonem cernere per simulacra, oculos quaecumque lacessunt, scire licet mentem simili ratione moveri per simulacra leonum <et> cetera quae videt aequae	755
nec minus atque oculi, nisi quod magis tenuia cernit. (6) nec ratione alia, cum somnus membra profudit, mens animi vigilat, nisi quod simulacra lacessunt haec eadem nostros animos quae cum vigilamus usque adeo, certe ut videamur cernere eum quem	760
relicta vita iam mors et terra potitast. hoc ideo fieri cogit natura, quod omnes corporis affecti sensus per membra quiescunt nec possunt falsum veris convincere rebus.	
praeterea meminisse iacet languetque sopore nec dissentit cum mortis letique potitum	765
iam pridem, quem mens vivum se cernere credit.	767
(7) multaque in his rebus quaeruntur multaque nobis clarandum est, plane si res exponere avemus. quaeritur in primis quare, quod cuique libido venerit, extemplo mens cogitet eius id ipsum.	777
anne voluntatem nostram simulacra tuentur et simul ac volumus nobis occurrit imago, si mare, si terram cordist, si denique caelum? conventus hominum pompam convivium pugnas, omnia sub verbone creat natura paratque?	780
cum praesertim aliis eadem in regione loquor longe dissimilis animus res cogitet omnis. quid porro, in numerum procedere cum simulacra	785

cernimus in somnis et mollia membra movere, mollia mobiliter cum alternis brachia mittunt et repetunt oculis gestum pede convenienti? scilicet arte madent simulacra et docta vagantur, nocturno facere ut possint in tempore ludos.	790
(8) an magis illud erit verum? quia tempore in uno, quod sentimus, id est, cum vox emittitur una, tempora multa latent, ratio quae comperit esse, propterea fit uti quovis in tempore quaeque praesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata: tanta est mobilitas et rerum copia tanta.	795
[hoc, ubi prima perit alioque est altera nata] [inde statu, prior hic gestum mutasse videtur.] et quia tenvia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acute certiere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt praeterea pereunt, nisi <si ad> quae se ipse paravit. ipse parat sese porro speratque futurum	800
ut videat quod consequitur rem quamque; fit ergo. nonne vides oculos etiam, cum tenvia quae sunt cernere coeperunt, contendere se atque parare, nec sine eo fieri posse ut cernamus acute?	805
et tamen in rebus quoque apertis noscere possis, si non advertas animum, proinde esse quasi omni tempore semotum fuerit longeque remotum. cur igitur mirumst, animus si cetera perdit praeterquam quibus est in rebus deditus ipse?	807
(9) quod superest, non est mirum simulacra moveri brachiaque in numerum iactare et cetera membra, nam fit ut in somnis facere hoc videatur imago;	809
quippe ubi prima perit alioque est altera nata inde statu, prior hic gestum mutasse videtur. scilicet id fieri celeri ratione putandumst: tanta est mobilitas et rerum copia tanta	810
tantaque sensibili quovis est tempore in uno copia particularum, ut possit suppeditare.	815
deinde adopinamur de signis maxima parvis ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi. fit quoque ut interdum non suppeditetur imago eiusdem generis, sed femina quae fuit ante, in manibus vir uti factus videatur adesse,	768
aut alia ex alia facies aetasque sequatur, quod ne miremur sopor atque oblivia curant.	770
	775
	776
	816
	820
	[826]

752 Leonem Lachmann. Leonum codd. 768 76 post 815 transp. Assius 800-1 uel. Lachmann. cf.
771 2 804 si ad quae se Bruger quae ex se CQL quae ex se BE 808-809 uel. ital.

Context: immediately following Lucretius' explanations of sensation.

734 Dreams about the dead are explained only here and at 757–67. Lucretius' remarks in his proems (1.132–5, 4.31–63, 5.54–63, though not, significantly, in the original proem to book 4 which accidentally survives at 4.45–53) show that he meant to work this up into a central theme of book 4, thus complementing book 3's proof of the soul's intrinsic mortality by refuting the main external evidence for its survival. But in the present state of book 4 we are told little, not even the source of the images which cause these dreams. Are they images cast off by the actual person before his death, however long ago? Or are they, more plausibly, images selected by the mind as merely bearing some resemblance to the person?

762–7 Cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fr. 5.4–6.1 (Smith [174]).

768–76 For the transfer of these lines, to follow 815, see the powerful arguments of Asmis [224].

788–93 The second question raised here and answered at the end of the passage is how dream figures can move so rhythmically, if they are not living beings. The language chosen is that appropriate to dancing (e.g. compare 789 with 4.980), but the scientific scope of the question extends to all lifelike movement. Democritus had endowed these dream figures with life and the power to affect us for good or evil: cf. g 7–8.

E Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fr. 5.3.3–14

ἢ ἐν[τῷ]σ ... νο... τὰ | ὑπὸ τῶν ὄψεων βλέπο[μενα] ἢ ψυχὴ παραλαμ-
| βάνει, μετὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν | πρῶτων ἐνπτάσεις εἰδῶλων ποροποιεῖ-
| ται | ἡμῶν οὕτως ἡ φύσις | ὥστε, καὶ μὴ παρόντων | ἐτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἂ
τὸ | πρῶτον εἶδεν, τὰ ὅμοι[α] τοῖς πρῶτοις τῇ δια[νοίᾳ] δεχθ[ῆ]ναι καὶ τὰ | |.

For textual information etc., see Smith [174].

Context: Diogenes' physics treatise, section corresponding to Lucretius 4. Dreams are not mentioned until the next column. Hence this column may well be explaining the mechanism of memory in general, not just that of dreaming, even though (cf. Lucretius 4.976–7) what it says is certainly applicable to dreams.

F Diogenes Laertius 10.32 (= 16B 11)

καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπινόοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασαι κατὰ τε
περίπτωσιν καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, συμβαλλομένου τι
καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

Context: doxography of Epicurean canonic.

g Diogenes of Oenoanda 7.1.4–2.11 | new fr. 1.2.7–3.14 (with omissions)

(fr. 7) κενὰ μὲν οὖν [σ]ε[α] | γραφήματα τῆς δια[νοίας] οὐκ ἔστι τὰ φάσματα, ὡς ἀξιούσιν
οἱ | Στωικοί. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν οὕτως αὐτὰ λέγουσιν | κενὰ ὡς ἔχοντα μὲν | σωματικὴν φύσιν,
λεῖπτην δὲ ἄκρως καὶ οὐχ ὑπόπτων ταῖς αἰσ[θη]σεσι, τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ | [κέρχ]ρηται
κακῇ ... εἰ δὲ οὕτως κενὰ ὡς οὐδ' ὅλως ἔχοντα σωματικὴν φύσιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ | μ[ε]τ[ε]λ[ο]ν
βούλονται | λέγε[σ]ιν ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ λ', | πῶς οὖν τε τὰ κενὰ | ἀναλογαρε[ῖ]σθαι | εἰ οὐδ' 5

ἔστις . . . (new fr. 1.2.7ff.) οὐκ οὐκ μὲν κενὰ λέγει | ταῦτα ὡς καὶ δύναμις | τοσαύτη
 πρόσθε[τ]ιν. οὐδ' | μὴν πάλιν, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν | κενόν, αἰσθηθ[ε]ν[τ] ἔχει | καὶ λαγισμῶν καὶ τῶν | ὅντι
 προσλαλεῖ ἡμ[ε]ῖς, | ὡς ὑπολαμβάνει Δημό[κ]ριτος. [ἀ]μήχανον γὰρ λεῖπτοῖς ὑμέσιν
 οὕτως καὶ | στερεμρίας φύσεως βά[θ]ος οὐκ ἔχουσιν | ταῦτα προσεῖναι. οὕτοι μὲν οὖν κατὰ
 τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπλανήθησαν οἱ γὰρ Στωικοῖς | κ[αὶ] Δημόκριτος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ καὶ ἦν 10
 ἔχουσι δύναμιν τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀφαιρούμεναι Δημόκριτος δὲ | καὶ ἦν οὐκ ἔχουσι
 χαλ[ρ]ίζεσθαι.

For apparatus, see Chilton [170] and [171] and Smith [173] and [176].

Context: Diogenes' physics treatise, cf. E.

For Democritus' view, see also vol. 1, 145, and for the Stoics', 39B 5 6.

6 λέγει Sr. Epicurus.

EPISTEMOLOGY

16 The truth of all impressions

A Lucretius 4.469–521

(1) denique nil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit
 an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur. 470

hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam,
 qui capite ipse suo in statuisti vestigia sese.

(2) et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum
 quaeram, cum in rebus veri nil viderit ante,
 unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire vicissim, 475
 notitiam veri quae res falsique creant

et dubium certo quae res differre probant.

(3) invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam
 notitiam veri neque sensus posse refelli.

(4) nam maiore fide debet reperitier illud, 480
 sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.

quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi
 debet? (5) an ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit

dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est?
 qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis. 485

(6) an poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an auris
 tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris,
 an confutabunt nares oculive revincant?

non, ut opinor, ita est. nam sorsum cuique potestas
 divisast, sua vis cuiquest, ideoque necesse est 490

et quod molle sit et gelidum fervensve sorsum
 et sorsum varios rerum sentire colores

et quaecumque coloribu' sint coniuncta videre,
 sorsum item sapor oris habet vim, sorsum odores

noscuntur, sorsum sonitus. ideoque necesse est non possint alios alii convincere sensus.	495
(7) nec porro poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese, aequa fides quoniam debebit semper haberi.	
(8) promde quod in quoquest his visum tempore, verumst.	
(9) etsi non poterit ratio dissolvere causam, cur ea quae fuerint iuxtim quadrata, procul sint visa rutunda, tamen praestat rationis egentem reddere mendose causas utriusque figurae, quam manibus manifesta suis emittere quoquam et violare fidem primam et convellere tota fundamenta quibus nixatur vita salusque.	500
(10) non modo enim ratio ruat omnis, vita quoque ipsa concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis praecipitesque locos vitare et cetera quae sint in genere hoc fugienda, sequi contraria quae sint.	505
(11) illa tibi est igitur verborum copia cassa omnis quae contra sensus instructa paratast.	510
(12) denique ut in fabrica, si pravast regula prima, normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, et libella aliqua si ex parti claudicat hilum, omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est prava eubantia prona supina atque absona recta, iam ruere ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque prodita iudiciis fallacibus omnia primis, sic igitur rano tibi rerum prava necessesit falsaque sit, falsis quaecumque ab sensibus ortast.	515 520

472 suo OQ: suo Lachmann 491 sensum Bentley: videri codd. videre Martin 493 videre Lachmann.
necessesit codd. 495 nascuntur Grussani: nascuntur OQ: nascuntur ed. Veconensis 511 prava Marullos
parva codd.

Context: following Lucretius' accounts of vision and optical illusion. Cf. also vol. 1, 109.

472 See Burnyeat [10], [229] for the recognition of Epicurus' expression *περικύπτω τρέπεται* in this line, and for the dialectical principle involved cf. also 20C 3. Most editors emend *suo* to *sua*, presumably so that *in* can govern it. The separation of *in* . . . *vestigia* is no doubt the more irregular usage, but it would be entirely in character for Lucretius to use linguistic disorder to convey the sceptic's confusion (for a nearby example, cf. 13E 832-3, on the back-to-front nature of teleology).

504-6 Cf. 18A 29.

513 *regula* Probably = *κανών*, for which see 17.

B Diogenes Laertius 10.31-2

(1) *πᾶσα γάρ, φησίν, αἰσθησις ἀλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική*.

(2) οὐτε γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆς κινεῖται οὐτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναται τι προσθῆναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν. (3) οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι. (4) οὐτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια αἰσθήσις τὴν ὁμογενῇ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, (5) οὐθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν, οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικάι. (6) οὐτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἥρτηται. (7) οὐθ' ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις γὰρ προσέχομεν. (8) καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐπαίσθηματα δ' ὑφέσταται πιστοῦνται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν. (9) ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀκούειν ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν. (10) ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρή σημειοῦσθαι. (11) [= 15F] (12) τὰ τε τῶν μαينوμένων φαντάσματα καὶ <τὰ> κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ, κινεῖ γάρ· τὸ δὲ μὴ οὐ οὐ κινεῖ.

2 δύναται Cassiod. ἀδυνατεῖ codd 4 αἰσθήσις scil. Diogen 6 ἥρτηται φ: εἰρηται ceti.
7 ἐπαίσθηματα BP: ἀνεπαίσθητα FP(corr.) 11 <τὰ> Casaubon

Context: doxography of Epicurean canonic

6–7 It is unclear how this relates to the arguments of 3–5, which seem in themselves to cover all possible cases. It apparently caps them with a quite general consideration, one which differs in not referring to different types of sensation at all.

7 ἐπαίσθηματα The term ἐπαίσθησις seems to be 'sensory recognition' (C 24; 15A 15–16; P. Herc. 19/698, cols. 8–10, in SVett | 149) – not a rational judgement as to an object's identity, but a successfully made sensory apprehension of something, normally an object or property (34.31.13 Arrighetti [119] is an exception, apparently a completely untechnical use). ἐπαίσθημα will be explicitly the product, the accomplished act of recognition, where ἐπαίσθησις can also include the power of recognition (this accords with Greek usage, and may be the most that can be got out of the confused Actius 4.8.2 = Usener 249). But for a different view, see Asmus [225], 162–3. The role of ἐπαίσθηματα in the present laconic argument is unclear: perhaps (cf. 15A 15) the point is that we can be said e.g. to hear external objects, not just their sounds; the senses successfully put us into contact with external objects in a way the sceptic would disallow.

10–12 This implicit glossing of ἀληθῆς as 'real' is made explicit at S.E. M. 8.9 (= Usener 247): for reservations about it as a satisfactory interpretation of Epicurus, see vol. 1, 85.

11 φαντάσματα A sign that Epicurus' own words are not being quoted. He uses this term for impressions in general (cf. 18C 21, 19A 8–9), whereas here it clearly carries its normal sense 'figments' (cf. its Stoic definition, 39A–B).

C Anonymous Epicurean treatise on the senses (P. Herc. 19/698), cols. 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, fr. 21

(1) τὴν μέν | γὰρ | [ὁ]ψὶν ὁρατὰ κατα[λ]αμβ[ά]νειν ἡγούμεθα, τὴν δὲ | ἀφῆν ἀπτά, καί | τὴν μέν | χρώματις, τὴν δὲ σώματος, καὶ | τὴν ἑτέραν | τοῦ τῆς ἑτέρας | [κρ]ίμα[τος] | μηθέν | πολ[υ]πραγμ[ο]νεῖν· ἐπειδὴ περ εἰ συ[ν]έβαινε τὴν ὁψιν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ σχῆμα | κ[α]ταλαμβάνειν, π[ο]λὺ | π[ρ]ότερον ἂν καὶ σῶμα | κ[α]τελάμβανεν . . . (2) . . . τύπον εἰ[ς] . . . ε, καὶ πολ[λ]ά | κ[ι]ς οὐδὲ αὐ[τὸ] τοῦτο. [εἰ] | περ οὖν οὐδὲν

ἑτερόν] | ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ὁρα|τόν] | ἢ τῶν χρωμάτων] ἢ [ἐξω|τάτω
 θεοῖς, οὐδὲ τὸ μ[έ|γεθος τὸ ὁρατόν ἢ τῷ] | πλείονων χρωμάτων] | ἢ
 κατὰ τὸ ἐξ[ω] θέσις], ἰσ[ω]ς] δύνατον τὴν α[ύτ]ῳ χρωμάτων αἰ|σαν
 [ἀντιληπτικὴν | τὴν] | ἐξωτάτω θεοῖν τῶν] | χρωμάτων καταλαμ|βά]- 10
 |νειν . . . (3) ὥστε | κατ' αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν | κοινὰ κρίματ' εἶναι | τῶν
 αἰσθήσεων τοῦ[τ]ων] τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ μέ|γεθος, ὃν λόγον ἔχει | τὰ τοῦ
 χρώματος π[ρ]ὸς | τὸ χρῶμα, τοῦτον ἐχόντων | τῶν τοῦ σώματος | πρὸς
 τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ὃν | λόγον ἔχει τὸ χρῶμα] | πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῆς ὁρά|σεως
 [κατ'ἀληψιν, τοῦ|τόν τοῦ σ]ώματος π[ρ]ὸς | τὴν δ[ιὰ] τῆς ἀφῆς 15
 . . . (4) . . . ἀ|κοῆς, χωρὶς τῶν ἀνω|τάτω καὶ κοινοτάτων | ἀ προδιήθο-
 μεν, κρίμα | κοινὸν οὐκ οἰόμεθα | κατὰ τὸν πρόχειρον | τρόπον εἶναι κατὰ
 δὲ | τὸν οὐ πρόχειρον μὲν, | κοινότητα δὲ προσφερόμενον, ὥστ' ἀναλογίαν
 εὐρύδως ἂν ἔχειν | ῥηθῆναι, φῆσα|ι]μεν | ἂν κοινὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι κρίμα τὸ
 σχῆμα | . . . (5) ὥστε | τῶν αἰσ|θήσεων προ|υπομνήσωμεν ὃ προσ|φερε- 20
 ται ἴδιον ἐκάστη χωρὶς τῆς τῶν κρινομένων ἐπ[α]ισθήσεως. ἢ | μὲν
 τοῖνυν ὁρασις ἰδιώ|τατον εἴ|χει παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας, χωρὶς τῆς τῶν
 |χρ]ωμάτων καὶ τῶν πρ[ὸς αὐ]|τὰ κρίσεως, τὸ ἐν ἀποσ|τάσει κατ'αλαμ-
 βάνειν | τὰς μορφάς, ἐπαισθ|ανομένην καὶ τοῦ με|ταξύ ἑαυ|τῆς τε 25
 καὶ ἐκ|τῶν δια|στ[ή]ματ[ος] . . . (6) ἢ δὲ ἀφῆ], κατὰ μέ|ρ] τὸ [ἴδιον, τὸ
 μηδεμιάς | ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ποι|ότητος· κατ[ὰ] δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἢ ποιὰ σάρξ
 ἐστίν, ὃ παρ[α]κ[α]λοῦται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν, τὸ ἐτε|ρογενῶν
 ποιότητων | ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. [σκ]ληρῶν γάρ καὶ μ[α]λακῶν] | οὐσ[α]
 κριτική, καταλαμ|βάνει καὶ θερμὰ καὶ | ψυχρά, τὰ τε ἐν ἑαυτῇ | καὶ παρ'
 ἑαυτῇ] . . . | (7) τῆς ὁρά|σεως τοῖνυν στερεμνι|ότητα μὴ κρινούσης, | 30
 καταψεύδονται τ[ι]νες | κρίνειν νομίζοντες | ὑποβ[ά]λλειν γὰρ αὐτὴν |
 καθ' ἀπλὴν προσβ[ο]λ[ήν] | ὅταν π[έ]τρας ὁρώμε]ν | . . .

ο ἰσ[ω]ς Sedley: πῶ]ς Sentz 12 μέ|γεθος: μέ|γεθών pap. aut. corr. 12 τῇ Sedley εἰ
 Scott 28 σκ|ληρῶν Asitis. π|ληρῶν Sentz

The full text is that of Sentz [149], except where otherwise indicated. Fuller papyrological information will be found there.

Context: a work on the senses by an Epicurean, possibly Philodemus.

26–8 Cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1121B–C, τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐ λεγούσης [corr. Emerton! De lacry: λέγουσι eudd.] τὸ ἐκτὸς εἶναι θερμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθος γεγενέ|σθαι
 τοιούτων . . . For 'internal touch' as a common function of the senses, the aspect of
 self-awareness in the sensory process, see Cicero, *Acad.* 2.20 and 76, *Acus.* 4.8.7
 (= SVF 2.832), and note on 53G. Although the only explicit attributions are to the
 Cyrenaics and Stoics, Cicero reports it to be a standard philosophical usage. Hence the
 suggestion in vol. 1, 84, that the Epicureans are invoking it here. Actius, loc. cit., may
 be right to connect it with Aristotelian κοινὴ αἴσθησις. Before τὸ μηδεμιάς (25 ἢ)
 and τὸ ἐτερογενῶν (27) understand ἰδιώ|τατον ἔχει from 22.

D Epicurus, RS 23

εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ' ἄς ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν

διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνης.

καὶ μάχη Bynaeet εἰ μὴ τοῦ

E Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.203–10 (Usener 247)

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ οὖον ὄρων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ τῆς
 δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθὴ φημι ὑπάρχειν.
 ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη, ταυτέστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ πόθος, ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τινων καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ
 ποιητικά συνίσταται, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἡ δὲ ἀλγυδιὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγευῶν,
 καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ποιητικὸν ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδὺ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγυδιῶν
 παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγευῶν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἡδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγυδιὸν ἀλγευῶν
 τὴν φύσιν ὑποκίσθαι, οὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαιτασιῶν παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὖον τὸ ποιητικὸν
 ἐκάστης αὐτῶν πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως φαντασιῶν ἐστίν, † οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὃν φαντασιῶν μὴ
 ὑπάρχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται, ποιητικῶν φαιτασιῶν κοθεστάναι. † καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον χρὴ λογίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὁρατὸν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον οὖον φαίνεται καὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστὸν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσοσῶτως. γίνονται οὖν πᾶσαι αἱ
 φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς, καὶ κατὰ λόγον εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς φαίνεται φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ
 Ἐπικουρίων, ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πᾶσι δὲ
 φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φαντασιῶν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φαντασιῶν συνίσταται, πᾶσι
 κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς. (1) ἐξαπατῇ δὲ ἐνίοις ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ οἷον ὁρατοῦ δοκουσῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασιῶν, καθ'
 ἣν ἡ ἀλλοιοσύνη ἢ ἀλλοιόσχημον ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ
 ὑποκείμενον· ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν οὕτω διαφερομένων καὶ μαχομένων
 φαντασιῶν δεῖ τὴν μὲν τινὰ ἀληθὴ εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιῶν ψευδῇ
 τυγχάνειν. ὁ πέρ ἐστιν εὐθης καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνορώντων τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι
 φύσιν. (2) οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὁράται τὸ στερεμνίον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν ποιῶμεθα
 τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου. τοῦ δὲ χρώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστίν
 ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου, καθά περ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου
 διαστήματος βλεπομένων· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου καὶ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς
 τόποις ὑποκείμενον, καθά περ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρου-
 μένων· τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξύ ἐξαλλαττόμενον καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον
 σχῆμα τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν, ὅποιον καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
 ὑπόκειται. (3) ὃν περ οὖν τρόπον οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ κρουμένῳ χαλκῷ φωνὴ
 ἐξακούεται οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγόντος ἀλλ' ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῇ
 ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθήσει, καὶ ὥς οὐθεὶς φησι τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς
 ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν, ἐπεὶ περ σύνεγγυς ἔλθων ὥς μείζονος
 ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται, (4) οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴπομι ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, ὅτι
 ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος μικρὸν ἀρὰ τὸν πύργον καὶ στρωγγύλον, ἐκ δὲ
 τοῦ σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ ὅτε
 φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιοῦτόσχημον, οὕτως ἐστὶ μικρὸν
 καὶ τοιοῦτόσχημον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾷ ἀποθραυκόμενων τῶν κατὰ τὰ
 εἶδωλα περάτων, καὶ ὅτε μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, πάλιν ὁμοίως

μέγα καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, ἤδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφότερα καθεστώς. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστροφῆς λοιπὸν ἔστι δόξης οἶεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν. (5) αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ κινούντος αὐτὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οἷον χρώματος, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τὸ ἐνθάδε ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε ὑποκείμενον. (6) διὸ περ αἱ μὲν φαντασίαι διὰ τὰυτὰ πᾶσαι εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς· <αἱ δὲ δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς>, ἀλλ' εἶχόν τινα διαφοράν. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἐπεὶ περ κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις, κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς, τὰ δὲ μοχθηρῶς ἦτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναι τι καὶ προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν τι τούτων καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως.

8 Ἐπίδοτος Kayser ἐκείνου codd. 45 suppl Usener

Context: the beginning of the section on Epicurus within a brief history of theories of the criterion, almost certainly derived from the *Canonica* of Antiochus (cf. on 18A, the sequel to this passage; and note the Stoicizing reading of Epicurus at 14–15, for which cf. 40C 4–5, etc.). The first person singular in 33 shows how little Sextus has adapted his source material.

3–13 This first exegesis of 'all impressions are true' looks too feeble to deserve serious attention, unless the apparent corruption in 8–9 conceals some more subtle ground than that *prima facie* offered, that every sense-object really is a sense-object.

22–3 Cf. C 2.

25–7 The hazy outline of distant objects is attributed to the fact that some of their colour is physically transmitted to the air surrounding them.

27–9 For the same basic interpretation, cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1121A (Usener 252, part).

36 τὸ αἰσθητόν Not the tower itself, since solid bodies are not the object of vision, but its colour-at-a-distance, an object distinct from its colour-close-up (38–9).

45 διαφοράν This may well be meant to paraphrase Epicurus' *διάληψιν* at 15A 40, but if so Antiochus has probably missed the relevant technical sense of the latter term (see vol. 1, 86, 109–10).

F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.63–4 (Usener 253)

(1) ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν, (2) πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. (3) ἐπὶ γοῦν τοῦ Ὁρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἑρινύας, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ' εἰδωλῶν κινουμένη ἀληθὴς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἰδῶλα), ὁ δὲ νοὺς οἰόμενος ὅτι στερήμενιοί εἰσιν Ἑρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησὶν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφοράν εισάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς οὔτε γὰρ φαινόμενι διδάξουσι τὸ

τοιούτων (ζητείται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα) οὔτε ἀδῆλω (διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει τὸ ἀδῆλον ἀποδεικνύσθαι). 10

Context: 'Is there anything true?'

5 The text implies that the fantastic images acted on Orestes' eyes, not directly on his mind. 15D 2-4 may suggest that this is strictly inaccurate. On the other hand, note the similar but innocuous inaccuracy at 15D 791.

G Lucretius 4.353-63

(1) quadratasque procul turris cum cernimus urbis,
propterea fit uti videantur saepe rutundae,
angulus obtusus quia longe cernitur omnis 355
sive etiam potius non cernitur ac perit eius
plaga nec ad nostras acies perlabitur ictus,
aera per multum quia dum simulacra feruntur,
cogit hebescere cum crebris offensibus aer.
hoc ubi suffugit sensum simul angulus omnis, 360
fit quasi ut ad tornum saxorum structa terantur,
(2) non tamen ut coram quae sunt vereque rutunda,
sed quasi adumbratim paulum simulata videntur.

361 *terantur* Munro. *trantur* OQ: *tuantur* Lachmann

Context: optical illusion.

359 Cf E 37 8.

H Lucretius 4.364-86

umbra videtur item nobis in sole moveri
et vestigia nostra sequi gestumque imitari, 365
aera si crebris privatum lumine posse
indugredi, motus hominum gestumque sequentem.
nam nil esse potest aliud nisi lumine casus
aer ad quod nos umbram perhibere soemus.
nimirum quia terra locis ex ordine certis 370
lumine privatur solis quacumque meantes
officimus, repletur item quod liquimus eius,
propterea fit uti videatur, quae fuit umbra
corporis, e regione eadem nos inque veluta
semper enim nova se radiorum lumina fundunt 375
primaque disperunt, quasi in ignem lana trahitur
propterea facile et spoliatur lumine terra
et repletur item nigrasque sibi abluit umbras.
nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus bilum.
nam quocumque loco sit lux atque umbra tuent 380

illorum est; eadem vero sint lumina necne,
 umbræque quæ fuit hic eadem nunc transeat illuc,
 an potius fiat paulo quod diximus ante,
 hoc animi demum ratio discernere debet,
 nec possunt oculi naturam noscere tetum.
 385
 proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli.

Context: following G.

I Plutarch, Col. 1109A--E (Usenet 230)

ὃ δ' οὖν δόξας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον Ἐπικουρείῳ δόγματι κέχρηται τῷ
 πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι' αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς· εἰ γὰρ θυμῷ λεγόντων τοῦ μὲν αἰσθητὴν
 εἶναι τὸν οἶνον, τοῦ δὲ γλυκὺν οὐδέτερος ψεύδεται τῇ αἰσθήσει, τί μᾶλλον ὁ οἶνος αὐτηρὸς
 ἢ γλυκὺς ἐστίν; καὶ μὴ λουτρῷ γε τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς μὲν ὡς θερμῷ, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ψυχρῷ
 χρωμένους ἰδεῖν ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχρὸν, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν ἐπιβάλλειν κελεύουσιν . . . εἴπερ
 οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας ἀληθῆς αἰσθήσεως, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν μὴ μᾶλλον
 εἶναι ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν . . . εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ <τὸ> φαινόμενον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ φάσκει τις,
 ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγων λέληθεν. αἱ δὲ πολυθρύλητοι συμμετρίαι καὶ ἁρμονίαι
 τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων αἱ τε πολυμιξίαι τῶν σπερμάτων, αἱ δὲ
 πᾶσι χυμοῖς καὶ ὕμαις καὶ χροαῖς ἐνδiesπαρμένα λέγουσιν ἑτέραν ἑτέρῳ
 ποιότητος κινεῖν αἰσθῆσιν οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον τὰ πράγματα
 συνελαίνουσιν αὐτοῖς; τοὺς γὰρ οἰομένους ψεύδεσθαι τὴν αἰσθῆσιν, ὅτι τὰ
 ἐναντία πάθη γινόμενα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἁρῶσι, παραμυθού-
 μενοι διδάσκουσιν ὡς ἀναπεφυρμένων καὶ συμμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ τι
 πάντων, ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλῳ πεφυκότος ἐναρμόττεται οὐκ ἐστὶ τῆς αὐτῆς
 ποιότητος ἐπαφή καὶ ἀντίληψις οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι κινεῖ πάντα
 ὡσαύτως τὸ ὑπακείμενον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις ἕκαστοι μόνους ἐντυχάνοντες
 πρὸς αἱ συμμετρον ἔχουσι τὴν αἰσθῆσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς διαμάχονται περὶ τοῦ
 χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ ἢ λευκοῦ ἢ μὴ λευκοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὰς αὐτῶν
 οἰόμενοι βεβαιοῦν αἰσθήσεις τῷ τὰς ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖν. δεῖν δὲ αἰσθῆσαι μὲν
 μηδεμιᾷ μάχεσθαι· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἄπτονται τινός, οἶον ἐκ πηγῆς τῆς
 πολυμιξίας ἐκάστη λαμβάνουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον· ὅλου δὲ μὴ
 κατηγορεῖν ἀπομένους μερῶν· μηδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οἰεσθαι δεῖν πάσχειν
 ἅπαντας, ἄλλους κατ' ἄλλην ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ πάσχοντας. δο-
 20
 25
 35
 δεῖ σκεπεῖν, τίνες μᾶλλον ἀνθρώποι τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἢ οἱ πᾶν μὲν τὸ
 αἰσθητὸν χρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιότητων ἀποφαίνουσι "σύμμικτον ὥστε γλυκύας ὕλησιν
 ῥιαν" ἔρρειν δὲ ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς κανόνες αὐτοῖς καὶ παντάπασιν οἰχεσθαι τὸ κριτήριον, ὅν
 περ εἰλικρινεῖς αἰσθητῶν ὅτιόν καὶ μὴ πολλὰ ἕκαστον ἀπολείπωσιν.

7 <τὸ> Epistemon/De Lucy 15 αὐτῆς <πᾶσι> Pohlenz 21 μηδεμιᾷ Duhet μηδὲ δια- codd

Context: reply to the Epicurean Colotes' attack on Democritus for allegedly holding
 that things are 'no more this than that' (a standard sceptic formula, cf. 1F-G, 71C).

8 συμμετρίαι Explained at 15A 23 5. See 1.

19 χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν The argument *en passant* defends the objectivity of moral qualities. 'Good' and 'bad' are no doubt included on the ground that they are reducible to the sensible properties 'pleasant' and 'painful'.

17 The criteria of truth

A Diogenes Laertius 10.31

(1) ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, (2) οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Κυρίαις δόξαις.

2-4 οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι δόξαις *sect. Diogenes* 1 καὶ (αὐτὸς) Usener

Context: doxography of Epicurean canon.

2 The same list appears at Cicero, *Acad.* 2.142.

2-3 For Epicurus' own appeals to φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, in addition to the texts cited in vol. 1, 40, see 11E 15-16.

3-4 I.e. at B, C and D.

B Epicurus, RS 24

(1) εἴ τινα ἔκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθῆσιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμενόμενον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λαιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἔκβαλεῖς. (2) εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμενόμενον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν <...> οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον ὥστ' ἐξηγηκῶς ἔσθι πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

1-2 κατὰ τὸ προσμενόμενον BP καὶ τὸ προσμένον F 3 προσμενόμενον BP προσμένον F 4 lacuna in ind. Mühlh 6-7 ὥστ' ἐξηγηκῶς Usener ὡς ἐξηγηκῶς *Usener*

2, 5 **προσμενόμενον** 'Evidence yet awaited.' The reading *προσμένον* has been preferred here, at C 9, and at 18B 3, by all modern editors except Bollack [123]. It is generally glossed as 'that which awaits ἐπιμαρτύρησις'. But the passive form is the reading of the best MSS both here and at C, and its shortening by a simple haplography in the inferior MSS is likelier palaeographically than that the same dittography should have occurred independently three times. Even at 18B, where the active form is found in all MSS, the illustration is 'waiting to get near the tower and find out what it looks like from close to'. This is quite inappropriate to *προσμένον* on the traditional interpretation, according to which it is the belief, not the observer, that does the waiting. There too, then, the passive form should be adopted.

C Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 37-8

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὡς Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ

εὐληφέειναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν εἰς ἀπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενούς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσ- 5
δεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἔξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάξομεν. (2) εἶτα κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμενόμενον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον 10
ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

3 ποτὶ ἡμῖν, ἢ γ. ἢ δ. ο.π. cett. 7 εἶτα Cassendi. εἴτε codd.: εἴτε τε Arndt 9 προσμενόμενον B¹· προσμέου 1P[corr.]

Context: opening methodological recommendations of the *Letter to Herodotus*.

1–7 For discussion, see especially Striker [9], 68–73. The absence of the actual word πρόληψις is more economically explained (cf. vol. 1, 89) as due to Epicurus' avoidance of excessive technical assumptions at the outset than by the suggestion (Sedley [126], 14) that this part of *Ep. Hdt.* was written before the term itself had been introduced.

9 προσμενόμενον See on B 2.

D Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 82

ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παρούσι καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις, καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κριτηρίων ἐναργείᾳ. ἂν γὰρ ταῦτοις προσέχωμεν, τὸ ὅθεν ὁ ταραχὸς καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγίνετο ἐξαιτιολογήσομεν ὁρθῶς καὶ ἀπολύσομεν, ὑπὲρ τε μετῴρων 5
αἰτιολογούντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων, ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἰσχύτως.

1 πάθεσι Bonnet: πάσι codd.

Context: the need to gear physical research to the goal of tranquillity (cf. 18C; 25B).

1–2 For κοινὰ αἰσθήσεις see Bignone [121] ad loc., and Striker [9], 68, who helpfully cites Philodemus, *Rhet.* 1.207, 2.41, and Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.1, 981b14.

E Diogenes Laertius 10.33

(1) τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἰοεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὁρθὴν ἢ ἐννοίαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, ταυτέστι μνήμην, τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον "τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος". (2) ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων 5
τῶν αἰσθήσεων. (3) παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· (4) καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐξηγήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό· οἷον "τὸ πόρρω ἐστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βουῖ;" δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνώκεναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βουῖς μυρφήν· (5) οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσασμέν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. (6) ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσω

αἱ προλήψεις· (7) καὶ τὸ δοξαυτὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργυῶς ἡρτηται, 10
ἐφ' ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν, οἷον "πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;"

3 ὑποσταγμένον Gaisvoldi (cf. C. 1); ἐπι- cndd.

Context: doxography of Epicurean canonic (immediately following 16B).

1 For Epicurus as originator of the term *πρόληψις*, see 23E 3. For the Stoics' definition and use of it, cf. 40A 3, N, S; and for the Pyrrhonists, 40T.

2 We punctuate after *τοιούτου μνήμην*, to make this a gloss on the preceding two words. Other editors take it directly with what follows, but that severs τοῦ πολλάκις κτλ. from κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν κτλ., leaving the latter as hopelessly weak definitions of *πρόληψις*.

6-9 For the same principle, see 23E 2, 40T 1; S.E., M 1.57, 11.21; and cf. 39C 4.

18 Scientific methodology

A Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.211-16 (Usener 247, part)

(1) οὐκοῦν τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ
ψευδεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἱ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι
πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἱ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ
ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. (2) ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν
κατάληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιούτον εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε 5
ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον Πλάτωνος μακρόθεν προσιόντος εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ δοξάζω
παρὰ τὸ διάστημα ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί, προσπελάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ προσεμαρ-
τυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος, καὶ
ἐπιμαρτυρήθη δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. (3) οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις δὲ ἐστὶν
ἀκολουθία τοῦ ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ, οἷον 10
ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων εἶναι κενόν, ὃ πέρ ἐστιν ἀδηλον, πιστοῦται δι'
ἐναργυῶς πράγματος τοῦτο, τῆς κινήσεως· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ οὐδέ
κίνησις ὠφείλειν εἶναι, τύπων μὴ ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν
περιστήσεται διὰ τὸ πάντα πλήρη εἶναι καὶ ναστά· ὥστε τῷ δοξασθέντι
ἀδήλῳ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον κινήσεως οὕσης. (4) ἡ μέντοι 15
ἀντιμαρτύρησις μαχόμενόν τί ἐστι τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ
ἀνασκευὴ τοῦ φαινυμένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀδήλῳ, οἷον ὁ Στωικός λέγει
μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἀδηλόν τι ἀξιῶν, τοῦτω δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι ὀφείλει τὸ
φαινόμενον συνανασκευάζεσθαι, φημί δ' ἡ κίνησις· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ
κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδέ κίνησις γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν ἥδη προειδηλωμένον ἡμῖν 20
τρόπον. (5) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις ἀντίξους ἐστί τῇ
ἐπιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ ὑπόπτωσις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ
εἶναι τοιούτον ὁποῖόν περ ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον πόρρωθέν τινος προσιόντος
εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ
διαστήματος ἐγνωμεν δι' ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτων. καὶ γέγονε τὸ 25
τοιούτον οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρήθη τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ
δοξαζόμενον. (6) ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ

ἀληθές εἶναι τι ἐστὶ κριτήριον, ἥ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψεύδους εἶναι. πάντων δὲ κρηπὶς καὶ θεμέλιος ἡ ἐνάργεια.

17 ἀνασκευὴ codd.: συνανασκευὴ Gassendi

Context: immediately following 16E.

Our grounds for naming Antiochus as the source of this text (along with 16E), and for questioning its evidential value, are fully argued in Sedley [243]. For a more positive assessment, see especially Striker [9].

B Diogenes Laertius 10.34

τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν, ἀληθὴ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῇται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῇται, ἀληθὴ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρῇται ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρῇται, ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν <τὸ> προσμενό<μενο>ν εἰσῆχθη· οἷον τὸ προσμεῖναι καὶ ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι τῷ πύργῳ καὶ μαθεῖν ὁποῖος ἐγγὺς φαίνεται.

5

3 <τὸ> Gassendi προσμενό<μενο>ν Sedley: προσμένον B: προσμένον B(ait.): πρὸς μὲν δὲ FP

Context: immediately following 17E.

3 προσμενό<μενο>ν See on 17B.

4 5 For the tower example, a standard one, see 16E 4, G; 72F 2.

C Epicurus, Ep. Pyth. 85-8

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως εἶτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἶτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν <δεῖ> εἶναι ἥπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. (2) μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι μήτε ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων καθαροῖν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα καὶ ἀναφῆς φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἄτομα στοιχεῖα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ταιαυτά δὴ ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει τοῖς φαινομένοις συμφωνίαν· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ ταυτὰ γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμφωνον κατηγορίαν. (3) οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον, ἀλλ' ὥς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρεῖαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορυβῆς ἡμᾶς ζῆν. (4) πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων <τῶν> κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαίρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπη· ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπη, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως συμφωνον ὃν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. (5) σημεῖα δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συντελουμένων φέρει τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν τινα φαινομένων, ἃ θεωρεῖται ἢ ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινόμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς γενέσθαι. (6) τὸ μέντοι

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φάντασμα ἐκάστου τηρητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτῳ διαιρετέον ἢ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν γενομένοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι.

2 <δεῖ> Cassendi ὁ οὐρανὸς codd. πωμάς τε> Lwenet ? δὲ Bignone ἢ codd. ἡ ὑπάρχει Cassendi ὑπάρχει codd. 11 ἰδιολογίας Stephanius ἰδιολογίας BP ἡδὴ ἀλογίας Elricourt ? 13 <τῶν> Bignone 17 δ' ἐπὶ Lwenet δέ τε BP δέ τινα Elricourt ? 18 φέροι Kuhn φέρει codd

Context: methodological introduction to *Letter to Pythacles*.

D Lucretius 5.509–535

- (1) motibus astrorum nunc quae sit causa canamus.
 (2) principio magnus caeli si vertitur orbis, 510
 ex utraque polum parti premere aera nobis
 dicendum est extraque tenere et claudere utrimque;
 inde alium supra fluere atque intendere eodem
 quo volvenda micant aeterni sidera mundi;
 (3) aut alium subter, contra qui subvelat orbem, 515
 ut fluvius versare rotas atque haustura videmus;
 (4) est etiam quoque uti possit caelum omne manere
 in statione, tamen cum lucida signa ferantur;
 (5) sive quod inclusi rapidi sunt aetheris aestus
 quaerentesque viam circum versantur et ignis 520
 passim per caeli volvunt summania templa;
 (6) sive aliunde fluens alicunde extrinsecus aer
 versat agens ignis; (7) sive ipsi serpere possunt
 quo cuiusque cibus vocat atque invitat euntis,
 flammea per caelum pascentis corpora passim. 525
 (8) nam quid in hoc mundo sit eorum ponere certum
 difficile est; sed quid possit fiatque per omne
 in variis mundis varia ratione creatis,
 id doceo pluriusque sequor disponere causas,
 motibus astrorum quae possint esse per omnes 530
 e quibus una tamen sit et hic quoque causa necesses
 quae vegeat motum signis; sed quae sit earum
 praecipere haudquaquamst pedetemptim progredientis.

511 sit et hic Nennius sit et haec Q sit in hoc Munro; set hic Beerayv set haec Lachmann

Context: following Lucretius' account of cosmogony. The corresponding text in Epicurus is at *Ep. Pyth.* 92

The various alternative explanations listed in the *Letter to Pythacles* and Lucretius 5.509–770 and 6.96ff. seem in general to be culled from Presocratic sources. Virtually any such theory is deemed intrinsically possible, provided only that it is sufficiently mechanistic in character to exclude divine control (cf. 13). Those in the present passage cannot be attributed with certainty: see Bailey [154] ad loc.

sunt aliquot quoque res quarum unam dicere causam
 non satis est, verum pluris, unde una tamen sit;
 corpus ut exanimatum siquod procul ipse iacere 705
 conspicias hominis, sit ut omnis dicere causas
 conveniat leti, dicatur ut illius una.
 nam neque eum ferro nec frigore vincere possis
 interisse neque a morbo neque forte veneno,
 verum aliquid genere esse ex hoc quod contingit ei 710
 scimus. item in multis hoc rebus dicere habemus.

710 *verum* Marullus: *verum* OQ

Context: in the middle of a long series of explanations of natural phenomena, paving the way for four alternative explanations of the Nile's flooding at 712–37.

F Philodemus, *Sign.* 11.32–12.31

(1) τιθεμ[έ]νου γάρ | τοῦτό τε ἀληθεύ[εσθα]ι, τὸ εἰ τὸ | πρῶτον τὸ
 δεύτε[ρο]ν, ὅταν ἀλ[η]θές ᾖ τὸ εἰ μὴ τὸ δ[ε]ύτερον | [οὐ]δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ
 [κα]τὰ τοῦτο | [συν]άγεται τὸ μόνον εἶναι τὸν | [κατὰ τ]ὴν ἀνασκευὴν
 τρ[ο]π[ο]ν ἀναγκαστικόν. (2) τὸ γάρ εἰ μὴ | τὸ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον
 ἀλ[η]θές [γ]ίνεται ποτὲ μὲν παρ[ό]σον τοῦ δευτέρου καθ' ὑπόθεσιν {πθ} | ἀ- 5
 νασκευασθέντος, παρ' αὐτὴν | τὴν ἀνασκευὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον
 ἀναιρεῖται, (3) καθάπερ [ε]χει | καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι κίνησις | ἔστιν κενόν
 ἀναιρεθέντος γὰρ | καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ κενοῦ, παρὰ ψιλὴν | τὴν ἀναίρεσιν
 [αὐτ]οῦ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀναιρεθή[σεται], ὥστ' εἰς τὸ | κατ' ἀνασκευὴν γέν[ε]ος 10
 ἐναρμότ[τειν] τὸ τοιοῦτο. (4) ποτὲ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ
 δύνα[σ]θαι τὸ μὲν π[ρ]ῶτον ὑπάρ[χ]ον <ν>ο[κ]εῖν | ἢ τοιοῦτον ὑπάρ[χ]ον τὸ
 δὲ | [δ]εύτερον μὴ ὑπάρ[χ]ον ἢ μ[ὴ] το[ι]οῦτο, (5) ο[κ]ο[ν] εἰ | Ἰ[λ]λάτων 15
 ἐστὶν ἀν[θ]ρωπος, καὶ Σωκ[ρά]της ἐστὶν ἀν[θ]ρωπ[ος]; τούτου γάρ
 ἀληθοῦς | ὄντος ἀλ[η]θές [γ]ίνεται | καὶ τὸ | εἰ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ἀν[θ]ρωπος, | οὐδὲ Ἰ[λ]λάτων ἐστὶν ἀν[θ]ρωπος, | οὐχί | τ[ῶ]ι τ[ῇ] Σωκράτους 25
 ἀναίρε[σει] συνανασκευ[ά]ζεσθα[ι] τὸν Ἰλλάτωνα, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δυν[ά]τ-
 [ῶ]ν | εἶναι τὸν μὲν Σωκ[ρά]την νοεῖν | οὐκ ἀν[θ]ρωπον, τὸν δὲ Ἰ[λ]λάτωνα
 ἀν[θ]ρωπον, [δ]ὲ δὴ τοῦ κ[αθ'] ὁμοιότ[η]τα | ἔχεται τ[ρ]ό[πον].

6 τὸ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον Bartsch: τὸ πρῶτον οὐδὲ τὸ δεύτερον par. 17 νοεῖν Sedley: εἶναι Giomperz

For fuller apparatus, see De Lacy [132].

Context: reply to the Stoic Dionysius' first two arguments against the Epicurean Similarity Method, reported in the lost portion of text preceding 42G. Philodemus' source is his Epicurean master Zeno of Sidon (19.4–11).

17 *νοεῖν* Thus, in preference to Giomperz's *εἶναι*, is supported by *Sign.* 14.26, 33.1–9. The 'inconceivability' that one of the similar items should lack an essential

property which the other possesses is presented in the *De signis* as an entirely cogent ground of inference.

G Philodemus, *Sign.* 34.29–36.17

(1) τοῖς δ' ἐπιλαμβανομένοις τῆς καθ' ὁμοιότητα | σημειώσεως ἢ τε
 παραλλαγῇ | τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνεπιστήμων | τὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς τὸ καθὼ
 λαμβάνομεν, οἷον λόγου χάριν ὥς | ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθὼ ἀνθ[ρ]ωπος | θνητός
 ἐστὶ· διὸ καὶ φασιν αὖ || μὲν παρὶται τὸ καθὼ, τὸν λόγον | ἀπρόβατον ὑπάρξειν, ἀν δέ
 παρὰ λαμβάνηται, τῷ κατ' ἀνασκευὴν χρήσασθαι τρόπῳ. (2) τὸ γὰρ | τὸδε
 συνηρτῆσθαι τοῖδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης λαμβάνομεν [ἐ]ξ αὐτῶν πᾶσιν οἷς
 περιεπέεσμεν | θεωρηθῆσθαι τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα ποικίλοις
 ἐκ ταυ[το]ῦ γένους ἐντετυχηκότων | ζώοις καὶ παραλλαγὰς κατὰ τὰ λ[α]
 πρὸς ἀλλήλ' ἐ[χ]ουσι, τῶν δέ | το[ι]οῦτων κοιν[ο]τ[ή]των πᾶσι | μ[ε]τ[έ]χ-
 ουσι. (3) τὸν [οὐ]ν φα[με]ν κα[ί] | ἀνθ[ρ]ωπον | καθὼ κ[α]ὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπ-
 ὅς | ἐο[ύ]τι θνητὸν εἶναι, τῷ π[ε]ρι[πε]τ[ι]ωκέναι πολλοῖς | καὶ ποικίλοισι
 ἀνθρώποις ἐ[ξ]αλλαγ[έν] | δέ | τ[ο]ιοῦτο σ[ύ]μ[π]τωμα μηδ[έ]ποτ' | ἐφευρ-
 εῖν, εἰς τούναντίον | [τε] μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπώμε[ν]οι, (4) ὥστε κατὰ τὸν
 τρόπον | [τοῦ]τον εἰληφθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κα[ί] | ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφ' ὧν
 τάττομεν τὸ καθὼ καὶ τὸ ἦι, | τ[ῇ]ν ἰδιότητα ἐνδεικνυμένου τοῦ μὴ ἄλλως
 ἢ σὺν τούτῳ | καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρακολουθεῖν τοῦτο τούτῳ, (5) καὶ οὐκ
 ἐπὶ | τῶν δι' ἀνασκευαζομένου σημεῖου μόνον λαμβανομένων, καὶ ἐπὶ
 τούτων δέ τὸ πᾶσιν περιπεσεῖν τοῦτ' ἔχουσιν | παρακολουθεῖν ἐργάζε-
 ται | τὴν διαβεβαίωσιν. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ | τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κινούμενα ἢ | πάντα
 διαφορὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἔχειν | κοινὸν δέ τὸ διὰ κενωμάτων, πάντως τὸ κἄν
 τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ ἵνα | μὴ πυρὸς {οὐκ} οὗτος ἢ γεγονότος, ὁ καπνὸς
 ἀνασκευασθῇ τῷ πάντως καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων καπνῶν | ἐκ πυρὸς ἐκκρινόμε-
 νον θεθεωρηθῆσθαι διατεινόμεθα. (6) διαπίπτουσιν δέ καὶ καθύσων οὐ
 συνβλέπουσιν τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς | ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀντιπίπτει διὰ τῶν | φαινο-
 μένων. οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν εἰς | τὸ προσδέξασθαι τὰς ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον παρενκλί-
 σεις τῶν ἀτόμων | διὰ τὸ τυχερὸν καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, | ἀλλὰ δε[ί] |
 προσεπιδείξαι | καὶ τ[ὸ] μὴδ' ἄλλ[ο] εἶναι τούτῳ μάχεσθαι | τῶν
 ἐνα[ρ]γῶν.

κ κατὰ Corniger, καὶ παρ. 11 (2 π[ε]ρι[πε]τ[ι]ωκέναι τ[ο]ιοῦτο Sedley 12 μηδ[έ]ποτ' Sedley
 For fuller apparatus, see 77c 1 acy 152)

Context: Philodemus' report of an oral contribution to the same Epicurean–Stoic debate as in **F** by an unidentified Epicurean, replying to the Stoic proposal at **42G 4**. He accepts the suggested rewriting of the inference 'Since all men familiar to us are mortal, men everywhere are mortal' into the essentialist-sounding 'Since the men familiar to us are mortal *in so far as they are men*, men everywhere are mortal', but insists that the 'in so far as' premise is itself established empirically by the Epicurean 'Similarity Method'. However, in being prepared to include 'in so far as they are men' in the premise, this Epicurean goes beyond Zeno of Sidon's rejoinder to the Stoic objection stated in **42G 3**; cf. *Sign.* 16.5–29, 22.28–23.7.

2 τῶν εἰρημένων At 33 33 34.29 Philodemus' Epicurean source has distinguished four uses of καθό. (1) Necessary concomitant, e.g. 'Men in so far as they are men are prone to disease and ageing'. (2) definition and πρόληψις, e.g. 'Man, in so far as he is man, is a rational animal'. (3) attribute . . . (text truncated); (4) necessary concomitant of an attribute, e.g. '⟨A man, in so far as he⟩ is foolish, is utterly unhappy'. However, he adds that all four usages express a necessary connexion, and the thesis in the present passage that 'in so far as' premises are verified empirically seems to be intended as equally applicable to them all.

19–21 On this argument from motion to void, see vol. 1, 32.

25–6 The inference from τὸ παρ' ἡμῶς to the atomic swerve is well attested, e.g. at 20E 3, F. A similar inference from the existence of luck to that of the swerve is attested only here and at Plutarch, *Soll. an.* 964c (Usener p. 351, 11), and the latter passage is perhaps textually suspect. See further, Long [219], and cf. note on 20A 7.

26–8 This formal requirement of οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις in confirmation of the atomic swerve is fulfilled at 11H 249–50.

19 Language

A Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 75–6

(1) ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισι θάττον, ἐν δὲ τισι βραδύτερον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τισι περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις ἀπὸ τῶν [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου] (ἰδίων χρειῶν κατὰ μείζους ἐπιδόσεις), ἐν δὲ τισι κατ' ἐλάττους. (2) ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθῃ καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ' ἐκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, ὥς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν διαφορά ᾗ. (3) ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἦττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλαις καὶ συντομωτέως δηλουμένας. (4) τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνωρώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας παρεγγυῆσαι τινὰς φθόγγους. (5) τοὺς (μὲν οὖν) ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι.

5 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου scil. Sedley ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου scil. Muhl. (ἰδίων χρειῶν) Sedley (ἐπὶ μείζους ἐπιδόσεις) Leopold 10 ἢ Usener: εἰς codd. 12 ἀλλήλαις BFG(corr.): -ους F. -ας Meibom 14 τοὺς (μὲν οὖν) Sedley: (καὶ) τοὺς (μὲν) Cassendi: τοὺς del. Usener

Context: following the section on world formation which includes 13C.

9–10 It is not clear whether these differences are a primary or merely a supplementary factor in the production of different languages and dialects: καὶ may suggest the latter (see Brunswick [24B]), unless it is an instance of Epicurus' redundant καὶ (see Usener [133], s.v.), as at 7B 29. Nor is it made clear how far impressions and reactions result (a) from environmental differences (cf. 22B 1), and (b) from differing racial physique (cf. 22Q 5–6).

15 *ἐμνηνεῖσθαι* virtually = 'to use language', just as *ἐμνηνεῖα*, 'self-expression', often amounts to 'language' (G 6; also Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.3 12, Diodorus Siculus 1.8.3-4). Cf. note on C 3.

B Lucretius 5.1028-90

- (1) at varios linguae sonitus natura subegit
mittere et utilitas expressit nomina rerum,
(2) non alia longe ratione atque ipsa videtur 1030
protrahere ad gestum pueros infantia linguae,
cum facit ut digito quae sint praesentia monstrant.
sentit enim vis quisque suas quoad possit abuti.
cornua nata prius vitulo quam frontibus existent,
illis iratus petit atque infestus inurget. 1035
at catuli pantherarum scymnique leonum
unguibus ac pedibus iam tum morsuque repugnant,
vix etiam cum sunt dentes unguesque creati.
alituum porro genus alis omne videmus
fidere et a pinnis tremulum petere auxiliatum. 1040
(3) proinde putare aliquem tum nomina distribuisse
rebus et inde homines didicisse vocabula prima,
desiperest. nam cur hic posset cuncta notare
vocibus et varios sonitus emittere linguae,
tempore eodem alii facere id non quisse putentur? 1045
(4) praeterea si non alii quoque vocibus usi
inter se fuerant, unde insita notities est
utilitatis et unde data est huic prima potestas.
quid vellet facere ut sciret animoque videret?
(5) cogere item pluris unus victosque domare 1050
non poterat, rerum ut perdiscere nomina vellent.
nec ratione docere ulla suadereque surdis,
quid sit opus facto, facilest; neque enim paterentur
nec ratione ulla sibi ferrent amplius auris
vocis inauditos sonitus obtundere frustra. 1055
(6) postremo quid in hac mirabile tantoperest re,
si genus humanum, cui vox et lingua vigeret,
pro vario sensu varia res voce notaret?
cum pecudes mutae, cum denique saecula ferarum
dissimilis soleant voces variasque ceterae, 1060
cum metus aut dolor est et cum iam gaudia gliscunt.
quippe etenim licet id rebus cognoscere apertis.
irritata canum cum primum magna Molossum
mollia ricta fremunt duros nudantia dentis,

longe alio sonitu rabe restricta minantur	1065
et cum iam latrant et vocibus omnia complent.	
at catulos blande cum lingua lambere temptant	
aut ubi eos iactant pedibus morsuque potentes	
suspensis teneros imitantur dentibus haustus,	
longe alio pacto gannitu vocis adulant	1070
et cum deserti baubantur in aedibus aut cum	
plorantes fugiunt summissò corpore plagas.	
denique non humilis stem differre videntur.	
inter equas ubi equus florenti aetate iuvenens	
pinnigeni saepe calcibus ictus amoris	1075
et frenatum patulis soli naribus egit ad arna,	
et cum sic alias concussus artibus hinc?	
postremo genus altitum variaque volucres,	
accipitres atque ossifragae mergique marinis	
lucubris in salbo vacuus vitamque petentes,	1080
longe alias alio iactant in tempore voces	
et cum de victo certant praedaeque repugnant.	
et partim mutant cum tempestatibus una	
lamentemur cantus, formicunt ut saecula vetusta	
corvorumque greges ubi aquam dicuntur et umbris	1085
proscire et interdum ventos aurasque vocare.	
{7} ergo si varii sensus animalia cogunt,	
muta tamen cum sint, varias emittere voces,	
quanto mortalis magis acquumst tum potuisse	
dissimilis alia atque alia res voce notare!	1090

1071 *quod* Lambinus: *quod* OQ 1075 *varia* Bentley: *varios* OQ 1084 *fremunt* Marullus: *premitur* OQ 1088 *iactant* Naugerius: *iactant* OQ *potentes* OQ: *potentes* 131

Context: immediately following 22K, which itself describes the use of *pre-linguistic* gestures in the forming of social compacts.

The argument is: it is natural to human beings both to designate (witness instinctive pointing by infants), and to utter different sounds in reaction to different stimuli (witness the instinctive utterances of numerous animal species); to stumble upon a rudimentary language, they had only to link these two tendencies.

1029 There is no possible ground for seeing any reference here to the later, artificial stage of language development (A 3-4), as Giussani [164], 280, and others have done.

1030-40 On the potentially un-Epicurean implications of this apparent appeal to animal instinct, see vol. 1, 64-5. Cf. also the interesting study by Schrijvers [247], who argues that *sensit* at 1033 represents not instinctive feeling but empirical observation, as at 21A 9: he stresses the fact that the young animals are said to start trying to use the part in question when it has *barely* emerged, but not *before* it has, as the teleologists normally claimed.

C Diogenes of Oenoanda 10.2.11-5.15

καὶ τῶν | φθόνων δὲ ἔνεκεν (λέγω δὲ τῶν τε ὀνομάτων | καὶ τῶν
 ῥημάτων) ὧν | ἐποίησαντο τὰς πρώτας | ἀναφθένξεις οἱ ἀπὸ | γῆς φύντες
 [ἄνθρω]ποι | μήτε τὸν Ἑρμῆν παρα|λαμβάνωμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν, ὡς
 φασὶν | τινες - περιφανῆς γάρ | αὕτη γε ἀδολεσχία - | μήτε τῶν φιλο-
 σόφων | πιστεύωμεν τοῖς λέγουσι κατὰ θέσιν καὶ | διδαχὴν ἐπιτεθῆ- 5
 ναι | τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγ[μα]σιν, ἵνα αὐτῶν ἔχωσι σημεία τῆς πρὸς
 [ἀλ]λήλους ἐνεκα ραδίας ἀποδηλώσεως οἱ | ἄνθρωποι. γελοῖον γάρ | ἐστι,
 μᾶλλον δὲ παν|τός γελοίου γελοϊότερον πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ ἀ[δύνα]τ[ο]ν αὐτῷ
 προσεῖναι, σιναγαγεῖν μὲν | τινα τὰ [το]σάδε πλήθη | ἵνα τυγχά|νουντα
 [οὐδὲ | γάρ] πω τ[ό]τε βασιλεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ μὴν γράμματα ὅπου γε μηδὲ οἱ 10
 φθόνιοι - περὶ γάρ τούτων καὶ [lacuna of a few words] [διὰ] προσταγῆς
 τὴν | συ[ν]αγωγὴν αὐτῶν γε|νέσθαι, συναγαγόντα | δὲ καθηγείσθαι
 γρ[α]μματιστοῦ τρόπον [ρα]κείδος τινος ἀν[τι]λαβό|μενου, καὶ ἐκάστου
 τῷ[ν] | πραγμάτων θινγάνου[ν]τα ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι "τοῦτε[ῖ] μὲν καλεῖσθω
 λῆ[ξ]θος, τοῦτε[ῖ] δὲ ξύλον, | [τ]οῦτε[ῖ] δὲ ἄνθρωπος, | ἣ κύων . . ." 15

10 *Βασιλεῖς* Chilton [246]

The text is from Chilton [179], which should be consulted for fuller apparatus.

Context: the early history of man - a context in Diogenes' work equivalent to Epicurus *Nat.* xiii (represented in *Ep. Hdt.* by A) and to the second half of Lucretius 5.

3 *Ἑρμῆν* That Hermes was the inventor of language, *ἐρμηνεία*, is an etymological flight of fancy known to Diodorus Siculus (5.75), and possibly foreshadowed at Plato, *Crat.* 407c 8b.

4-7 It was apparently an unquestioned assumption before Epicurus that language arose either as a human contrivance or as a gift from the gods: cf. Plato, *Crat.* 439c2, etc., *Prot.* 322a; Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.3.12; Diodorus Siculus 1.8.3-4, Vitruvius 2.1 (both often held to stem ultimately from Democritus, see Cole [273])

D Epicurus, *Nat.* 28, 31.10.2-12

εἰ δὲ | τότε [τα]ῦτό τι διαυ[ο]σύμεναι ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κ|κεμένην
 ἑρμηνίαν τῷ | ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἀμ[α]ρτία ἐστὶν | τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἔτε|ρον
 ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ | τῷμ προλήψεων γινν[ό]μενον καὶ τῷμ φαινο-
 μ[έν]ων | διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐ[θι]σμοὺς τῶν λέξεων . . .

Readings from Sedley [120]

Context: discussion, in a book written in 296/5 B.C., of Epicurus' own earlier views on language.

1 *εἰ* With the apodosis lost, it cannot be judged whether or not the protasis is counterfactual ('If we had said . . .'). Thus the text maddeningly refuses to tell us whether Epicurus himself ever entertained the view described here. *τότε* Not datable, but no doubt in Epicurus' 'early' works known as the *ἀρχαία* or *ἀρχαικά*, which Philodemus mentions as providing Epicurean orthodoxy with a problem

comparable to the Stoics' embarrassment over Zeno's youthful *Republic* (*De Stoicis* 1.44ff., in Dorandi [334], cf. notes on 67B, E).

1-2 **κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κ καιμένην ἑρμηνίαν** Perhaps added because Epicurus is aware that at the time of which he is speaking he had not yet introduced *πρόληψες* (3; cf. 23E 3) into his philosophical vocabulary. (*ἑρμηνίαν* is the papyrus' orthography for *-εἰαν*.)

4 The reference is apparently to a time when Epicurus, regarding language as a prime source of error, attempted to reform it for philosophical purposes. See Sedley [126], 22-3. For further speculation on the philosophical significance of this fragment, cf. Long [232], Glidden [250].

E Epicurus, *Nat.* 28.31.13 23-14 12

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρόν | ἐστ|ι ταύ|τ|η| προφέροντα μη.κύνει|ν· κ|αὶ
μαλ' ὀρθῶς |γε, ὦ|| Μητροδώρε· πάνν γὰρ οἶμαί | σε πολλά· ἂν ἔχειμ
προε|ν|έγ|κασθαι ἂ ἐθειάρεις γελαίως |π||ώ|ς| τι|να|ς ἐγδεξαμένους καὶ
π|άν|τ|α| μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον· κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν | ἰθι-
μένων λέξεων ἡμῶν, χρωμένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέν.ταιν ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ 5
φανε||ρίων.

Readings from Sedley [126]

Context critique of Epicurus' own and his pupil Metrodorus' earlier views on language. Metrodorus had apparently held an extreme conventionalist view of meaning, like that of Hermogenes in Plato's *Cratylus* (Sedley [126], 22).

The scribe's orthography is idiosyncratic: ἐγ- (3) = ἐκ-; ἰθ- (4) = εἰθ-

3 **τι|νο|ς** We suggest in vol. 1, 101, that Epicurus is thinking of Diodorus Cronus' extreme conventionalist theory (37N-O). If so, he is perhaps using the absurdity of Diodorus' position as a gentle way of criticizing Metrodorus' former view that no name is better than any other, and defending their current orthodoxy that existing linguistic conventions should be adhered to.

4-6 For Epicurus' avowed respect for current linguistic conventions, cf. 7B 15; 14A 28-30; D.L. 10.13; Plutarch, *Col.* 1112E.

F Anon., *In Plat. Theaet.* 22.39-47

Ἐπίκου||ρος τὰ ὀνόματά φησ|ι|ν σαφέστερα εἶναι | τῶν ὄρων, καὶ
μέντοι καὶ γελαῖον εἶ|ναι, εἴ τις ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰ|πεῖν "χαῖρε Σώκρα|τες" λέγει
"χαῖρε ζῶν|τον λο|γ|ικὸν θνητόν".

Context comment on the remark at *Theaet.* 147h that no one understands a thing's name if he does not know what the thing is.

1 **ὀνόματα** One would expect this to be 'words', rather than '(proper) names'. If so, the example, 'Socrates' is unfortunate.

G Erotianus 34.10-20 (Usener 258)

εἰ γὰρ μέλλοιμεν τὰς πᾶσι γινωσκομένας ἐξαπλοῦν φωνάς, ἦτοι πάσας
ὀφειλήσομεν ἐξηγησασθαι ἢ τίνας, ἀλλὰ πάσας μὲν ἀδύνατον, τινάς δὲ καὶ
κενόν, ἢ γὰρ διὰ συνήθων ἐξαπλώσομεν αὐτὰς ῥημάτων ἢ διὰ τῶν μὴ

συνήθων· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἀσυνήθεις εἰς τοῦτο ἀφνεῖς φαίνονται (δεκτὸν γὰρ τὰ
 ἥττον γινωσκόμενα διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον γινωσκομένων ἐξαπλοῦν), αἱ δὲ 5
 συνήθεις τῷ ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι φανεραὶ πρὸς τὸ δηλωτικὸν τῆς ἐρμηνείας οὐκ
 ἔσονται, ὡς φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος· ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ἰδίως τῆς ἐρμηνείας τὸ
 φανερόν, ὅθ' ὑπὸ λόγου καθάπερ τινὸς οἰκείου μαγγανεύηται φαρμάκων.

2-3 καὶ κεκόν Usener· δίκαιον codd. (οὐ) δίκαιον Eustachius 4 δεκτὸν codd.· δίκαιον dubitanter
 Usener 5 τῷ Stephanus τό codd.· (διὰ) τὰ Turnebus 7 ἔσονται (χρήσιμοι) Usener ἰδίως
 codd.· πῶς dubitanter Usener

Context: preface to the lexicon, discussing what classes of words should be explained and by what means.

H Cicero, *Fin.* 1.22 (Usener 243, part)

iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική
 dicitur, iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. tollit
 definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet, non quo modo efficiatur
 concludaturque ratio tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur ambigua
 distinguantur ostendit. 5

Context: Cicero's own attack on Epicurus.

I Diogenes Laertius 10.31 (Usener 257)

τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς
 φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.

Context: doxography of Epicurean canonics. Followed by 17A.

1 παρέλκουσαν We translate 'superfluous', but another possibility is 'mislead-
 ing', 'diversionary'.

J Diogenes Laertius 10.34 (Usener 265)

τῶν τε ζητήσεων εἶναι τὰς μὲν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ περὶ φιλήν τὴν
 φωνήν.

Context: as I.

K Plutarch, *Col.* 1119f (Usener 259, part)

τίνες μᾶλλον ὑμῶν πλημμελοῦσι περὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, αἱ τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν
 γένος, οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχον, ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖτε, τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ
 τυγχάνοντα μόνον ἀπολιπόντες, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ σημαινόμενα πράγματα, δι'
 ὧν γίνονται μαθήσεις, διδασκαλῖαι, προλήψεις, νοήσεις, ὁρμαί, συγκατα-
 θέσεις, τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ εἶναι λέγοντες; 5

2 παρέχον Usener· παρέχοντες codd.

Context: attack on Epicurean theology for violating the gods in reality, not just
 linguistically. For good measure, he throws in the remark that if linguistic violations

do matter too, none are guiltier of them than the Epicureans – as explained here.

For a similar use of Stoic metaphysical doctrine as a weapon against the Epicureans, cf. *ibid.* 11168.

ETHICS

20 Free will

A Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 133–4

(1) ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν δυνάμοσι δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ
θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος, καὶ τὸ μὲν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυνπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπύριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν
κακῶν ὡς ἡ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν δεσπότην
εἰσαγομένην πάντων ἂν γελῶντος (εἰμαρμένην, ἀλλ' ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην
ὄντα συνορώντος), ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην
ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὄραν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον
ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτόν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν; (2) ἐπεὶ
κρείττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν
εἰμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν; ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ
τιμῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην.

5 ἂν γελῶντος Sedley: ἀγγέλλοντος BF ἀγγελῶντος P ἔγγελῶντος Bailey ἀγγέλλω Diapo εἰμαρ-
μένην add Usener 5 ὃ ἄλλ' ἃ-συνορώντος add. Sedley. καὶ μᾶλλον ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι
λέγοντος Usener

Context: the beginning of Epicurus' final summing up of his ethical precepts.

5 The proposed reading ἂν γελῶντος would be palaeographically identical with P's ἀγγελῶντος in one of the orthographic systems used in early Epicurean texts: cf. C 9 etc. The point of ἂν is that this idealized sage need not actually have encountered determinism, but would deride it if he did.

5–6 An advantage of the supplement which we print is that it makes the omission readily explicable through homoioteleuton. Cf. also the very similar use of συνοράν in C 40.

7 τύχη is said at *ibid.* 134 not to be an 'unreliable cause'. It seems doubtful whether Epicurus would offer any analysis of it at the physical level. Cf. Long [219]

8 Cf. C 2, G.

B Epicurus, *Nat.*, liber incertus, 34.21–2

γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν πρ[ο]σειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν [α]ἰσθάνων ἀπεργαστικά εἶναι. (1) πολλὰ
δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδε φύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεργαστικά [γί]νεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ
οὐ γίνεται ἀπ[ε]ργαστικά, οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ
ἑαυτῶν. (2) οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μ[ι]σοῦντες
κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς[ς] παραχῶδῃ φύσιν ἔχοντα καθ[ά]περ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων
ζώων. (3) οὐθέν γάρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἕνα ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων

καὶ διαθέσεων ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων φύσει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεννημένα τὴν
 πᾶσα[ν ἡ] τὴν πλη[ισ]την κέ[κ]τ[η]ται|αί αιτίαν τῶνδ' ἐ[τι]νων. {4} ἐκ δ'
 ἐκ[ε]ίνης [ἐν]νοιαί τῶν [ἀ]τόμων κινήσεις παραχώδε[ις] κινου[ν]ται, οὐχὶ δέ
 τὰς ἀτ[όμου]ς | . | πάντως | . | ν[ο]... .. | πιστον | | έχοντος 10
 |[λαμπη αρρηox. 43 υποθ.] φασθαι μαχόμενοι πολλοὺς ὅμα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
 κουθε[τοῦ]ρες, ὃ τῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου κατ' ἀνάγκην εἰ[σι]τά[ι]σιν ὑπεραντίον ἐστίν. {5}
 οὕτως ἐπειδὴ ἀπογεννηθῆ τι λαβάνον [τι]νὰ [ἐ]τερότητα τῶν ἀτόμ[ω]ων
 κατὰ τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν, αὐ τὸν ὥς ἄφ' ἐτέρου δι[ε]αστήματος,
 ἰσχάει[ε] τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ αιτίαν, {6} εἰτα [ἀν]αδιδ[ω]σι| εὐθύς μέχρι τῶν 15
 [πρ]ώτων|αί φύσεων καὶ [κ]αν[ὸ]να π[ᾶ]σαν αὐτῇ[ν] ποιεῖ. {7} ὁθεν δὲ καὶ οἱ
 μὴ δυναμένοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαμερεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ
 τῇ τῶν αἰτίων ἀπόφασι· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τοῖς [μέ]τρ[ω]ν μάλλον τοῖς δ' ἤτοι
 μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμώμεν κα[ὶ] | νομο|

5 ἀρχή[ς] <ἀντιστασις> Μιανό 13 [7]: P 497: | . | P 1056: το C 1056 13 14 [6]: τερόση[ς] τε + τινος
 6ου: nm. 1056

Note on sigla for B, C and J: P = papyrus Herculanensis (100?–1050, or 1100; these contain parallel texts of the same book); O = apographum Oxoniense; N = apographum Neapolitanum (C and N are 19th-century facsimiles of the papyrus), *ady* = letters read in P, O, or N (at least one papyrus); *ady* = letters no longer legible in any P, but given in C or N and altered by editor. Readings of papyrus are from Sedley (2006), on which the entire vol. 1 commentary on 20 is based.

Context: from the book's exposition of the *αιτιολογικὸς τρόπος* of psychological explanation (cf. *ibid.*, 34.33.4-7); but the immediate context is lost.

iff. The neuter plurals probably have $\zeta\omega\alpha$ as their subject. Cf. F 1, j with notes.

45 Our translation takes ἔχοντα as the verbal counterpart of ἔστι; but Diano's supplement has its attractions. For the doctrinal point in these lines, cf. j.

9 ἐκ[ε]ίνος This is taken in the translation to refer back to φῶς in 7. But one might, slightly less naturally, connect it with αἰτίαν in 8, in which case the point made would be, as at 15-16, that psychological causation operates on our soul atoms and not vice versa.

11-12. Although it is unclear just how it stands in relation to 13ff., this phrase seems to contain an argument very like C 2, that moral criticism of others is inconsistent with determinism. If *τράπον* is right, the reference could be to the 'difference of scale' mode mentioned at 14 (cf. also *ibid.* 34.4.10). That mode would be, for Epicurus, the principle by which Democritean atomism reduces psychology to mechanism.

16 [κ]αυ[ό]να The reading is very uncertain. If correct, it will mean that the man who has developed his own principle of conduct goes on to impose it on his own soul atoms as a pattern regulatory of his behaviour. Even rational principles can become mechanical habits.

C Epicurus, *Nat.*, liber incertus, 34.26-30

(1) ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς σπέρματα ἡμῖν ἀγαγὰ τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰδε | τὰ
δ' εἰς τὰδε τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω | ταυτά ἐστιν αἱ | καὶ πράξις | καὶ
διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέσεων καὶ πλεῖων | καὶ ἐλάττω. ὥστε παρ' ἡμῶς

π[ρ]ώτων] ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἦδη γίνεσθαι, [τ]ρία ἢ τοια, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εισρέο[υ]τα παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γέ[ιν]εσθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ῶ]ς ἡμετέρας [ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶ]ν δόξ[ας] ... [ε]ι παρὰ τὴν φ[ύ]σιν α[ἰ]... [σο]... [υκ]... [θ]... [ε]ι [....] ετησ[....] [τα]... [α]... [κε]... [ν]... [υ]... [μπε]... [μκε] (lacuna approx. 60 words) [τα] τὸν φουκόγον χα[ρα]κτῆρα ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τ[....] [ο]ς κε[ν]οῖς πόροις [....] τ[ῶ]ν αὐτ[ῶ]ν ιδιότη[των] [ο]... [ἐ]πι πάν[τ]ημι... [ντα]... [....] ἐπειδ[ὴ] (lacuna approx. 12 words) (2) [ε]στῆκει, ὧν οὐ... [ἀ]πολείπει τὰ πάθη τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τὸ νοθε[τ]εῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ μεταρρυθμίζειν ὥς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατὰ τὰ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκη. (3) εἰ γάρ τις καὶ τῷ νοθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νοθετεῖσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόμ[α]τ[ον] ἀνάγκην προστ[ι]θεῖν] αἰ τοῦ [τό]θ' ἑαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχον[τος], μὴ οὐ[χ]ί πο[τε] δύνηται ταύτ[ῃ] συνίναί [....] [αλλ]... [ἡμεῖν]... [πονε] (lacuna of a few words) (4) μεμ[φ]όμενος ἢ ἐπαιῶν ἀλλ' εἰ] μὲν τοῦτο πράττει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐργ[ο]ν ἂν εἴη κ[α]τα[λ]είπων ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [ποιεῖ] τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρόσληψιν, ἐν ᾧ αὐ μὲν τὸ δόγμα ... [μετατεθε]ίμεν[ος] ... [μὴ πρ]... [π]... [τ]... [ο] (lacuna approx. 45 words) (5) τοι[αύ]της πλάνης. περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται, καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἐστὶν τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα· ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὡς δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀβελτερευομένῳ. (6) καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον φῆι πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων αἰ, οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνα[π]τεν τοῦ κατὰ τ[ρ]ίπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. (7) εἰ δὲ μὴ ἂ πο[ι]εῖ ἀπαλήγοι [ε]ἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην τ[ι]θεῖν, [ο]ὐδ' ἂν [ε]... [κα]... [επ] (lacuna approx. 30 words) (8) εἰ τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσαγ[ο]ρευῶν ὀνομα μόν[ο]ν μετατίθετα[ι] 'μὴ δ' ἐπιδείξει ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι ᾧ μοχθηροσί εἰσι τύποι προειλ[η]φότες τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἰτῶν καλ[ο]ύμεν, οὐτ' ἔδ[ι]... (lacuna approx. 25 words) (9) γενέσθαι, ἀλλ[ὰ] κε[ν]ὸν [καί] τὸ δι' ἀνάγκην καλ[ο]εῖν πρὸ] σ' ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μ[ὴ] τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει, μὴδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τῇ] συνεργόν μὴδ' ὄρμημα ἀποτ[ι]τρέπει ὧν καλούμεν δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελούμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσα] νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶ]ν ὀνομαζόντες τὴν αἰτίαν [εἶναι διαβε]βα[ι]ούμεθα πράττε[ιν] κατὰ μῶραν ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει (10) ἔργον δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνωρὼν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν ἀποτρέπει εἰώθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πρ[α]ττεν. (11) ζητήσῃ δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [α]ἶν τι δεῖ νομ[ῆ]ζε[ιν] τὸ ἐξ ἡ[μ]ῶν αὐτῶν π[ω]ς [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμουμένων πρᾶτ[τε]ν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλλο τι οὐθὲν εἰ μὴ φά[ναι] τὸ ποῖον κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστ[ί]. (lacuna approx. 12 words) [ε]... [το]ῦ ὀνόματος ... (lacuna approx. 25 words) (12) μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. ἂν δὲ τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζεται, μὴδ' αὖ ὁ

ἐξελέγχει τε ἢ ὁ εἰσφέρει πρᾶγμα ἐκτιθεῖ, φωνῇ μόνον ἀμείβεται, καθάπερ
 πάλαι θρυλῶν. (13) οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἱκανῶς, καὶ οὐ μ' ὁ[ν]το
 [τ]ῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλ[α]-
 σί[ως], ἔλαθ' ὁ[ν] εἰς αὐτοὺς, καίπερ ἐν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες, εἰ[ς] 50
 τὸ τ[ῆ]ν ἀνάγκην καὶ ταυτομάτ[ο]ν πάντα αἰτί[α]σθαι. (14) ὁ δὲ λόγος
 αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἔλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις
 πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρού[ο]ντα· καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθῃ τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης
 ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν αὐτὸν ταραττόντα· ἤ δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης καὶ
 τοῖς ἐσχάτοις π[ε]ριπέπτοντα· ἤ[ι] δέ μὴ ἐκράτει στάσεως ἐμπιμπλάμε- 55
 ναν διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης· (15) τούτων οὖν
 οὕτως ἐχόντων δεῖ κα[ί] περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα
 παρεκκαθαίρειν ἀφικόμεν ἀποδιδόναι, μ[ὴ] κακ[όν] τι τοιοῦτ[ο]

13 μόνον 697: om. 1056 16 τὸθ' εἰσαυτῶν[ι] ἀπ[ὸ]ρχαντος μ[ὴ] οἱ[χ]ι 697: [ἐ]π[ὶ]ρχο[ν]-
 τος 1 [τ]ῆ μ[ὴ] οἱ[χ]ι ± 23]η 1056 (but η preserved only in O) 23 ὁ 1191 om. 1056 24 πάντα
 οὐατά κατ' ἀνάγκην καλοῦμεν 1056: πάν τ' ἀνάγκην καλοῦ[σ]μεν 1191 28 ὁ δ' οἱ[χ]ι 1056: om.
 697 32 μ[ὴ] . . . δεῖ O 1191 35 γ' ε O 1056 50 1 ε[ἰ]ς τὸ Sedley. εἰ τὸ Gigante 52
 ἐλάνθανε 697: . . . [δ] . . . [θ]ο[ν] 1191 1056: [ἐ]λ[α]μ[β]η[ν] 36 13 1056

For sigla, see on B above. Readings are from Sedley [260]. Note that each of the three scribes had his own orthographic system, so that the above text, pieced together out of the fragments of the three parallel papyri, fluctuates between them. 4 γαίνεσθαι – γίνεσθαι, cf. 6, 54. 55 ὁ τὸν φυσικόν – τὸν φυσικόν, cf. 31–3 32 ἐπιδίδει – ἐπιδείξει 47 ἐκτιθεῖ – ἐκτιθῇ.

Context: shortly after j, probably concluding Epicurus' discussion of the responsibility issue.

1 σπέρματα Probably metaphorically, 'potentials'. There is no good evidence in Epicurus for the equivalent of Lucretius' poetic use of *semina* for 'atoms'.

3 πλείω[ς] καὶ ἑλάττω It is unclear whether this qualifies the nominatives τὰ μέν, etc. or the accusatives τάδε, etc.

4–7 On our power to control our intake of εἶδωλα, see 15B.

16–17 Text very uncertain.

19–21 Cf. 30–3 It is precisely our adoption of critical attitudes to others that creates our preconception of the individual's own self as responsible for his actions.

23 περικά[τω] . . . τρέπεται This is the technical Epicurean term for self-refutation (= περιτρέπεται in later, non-Epicurean texts). Cf. 16A 1 with note; Epicurus, Nat. 35.11.1–5 (referring to this same argument); Philodemus, Sign. 30 14 15; Burnyeat [10] and [229].

26–7 οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται See note on 21V 1.

28–29 The determinist can only halt the regress and eliminate his inconsistency by ceasing to claim responsibility for being right. Whereupon, Epicurus perhaps went on to say, he would have no reason left for supposing that he is right.

35 φάτε The reading is certain, but puzzling. ὑμεῖς also occurs in the fragmentary closing sentences of the book (not in Arrighetti [119]), as also in those of book xxviii. On nature was a lecture course, addressed to Epicurus' pupils, and sometimes to individuals, like Metrodorus in book xxviii (see 19E), with whom he was engaged in debates. The second person plural at this point in the text may suggest

that a group of Epicurus' own pupils had shown some sympathy for Democritean determinism.

35-6 The colloquial style of *On nature* permits the non-literary Hellenistic construction of *ἐάν* + indicative, cf. Sedley [126], 69-70.

47 **τε** The certain reading of P 1191, but probably corrupt. Perhaps an additional verb has fallen out before or after *ἐξελέγχει*.

47-8 **καθάπερ πόλαι θρυλῶ** i.e. at 31.2 and 39.

48 For Democritus as an exponent of *αἰτιλογία*, see his 68 & 118 DK. The plural may have been chosen to pay lip service to Leucippus, although Epicurus is said to have doubted his existence (DL 10.13). He lapses into the singular at 52.

48 30 Cf. Lucretius 1.734ff., where Empedocles is contrasted with his 'inferior' successors.

50 1 For the interpretation, see Arrighetti [111].

50 **ε[ι]ς** The facsimile O 1056 gives *εν*. The slight traces remaining in the papyrus today could be compatible with this or with *ε[ι]ς*. The old solution of reading *εν τῷ* as equivalent to *εν τῷ* is orthographically incredible. Gigante's suggestion ([106], 56ff.) of *ἐν τῷ κατὰ* is greatly superior. However, our preference for *ε[ι]ς* rests on doubts about the double accusative construction with *λανθάνειν* (in Plato, *Rep.* 619b and *Leg.* 746b, cited by Gigante, only one accusative appears to serve as object of *λανθάνειν*, the other as subject; his translations of *λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν* as 'not pay attention' and of *αἰτιάσθαι* as 'cause' also seem to require justification). With our conjecture, the point made is that the early atomists, in order to maintain their deterministic thesis, had to overlook the contrary evidence available from introspection - 'to escape their own notice'. It is a familiar fact that determinism is more easily believed true of others' behaviour than of one's own immediate decisions and actions.

52 **ἐλάνθανεν** The certain reading of P 697 (without final *ν*), and the probable reading of O 1056 too. (Earlier editors printed *ἐλάμβανεν*, on the strength of an insecure reading of O 1056.) It must be accepted in spite of the irregularity of the construction *λανθάνειν τινὰ ποιοῦντά τι*, 'escape someone's notice that he is doing something'. The verb is appropriate, because Epicurus is at pains throughout to stress that Democritus' error was one of nothing more than oversight. **τὸν ἄνδρα** 'The great man', i.e. Democritus. For the common Epicurean application of this expression to distinguished predecessors or to the founders of the Epicurean school, cf. Epicurus *Nat.* 26.44, 22, 29.26, 14; Lucretius 3.371, 5.622; Longo Auricchio [134].

D Epicurus, SV 40

ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτ' ὀφείλει κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι.

The saying probably originated as a non-technical summary of C 5

E Cicero, *Fat.* 21-5

(1) hic primum si mihi libeat adsentiri Epicuro et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam, eam plagam potius accipiam, quam fato omnia fieri comprobem: illa enim sententia habet aliquid disputationis, haec vero

non est tolerabilis. itaque contendit omnis nervos Chrysippus, ut persuadeat omne δέλωμα aut verum esse aut falsum. ut enim Epicurus veretur ne, si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant (si enim alterum utrum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum, et, si certum, etiam necessarium: ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat), sic Chrysippus metuit ne, si non obtinuerit omne quod enuntiatur aut verum esse aut falsum, non teneat omnia fato fieri et ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum. (2) sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari necessitatem fari putat. itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo (id appellat ἐλάχιστον); quam declinationem sine causa fieri si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri. non enim atomus ab atomo pulsa declinat. nam qui potest pelli alia ab alia, si gravitate feruntur ad perpendicularum corpora individua rectis lineis, ut Epicuro placet? sequitur enim ut (si) alia ab alia numquam depellatur, (si) ne contingat quidem alia aliam, ex quo efficitur, etiam si sit atomus eaque declinet, declinare sine causa. (3) hanc Epicurus rationem induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus ut atomorum motu coeretur. id Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturalis motus avellere. (4) acutius Carneades, qui docebat posse Epicureos suam causam sine hac commenticia declinatione defendere. nam cum docerent esse posse quendam animi motum voluntarium, id fuit defendi melius quam introducere declinationem, cuius praesertim causam reperire non possent. quo defenso facile Chrysippo possent resistere. (5) cum enim concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent omnia quae fierent fieri causis antecedentibus: voluntatis enim nostrae non esse causas externas et antecedentis. communi igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dicimus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa; ita enim dicimus "sine causa", ut dicamus: sine externa et antecedente causa, non sine aliqua; ut, cum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet, sed ita ut verbi causa sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus, sic, cum sine causa animum dicimus moveri, sine antecedente et externa causa moveri, non omnino sine causa dicimus. (6) de ipsa atomo dici potest, cum per inane moveatur gravitate et pondere, sine causa moveri, quia nulla causa accedat extrinsecus. rursus autem, ne omnes physici irideamur, si dicamus quicquam fieri sine causa, distinguendum est et ita dicendum, ipsius individui hanc esse naturam, ut pondere et gravitate moveatur, eamque ipsam esse causam, cur ita feratur. (7) similiter ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa: motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate nobisque pareat, nec id sine causa; eius rei enim causa ipsa natura est.

Context: following 38G, on Chrysippus' argument from bivalence to determinism.

13–18 **sine causa** Here, as at 26 (also *ibid.* 46–8, Plutarch, *De an. proc.* 1015C; Cicero, *Fin.* 1.19 is the only exception), the swerve's causelessness is the inference of Epicurus' critics, not his express doctrine. The actual position is more complicated. In cosmogony, on which these critics usually concentrate (hence the restriction to perpendicular motion at 14–17), the swerve is indeed causeless. In the mind too it has no physical, or 'natural', cause, as once again the critics stress, *cf. ibid.* 46–8. But some swerves of mind atoms are engineered by volitions, if the interpretation maintained in vol. 1 is correct. The self and its volitions must be counted as non-physical causes, as the self certainly is at *Nat.* 34.32–21: they are, after all, never listed in the sources on Epicurean physics as causes of atomic motion alongside weight, impact and the swerve (see 11).

23 Carneades, as often (see vol. 1, 448, 465), was defending a dogmatist position for dialectical purposes, here (*cf.* 26–7) in order to provide a strong enough counterweight to Chrysippean determinism. (*Fat.* 18–19 probably derives from the same context.) This obliges him to use only authentic Epicurean premises. His evidence is therefore extremely damaging to the widespread view that the swerve plays an integral role in the analysis of volition itself, for Carneades' suggestion to the Epicureans is to abandon the swerve while continuing their defence of the voluntary motion of the mind. His assertion that even without the swerve's assistance volitions are in their nature free from external antecedent causes would be unintelligible if, as is commonly assumed, Epicurean volitions were nothing more than chains of atomic motion. But on the non-reductionist psychology which we attribute to Epicurus in vol. 1 it makes excellent sense. **Epicureos** The point of not naming Epicurus himself is not to differentiate between his views and those of his later followers, but to provide Chrysippus with non-anachronistic opponents.

F Lucretius 2.251–93

- (1) denique si semper motus concititur omnis
et vetere exoritur <motu> novus ordine certo
nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
principium quoddam quod fari foedera rumpat,
ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 255
libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat,
unde est haec, inquam, fatis avulsa voluntas
per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas,
declinamus item motus nec tempore certo
nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 260
(2) nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas
principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur.
nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore paucis
carceribus non posse tamen prorumpere equorum
vim cupidam tam de subito quam mens avert ipsa? 265
omnis enim totum per corpus materiali

copia conciri debet, concita per artus
 omnis ut studium mentis conixa sequatur;
 ut videas initum motus a corde creari
 ex animique voluntate id procedere primum. 270
 inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus.
 (3) nec similest ut cum impulsu procedimus ictu
 viribus alterius magnis magnoque coactu.
 nam tum materiem totius corporis omnem
 perspicuumst nobis invitis ire rapique, 275
 donec eam refrenavit per membra voluntas.
 iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis externa multos
 pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe
 praecipitesque rapi, tamen esse in pectore nostro
 quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit? 280
 cuius ad arbitrium quoque copia material
 cogitur interdum flecti per membra per artus
 et proiecta refrenatur retroque residit.
 (4) quare in seminibus quoque idem fatcare necessest,
 esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam 285
 motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas,
 de nilo quoniam fieri nil posse videmus.
 pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant
 externa quasi vi, sed ne mens ipsa necessum
 intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis 290
 et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique.
 id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
 nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo.

252 <mona> Bailey: <mona> Martini: *semper* 1 257 voluntas Lambinus: *voluptas* OQUP 258
 voluptas ABF: *voluntas* OQU 289 *mens* Lambinus: *res* OQ

Context: the causes of atomic motion (immediately following 11H).

The reader can be referred to the very extensive critical discussions of this passage, especially in Bailey [154], Furley [204], Fowler [258], Saunders [259], and Englert [261].

256 unde Here and at 286 the swerve is that 'from which' free volition arises. This may be felt to imply a stronger relation between the two than is proposed in the vol. 1 commentary. But no serious interpretation can make the swerve more than a necessary condition of free volition, and if that is the relation expressed by *unde* (as it is at 6A 383) it may be hard to squeeze any more information out of the word. **animantibus** Cf. j below, with note.

259–60 declinamus certa The expression has a clear echo at 292–3, and may well be meant to hint at a direct involvement of the swerve in every new autonomous action.

260 mens This word, here and at 265, is perhaps to be understood as equivalent

to what Lucretius more accurately calls 'the mind's volition' (270) or just 'volition' (261, 276; cf. 268, 281). The slight looseness is natural enough, since the precise significance of 'mind' as the physical organ of thought and emotion will not be established until book 3 (see 14) and the non-physical character of psychological causation is entirely beyond the scope of his poem.

289 **mens ipsa** Lambinus' widely accepted emendation for *res ipsa* has parallels at 260 and 265. It certainly makes better Latin, and is more consistent with the personalized language of 290–1. Against this, Avotins [255] has rightly stressed that in strict consistency the reference at this point should be to the atom, not to the mind, since the impacts and weight in 288 must still be those named at 285 (cf. also E 2) as causes of atomic motion. If on this ground *res* were retained it would have to be translated 'the thing' or 'a thing' and understood as referring to the atom. But it is hard to see why Lucretius should have expressed himself so badly. Probably we should adopt *mens* and guess that he has skated over a move, via the internal necessity imposed on the individual atom by its weight, to the resultant internal necessity imposed on the mind as a whole – the move made explicitly by Cicero at E 3, in a text which resembles Lucretius' argument closely enough to be invoked in its interpretation.

G Diogenes of Oenoanda 32.1.14–3.14

[πὼς ἀνηρημένης οὖν | μαντικῆς σημεῖον εἰμαρμένης ἔστιν | ἄλλο; ἀν
γὰρ | τῷ Δημοκρίτου τι<ς> | χ[ρ]ήσεται | λόγῳ, μηδεμίαν μὲν | ἐλευθέραν
| φάσκων | ταῖς ἀτόμοις κένησιν εἶναι δι[ὰ] τὴν πρὸς | ἀλλήλας σ[ύν]-
κρουσιν | αὐτῶν, ἐν<θ>[ε]ν δὲ φαίνεσθαι κατ[η]νανκασμένως π[άν]τα
κινεῖσθαι, φή[σομεν] πρὸς | αὐτόν· "οὐκ οὐκ οἶδας, ὅσ[οι]ς ποτὲ εἴ, καὶ
ἐλευθέραν τινὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις κένησιν εἶναι, ἥ[ν] | Δημοκρίτος μὲν οὐχ
εὔρεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ | εἰς φῶ[ς] ἤγαγεν, παρεγκλιτικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὥς
ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων δαίκνυσιν;" τὸ δὲ | μέγιστον πιστευθείσης γὰρ
εἰμαρμένης | αἶρεται πᾶσα νοθεσί[ς] καὶ ἐπιτείμησις καὶ | οὐδὲ τοὺς
πονηροὺς |

10

For full apparatus, see Chilton [170].

Context: Diogenes' ethical treatise.

7–8 The 'phenomena' cited by Epicurus are presumably those of the type described by Lucretius in F 2.3.

8ff. Cf. A 7–8, C 2.

H Cicero, *Fat.* 37

(1) necesse est enim in rebus contrariis duabus (contraria autem hoc loco ea dico quorum alterum ait quid, alterum negat), ex iis igitur necesse est invito Epicuro alterum verum esse, alterum falsum, ut "sauciabitur Philocteta" omnibus ante saeculis verum fuit, "non sauciabitur" falsum. (2) nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enuntiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, (3) aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicunt quod est

5

impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis diiunctiones, sed quae in his enunciata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum.

Context: defence of the Carneadean distinction between logical and causal determinism (see 70G).

Hellenistic debate regularly associates this denial of bivalence with Epicurus (cf also 70G 8), and seems unaware of the apparent Aristotelian precedent at *Int.* 9. Cf. Sedley [11], 96–9 on the possible role of Diodorus as intermediary.

I Cicero, *Acad.* 2.97 (Usener 376)

etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et intridet, non inperrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur “aut viveret cras Hermarchus aut non viveret”, cum dialectici sic statuunt omne quod ita disiunctum sit quasi “aut etiam aut non” non modo verum esse sed etiam 5
necessarium, vide quam sit cautus is quem isti tardum putant. “si enim” inquit “alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas.”

Context: Cicero’s speech for the New Academy, invoking Epicurus against the principle of bivalence maintained by the Stoics. Cf. 34C, 38G.

J Epicurus, *Nat.*, liber incertus, 34.25.21–34

ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐνίοτε κ[α]κίζομεν, ἐν νοουμένη κ[α]τὰ τοὺς μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόποις, καὶ οὐχ ὥστερ
[τ]ὸ δ’ ὅ γ’ ῥα τῶν ζῴων καθ’ αἴρημεν μὲν ὁμοίως πᾶσι τὰ ἀπογεγε[ν]νῆ μένα κ[α]τὰ τὴν
σύστασιν εἰς ἑνὶ τι συμπιλέκοντες, οὐ μὲν οὐδ’ ἐτε τῶν νοουμένων τ[ρ]οποῖς καὶ
ἐπινοητοῦται οὕτε τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀντιθέτοις τικῶν χρώμεθα]

ε δ’ ὅ γ’ ῥα: ἀρρη Ο 697: α[. . . P 697

Readings: of papyri are from Sedley [260]. For sigla, see on B above

Context: comparison of self-determining animals with those which are mere automata.

‘We sometimes vilify it [sc. a self-determining animal] all the more, but more in an admonitory mode – and not in the way in which we exonerate those animals which are wild by conflating their developments and their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.’ Cf B 2. We hate wickedness in any animal, but we do not blame wild animals, since we regard their eventual development as already built into their congenital nature. Eg. we hate, but do not blame, sharks for eating people. For the same issue, cf. Galen, *Quod animi mores* 73.3–74.13, *Manilius* 4.106–118.

It is unclear how far beyond human beings self-determining animals extend. They include race-horses (F 2), and perhaps all animals capable of forming some contractual relation with man or with each other – cf. 22A 2.

21 Pleasure

A Cicero, *Fin.* 1.29–32, 37–9

(1) quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque insituit docere sic: (2) omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem; altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta iudicari (3) etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? (4) sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum aspernandum sentiamus. alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquestis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant. sed ut perspicatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam, eaque ipsa quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. (5) nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem . . . (6) non enim hanc solam sequimur. quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et portione fames sitisque depulsa est,

ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris
 amorio successionem efficit voluptatis. (7) itaque non placuit Epicuro medium
 esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod
 quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo
 voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. quisquis enim sentit,
 quem ad modum sit affectus, cum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in
 dolore. omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam
 voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguere possit, augeri amplificari-
 que non possit. (8) at etiam Athenis, ut e paure audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos
 irridente, statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus
 significet illum in hac esse rogatione delectatum: "numquidnam manus tua
 sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?" nihil sane. — "at, si
 voluptas esset bonum, desideraret." ita credo. "non est igitur voluptas
 bonum." hoc ne statim quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset conclusum est
 enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum.

9 haec A. hoc NV 12 tantum om. BE 13 indicat NV 14 post audiam add. V voluptatem etiam per
 se expectandum esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum 46 omnia Morel. omne codicē

Context: opening of Torquatus' exposition of Epicurean ethics 1–33 treat the grounds
 of the hedonism, while 33–54 expound the doctrine that complete absence of pain
 constitutes the greatest pleasure. Between sections 5 and 6 we omit *Fin.* 1.32–6, which
 amplifies the thesis of section 5 and supports it by historical *exempla*. For Cicero's
 criticism of A, cf. *Fin.* 2.31ff.

4–8 For similar testimonies, cf. D.L. 10.137; S.E., *PH* 3.194, *M.* 11.96. The
 argument from infantile behaviour was almost certainly made more prominent by
 later Epicureans, through their competition on this point with the Stoics; cf. 57A 3. In
 Alexander, *Mantissa* 150, even traces of Stoic οἰκείωσις have entered Epicurean
 doxography: τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπικούρου ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον [cf. B 20–1 and 22C
 4] ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς, πρῶτοντιν δὲ διαβροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονὴν φασιν. Cf.
 also Steckel [252], 19–33, who refers to Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 32 II, where, in an
 apparent use of Epicurean doctrine, the primary pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of
 pain are presented as the foundation of a creature's self-preservation.

16–25 Such further arguments may be presumed to have been prompted by the
 need to defend the doctrine against Stoic and other opponents; cf. Annas [225], 36–9,
 who aptly refers to the similar passage at 23E 6 *naturalem atque insitam . . . notionem*,
 20–1, represents πρόληψις; cf. 23E 2.

28–33 Cf. B 16 25, D 1–2.

33–41 Cf. R with notes.

46–7 For *terminari*, cf. ὅρος C 1; *variari* translates ποικιλλεσθαι as at E 2.

54 The alleged vulnerability of the Cyrenaics to Chrysippus' argument is due to
 their admitting only kinetic pleasure, cf. R.

B Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 127–32

(1) ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί. καὶ
 τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δ' ἀναγκαῖων αἱ

μέν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος
 ἀσχηλασίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πάσαν
 αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγιείαν καὶ τὴν
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστὶ τέλος. τούτου γὰρ
 χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μῆτε ἀλγῶμεν μῆτε ταρβύμεν· (2) ὅταν δ'
 ἀπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμῶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν, οὐκ
 ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῶου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ὧ τὸ τῆς
 ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονὴν χρειάν
 ἔχομεν ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρῆναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· (ὅταν δὲ μὴ
 ἀλγῶμεν,) οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν
 καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ
 συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ
 φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν
 κρίνοντας. (3) καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 οὐ πάσαν ἡδονὴν αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν,
 ὅταν πλείον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερές ἐκ τούτων ἔπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀληθόνας
 ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὴν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ
 πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείναισι τὰς ἀληθόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν
 ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἰρετὴ· καθάπερ καὶ ἀληθῶν πᾶσα
 κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ αἰεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα. τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ
 συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέπει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει·
 χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατὰ τινες χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ
 τοῦμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ. (4) καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν,
 οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως εἴαν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ,
 τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἡδίστα πολυτελείας
 ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἡκίστα ταύτης δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικόν πᾶν
 εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον. οἱ τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ
 διαίτη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν ὅταν ἄπαν τὸ ἀλοῦν κατ' ἐνδεῖαν ἐξαιρεθῇ·
 καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονὴν ἐπειδὴν ἐνδέων τις
 αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. τὸ συνθερίζει οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελεῖσι
 διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικόν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαῖας τοῦ βίου
 χρήσεις ἄσκοναι ποιεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ τοῖς πολυτελεῖσιν ἐκ διαλεμμάτων
 προσερχομένους κρείττον ἡμᾶς διατίθεται καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους
 παρασκευάζει. (5) ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν
 ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένους λέγομεν, ὡς τινες
 ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογούντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ
 τὸ μῆτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μῆτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν. οὐ γὰρ πότοι
 καὶ κῶμοι συνεύροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελεῆς τράπεζα τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ
 ἡφίων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ
 τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων ἐξ ὧν πλείστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος. (6)
 τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις· διὸ καὶ
 φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι

πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, (οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως) ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως· συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταί τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τοῦτων ἔστιν ἀχάριστον.

6 τῆς φύξης B(corr.): om. B ante corr.: τοῦ σώματος cett. 11 12 suppl. Cassendi 16 17 καὶ οὐ BP(corr.): καὶ FP 22 καὶ scil. Plato 27 χρώμεθα codd. ἀρκούμεθα Clobet 37 τὰς ἐν φ. τὰς τῶν ἐν codd. 46 διδάσκουσα Dulae: -σαι codd. 47 suppl. Stephanus

Context: 3 lines after 24A. Having instructed Menoeceus in the right beliefs about gods and death (the contents of RS 1–2), Epicurus turns to the basic principles of his hedonism.

1–4 This division of desires has a simpler prototype in Plato, *Rep.* X.558d; cf. also Aristotle, *EN* III 13, 1118b8. On the term *κενός* in Epicureanism (standard ethical jargon at this time, see 1C to, 2C 4), cf. Konstan [253], 30–3, 49.

9 ζῶου As to Stoicism (cf. 57A), Epicurus treats man's primary objective as one that he shares with all animals.

20–1 φύσιν . . . οἰκείαν Cf. 22C 4, and note on A 4–8.

28–9 φυσικόν and κενόν pick up the division of desires in 1. How could Epicurus be so confident that everything natural is easy to procure? For a discussion of the assumptions underlying his claim, cf. Long [280].

36–43 It is generally assumed that Epicurus is distancing himself here from the Cyrenaics. But there is no reason to read his disclaimers so restrictedly. As the constant disapproval his own hedonism has encountered over the centuries shows, he could not be too careful in spelling out its difference from sensual self-indulgence.

45 φρόνησις What Epicurus seems to envisage is something like the quality of mind described by Aristotle, *EN* VI.3, 1140a25: τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσάσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς υγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. The claim that φρόνησις is even more precious than philosophy turns out to be a rhetorical exaggeration in the light of such texts as 25A.

C Epicurus, RS 3–4

(1) [3] ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ' ὃν ἂν χρόνον ῇ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον. (2) [4] οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμμένει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἥπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

1 λυπούμενον BV: τὸ λυμ. FP(corr.) 5 συμμένει Byzwater: συμβαίνει codd.: ὑπάρχει SV 3

RS 3 fills out the third maxim of the *tetrapharmakos* (25f), and RS 4 the fourth.

1 Scholars are probably right in seeing a rejoinder to the Cyrenaics, cf. D.L. 2.89 for their rejection of Epicurus' claim about absence of pain, citing the words τοῦ ὑπεξαίρεσις. For a collection of Epicurean texts on *limit* as an ethical concept, cf.

Krämer [12], 197–8 n. 47, and in general De Lacy [217]. It gives Epicurus a defence against the (probably Platonic) criticism that pleasure, as something indeterminate, cannot be 'the good', which is determinate, Aristotle, *EN* x.2, 1173a15–17.

2–3 Since Bailey [117] ad loc. and Bignone [90], 15–22, it has become customary to explain these lines as a rejection of the Platonic notion of 'mixed pleasures' (e.g. simultaneously experiencing the pain of thirst and the pleasure of quenching it); cf. *Gorg.* 496c–e, *Phileb.* 46b–c. While this historical point is plausible, it has not been noted that 2–3 combined with 1 state the logical equivalence of pleasure and absence of pain. In 1 we learn that absence of pain entails pleasure, and in 2–3 that pleasure entails absence of pain. Epicurus is not of course saying that a person cannot take pleasure in one thing and feel pain at something else at the same time; cf. **C 2** and **24D**. See further Diado [254], 271–6.

3 **λυπούμενον** This picks out mental as distinct from bodily pain (*ἀλγούν*).

3–7 Further texts bearing on this passage include Seneca, *Ep.* 78; Diog. Oen. fr. 42; and Usener 447–8. Cf. Bignone [90], 173–89.

D Epicurus, RS 8 10

{1} [8] οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ
πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν. (2) [9] εἰ κατεπυκνούτο
πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τ(όπ)ῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ
κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἂν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί. (3)
[10] εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτων ἡδονῶν ἔλυνε τοὺς φόβους τῆς
διανοίας τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγυδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ
πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἴχομεν ὃ τε μεμφιμίμεθα
αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθιμώθεν οὔτε τὸ
ἀλγούν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

1 εὐδὲ κακόν HP: εὐδὲ κακὴ EP[icor]t; 2 κατεπυκνούτο EP[icor]t; 3 τ(όπ)ῳ καὶ
χρόνῳ Diado: τῷ ... χρόνῳ B: τῷ καὶ χρόνῳ B[ignone]; P: καὶ χρόνῳ EP[icor]t; 4 τῷ χρόνῳ A[risto]t.; καὶ
χρόνῳ M[ohr]; 5 καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ C[icero]; τ(όπ)ῳ καὶ χρόνῳ Bignone; περὶ ὅλου B[ignone];
περὶ ὅλου BP: περὶ ὅλου EP[icor]t; 6 καὶ τῶν ἀλγυδόνων οὐκ ἐπιθυμιῶν add Diog. Oen. fr. 27 7
ἐκπληρουμένοις Diog. Oen. fr. 27 ἐσπλ- uidd

1–2 Cf. **A 28–30**, **B 20–2**.

2–4 Our text and translation follow Diado [254], 243–89; see further Rist [95], 114–15, and Gosling/Taylor [19], 378–82. The thought seems to be closely related to **C 2**, where place and time are similarly related to pleasure and/or absence of pain. We interpret thus: if the bodily location and duration of every pleasure were closely packed (*κατεπυκνούτο*), and if the same condition were applied to all a creature's sentient parts, all pleasures would be identical, in the sense that complete absence of pain and hence maximum pleasure would result, whatever the source of the pleasure. We agree with Gosling/Taylor that Epicurus does not endorse the truth of the proposita, and hence is not claiming that pleasure in fact will ever be utterly homogeneous. For *κατεπυκνύναι* in connexion with pleasure, see also **54P 1**.

5–7 Cf. **B 36–43**; **25B 1–2**. What the sources of dissipated pleasures fail to do, it seems, is to provide the medicaments of the *iatropharmakes*, **25J**.

E Epicurus, RS 18, 25, 30

(1) [18] οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἐνδοειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται· τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέραν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγένησεν ἢ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγους καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ.
 (2) [25] εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἑκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονται σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.
 (3) [30] ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγούσων ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν πῦται γίνονται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.

1 2 Cf. A 46–8, C 1–3, and Plutarch, *Comm. Ep. deat.* 1085c, where ποικίλλεται is expressed by ποικιλοῦς τινὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαίους

3–4 **τούτων αὐτῶν . . . τούτοις** Not 'these very pleasures and the emotions akin to them' (Bailey [117] ad loc.), but the doctrines concerning the limit of pleasure just stated (with reference to the body) and the related doctrines concerning the irrationality of fearing divine intervention and death. Cf. 25B, 24C 2, and for the expression ὁμογενῆ τούτοις, *Ep. Pyth.* 116 and 23J

6 7 **τέλος τῆς φύσεως** the health of the body and the mind's freedom from disturbance, cf. B 4 6 τοῖς λόγοις might mean either Epicurean theories or any theories that someone professes. The second alternative makes a much more interesting point: consistency between thought and action can only be achieved by making the Epicurean τέλος the standard of every choice and avoidance

8–11 B 1 divided desires initially into natural and empty. We now learn that this division does not exclude a combination of natural and empty: a desire (e.g. for sex) can be natural, yet derive its intensity entirely from empty opinion.

F Epicurus, SV 17, 21, 25

(1) [17] οὐ νέος μακαριότης, ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκὸς καλῶς· ὁ γὰρ νέος ἀκμήν πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν λμνῇ τῇ γῇρα καθύρμηκεν, τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι. (2) [21] οὐ βιωστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τὰς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτουσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβεράς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες. (3) [25] ἡ πενία μετρομένη τῇ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

2 ἀκμήν = *apex* = ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκρῶς = ἐπὶ τοῦ

1 4 Old age is not privileged over youth in 25A, which may cast doubt on Epicurus' authorship of this elaborately phrased but rather true maxim

4–5 There is not the least justification for emending πείσομεν to πεισόμεθα with Bailey [117], and for translating, 'we must . . . obey [nature]; and we shall obey her'. Cf. Diogenes [254] 85–6.

6 8 Adapted by Lucretius in 22L 337 29; cf. B 31 2.

G Epicurus, SV 33, 42, 51, 59

{1} [33] σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν <Δι> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσεται. (2) [42] ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολαύσεως. {3} [51] πυνθάνομαι σπυ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονωτέραν διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισίων ἐντευξιν. οὐ δὲ εἰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους καταλύεις μήτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθῃ κείμενα κινεῖς μήτε τῶν πλησίον τινα λυπεῖς μήτε τὴν σάρκα καταξάνεις μήτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκεις, χρῶ ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. ἀμῆχανον μέντοι γε τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τινι τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδισία γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν, ἀγαπητὰν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν. (4) [59] ἀπληθὺς οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ψευδὴς ὑπὲρ τοῦ <τῆς> γαστροῦ ὁρίστου πληρώματος.

2 κἂν (<Δι>) Hartsf; cf. Usener fr. 602; καὶ cod. 1 ἀπολαύσεως Usener; ἀπολήσεως cod.; ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ> Bignone 4 ἀφθονωτέραν P. Berol. 14369; ἀφθονῶν SV; ἀφθονωτέρων Usener 5 εἰ μὴ P. Berol. ὅτε μήτε SV; ὅταν μήτε Usener 6 ἔθῃ P. Berol.; ἔθει SV; πλησίον P. Berol.; πλησίον SV; λυπεῖς P. Berol.; λυπῆς SV 7 εἰς τὰς πόδας] post ἀναγκαῖα P. Berol. cesi. Vogliano om SV ὡς βούλει post προαιρέσει pro P. Berol. 8 τὸ Usener; τῷ cod. 11 supr. Usener

1-2 A much quoted and adapted maxim; cf. Arrighetti [119] and Bailey [117] ad loc. For the godlike happiness of the Epicurean philosopher, cf. 23J-K. The Stoics made the same claim for their wise man; Stobaeus 2.98.19-99.2 (= SVF 3.54, part).

3 Adopting Usener's correction, this line would fit Diogenes of Oenoanda's category of pleasures that are synchronous with their sources, fr. 27. It also reads like a version of the Aristotelian thesis that pleasure is complete at any moment, EN x.4, 1174b5-6. In that context Aristotle goes on to deny any γένεσις of pleasure, but this anti-Platonic point is hardly his considered view; cf. Gauthier-Jolif comm. ad loc.

4-9 For the text and attribution to Metrodorus, cf. Vogliano [136], 207ff.

10-11 In 24C 2, on the other hand, the flesh is said to take the limits of pleasure to be infinite.

H Epicurus, SV 63, 71, 73, 81

{1} [63] ἔστι καὶ ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης, ἧς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιτος παραπλησιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ὁριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι. (2) [71] πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον, καὶ τί ἂν μὴ τελεσθῇ; {3} [73] καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν. (4) [81] οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιώλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὐθ' ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὐτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας.

1 λεπτότητι cod.; λιτότητι Usener καθαριότης Mühl; καθάριος end 3 ἀδιορίστους Usener; ἀδιορίσι(?)τους end.

1-2 For λεπτότης = slenderness of means or absence of luxury, cf. λεπτοτάτης, J 9. We take the point to be a warning against erring on the side of deficiency as well as excess.

2-4 Cf. especially **B** 1-6, **E** 3, **G**, **I**.

4-6 For the value of learning from experience, cf. **B** 32-6.

6-9 For what does relieve the soul's disturbance, cf. **B** 41-3, **W** 61, **X** 24-8; **25B**.

I Scholion on Epicurus, *RS* 29

φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίαις ἡγείται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀληθύνους ἀπολυούσας, ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δόφους· φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις δὲ τὰς ποικιλοῦσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαιρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἀλγημα, ὡς πολυτελὴ αιτία· οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτε ἀναγκαίαις, ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις.

1 ἀληθύνους *Web*: νόους *codd.* 2 δὲ οὐκ *BP*: δὲ καὶ οὐκ *F*

For the classification of ἐπιθυμίας, cf. **B** 1-4

2-3 The point must be not that luxurious foods *qua* foods are incapable of removing the pains of hunger if one is hungry, but that then luxuriousness exemplifies the object of a desire which, though natural, pertains to variation of existing pleasure and is unnecessary to the removal of pain. Cf. **J**.

J Porphyry, *Abst.* 1.51.6-52.1 (*Usener* 404, part)

(1) ὡς τό γε τῆς σαρκοφαγίας οὐτ' ἑλύνει οὐδ' ὅλην τὴν φύσεως οὐθ' ὁ μὴ συντελούμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὺν ἡνέτα, τὴν δὲ χάριν βιαίαν εἶχε καὶ ταχὺ τῷ ἐναντίῳ μινυμένην. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ζωῆς συμμονήν, πρὸς δὲ ποικιλίαν ἡδονῶν συνεβάλλετο, εὐκὸς ἀφροδισίοις ἢ ξενικῶν οἴνων πόσσειν, ὧν καὶ χωρὶς διαμένειν δύναται ἡ φύσις. ὧν δὲ χωρὶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείκειν, βραχεῖα πάντας οἷον ἐστὶ καὶ δυνάμενα βραδίως καὶ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐλευθερίας, ἡσυχίας τε καὶ πολλῆς ῥαφτότης πορίζεσθαι. (2) ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίαν τὰ κρέα συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῇ ὑγίᾳ ἐμποδίζει. δι' ὧν γὰρ ὑγίᾳ ἀνακτάται, διὰ τούτων καὶ διαμένει· ἀνακτάται δὲ διὰ τῆς λεπτοτάτης καὶ ἀσάρκου διαίτης, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν συμμείξειν.

1 οὐθ' . οὐθ' *Usener*: οὐδ' οὐδ' *codd.* 2 χάριν βιαίαν *Usener*: βιαίαν χάριν *codd.* 3 λεπτοτάτης *ed*: βραχυτάτης *Usener*: λεπτοτάτης *Usener*

Context: arguments in favour of vegetarianism derived from Epicurus, cf. Porphyry, *Abst.* 1.49.1.

1-3 Cf. **B** 36-49, **D** 1

K Diogenes Laertius 10.121

τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῇ νοεῖσθαι, τὴν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἷα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν· καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

2 *suppl.* *Usener*

Rightly appreciating that divine happiness has its human equivalent (cf. **23J** **K**), some scholars (e.g. Bailey [117] *ad loc.*) take the second conception to be that of people in general, and not Epicureans. This is unnecessary. Divine happiness, though the human ideal, is utterly invariant. But men are subject to unavoidable bodily changes from which the gods are exempt. Could ἀφαίρεσις also refer to deliberately foregoing

pleasures that result in excess of pain? Support for this might be drawn from ἀφαιρῆν in 24A 2 and SV 18. Cf. also *detrachens* L 1-3 (= ἀφαιρῶν).

L Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.41-2 (Usener 67, 69)

(1) "nec equidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suaves motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu. nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam
5 solam esse in bonis, laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore ut natura iis potius dolore careat." atque haec quidem his verbis, quibus ut intellegat quam voluptatem nori Epicurus (2) deinde paulo infra "saepe quaesivi", inquit, "ex iis qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis relinquerent, si illa detraxissem, nisi si vellent voces inanes fundere; nihil
10 ab iis potui cognoscere: qui si virtutes ebullire volent et sapientias, nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam qua efficiantur eae voluptates quas supra dixi."

2-3 eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneriis detrahens V¹, cf. Athenaeum 278F om. X 7 fore (hidentem) (Cruata

Context: Cicero claims to be quoting from Epicurus' book *qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam* [sc. *Epicuri*]. The *Περὶ τέλους* is meant; cf. Usener 67.

1 **nec-intellegam** We take this to mean 'the only way I can conceptualize'; cf. Rist [95], 108-9.

1-7 These lines strongly support the commonly held view that all the sensory pleasures as mentioned here are 'kinetic': cf. Q 8-9. For doubts, not shared by us, about this view, cf. Gosling/Taylor [19], 375-94. If such sensory pleasures could be counted as 'static' (i.e. pleasant simply *qua* absence of pain), *natura-careat*, 7, loses all point. On *spe*, 6, and its doctrinal importance, cf. Gosling/Taylor [19], 371-2.

8-12 This passage reads like anti-Stoic polemic. cf. P.

M Athenaeus, 546F (Usener 409, 70)

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δέ φησιν "ἀρχὴ καὶ ρίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή· καὶ τὰ σοφὰ (καὶ) τὰ περιττὰ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν." καὶ τῷ Περὶ τέλους δὲ πάλιν φησὶν "τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτότροπα, ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, χαίρειν
ἐατέον."

2 καὶ legitur ap. Athenaeum 280a

1-2 For discussion, cf. Gosling/Taylor [19], 352-3, and Sedley [104], 132 and n. 49. Metrodorus amplified the second sentence (Plutarch, *Col.* 1125B); note especially his *καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς* expansion of τὰ σοφὰ-περιττὰ into τὰ καλὰ πάντα καὶ σοφὰ καὶ περιττὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐξευρήματα.

3-4 Cf. L 10-12, P.

N Plutarch, *Contra Ep. heal.* 1089D (Usener 68, part)

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατὰστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα

τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιθυγιῖσθαι δυναμέ-
νοις.

Context: polemical comments on the Epicureans' attempts to stabilize their hedonism by taking refuge εἰς τὴν ἀπὸνίαν καὶ τὴν εὐστάθειαν . . . τῆς σαρκός

1. Diogenetius 68 n 191 DK combines εὐστάθης with εὐθυμος; cf. Cirilli [269], 101. 2. κατὰσθημα only occurs again in extant Epicurus at fr. 73 Arrighetti [119], a fragmentary letter from Epicurus to Metrodorus which appears to have much in common with N. For ἑλπίσμα and for N in general, cf. G 1. 2 and L 6.

2 ἐπιθυγιῖσθαι. Cf. ἐκλόγεις, E 3, and note on V 1.

O Cicero, *Fin.* 2.69

pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae quam Cleantes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos qui audiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret imprudens quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. "nos quidem virtutes sic natae sumus ut tibi serviremus; aliud negotii nihil habemus."

Context: Cicero's refutation of Epicurean hedonism

P Diogenes of Oenoanda 26.1.2-3.8

ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μ[έν] | τῆς ἀφροσύνης μετὰ με[κ]ρὸν ἐρῶ, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀ[ρε]τιῶν
καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς | ἥδη· εἰ μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, | τὸ μετὰ τούτων τε καὶ | ἡμῶν
προβεβλημένον | ἐπίσκεψιν εἶχεν "τί τῆς | εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν", | ἐ-
βούλοντο δ' οὗτοι τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγειν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐτόνχανε,
οὐδὲν | ἀλλ' ἔδει ποιεῖν ἢ τούτοις | [συνο]μογνωμονοῦν[τας μὴ] ἔχειν
πράγμα[τα]. ἐπ[ε]ὶ δ', ὡς λέγω, τὸ πρό[β]λημα οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν | τ<ί> | τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας ποιητι[κ]όν, τί δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμον[ε]ῖν ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ
[ἐ]σχατον ἢ φύσις | ἡμῶν | ὀρέγεται, | τ[ὴν] | μὲν [ἡ]δονὴν [φημι] καὶ | νῦν
[κ]αὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ | βαρβάροις μέγα | ἐνβ[ο]ῶν τῆς ἀρίστης | δι-
α[λ]υγῆς ὑπάρχειν τέλος, τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς τὰς | νῦν ἀκαίρως ὑπὸ τούτων
ἐνοχλουμένας | (ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ ποιητικοῦ | χώρας εἰς τὴν τοῦ τέλους |
μεταφέρονται) τέλος | μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ποιητι[κ]ὰς δὲ τοῦ τέλους εἶναι.

For full critical apparatus, see Chilton [130]

Q Cicero, *Fin.* 2.9-10

(1) "estne, quaeso", inquam, "sitiendi in bibendo voluptas?" "quis istud possit", inquit, "negare?" "eademne, quae restincta sit?" (2) "immo alio genere; restincta etiam sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet", inquit, "illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est." (3) "cur igitur", inquam, "res tam dissimiles eodem

nomine appellas?" "quid paulo ante", inquit, "dixerim nonne memmisti, cum
 5 omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem?" " . . . ista
 varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod his, cum dolore carcamus, tum in
 summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus quae dulcem motum
 afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, quae faciat varietatem
 10 voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam ear voluptatem
 appelles nescio "

3 enim om. RN inquit om. BE 4 dissimiles] difficiles A ante corr. 5 quae cod. lat. qui Davies; sed c.f. Fin 2.75

Context: Cicero's refutation of Epicurean hedonism.

As we point out in vol. 1, 123, this passage envisages kinetic pleasure as (a) coextensive with the process of removing pain, and (b) varying a pre-existing state of *ἀπονία*. Rist [95], 106–8, 170–2, following Diiano [254], treats (b) alone as the correct Epicurean position; Gosling/Taylor [19], 374–88, accept (a) as a valid role for kinetic pleasure, and argue that 'static' pleasures can [also] involve variety. Our view is closer to theirs, but we do not share their strong doubts about Cicero's reliability. In particular (see our note on L) we think they are too ready to play down the significance of the distinction between static and kinetic, and to regard sensory pleasures as instances of the former: see especially I and J.

R Diogenes Laertius 10.136–7

(1) διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίους περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν
 κατασθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει· ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν
 (καὶ) ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυχῆς καὶ
 ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μιτιλήνῃ
 φίλους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ 5
 Μητροδώρου ἐν τῷ Τεκνοκράτει λέγουσιν αὐτῶν· νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν
 καὶ τῆς κατασθηματικῆς. ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεων οὕτω λέγει· "ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία κατασθηματικαὶ εἰσιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ
 ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι βλέπονται." (2) ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς
 Κυρηναίους· οἱ μὲν γὰρ χεῖρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀληθόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν, 10
 κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας σώματι· ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικὰς. τὴν γὰρ σάρκα τὸ
 παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ
 μέλλον.

1 τῆς om. F 2 3 ἀμφοτέραν F. ἀμφοτέρη BP. ἀμφοτέρως Cassendi. ἀμφοτέροι (καὶ) A. A. Long, c1.
 Merlan [265]. 5 ἀμφοτέρη (τὸ γένος) Higginne 8 γὰρ om. F 9 ἡ ὁ om. F ἐνέργειαι A. A.
 Long ἐνέργειαι could.

Context: Diogenes' summary of Epicurean doctrine.

2–9 In the main we follow the excellent interpretation of Merlan [265], 3–7. From 8–9 it is clear that Epicurus posited 'static' and 'kinetic' pleasures both of mind and body. In order to prepare for the mention of these, we must assume the minimal lacuna of a καὶ after ἀμφοτέραν in 2; the singular ἀμφοτέραν is defensible as Greek, though generally rejected in favour of ἀμφοτέρα. The terms ἀταραξία and ἀπονία

evidently pick out mental and bodily absence of pain respectively, but *χαρά* and *εὐφροσύνη* are most naturally interpreted as two terms for kinetic pleasure each of which can apply to mind or body.

9 *ἐνέπυσται* Our emendation, which is merely orthographic, is an attempt to restore grammar and sense. The dative has never been satisfactorily explained.

11-13 For the greater magnitude of mental pleasures, see U. V

S Lucretius 4.622-32

hoc ubi levia sunt manantis corpora suci,
 suaviter attingunt et suaviter omnia tractant
 umida linguae circum sudantia templa.
 at contra pungunt sensum lacerantque coorta, 625
 quanto quaque magis sunt asperitate repleta.
 deinde voluptas est e suco fine palati;
 cum vero deorsum per fauces praecipitavit,
 nulla voluptas est, dum in artus deditur omnis.
 nec refert quicquam quo victu corpus alatur, 630
 dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis
 artubus et stomachi umidulum servare tenorem.

629 *dum omnia* Marullus: *dum deditur omni: in artus* codd. 632 *umidulum* Lachmann. *umidum* codd.

Context: explanation of taste as direct contact with the atomic structure of the tasted object.

627-9 These lines are crucial to the view defended by Diano [254], 260ff., and elsewhere (see Merlan [265], 11 n. 13 for Diano's other statements of his position) that all kinetic pleasure presupposes static pleasure, and consists only in the variation of the latter. Diano focuses on the fact that the palate, which was previously experiencing no pain (i.e. was already in a condition of static pleasure), is here described as the locus of a kinetic pleasure, but that pleasure is said to cease when the food passes into those regions of the body where the pain of hunger is experienced. In other words, he claims, the actual process of removing pain is not to be regarded as a kinetic pleasure. In our opinion (cf. Merlan [265], 11-13), Diano's influential theory is unconvincing in general, and not even plausible for this passage. The pleasure of taste is obviously not something that is registered by the stomach; but the removal of hunger pain from the stomach would not be something registered by the palate. *nulla voluptas*, 629, should mean no pleasure of taste, which is Lucretius' topic here. It implies nothing about the pleasure of actually replenishing one's stomach, to which taste makes no difference. 630-2

T Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.95 (Usener 439, part)

corpus gaudere tam diu, dum praesentem sentiret voluptatem, animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prospicere ventientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere: ita perpetuas et contextas voluptates in

sapiente fore sempet, cum expectatio speratarum voluptatum cum percep-
tarum memoria nungeretur.

5

Context: report of Epicureanism.

4-5 For the significance of anticipation and recollection, cf. **L 6, N**, with notes, **R**
11-13, **24D**.

U Cicero, *Fin.* 1.55

(1) nullus in ipsis error est finibus bonorum et malorum, id est in voluptate aut
in dolore, sed in his rebus peccant, cum e quibus haec efficiantur ignorant. (2)
animi, autem voluptates et dolores, nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et
doloribus . . . nec ob eam causam non multo maiores esse et voluptates et
dolores animi quam corporis.

5

Context: Tullius' exposition of Epicurean ethics.

1-2 Cf. **D1-2**.

4-5 Mental pains are also said to be 'worse' than bodily ones, **R 10-11**

V Diogenes of Oenoanda 38.1.8-3.14

(1) [δυσε]πιλόγιστος δέ ἐσ[τι] τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ τῶν | [ψυχι]κῶν τούτων
ὑπερ[οχῇ] παθῶν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ | [οὐκ] ἔστιν ἐξ ἀντιπα[ρ]ακρ[ί]σεως ὅψ' ἔνα
καί[ρ]ον ἀμφοτέρας παθεῖν | τὰς ἀκρότητας (τῶν | ψυχικῶν λέγω καθὼς | τῶν
τε σωματικῶν), διὰ τὸ σπανίως ποτὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, καὶ ὅταν δὲ συμβῇ,
<τ>ὁ [ζ]ῆν ἀναιρεῖσθαι, (2) τοῦ[των] ἐτέρων | τῆς ὑπεροχῆς τὸ κρι[τήριον]
οὐχ [ε]ὐρίσ[κε]ται. ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ἐν ταῖς | σωματικαῖς ἀλγηδόσι | τυν-
χάνῃ τις, φησί ταύτας τῶν ψυχικῶν εἶναι | μείζονας, ὅταν δ' ἐν | ταῖς
ψυχικαῖς τυγχάνῃ, | μείζονας εἶναι φησί | ταύτας. [τῶν γὰρ ἀπάν]των
αἰεὶ τὰ [παρόντα πι]θανώτερα καὶ ἰδῆλος | ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ [δι' ἀνάν]κην
ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τ[ῶν] | κατέχοντι αὐτὸν π[έ]θει τὴν ὑπερυχὴν ἀπ[ο]δεδωκέναι.
(3) σοφός | δὲ ἀνὴρ τὸ δυσεπιλόγιστον τοῦτο τοῖς πο[λ]λοῖς ἐξ ἄλλων τε
ἀν[α]λογίζεται πολλῶν.

5

10

For full apparatus, see Chilton [170].

1 **δυσεπιλόγιστος** This word, repeated in 11, is not attested elsewhere
according to LSJ. For *ἐπιλογισμός* in Epicurean ethics, cf. **20A 2, C 27: 24C 4**. On the
interpretation of it as 'empirical reasoning', see Sedley [126], 27-34. Another possible
interpretation is 'direct calculation' by contrast with indirect *ἀναλογισμός*, as
frequently in the medical tradition: cf. **7B 36-7**.

4-5 Cf. Plutarch, *Contra Ep. beat.* 1103E, who cites as Epicurean the proposition,
ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβῶλλιν συνάψει θανάτῳ.

W Lucretius 2.1-61

(1) tuave, nam magni turbantibus aequora ventis,
e tetra magni alterius spectare laborem;

non quia vexari quemquam est iucunda voluptas, sed quibus ipse malis carcas quia cernere suave est. suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli.	5 [6] [5]
(2) sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, despicere unde queas alios passimque videre errare, atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, noctes atque dies niti praestante labore ad summas emergerere opes rerumque potiri.	10
(3) o miseras hominum mentis, o pectora caeca! qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis degitur hoc aevi quodcumque est! nonne videre nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui corpore sciunctus dolor absit, mensque fruatur iucundo sensu cura semota metuque?	15
(4) ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus esse opus omnino, quae demant cumque dolorem, delicias quoque uti multas substernere possint gratus interdum; neque natura ipsa requirit, si non aurea sunt iuvenum simulacra per aedes lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris, lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppeditentur, nec domus argento fulget auroque renidet nec citharae reboant laqueata aurataque tecta, cum tamen inter se prostrati in gramine molli propter aquae rivum sub ramis arboris altae non magnis opibus iucunde corpora curant, praesertim cum tempestas aridet et anni tempora conspergunt viridantis floribus herbas. nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres, textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti iacteris, quam si in plebeia veste cubandum est.	20 25 30 35
(5) quapropter quoniam nil nostro in corpore gazae proficiunt neque nobilitas nec gloria regni, quod superest, animo quoque nil prodesse putandum; si non forte tuas legiones per loca campi fervere cum videas belli simulacra cientis, ornatasque armis statuas pariterque animatas, subudiis magnis et ecum vi constabilitas.	40 [43] [42]
his tibi tum rebus timefactae religiones effugunt animo pavidae; mortisque timores	45

tum vacuum pectus inquant curaue solum.
 (6) quod si ridicula haec ludibriaque esse videmus,
 te veraque metus hominum curaeque sequaces
 nec metuunt sonitus armorum nec feta tela
 audacterque inter reges rerumque potentis 50
 versantur neque fulgorem reverentur ab auro
 nec clarum vestis splendorem purpureai,
 quid dubitas quin omni' sit haec rationi' potestas?
 omnis cum in tenebris praesertim vita laboret.
 nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 55
 in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus
 interdum, nili quae sunt metuenda magis quam
 quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura.
 (7) hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessesse
 non radii solis neque lucida tela dies 60
 discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

5-6 transp. Avancius 18 mensque Maculhus mente codd. 28 rectu Macrobius sempla codd. 42 1
 transpon. Bailey: om. Q, truant verum spatio post 41 celulo 41 ornato (que) Munro: ornata
 OG: pulvis (itavus) (Ocorr) (i) ita status ed. Venet pariter Lachmann pariter codd. 46 prius
 Lambinus tempus codd.

1-13 On these lines, and the whole extract, cf. Konstan [253], 3-16, who aptly compares Democritus 68 B 191 DK for the injunction to compare one's life with those less fortunate. See also Clay [162], 65-6, 219-20.

22-3 We take *uti* in the sense of *ita ut*, with the subjunctive *possint* dependent on *videmus*. Thus *gratius interdum* makes the important point that the few things needed to satisfy the body's natural and necessary desires remove pain in such a way that they can also often be a source of kinetic pleasure. The phrase *gratius interdum* is normally taken with *requirit*, but word-order and sense are against this. We are grateful to Michael Wigodsky for drawing our attention to this latter point.

X Lucretius 6.1 28

(1) primae frugiparos fetus mortalibus aegris
 dididerunt quondam praeclaro nomine Athenae
 et recreaverunt vitam legesque rogarunt,
 et primae dederunt solacia dulcia vitae,
 cum genuere virum tali cum corde repertum, 5
 omnia veridico qui quondam ex ore profudit;
 cuius et extineti propter divina reperta
 divulgata vetus iam ad caelum gloria fertur.
 (2) nam cum vidit hic ad victum quae flagitat usus
 omnia iam ferme mortalibus esse parata 10
 et, proquam posset vitam consistere tutam,
 divitiis homines et honore et laude potentis
 adfluere atque bona gnatorum excellere fama,

nec inimus esse domi cuiquam tamen anxia corda,
 atque animi ingratis vitam vexare (sine ulla) 15
 pausa atque infestis cogi saevire querellis,
 intellegit ibi vitium vas efficere ipsum
 omniaque illius vitio corrumpier intus
 quae collata foris et commoda cumque venient;
 (3) partim quod fluxum pertusumque esse videbat, 20
 ut nulla posset ratione explerier umquam,
 partim quod tactro quasi conspurcare sapore
 omnia cernebat. quaecumque receperat, intus.
 veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dicus
 et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris 25
 exposuitque bonum summum quo tendimus omnes
 quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo
 quia possemus ad id recto contendere cursu.

7 *extinere* Marullus; *remota* codd. 11 *posset* Lachmann; *possent* codd. 14 *corda* Marullus; *cordi* codd. 15 *suppl.* Munro 16 *cogi* Lambinus; *cogit* codd. 17 *vas* Marullus; *for* codd.

1-4, 9-13 Notice the positive emphasis on the benefits of high civilization and on the provision of necessary amenities and security; for discussion of how these bear on basic assumptions of Epicurean ethics, cf. Long [280].

17-23 Bailey [154] ad loc. refers to Plato, *Protag.* 314a for the comparison of the mind to a *vas*, but misses the much more telling antecedent in *Gorg.* 493a-494b.

22 Society

A Epicurus, RS 31-5

(1) [31] τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ
 βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. (2) [32] ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἐδύνατο
 συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι,
 πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθέν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἀδικον. ἰωσαυτὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα
 μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ 5
 βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. (3) [33] οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιουσύνῃ, ἀλλ'
 ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὀνηλίκους δὴ ποτε αἰεὶ τόπους
 συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι. (4) [34] ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ'
 ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ
 τῶν ταιούτων ἐφεστηκότας καλαστάς. (5) [35] οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι 10
 ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσ-
 θαι πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, καὶ μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λαυβάνῃ. μέχρι γὰρ
 καταστροφῆς ἀδελφὸν εἰ καὶ λήσει.

3 ἀλλήλα Cassendi; ἀλλά codd. 4 ἦν Usener; ἢ BP. ἔστιν οὐδὲ F 12 ἐπὶ SI' A; ἀπὸ vel ἐπὶ codd.

1 It is difficult to decide whether *σύμβολον* is simply equivalent to *συνθήκη*, or whether it should be translated 'sign', indicating that the utility of mutual non-

aggression is what the expression 'natural justice' signifies; cf. Goldschmidt [276], 278.

2 **ζῴων** The Stoics insisted that justice does not apply to human relations with other animals, 57F 3. Epicurus, unlike Hermarchus (N 9 10), does not exclude this in principle; cf. Goldschmidt [276], 43–57.

6 The imperfect *ἦν* is best interpreted as indicating what always holds good; cf. B 1 and the Aristotelian expression τὸ τέ *ἦν* εἶναι. It is generally and rightly assumed that Epicurus' denial of justice being καθ' ἑαυτὸ is most obviously directed against Plato; cf. Rep. 2, 358b, 4, 443a c etc. For antecedents of the contractual conception of justice, cf. Denyer [279]. It should be emphasized that what Epicurus means by 'contract' has nothing to do with the later idea of a *pact* agreement by our predecessors which 'provides laws with their current binding force'; cf. Long [3], 70–1, and Goldschmidt [276], 73–8.

8–13 The anti-Platonic stance continues; cf. Gorg. 509a–c on doing injustice with impunity as the greatest of evils for the wrongdoer. In the Epicurean theory, where injustice is bad solely for its consequences, its badness consists not in the possibility of punishment but in the certainty of fearing punishment; cf. SV 7, ἀδικούετα λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον, πῶστιν δὲ λαθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον; Lucretius 3.1013–23; and Denyer [279], 147. For further relevant material, see Usener 18, 330.

B Epicurus, R5 36–7, 17

(1) [36] κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτὸ, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ἥσων δὴ ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. (2) [37] τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρεi ἐν ταῖς χρεαῖαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δίκαιον ἔχει τὸ ἐν τοῦ δικαίου χώρῳ εἶναι, εἴαν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται εἴαν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό, εἴαν δὲ νόμον θῇται τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τῇ τοῦ δικαίου φύσει ἔχει, καὶ μεταπίπτει τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον χρόνον δὲ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττη, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν. (3) [17] ὁ δίκαιος <βίος> ἀταρακτότατος, ὃ δ' ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμειν.

1 add. Useneri 2 αἰτίων B: αἰτιῶν csa. 3 ἔχει FP: ἔχειν B 5 εἰς τὸ εἶναι Muhl: τοῦ δικαίου χώρῳ εἶναι B: τὸ τοῦ δικαίου χώρῳ εἶναι F: τὸν τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι P: τὸ τοῦ δικαίου ἐνέχυρον Bailey 6 νόμον Usener: μόνον codd.: <νόμον> μόνον Diogen 11 ἀπλῶς εἰς τὸ Kochalkin: ἀλλὰ πλεῖστα codd.: ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ Usener 21 βίος SV 12. csa. codd.

1 3 Cf. N 6–7.

3–5 Construct τῶν νομισθέντων . . . δικαίων, following Bailey [117] ad loc., as a parative genitive with τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον. For ἐπιμαρτύρησις as a method of testing empirical generalizations, see vol. 1, 94–5.

8–11 The requirement of 'fitting the πρόληψις' is repeated in R5 18; cf. 17E and C 1, which repeats the point about avoiding 'empty words'. It sums the thought and Epicurean usage to take the πρόληψις to be of utility rather than justice. For a Stoic use of 'fitting' πρόληψις to particular instances, see 40S.

11-12 Clay [268] suggests Solon fr. 11 Diehl³ as Epicurus' model for this maxim: ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταρασσεται· ἣν δὲ τις αὐτὴν μὴ κινή πάντων ἐστὶ δεικασιώτης. Certainly the image expressed by γαλήνη was a favourite in Epicureanism; for a wealth of parallels, see Usener [133] s.v.

C Epicurus, RS 7, 40

(1) [7] ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλὴς, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν. (2) [40] ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορουντῶν παρασκευάσασθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετ' ἀλλήλων ἡδίστα τὸ βεβαιοτάτον πίστιμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ὠδύραντο ὥς πρὸς ἕλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφὴν.

5 τὸ Meibom: τε BP: om. F 6 οὕτω BP: οἷτοι F ἡδίστα τὸ Usener ἡδίστον τὸν B: ἡδίστων FV

1-5 Lucretius develops the point at length, L 1120ff., but without entertaining the theoretical possibility that such a life could achieve ἀσφάλεια. What is κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν is anything that does this; cf. RS 6. With τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον, cf. 21B 20-1.

8 The emphasis falls on ἕλεον. Our dead friends are not to be pitied, since death cannot mar *their* happiness; cf. 24C 2. Likewise, the wise man will be indifferent to his own funeral. Q 10. But if Epicurean sympathy differs from conventional mourning, F 6, the school stressed its rejection of Stoic ἀπάθεια; cf. Q 4, 8, 13, and Usener 120.

D Epicurus, SV 58, 70, 79

(1) [58] ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικά δεσμωτηρίου. (2) [70] μηδέν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθεῖν ὁ φόβον παρέξει σοι, εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον. (3) [79] ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐτέρῳ ἀόχλητος.

2 δεσμωτηρίου Usener -π cod

1 πολιτικά Epicurus' injunction to avoid politics is not a recommendation to opt completely out of community life, but to abstain from a public career; cf. Philodemus, *Rhet.* 2.58, 16 (=Epicurus 10.4 Arrighetti [119]), where Epicurus contrasts 'life's safety' with πολιτικὴ ἀγνορία.

2-3 Cf. A 4 5.

3 The undisturbed man resembles the Epicurean divinity, cf. RS 1 οὕτε αὐτὰ πράγματα ἔχει οὕτε ἄλλω παρέχει, and 23J.

E Epicurus, RS 27-8

(1) [27] ὦν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς φιλίας κτήσις. (2) [28] ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε

ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθέν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην.

2 ἴσταν om. F 4 κατεῖδε Madvig (cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 1.68) παρέρχεται codd

2-4 We interpret thus: in coming to see that conventionally regarded evils (death and severe pain, cf. 21C, 25J) are 'limited', we also recognize that these limits are a safeguard to friendship, since convinced Epicureans will not give up their friends for fear of death or pain; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 1.49. Cicero's actual version of the maxim, *Fin.* 1.68, is unconvincing as a translation of line 4, and also fails to connect that line coherently with what precedes: *eadem sententia confirmavit animum ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum.*

F Epicurus, *SV* 23, 28, 34, 39, 52, 66, 78

(1) [23] πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν ἀρετὴ, ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας. (2) [28] αὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινδυνεύσαι [χάριν] χάριν φιλίας. (3) [34] οὐχ οὕτως χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὥς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρείας. (4) [39] οὐθ' ὁ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντός φίλος οὐθ' ὁ μηδέποτε 5 συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν. (5) [52] ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν αἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν. (6) [66] συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηγνύοντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες. (7) [78] ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται· αἶν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ θνητὸν 10 ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

1 ἀρετὴ cod. αἰρετὴ Usener 3 χάριν¹ secl. Bailey 10 θνητὸν Hartel: ποτὸς cod

1 We think Usener's emendation has been accepted too readily (cf. Bollack [274], 223-6), especially since on either reading a verb has to be supplied, and the problem of assigning a *per se* value to something other than pleasure is unaffected. For discussion, cf. Müller [275], 118ff.; Rist [95], 131-2; and Long [280], 305.

3 Cf. Q 16, 25.

4 With πίστεως, cf. πίστωμα, C 7.

7-8 For discussion, see Bailey [117] ad loc.

9 See note on C 8.

11 Bailey explains ἀθάνατον, 'because it gives a man happiness equivalent to that of the gods'. But the texts he cites should apply equally to σοφία. It seems better to regard friendship as a good for the survivor which transcends the death of a friend; cf. line 9, and Usener 213, ἥδὴ ἡ φίλου μνήμη τεθνηκὸς. Also relevant may be the conception of the Epicurean philosopher/friend as a god; cf. Rist [95], 136; Frischi [108], 77-86.

G Plutarch, *Contra Ep. beat.* 1097A (Usener 544, part)

αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡδίων ἔστι τοῦ πάσχειν.

Context: criticism of Epicurean hedonism.

At Plutarch, *Mor.* 778C, Epicurus himself is credited with the claim, τοῦ εὐπάσχειν τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν οὐ μόνον κάλλιον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδιον εἶναι.

H Plutarch, *Col.* 1211B (Usener 546)

καὶ γὰρ τὴν πρῶτην ἀναίρων εὐσέβειαν ἀπολιπεῖν λέγει, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα τὴν φιλίαν αἰρούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων τὰς μεγίστας ἀλγηδόνας ἀναδέχεσθαι.

Context: criticism of Epicurus for alleged inconsistencies

I Seneca, *Ep.* 19.10 (Usener 542)

"ante" inquit [sc. Epicurus] "circumspiciendum est cum quibus edas et bibas quam quid edas et bibas; nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est."

Context: conclusion of a letter recommending Lucilius to take more *otium*.

J Lucretius 5 925–38, 953–61

- (1) at genus humanum multo fuit illud in arvis 925
durius, ut decuit, tellus quod dura creasset,
et maioribus et solidis magis ossibus intus
fundatum, validis aptum per viscera nervis,
nec facile ex aestu nec frigore quod caperetur
nec novitate cibi nec labi corporis ulla. 930
- (2) multaue per caelum solis volventia lustra
vulgivago vitam traccabant more ferarum.
nec robustus erat curvi moderator aratri
quisquam, nec scibat ferro molirier arva
nec nova defodere in terram virgulta neque alus 935
arboribus veteres decidere falcibu' ramos.
quod sol atque imbres dederant, quod terra crearat
sponte sua, satis id placabat pectora donum . . . 938
- (3) necdum res igni scibant tractare neque uci 953
pellibus et spolis corpus vestire ferarum,
sed nemora atque cavos montis silvasque colebant 955
et frutices inter condebant squalida membra
verbera ventorum vitare imbrisque coacti.
- (4) nec commune bonum poterant spectare neque ullis
moribus inter se scibant nec legibus uti.
quod cuique obtulerat praedae fortuna, ferebat 960
sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere doctus.

925 at Lachmann et OQ 934 molirier ed. Brix: molirier (vel molirier?) codd 953 scibant AB
scibant OQO, creabant Qicorci 959 scibant AB scibant OQO

Context: the life of early man, following the generation of vegetation and other living things, including extinct monsters, from the earth.

Lucretius stresses the self-sufficiency and bestiality (note 932) of this life by contrasting it with the technology and social developments of the next stage; see **K**. Contrary to what has often been claimed, he is not an advocate of primitivism, cf. Furley [278], 14–17.

K Lucretius 5.1011–27

- (1) inde casas postquam ac pellis ignemque parantur,
et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum
conubium, prolemque ex se videre creatam,
cum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit.
ignis enim curavit ut alia corpora frigus 1015
non ita iam possent caeli sub tegmine ferre,
et Venus imminuit viris puerique parentum
blanditis facile ingenium fregere superbum.
(2) tunc et amicitiam coeperunt iungere aventes
finitimi inter se nec laudare nec violari, 1020
et pueros commendarunt mulibrequae saeculum,
votibus et gestu cum balbe significarent
imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis.
(3) nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni,
sed bona magnaue pars servabat foedera caste; 1025
aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne peremptum
nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecula propago.

1013 *conubium* Lachmann; *cognata una* codd.; post 1012 lacunam add. Marullus 1020 *et* *etiam* Lachmann
1014 *et* *etiam* Marullus, *omni* OQ 1026 *aut* O *hanc* Q

Context: transition to the origins of civilized life, following a contrast between ancient and modern ways of death.

For a study of the features common to Lucretius' and other ancient accounts of the origin of society, cf. Cole [273], 308f., and see also **67Y** with note.

1019–20 Lucretius makes the Epicurean account of justice (cf. **A**) the motive for forming the first friendships; but this does not imply that his *amicities* is something other than Epicurus' conception of *φιλία* (as Konstan [253], 43, claims) since we have his own word for the utilitarian origins of friendship, cf. **F** 1, **O** 6–7, and *inimicitias*, **L** 1146.

L Lucretius 5.1105–57

- (1) inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem 1105
commutare novis monstrabant rebus et igni
ingenio qui praestabant et corde vigeant,
condere coeperunt urbis arcemque locare
praesidium reges ipsi sibi perfugiumque,
et pecua atque agros divisere atque dedere 1110
pro facie cuiusque et viribus ingeniumque;

- nam facies multum valuit viresque vigeant.
 (2) posterius res inventast aurumque repertum,
 quod facile et validis et pulchris dempsit honorem;
 divitiis enim sectam plerumque sequuntur 1115
 quamlibet et fortes et pulchro corpore creti.
 quod si quis vera vitam ratione gubernet,
 divitiae grandes homini sunt vivere parcae
 aequo animo; neque enim est umquam penuria parvi.
 (3) at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentes, 1120
 ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret
 et placidam possent opulenti degere vitam,
 nequiquam, quoniam ad summum succedere honorem
 certantes iter infestum fecere vias,
 et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos 1125
 invidia interdum contemptim in Tartara taetra;
 invidia quoniam, ceu fulmine, summa vaporant 1131
 plerumque et quae sunt alius magis edita cumque; 1132
 ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum 1127
 quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere. 1130 1128
 (4) proinde sine macsum defessi sanguine sudent, 1129
 angustum per iter luctantes ambitionis; 1130
 quandoquidem sapiunt alieno ex ore petuntque
 res ex auditis potius quam sensibus ipsis,
 nec magis id nunc est neque erit mox quam fuit ante 1135
 (5) ergo regibus occisis subversa iacebat
 pristina maiestas soliorum et sceptris superba,
 et capitis summi praeclarum insigne etruentum
 sub pedibus vulgi magnum lugebat honorem;
 nam cupide conculecatur nimis ante metutum. 1140
 res itaque ad summam faecem turbasque redibat,
 imperium sibi cum ac summatum quisque petebat.
 (6) inde magistratum partim docuere creare
 iuraque constituere, ut vellent legibus uti.
 nam genus humanum, defessum vi colere aevum. 1145
 ex inimicitiis languebat: quo magis ipsum
 sponte sua cecidit sub leges atque iura.
 acrius ex ira quod enim se quisque parabat
 ulcisci quam nunc concessumst legibus aequis,
 hanc ob rem est homines pertaesum vi colere aevum. 1150
 (7) inde metus maculat poenarum praemia vitae.
 circumretit enim vis atque iniuria quemque
 atque, unde exortast, ad eum plerumque revertit,
 nec facilest placidam ac pacatam degere vitam

qui violat factis communia foedera pacis.
essi fallit enim divum genus humanumque,
perpetuo tamen id fore clam diffidere debet.

1153

1105 hi vitum Naugetus: invictum OQ: hinc vitum Bockemüller 1110 pecua Echovat: pecudes OQ: pecuni
Luchmann 1124 certantes iter Marullus: certantesque inter Q: certantesque Q 1131-2 hinc transulit
Munro 1141 res itaque 2 31: resaque OQ redibat 1 31: recidat Q: recidit Q 1145 vi colere 1 31
visere O: vixere Q vi gerere B

Context: the further development of civilization, following accounts of the origins of language (= 19B) and human manipulation of fire

1117-19 Cf. 21F 3.

1120-30 Cf. C 1.

1151-7 Cf. A 4-5.

M Porphyry, *Abst.* 1.7.1-9.4

(1) οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου ὥσπερ γενεαλογίαν μακρὰν διεξιόντες φασὶν
ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται, ἀπιδόντες εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινωνίαν τῶν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράξεις, ἀνύσιον ἐπεφήμισαν τὴν
ἀνθρώπου σφαγὴν καὶ ἀτιμίας οὐ τὰς τυχοῦσας προσήψαν, τάχα μὲν καὶ
φυσικῆς τινος οἰκειώσεως ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀνθρώπους
διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς μορφῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ προχείρως φθίρειν
τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῶον ὥσπερ ἑτερόν τι τῶν συγκεχωρημένων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν
γε πλείστην αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τούτου καὶ ἀνύσιον ἐπιφημισθῆναι
τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν εἰς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ βίου σύστασιν ὑπολαβεῖν. (2) ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς
τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἱ μὲν παρακολουθήσαντες τῷ συμφέροντι τοῦ διαορίσμα-
τος οὐδὲν προσεδέθησαν ἄλλης αἰτίας τῆς ἀνειργούσης αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς
πράξεως ταύτης, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν αἰσθῆσιν ἱκανὴν τούτου τὸ
μέγεθος τῆς ζημίας δεδοῦτες ἀπείχοντο τοῦ κτείνειν προχείρως ἀλλήλους.
ὧν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται καὶ νῦν ἔτι συμβαίνειν. . . {3} οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
βιαίως κατέστη νόμιμον οὔτε μετὰ γραφῆς οὔτε ἄνευ γραφῆς τῶν
διαμενόντων νῦν καὶ διαδίδουσθαι πεφυκότων, ἀλλὰ συγχωρησάντων αὐτῷ
καὶ τῶν χρησαμένων. φρονήσει γὰρ ψυχῆς, οὐ ῥώμῃ σώματος καὶ
δυναστευτικῇ δουλώσει, τῶν ὅχλων διήνεγκαν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς
εἰσηγούμενοι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ χρησίμου καταστήσαντες
ἀλόγως αὐτοῦ πρότερον αἰσθανομένους καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλανθανομένους,
τοὺς δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐπιτιμῶν καταπλήξαντες. οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἑτέρῳ
χρησθαι φαρμάκῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἁμαθίαν ἢ τῷ φόβῳ τῆς
ἀφωρισμένης ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ζημίας. αὕτη γὰρ κατέχει μόνη καὶ νῦν τοὺς
τυχόντας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κωλύει τὸ μήτε κοινῇ μήτε ἰδίᾳ τὸ
ἀλυσιτελὲς πράττειν. (4) εἰ δὲ πάντες ἐδύναντο βλέπειν ὁμαίως καὶ
μητημονεύειν τὸ συμφέρον, οὐδὲν ἂν προσεδέοντο νόμων, ἀλλ' αὐθαιρέτως
τὰ μὲν εὐλαβοῦντο τῶν ἀπειρημένων, τὰ δὲ ἔπραττον τῶν προστεταγ-
μένων. ἱκανὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ χρησίμου καὶ βλαβεροῦ θεωρία τῶν μὲν φυγὴν
παρασκευάσαι, τῶν δὲ πῖρεσιν. ἡ δὲ τῆς ζημίας ἀνάτασις πρὸς τοὺς μὴ

προπορευμένους τὸ λυσιτελοῦν. ἀναγκάζει γὰρ δεσπάζειν ἐπικρεμαμένη 30
 ταῖς ἀγούσαις ἐπὶ τὰς ἀσυμφόρους πράξεις ὁρμαῖς, καὶ βίᾳ συναναγκάζει
 τὸ δέον ποιεῖν. (5) ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν ἀκούσιον φόνον οὐκ ἔξω πάσης ζημίας
 κατέστησαν οἱ νομοθέται, ὅπως μηδεμίαν ἐνδῶσι πρόφασιν τοῖς ἐκούσιως
 τὰ τῶν ἀκουσίων δρῶντων ἔργα μισεῖσθαι προαιρουμένοις, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ 35
 ἀφύλακτον ἢ μηδὲ ἡμελημένον τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὥστε πολλά πρὸς ἀλήθειαν
 ἀκούσια συμβαίνειν. οὐ γὰρ συνέφερον οὐδὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας δι'
 ἃς καὶ τὸ καθ' ἐκούσιον τρόπον φθεῖρειν ἀλλήλους. (6) ὥστε τῶν ἀκουσίων
 τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἀσάθμητον αἰτίαν καὶ ἀφύλακτον γιγνομένων 40
 ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν καὶ ἀνεπίστατον
 τῆς διαφορᾶς, βουληθέντες κωλύσαι τὴν βλάβητουσιν τοὺς πλησίον
 ῥαθυμίαν, οὐκ ἀθῶον κατέστησαν ζημίας οὐδὲ τὴν ἀκούσιον πρᾶξιν, ἀλλὰ
 τῷ φόβῳ τῶν ἐπιτιμιῶν ἀφείλον τὸ πολὺ τῆς τοιαύτης ἁμαρτίας. (7) οἶμαι 45
 δ' ἐγὼγε καὶ τοὺς συγκεχωρημένους ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου φόνους τὰς
 ἀφοσιώσεις λαμβάνειν τὰς εἰθιμμένας διὰ τῶν καθαρῶν παρ' οὐδεμίαν
 ἑτέραν αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν πρώτων καλῶς ταῦτα εἰσηγησομένων ἢ παρὰ τὸ 45
 τῆς ἐκούσιον πράξεως ὅτι πλείστον βούλεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀφιστάναι.
 πανταχόθεν γὰρ ἐδέοντο τοῦ κωλύσαντος ἐτοιμῶς πράττειν τὸ μὴ
 συμφέρον οἱ τυχόντες. (8) ὁθεν οὐ μόνον ζημίας ἔταξαν οἱ πρώτοι τοῦτο
 συνειδότες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρον φόβον ἄλογον ἐπήρτησαν, οὐ καθαρούς 50
 ἐπιφθιμίσαντες εἶναι τοὺς ὅπως οἷν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀνελόντας, μὴ χρησαμένους
 καθαρμοῖς. τὸ γὰρ ἀνόητον τῆς ψυχῆς ποικίλως παιδαγωγηθέν ἦλθεν εἰς
 τὴν καθεστῶσαν ἡμερότητα, προσμηχανωμένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλόγου φορᾶς
 ἐπιθυμίας τιθασεύματα τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πλήθη διακοσμησάντων ὧν ἐστὶ
 καὶ τὸ μὴ κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἀκρίτως.

9 τὸ Reiske: τῇ codd. 12 δουλώσει Reiske: δουλεύσει codd. 40 τοὺς Fuguetolles: πάντας νε: αὐ
 τοὺς codd. αἰτοῖς (τοῖς) Bouffartigue 45 καλῶς Reiske: κακῶς codd. 53 τιθασεύματα τῶν ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς Reiske: τιθασευμάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος codd. διακοσμησάντων Bouffartigue: διακοσμησάντων
 codd.

Context: part of a survey of philosophers hostile to the vegetarianism Porphyry
 attributes to Pythagoras and Empedocles. In concluding this survey, *Aha*. 1.26.4,
 Porphyry refers to τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ τὰ παρὰ . . . 'Ερμάρχῳ [*Ερμάχῳ* codd., corr.
 Bernays] . . . τῷ 'Επικουρείῳ, which is the basis for attributing the gist, if not the
 exact wording of **M N**, to Hermarchus. Cf. Krohn [137], 6–8; Philippson [272], 315–
 19, Cole [273], 71ff.; Goldschmidt [276]; Müller [275], 74ff.

4–7 This additional reason for refraining from homicide, where οἰκείωσις recalls
 Stoicism (cf. **57D 2, F, H 1**), reads like Porphyry's insertion or embellishment

19 ἐπιλογισμὸν Cf. **N 16**, and see note on **21V 1**.

48–9 The reference to οἱ συνειδότες recalls the contribution of experts to the
 refinement of language, **19A 4**. As noted in vol. 1, 135 (and cf. Cole [273], 73), the
 evolution of justice from a natural recognition of utility to a codified legal system
 precisely parallels the Epicurean account of language development. Cf. also the
 distinction between the spontaneous formation of social groups, **K 1019–20**, and the
 subsequent establishment of laws, **L 1143–7**, which closely resembles **M 14–21, 51–3**.

Goldschmidt [276], 128-70, seems to conflate justice with the institution of laws, which runs quite counter to **B** 2, and he also understates the continuity between the uncontrived perception of utility (cf. **M** 25-9, **N** 4-23) and the legislators' formal innovations. He was unduly influenced, in our opinion, by the Marxist line of interpretation (cf. Farrington [93], 27; Müller [275], 37ff) that governmental organization of social life is not deemed to be natural in Epicureanism, but an accidental product of convention. Against this, see Long [280], 287-93, 313-16.

N Porphyry, *Abst.* 1.10.1-12.7

(1) τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζώων εἰκότως οὐδὲν διεκώλυσαν φθεῖρειν οἱ πρῶτοι
 διορίσαντες ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἃ μὴ· τῇ γὰρ συμφέρον ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκ
 τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπετελεῖτο πράξεως. οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἦν σῶζεσθαι μὴ
 πειρωμένους ἀμύνεσθαι αὐτὰ συντρεφόμενους μετ' ἀλλήλων. (2) διαμνη-
 μονεύοντες δὲ τινες τῶν τότε χαριεστάτων ὡς αὐτοὶ τε ἀπέσχοντο τοῦ
 κτείνειν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς ἐνεποιούν
 μνήμην τοῦ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, ὅπως
 ἀπεχόμενοι τοῦ συγγενοῦς διαφυλάττωσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, ἣ συνήργει πρὸς
 τὴν ἰδίαν ἐκάστου σωτηρίαν. οὐ μόνον δὲ χρήσιμον ἦν τὸ χωρίζεσθαι μηδὲ
 λυμαντικὸν ποιεῖν μηδὲν τῶν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον συνελεγμένων πρὸς τὸ
 τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐξόρισμα ζώων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ
 παραγιγνομένους. μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινος διὰ ταύτην ἀπέσχοντο τοῦ
 συγγενοῦς, ὅσον ἐβάδιζεν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων . . . (3)
 ἐλθόντος δὲ ἐπὶ πλεόν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῆς δι' ἀλλήλων γενέσεως μακρὰν
 προηκούσης, ἐξωρισμένων δὲ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ζώων [καὶ τῆς παρασπάρ-
 σεως], ἐπιλυγισμὸν ἔλαβον τινες τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλων
 τροφαῖς, οὐ μόνον ἄλογον μνήμην. (4) ὁθεν ἐπειράθησαν βεβαιότερως
 ἀνείρξαι τοὺς προχείρως φθείροντας ἀλλήλους καὶ τὴν βοήθειαν ἀσθενεσ-
 τέραν κατασκευάζοντας διὰ τὴν τοῦ παρελθλυθότος λήθην. πειρώμενοι δὲ
 τοῦτο δρᾶν τὰς ἔτι μενούσας καὶ νῦν κατὰ πύλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη νομοθεσίας
 εἰσήνεγκαν, ἐπακολουθήσαντος τοῦ πλήθους αὐτοῖς ἐκούσιως παρὰ τὸ
 μᾶλλον ἤδη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀθροίσει λαμβάνειν
 αἰσθησιν. ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀφοβίαν συνήργει τό τε λυμαντικὸν πᾶν
 κτεινόμενον ἀφειδῶς καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν τούτου φθορὰν διατηρού-
 μενον. ὁθεν εἰκότως τὸ μὲν ἀπηγορεύθη, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύθη τῶν
 εἰρημένων. (5) ἐκεῖνο δὲ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐνία τῶν ζώων οὐ φθαρτικά
 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ὄντα φύσεως οὐδὲ καθ' ἕτερον οὐδένα τρόπον λυμανόμενα
 τοὺς βίους συγκεχώρηκεν ὁ νόμος ἀναιρεῖν ἡμῖν. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶ
 τοιοῦτο τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου συγκεχωρημένων, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐώμενον
 λαμβάνειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀφθονίας βλαπτικὸν γίγνοιτ' αὐ ἡμῶν· ἐν δὲ
 τῇ νῦν πλήθει διατηρούμενον χρειᾶς παρέχεται τινος εἰς τὸν βίον . . . ὁθεν
 τὰ μὲν [sc. λέοντας καὶ λύκους κτλ.] ἄρδην φθείρομεν, τῶν δὲ [sc. προβάτου
 καὶ βοῦ κτλ.] τὸ πλεόν τῆς συμμετρίας ἀφαιρούμεν. (6) διὰ παραπλησίους
 ταῖς εἰρημέναις αἰτίας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐδιωδὴν διορισθῆναι τῶν ἐμψύχων

νομιστέον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ταῦτα καταλαβόντων νόμων, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν οὐκ 35
 ἐδωδόμενων αἰτίων τὸ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. ὥστε τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι πᾶν
 τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἐπὶ περὶ τῶν νομοθετη-
 μένων ἡλιβάτου τινὸς γέμειν εὐθείας. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον ταῦτο,
 ἀλλ' ὅνπερ τρόπον ἢ ἐπὶ λοιπῶν συμφερόντων, οἷον ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ ἐτέρων 40
 μυρίων εἰδῶν <...> (7) ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν τε κοινῶν
 ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν ἰδίων. καὶ γὰρ τὰ παραπλησίως ἐφαρμόττοντα νομοθετή-
 ματα πᾶσιν οὐ καθορώσι τινες, ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων δοξάζοντες
 εἶναι παραλείπουσιν, οἳ δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν δόξαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὰ 45
 μὴ καθόλου συμφέροντα πανταχοῦ τινες οὔρηται συμφέρειν. ὅθεν διὰ τὴν
 αἰτίαν ταύτην ἀντέχονται τῶν οὐκ ἐφαρμοττόντων, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τινων
 ἐξευρίσκουσι τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτοὺς λυσιτελεῖ καὶ τὰ κοινὴν ἔχοντα τὴν 45
 ὠφέλειαν. (8) ὧν ἔστι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐδωδὰς τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ φθορὰς ἐν
 τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἔθνων διατεταγμένα διὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἴδιον, οἷς οὐκ
 ἀναγκαῖον ἐμμένειν ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκεῖν τόπον. (9) εἰ μὲν οὖν 50
 ἡδύναντο ποιήσασθαι τινα συνθήκην ὥσπερ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οὕτω καὶ
 πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ζώων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν μήτε πρὸς ἡμῶν ἀκρίτως
 αὐτὰ κτείνεσθαι, καλῶς εἶχε μέχρι τοῦτου τὸ δίκαιον ἐξάγειν ἐπιτεταμέ-
 νον γὰρ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. (10) ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν ἀμυχάνων ἦν 55
 κοινωῆσαι νόμου τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα τῶν ζώων λόγον, διὰ μὲν τοῦ τοιοῦτου
 τρόπου τὸ συμφέρον οὐχ οἷον τε κατασκευάσασθαι πρὶν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐμψύχων ἀσφάλειαν μᾶλλον περ ἢ τῶν ἀψύχων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὴν
 ἐξουσίαν λαμβάνειν, ἣν νῦν ἔχομεν, εἰς τὸ κτείνειν αὐτὰ μόνως ἔστι τὴν
 ἐνδεχομένην ἔχειν ἀσφάλειαν. ταυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἐπικουρεῶν.

4 αὐτὰ Eusebiius. τοῦτο codd. 5 αὐτοῖς Reiske. αὐτοῖς codd 10 11 τὸ ἐξέτασμα Boussin-
 gue τὰ ἐξέτασμα codd. τὸν ἐξέτασμον Valerius 15 προσηκούσας Aëtisch. Reiske
 προσηκούσας codd 15 16 καὶ τῆς παρασπόμεως vix iamum. παρασπάτως ed. pr. et omnes codd.
 ante Boussingue (quid veni non anteferimus) 22 ἀθροῖσαι Felicius ἀθροισθεῖσθαι codd. 24
 κτευνόμενον Felicius ἐκτευνόμενον codd 26 δὲ Reiske: τε codd 25 διὰ Reiske δι' α
 codd 34 αἰτίας Heicher αἰτίαι codd 35 νόμω Reiske. νόμων codd. 40 lacunam ind.
 Boussingue 46 αὐτοῖς Heicher αὐτοῖς codd

Context. immediately following **M**.

13 ἀναγκαῖων Cf. **S** 4.

16-17 Cf. **M** 19.20.

40-9 These lines apply the lessons of **B I** 2. For another Epicurean comment on moral relativism, cf. **7D**.

49-53 See note on **A** 2.

O Cicero, *Fin.* 1.66-70

(1) tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates quae ad amicos pertinerent negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur,

expediunt. (2) ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam
negant posse a voluptate discedere, nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis
insidiarum et merus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus
partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non
potest. (3) atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic
amicitiae non modo faurices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt volupta-
tum tam amicis quam sibi; quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam
spe eriguntur consequentis ac posterius temporis, quod quia nullo modo sine
amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus neque vero
ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, ideo et
hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia cum voluptate conecitur, nam et
laetatur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus.
quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum,
quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet
propter amici voluptatem. . . . (4) sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiore
paulo contra vestra convicia, sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si
amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia
quasi claudicare videatur, itaque primos congressus copulationesque et
consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; cum
autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere
tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se
ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si
canes, si equos, si ludicra exercendi aut venandi consuetudine adamare
solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit et iustius?
(5) sunt autem qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, ut ne minus
amicos quam se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe etiam
vidimus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse quod
conunctione tali sit aptius. (6) quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo
non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur,
sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri.

14 *neq.* *spu* ARV18 *poterat* *edd.* - *potuerat* *cs&d*30 *etiam* Davies. *enim* *codd.*

Cf. *Fin.* 2.78-85. This passage, and the general issue of friendship and altruism, are discussed excellently by Mitsis [281]; we have benefited from reading his work in typescript.

5-19 This account chimes well with Epicurus' own comments; cf. especially C 2. E 1, F, H.

19-28 This account, according to Cicero (*Fin.* 2.82), was never stated by Epicurus himself. It is a response to the Academic (cf. *vestra convicia*, 20), and probably Stoic, objection that the affectionate element in friendship, 14-19, is not consistent with its exclusively utilitarian foundation, 5-14; cf. *Fin.* 2.84-5. Hence the revisionary claim that *amor* can become quite detached from *utilitas*, 24-6.

29-30 This third account is too condensed to be fully intelligible, nor is it clarified by Cicero's retort in *Fin.* 2.83. It should be regarded as a second revisionary

answer to the objection set out above. Instead of affection developing by association, as in the second account, the third seems to require 'loving a friend as much as oneself' to be a commitment built into the friendship from its outset.

P Diogenes of Oenoanda 25.2.3-11

καθ' ἐκάστην | μὲν γὰρ ἀποτυμὴν | τῆς γῆς ἄλλων ἄλλη | πατρίς ἐστιν,
κατὰ δὲ | τὴν ὅλην περιοχὴν | τρυῖδε τοῦ κόσμου μέ|α π|άντων πατρίς
ἐσ|τιν ἡ πάσα γῆ καὶ εἰς | ὁ κόσμος οἶκος.

Context: discussion of what are called 'strangers', but are not really so.

The sentiment is close to that of the Stoic Aristo, 67H, but no direct influence of Stoicism need be posited. See further on S.

Q Diogenes Laertius 10.117-20

(1) βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἢ διὰ μῖσους ἢ διὰ φθόνον ἢ διὰ κατιφρόνησιν
γίνεσθαι, ὧν τὸν σοφὸν λογισμῷ περιγίνεσθαι. (2) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἀπαξ
γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν
ἐκόντα· πάθει μᾶλλον συσχεθῆσεσθαι, <ὁ> οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν
σοφίαν. οὐδὲ μὲν ἐκ πάσης σώματος ἕξωτος σοφὸν γενέσθαι ἂν οὐδ' ἐν παντί 5
ἔθνει. (3) κἄν στρεβλωθῇ δ' ὁ σοφός, εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα . . . ὅτε μέντοι
στρεβλοῦται, ἔνθα καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει. (4) γυναῖκί τ' οὐ μιγῆσεσθαι τὸν
σοφόν ἢ οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν . . . οὐδὲ κολάσειν οἰκέτας, ἐλεῆσειν
μέντοι καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἔξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. (5) ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν
σοφόν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς· οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν . . . οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν 10
καλῶς . . . καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσκειν τὸν σοφόν . . . οὐδὲ
πολιτεύεσθαι . . . οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν· οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν . . . οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν.
ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθέντα τὰς ὕφεις μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου . . . καὶ λυπήσεσθαι
δὲ τὸν σοφόν . . . καὶ δικάζεσθαι· καὶ συγγράμματα καταλείψειν· οὐ
πανηγυρικεῖν δέ· καὶ κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. φιλαγρή- 15
σειν τύχῃ τ' ἀντιτάξεσθαι, φίλον τε οὐδένα προήσεσθαι. (6) εὐδοξίας ἐπὶ
τοσοῦτον προνοήσεσθαι, ἐφ' ὅσον μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι. μᾶλλον τε
εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις. εἰκόνας τε ἀναβῆσειν. εἰ
ἔχοι, ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίη· μόνον τε τὸν σοφὸν ὁρθῶς ἂν περὶ τε μουσικῆς
καὶ ποιητικῆς διαλέξασθαι· ποιήματα δὲ ἐνεργεῖα οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι. οὐκ 20
εἶναι τε ἕτερον ἑτέρον σοφώτερον. χρηματίσεσθαι τε, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μόνης
σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα. καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν. καὶ ἐπιχαρῆ-
σεσθαι· τιμὴ ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι· καὶ σχολὴν κατασκευάσειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστ'
ὀχλαγωγῆσαι· καὶ ἀναγνώσεσθαι ἐν πλήθει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐκόντα· δογματιεῖν
τε καὶ οὐκ ἀπαρτῆσειν· καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ὁμοίον εἶσεσθαι· καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλου 25
ποτὲ τεθνήξεσθαι.

4 πάθει μᾶλλον σοφά: πάθει μὴ ὕστερον. πάθει μὴ <ἢ ὡς> ἄλλων Kischalsky. πάθει (τσοι) μᾶλλον
Bignone. <ὁ> Kischalsky. lacunam ante ἂν τοῦ ὕστερον. ἡ ἔθνη FP. εἶναι B. 4 δ' FP (ceteri). om.
H. 5 καὶ οὐδὲ ὕστερον αὐτὴ σοφά. 6 οὐκ ἀπορῶσαι F. τὴν σπουδαίαν BP. 7 3 πηρωθέντα
Bywater. πηρωθεῖν TP. πηρωθεῖς H. μεθέξειν 22. μετέξει B. μετέξει FP. 16 φίλον BP. φίλον

1 πρὸς ἡμᾶς Bignoni: πρὸς ἡμᾶς could 18-20 ἐξέπαιε τελευτήσας mortal 'he' ex D3
 19-20 Bignoni 19 ἀχρὶς Kuhn ἀχρὶς could 20 δὲ Koussakky 'a' could ἐπεσφύσεν Userer
 ἐπεσφύσεν could

Context: an account of the views of Epicurus and his followers on the wise man.

The similarity to, and difference from, what is attested for Stoicism (cf. D.L. 7.121-5) are probably deliberate (cf. vol. 1, 138-9) and not simply a doxographical coincidence. Some of what is said here can be assumed to postdate Epicurus.

Most of our omissions in sections 3-5 are of the books to which Diogenes refers for various doctrines.

1-2 Cf. L 1120-8, and for Stoics, D.L. 7.123.

4 As our critical apparatus indicates, several scholars have attempted to get rid of the assertion that the Epicurean wise man is *more* affected by feelings (sr. than others, cf. μᾶλλον . . . τῶν ἄλλων, 17-18 below). This does seem a rank falsehood, given the wise man's freedom from sexual passion, envy, fear of death etc. However, none of the suggested emendations, except perhaps Userer's, seems at all plausible to us in sense; and none at all explains the train of thought. The whole of 2-4 concerns the wise man's *δεύθεσις*. We take πάθεισιν ἀποχεθῆσθαι to expand and qualify μηδὲ πλάττειν ἐκόντα: the wise man does not deliberately feign an unwise character; *rather* (μᾶλλον, not 'more', as standardly interpreted) 'he will be genuinely moved by feelings, but this will be no impediment to his wisdom'. Given the very truncated style of this whole passage, with frequent asyndeton, this reading may even be adequately supported by the text as it stands, although corruption may be suspected. If this is on the right lines, the sentiment is anti-Stoic: a permanently wise character is perfectly compatible with susceptibility to many ordinary human feelings.

6-7 Likewise the Stoic sage will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris, cf. SVF 3.586. But he does not groan; cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.13.17.

7-8 Cf. 21G 3.

8-9 Both forgiveness and pity are officially alien to the Stoic sage; cf. SVF 3.640-

1

9-10 The Stoic sage, by contrast, is allowed to be a lover of the young; cf. note to 66C.

10-15 Rhetoric, politics, living as a Cynic, and suicide, are all permitted to the Stoic sage, but grief (13) is not. Cf. 66; 67.

19-20 μόνον-διαλέξασθαι For the Stoic sage, cf. SVF 3.294, 654

20-1 οὐκ-σοφώτερον For the same doctrine in Stoicism, cf. 611 1

21-2 χρηματίζεσθαι θεραπεύειν For Stoicism, see 67W.

R Plutarch, *Col.* 1124n

τελευτώντος ἤδη τοῦ βιβλίου φησὶν [sc. ὁ Κουλώτης] ὅτι "τὸν βίον οἱ νόμους διατάξαντες καὶ νόμιμα καὶ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καταστήσαντες εἰς πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἔθεντο καὶ βορῶν ἀπῆλλαξαν· εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα ἀναιρήσει, θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα καὶ ὁ προστυχὼν τὸν ἐντυχόντα μονοῦ κατέδετα."

1 ἐντυχόντα E. ἐντυχάνοντα B

Context: quotation of Colotes in order to score a point against Epicurean hedonism.

Colotes dedicated his book to one of the Ptolemies; cf. 1107n.

3 ἀσφάλειαν Cf. C

4 s Cf. J 958–61.

S Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fr. 21.1.4–14, 2.10–14

τίτε ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ τῶν | θεῶν βίος εἰς ἀνθρώπους | μεταβήσεται. δικαιο-
| ούνης γάρ ἐσται μεστὰ | πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίας. | καὶ οὐ γενήσεται
τειχῶν | ἢ νόμῳ χρεῖα καὶ πάντων ὅσα δι' ἀλλήλους | σκευωρούμεθα.
περὶ δὲ | τῶν ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἀναικάων . . . καὶ διακόψει [εἰς τὸ] | δέον τὸ
συνε[χῶς φι]λοσοφεῖν τοιαῦτα· τὰ | γὰρ γεωργή[ματα ὧν ἡ] | φύσις 3
χρήζει . . .

For the text with commentary, cf. Smith [178], 21–5.

2 φιλαλληλίας On this rare and seemingly late word, Smith comments: 'Even if the term φιλαλληλία was borrowed from the Stoics [the adjective but not the noun occurs 4 times in Epictetus], that does not necessarily mean that the idea originated with them. It is surely indisputable that . . . φιλαλληλία and φιλανθρωπία were characteristic of the Epicurean community from the beginning.' However, it is less clear that Epicurus himself had hopes of extending the Epicurean community to the entire citizen body (cf. Q 5.6). Diogenes' vision of breaking down existing boundaries, here and in P, could simply reflect the ideology of the Roman empire. For φιλάλληλος in Stoicism, cf. 67W ?.

23 God

A Lucretius 5.1161–1225

(1) nunc quae causa deum per magnas numina gentis
peruulgant et ararum compleverit urbis
susciptendaque curant sollemnia sacra,
quae nunc in magnis florent sacra rebus locisque,
unde etiam nunc est mortalibus insitus horror 1165
qui delubra deum nova toto suscitât orbi
terrarum et festis cogit celebrare diebus,
non ita difficilè rationem reddere verbis.
(2) quippe etenim iam tum divum mortalia sacra
egregias animo facies vigilante videbant 1170
et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu.
his igitur sensum tribuebant propterea quod
membra movere videbantur vocesque superbas
mittere pro facie praeclara et viribus amplis.
aeternamque dabant vitam, quia semper eorum 1175
suppeditabatur facies et forma manebat,
et tamen omnino quod tantis viribus auctos

- non temere ulla vi convinci posse putabant.
 fortunisque ideo longe praestare putabant,
 quod mortis timor haud quemquam vexaret eorum. 1180
 et simul in somnis quia multa et mira videbant
 efficere et nullum capere ipsos inde laborem.
- (3) praeterea caeli rationes ordine certo
 et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti
 nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causas. 1185
 ergo perfugium sibi habebant omnia divis
 tradere et illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.
 in caeloque deum sedis et templa locarunt,
 per caelum volvi quia nox et luna videtur,
 luna dies et nox et noctis signa severa 1190
 noctivagaeque faces caeli flammulaeque volantes,
 nubila sol imbres nix venti fulmina grando
 et rapidi fremitus et murmura magna minarum.
- (4) o genus infelix humanum, talia divis
 cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas! 1195
 quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis
 vulnera, quas lacrimas peperere minoribus nostris!
 nec pietas ullast velatum saepe videri
 vertier ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras
 nec procumbere humi prostratum et pandere palmas 1200
 ante deum delubra nec aras sanguine multo
 spargere quadrupedum nec votis necere vota,
 sed magis pacata posse omnia mente tueri.
- (5) nam cum suspicimus magni caelestia mundi
 templa super stellisque micantibus aethera fixum, 1205
 et venit in mentem solis lunaeque viarum,
 tunc aliis oppressa malis in pectora cura
 illa quoque expergefactum caput erigere infit,
 nequae forte deum nobis immensa potestas
 sit, vario motu quae candida sidera verset 1210
 temptat enim dubiam mentem rationis egestas,
 ecquaenam fuerit mundi genitalis origo,
 et simul ecquae sit finis, quoad moenia mundi
 solliciti motus hunc possint ferre laborem.
 an divinitus aeterna donata salute 1215
 perpetuo possint aevi labentia tractu
 immensi validas aevi contemnere viris
- (6) praeterea cui non animus formidine divum
 contrahitur, cui non correpunt membra pavore,
 fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus 1220

contremitt et magnum percurrunt murmura caelum?
 non populi gentesque tremunt, regesque superbi
 corripuit divum percussis membra timore,
 nequid ob admissum foede dictumve superbe
 poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum?

1225

1203 *parata* ed. Jutina *placata* OQ
 quod OQ

1214 *collocati* Beudry *et locati* OQ

1224 *nequid* Lachmann *ne*

Context: the origins of civilization. The passage corresponds to Epicurus, *Nat.* xii, 27 f (= Usener 84).

[173] **videbantur** Possibly 'were seen' rather than 'seemed'. But on neither translation would the figures seen have to be actually alive: see 15D 9.

B Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 123-4

(1) πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μὴθὲν μῆτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μῆτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσσπετε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν δόξαζε (2) θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν· ἐναργῆς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ γνώσις. (3) οἷους δ' αὐτοὺς (οἱ) πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἷους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβῆς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοὺς προσάπτειν. αὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ὑποφάσεις· ἐνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι αἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι. (4) ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντός ἀρεταῖς τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀπαδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.

ε (οἱ) Gassendi ο αἱ ἐπὶ A A Long αἵται τοῖς οἱ τοῖς Usener, αἵται τοῖς κακοῖς del Diogenes ο ὠφέλειαι (τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) Gassendi ? νομίζοντες, codd. ἐφορίζοντες Usener

Context: immediately following 25A, the introduction to the *Letter*.

ο φυλάττουσιν Echoing 3, φυλάττειν. Fake believes that the gods meddle in our affairs fail to ensure their capacity for everlasting bliss (cf. E 4). This idea that it is up to men to ensure their gods' imperishability becomes far more readily intelligible on the interpretation which makes Epicurean gods human thought constructs.

10-12 We take the subject to be people in general, the good and the bad alike (cf. SV 15), the ἰδιαί ἀρεταὶ of the latter being such misconceived forms of 'excellence' as power. Although Gassendi's supplement, <τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς> (or perhaps <αἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς> to fit our emendation in 9) would help clarify this reference, the transmitted reading should stand: Epicurus probably chose not to specify 'for the good' because a correct or relatively correct conception of the divine nature is beneficial not only to those already good, but to anyone at all.

C Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 76-7

(1) καὶ μὴν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν καὶ ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν καὶ τὰ σύστημα ταῦτοις μῆτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ

γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξοντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα
 ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας (οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες
 καὶ ὄργανα καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ 5
 προυδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται), (2) μήτε αὐ πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα
 συνεστραμμένον τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις
 ταύτας λαμβάνειν· (3) ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν, κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα
 φερόμενα ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, εἰ μὴδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῷ
 σεμνώματι δόξῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῇ 10
 ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει.

3 γίνεσθαι Meibom.; γινώσθαι codd. 9 ἴαν codd. ἴνα Usener μὴδὲν Meibom.; μὴδ' codd.
 ὑπεναντίον Meibom.; ὑπεναντίας BP; ὑπεναντίας HP (note); ὑπεναντίας εἰ v. in δόξῃ Meibom.; δόξαι
 codd. <γέννωμαι> τῷ σεμνώματι δόξαι Cassiod.

Context: immediately following 19A on the origin of language. The juxtaposition is explicable by the fact that both topics are excerpted from Epicurus' account in *Nat.* xii of the origins of civilization (see note on A, and Sedley [132]). The present passage may derive from the same section as A 3.

1-3 If the interpretation defended in vol. 1 is correct, why does Epicurus not argue that the gods cannot control celestial events on the ground that they are only concepts, not living beings? That ground could hardly be established by the present argument, which merely appeals to the common conception of god as blessed and imperishable. Hence his argument concerns not his own gods, but a *hypothetical* divine controller.

6-8 An allusion to the astral gods of Plato and Aristotle
 ὁ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας Sc. blessedness and imperishability.

D Lucretius 6.68-79

quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis
 dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum,
 delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta 70
 saepe oberunt, non quo violari summa deum vis
 possit, ut ex ira poenas petere imbibat acris,
 sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos
 constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus,
 nec delubra deum placido cum pectore adibus, 75
 nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur
 in mentis hominum divinae nuntia formae,
 suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis.
 inde videre licet qualis iam vita sequatur.

70 oberunt Wakefield; oderunt OQ; oderunt Marullus 71 quibus Marullus 72 in OQ 76 feruntur eis
 Braccensis; ferunt OQ

Context: the need to exclude the gods from cosmological explanations.

76 *feruntur* Whether or not this emendation is accepted, there can be little doubt that Lucretius is here assuming that the divine *simulacra* come to us from the bodies of the gods. Cf. L. with note.

E Cicero, ND 1.43 50

(1) ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero de quibus haec quaestio est habere debeat. (2) solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quoniam rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et iudicio volumine accepimus. quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum videtis. cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. (3) quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum sed etiam indoctos, fatemur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse *πρόληψιν* appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat) – hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et immortales putemus quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. (4) quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod quae talia essent inbecilia essent omnia. (5) si nihil aliud quaereremus nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum: nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata immortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nullos a superis inpendere metus, sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirat animus et formam et vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem in deo. (6) ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet partim ratio docet. nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam nisi humanam deorum: quae enim forma alia occurrat umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? sed ne omnia revoceantur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. nam cum praestantissimam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae conformatio lineamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? vos quidem Lucili soletis (nam Coctus meus modo hoc modo illud), cum artificum effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum verum etiam ad venustatem apta describere; quod si omnium

animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est quae pulcherrimast omnium. quomansque deus beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam messe nisi in hominis figura. hominis esse specie deos confitemur est. (7) nec tamen ea species corpus est sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem. (haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen fretus intelligentia vestra dissero brevius quam causa desiderat.) Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo videat animo sed etiam sic tractet ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem *στερέμυα* appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna, summa vero vis infixitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant: hanc *ἰσονομίαν* appellat Epicurus, id est aequabilemtributionem, ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minore[m], et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent vis infinita esse debere.

34 *arctos* Diogen. *specie*: *cond.*

35 *ad deos* *cond.* [*ad eos* B?]. *ad nos* Ciceroni. *ad deos* Flavius. *ad deos ad nos* Huxford.

Context: Velleius' exposition of Epicurean theology, immediately following his critique of rival theories (including 54B).

6 **informationem** This (cf. 39) must translate Epicurus' *τύπος*, cf. 15A; 17E 2; 20C 8.

8 **caelesti** Translated 'heaven-sent' in vol. 1, despite the un-Epicurean overtones, on the authority of Cicero, *Fm* 1.63 and Plutarch, *Col* 1118A. **de regula et iudicio** This translates *περί κανόνος καὶ κριτηρίου* – a reference to Epicurus' work the *Canon* (see 17A).

12 **innatas** The term has raised major problems for the traditional interpretation of Epicurus' theology. If the conception of god is already innate, how can it also result empirically (as it were) from our apprehension in dreams of images coming from him (cf. Kleve [284], ch. 3)? The dilemma does not even arise on the interpretation adopted in vol. 1. What is innate is a predisposition for forming an idealized conception of the happy being we ourselves aim to become.

21–4 For the original Greek of the maxim, see G 1–2.

31–46 On the interpretation proposed in vol. 1 it is inevitable that the gods should be anthropomorphic, since they constitute paradigmatic models for our own lives. Still an obligation might arise for the Epicureans to show, in opposition to the Stoic defence of a non-anthropomorphic god (e.g. 54A), that there is nothing non-ideal about a god in human shape. See also 13G 42–53, and Kleve [290].

38–41 For this Stoic thesis, see ND 2. 133–53.

47–9 The apologetic remarks suggest that Cicero is here simply translating

Epicurus' technical account without understanding it – a fact which virtually guarantees the authenticity of his report.

53: 4 *similitudine et transiōne* This expression has been widely misunderstood. Many interpreters have followed Philippson [240] in taking it to translate ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα μετάβασις, 'inference by similarity' – one of Philodemus' designations of the 'Similarity Method', on which see 18F–G. On this hypothesis, the text is often read as claiming that we infer the nature of the gods from the similarity of their images to them. What this interpretation misses is that as well as 'inference' μετάβασις can also designate a mode of *concept-formation*. In one Stoic text (39D 7) it is itself apparently a species of concept-formation, but Sextus (M. 1.40; see Mueller [652], 78), whose usage standardly reflects that current among the dogmatist schools, uses it as the generic name for such processes (the list of which perhaps originated with Epicurus; cf. 15F). These are all processes by which, starting from perceptually-based impressions, we form such concepts as Centaur, pygmy and giant. They are not processes of inference at all. That this is the sense of *transiō* here is virtually proved by the comparison of F 2–3. Thus we must take *similitudine* to constitute a distinct and prior stage. Both Cicero's phraseology and the comparison of G make it hard to doubt that the similarity in question is that of the images to each other (cf. 40N 1), not to the gods. Hence the reference is to the cinematographic effect of a series of similar images. This provides the primary impression of a happy human being, which by *transiō* we intensify into that of an everlasting and supremely blessed being.

54 *series* Brieger's emendation for *species* is hard to resist. As we would expect, and as G confirms, what 'flows' is the images, not their appearance. And in Cotta's summary of this passage at 1.105 his phrase *similium accessio* suggests the emended rather than the MS reading. The frequent occurrence of *species* in the preceding paragraphs could easily have influenced the corruption.

55 *ad deos* A merit of the interpretation adopted in vol. 1 is that it renders unnecessary Lambinus' frequently adopted emendation to *ad nos*.

57ff The return to *oratio recta* signals that the direct report of Epicurus has finished. The argument now added by Velleius appeals to what may be an authentic Epicurean principle, but puts it to desperately bad use. If accepted, it would wreck the argument for the mortality of the soul at 14H 1.

F Sextus Empiricus, M. 9.42–7

ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος τὸ ἦτον ἄπορον διὰ τοῦ μέζονος ἀπόρου διδάσκων ὁπιστάς ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πῶς νόησιν θεῶν ἔσχατον ἀνθρώποι πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἢ φύσιν δίδωσιν ἀφηρμῆς· τὴ δὲ εἰδῶλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπερφύη καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφὰς, καὶ καθόλου τοιαῦτα ὅποια βοῦλεται αὐτῷ ἀνοπλάττειν Δημόκριτος, παντελῶς ἐστὶν δυσσημῶντων. (1) τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἔνεστι λέγειν, οἰόμενον ὅτι κατὰ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους φαντασίας τῶν ἀνθρωπομόρφων εἰδῶλων ἐνοήθησαν θεοί· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τούτων νόησις ἐγένετο θεῶν ἢ ὑπερφύων ἀνθρώπων; καὶ καθόλου καὶ πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐκκειμένους δόξας ἐνέσται λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ ψιλὸν μέγεθος ἀνθρωποειδοῦς ζῶου νόησιν θεοῦ λαμβάνουσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ μακάριον εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προφερόμενον, ἅπερ οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς ἢ πῶς

ἐπενόηθη παρὰ τοῖς πρῶτον εἴνεον σπάσσει θεοῦ, οἱ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους αἰτιώμενοι φαντασίας καὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων εὐταξίαν. (2) οἱ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτό φασιν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς νοήσεως τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν γέγονεν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνοὺς ἰσθλαλλομένων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον θεωρου- 15 μένων, τὸ δὲ αἰδίων εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἀφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ παρήλθε κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν, ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ νόησιν ἔαχομεν Κύκλωπος, ὅς οὐκ ἐνῶκε

ἀνδρὶ γε σταφύλῳ, ἀλλὰ ῥίπῃ ὕληντι

20

ὑψηλὸν δρέων, ὅτε φαίνεται οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλων,

οὕτως ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμέ-
νον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους
ἄκρον ἐνόησαμεν θεόν. καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινα φαντασιουθέντες
ἀνθρώπων οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐπηύξησαν τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἀπειρον, προσσυνάψαντες 25
τῷ ἐνεστώτι καὶ τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς
ἐννοίαν ἡδίου παραγενόμενοι ἔφασαν καὶ αἰδίων εἶναι τὸν θεόν. (3) οἱ δὲ
τοιαῦτα λέγοντες πιθανῆς μὲν πρῶσταται δόξης, ἡρέμα δὲ εἰς τὸν δι'
ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτουσι τρόπον, ὅς ἐστιν ἀπορώτατος. ἵνα γὰρ πρῶτον
εὐδαιμόνα νοήσωμεν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ μετάβασιν τὸν θεόν, 30
ὀφείλομεν νοῆσαι τί ποτὲ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν νοεῖται ὁ
εὐδαιμών. ἀλλ' ἦν γε εὐδαιμονία κατ' αὐτοὺς δαιμονία τις καὶ θεία φύσις,
καὶ εὐδαιμών ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων. ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν
λάβωμεν τὴν περὶ ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονίαν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν
νόησιν θεοῦ καὶ δαίμονος, ἵνα δὲ τὸν θεὸν νοήσωμεν, πρότερον ἔχειν 35
ὀφείλομεν ἐννοίαν εὐδαιμόνος ἀνθρώπου. τοίνυν ἐκάτερον περιμένον τὴν
ἐκ θατέρου νόησιν ἀνεπισώστου γίνεται ἡμῖν.

Context: critique of theories of the origin of belief in god. The opinions of Democritus and Epicurus were first summarized at *ibid.* 19 and 24–35.

2. **τοιαῦτα** Democritus added that the images were hard to destroy, capable of speech, endowed with prophetic powers, and beneficent or maleficent (*ibid.* 19).

8. Thus criticism now takes in, as well as the Epicurean theory, those of Democritus and Aristotle (*ibid.* 19–27). But from 14 onwards the defence offered on behalf of this group seems exclusively Epicurean. Hence it uses the Hellenistic *μετάβασις* theory and the characteristic Epicurean phrase *συμπεπληρωμένον* . . . ἀγαθοῖς (cf. 21B 2), and while accounting for the ideas of god's happiness and imperishability it ignores the challenge (10–11) concerning a non-Epicurean attitude of god, namely power.

32–3. This etymology stems ultimately from Plato, *Time* 45c.

G Epicurus, RS 1, with scholion

τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρεχί, ὥστε οὔτε ὄργῃς οὔτε χίρῃσι σκιάχεται· ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τιναῖται· | ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοῦς, οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφέστωτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδέαν

ἐκ τῆς συνεχούς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποτετελεσ-
μέναι, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς.)

[illegible]

ἡ λόγῳ θεωρητός Cf. m below, and 11D 3, E 4. The expression is standardly used by Epicurus for entities not available to the senses but discoverable in thought. If our suggestion in vol. 1 is right, that the first group of gods mentioned here are human sages who have become ethical models for future generations, they will still fit this description because it will be *qua* thought-objects, not *qua* perceptible individuals, that they fulfil this function. κατ' ἀριθμὸν . . . κατὰ ὁμοσιδεῖαν For this distinction between numerical identity and formal identity, cf. Galen. *Met. med.* 10.135. Simplicius, *In Ar. De celo* 110.5ff.

4:5 ἀποτελεσμένων This verb has suffered from overinterpretation (e.g. 'perfected', Bailey). It is one of Epicurus' standard verbs for 'produce' in causal explanations. If the transmitted text is correct, it might be taken with ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, '... influx of similar images produced (and sent) to the same place ...'. This is not very convincing, and there is some merit in emending it to -αὖς with Kühn and understanding that the gods themselves are 'produced from the continuous influx ...'. Alternatively, one might read -ην and understand that it is the formal unity which is thus produced. Our translation in vol. 1 is designed to hedge our bets between these three possibilities. Nor much appears to turn on the choice.

3 ἀνθρωποειδής. Grammatically speaking this awkward afterthought could describe either all the gods or just the second group. Whatever the intention, there can be no doubt that all Epicurus' gods were anthropomorphic.

H Philodemus, *Pict.* 112.1-18 (including Usener 87)

καὶ πᾶσαν μ[ανίαν] Ἐ[πι]κυρου ἐμ[έ]ψατε τοῖς τῷ θεῷ ἐκ τῶν δυνά[με]ων αὐ[τοῦ] ῥησάν, ὡς
 κἀν τῷ | δωδεκάτῳ | Ἱερο[δ]ότῳ καὶ Δια[γ]όρῳ | καὶ Κριτία καλλ[ο]-
 λουσι | ἡμέψ[ε]ται φᾶς καὶ παρα[κ]όπτειν καὶ μ[α]νιᾶσθ[αι] καὶ βακ-
 χεύουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐκ[α]λλεῖ βουλιγμένῳ καὶ τράγικῳ δ[ι]μῶν παρέχειν ἡδ[ὲ]
 ἐνοχλεῖ κατ'ἐτοῖς | παρανομ[έ]νουν | τὰ πλὴν θεῶν ὁδομα[ν]τα ...

(καὶ πᾶσι | ἴκαν|ροσσην εἰρηπία | τ' ἐν κείνῃ | διαγύρου| βαυβελ· 2 : νάλλαςι
παρ||κόπτει· ὕστερ· | μαινέ||θαυ· ὑπερυτ· 3 : ἐκὰς ζεῖ· ὕστερ· 4 : βίη||ἀκουσ· αἱ
|δεδόμα||τα· ἡ θῆα)λ

Context: defence of Epicurus against the charge of impiety

Book XII of *On nature*, like Lucretius book 5, dealt with the origins of civilization. Epicurus' remark almost certainly occurred in the defence of his own account of the origin of religion against the rival accounts of the three named, who were held to have explained the gods as calculated human fictions. The point of imputing *insanity* to them is not obvious. We owe to D. Obbink the interesting suggestion that it is connected with a strategy for preserving the alleged universality of belief in gods (E 2): at *Pier* 109.17–20 (in Obbink's restoration) Philodemus claims that the gods are worshipped by all men ἐν αὐτῇ ἀποκαταστάσει τῆς φύσεως.

This is the earliest extant occurrence of the standard list of atheists, for which cf.

S.E., *M.* 9.33–4. It was widely alleged that Epicurus was really an atheist himself, and his repudiation of atheism just a façade to mollify the public; see the attributions of this view to numerous sources in Cicero, *ND* 1.85, 123, S.E., *M.* 9.58; Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.27.11, 15.5.12. Cf. also D.L. 2.97: Epicurus was said to have drawn heavily on *On the gods* by Theodorus the Atheist. Our interpretation of his theology can, we believe, satisfactorily explain both his vehement repudiation of this charge, and why he tended to attract it.

I P. Oxy 215, 13–24

τὴ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἔλεγον, | οὐκ εἶναι, μηδ' ὅταν γε | [ν]ῆ Δία οὕτως λέγεται
 πᾶσι | [λ]ι νὺν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων | "[δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πᾶσι | [τας οὐ]ς
 σέβ[ο]μαι | [κ]αὶ τοῦ[το]ις βο[ύ]λ[ο]μαι πάντα κα[τ]αθύνειν καὶ τοῦτοις
 | [ἀν]ατιθέναι." χαρίεστε | [ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ | [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων
 ἰδ[ω]ν | [τῶν] ἔστιν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ[δ]έ | [ταύτη] πω τὸ βέβαιον | [εὐ]σεβείας
 ὑπάρχει. αὐ[τῶν] | [δ'] ὡς ἀνθρώπου, μακαριώ[τε]ρα | [του] μὲν τι νόμιζε τὸ | [δ]ιείλ[η]-
 φέναι καλῶς ὁ τὸ | [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὐσι | [δια]γνηθῆναι δυνάμε[θα].
 καὶ | θ[α]ύμαζε ταύτην | [τῇ]ν δι[α]λήψιν καὶ σέβου | [ἡ]δε[ί]ται ταῦτο,
 ἔπε[ι]τα . . .

2 τυχόντων corr. c πολλῶν P οὐ]ς Obbink 4 χαρίεστε[ρο]ς corr. add. χαρίεσται | ν P 8
 ἀδ]ε[ί]ται Obbink

Restorations other than those noted are by Greenfield and Hunt. For text and discussion, see Obbink [291]

Context: fragmentary Epicurean theological treatise. The papyrus itself probably dates from the first century B.C.

J Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 135

ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις συγγενῇ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας, καὶ
 νυκτὸς πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐθ' ὑπάρ οὐτ' ἄναρ
 διαταραχθῆση, ζῆση δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθέν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῷον
 ζῶν ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.

J πρὸς (τε) Usener

Context: peroration of *Letter*.

K Plutarch, *Contra Ep. beat.* 1091B–C (Usener 419, part)

φεῦ τῆς μεγάλης ἡδονῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μακαριότητος ἣν καρποῦνται
 χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῇ μὴ κακοπαθεῖν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι μηδὲ ἀλγεῖν. ἀρ' οὐκ
 ἀξίον ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦτοις καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἢ λέγουσιν, ἀφθάρτους καὶ
 εὐαθροὺς ἀποκαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς καὶ δι' ὑπερβολᾶς καὶ ἀκρότητας ἀγαθῶν
 εἰς βρόμους καὶ ὀλοθυγμούς ἐκβαλεῖντες ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων
 περιφρονούντες ἐξευηρέκασιν μόνον θεῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα, τὸ μηθὲν ἔχειν
 κακόν.

Context: criticism of the Epicureans' negative characterization of good

3 ἀφθάρτους For Epicurus' own similar use of this epithet, cf. Usener 141 (1)

Colotes), ἀφθάρτος μοι περιπάτει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοῦ, and his *Letter to Mother*, 72.1.29–40 Arrighetti [119]. Cf. also J. Metrodorus fr. 37 = *SV* 10; and *SV* 36.

L Lucretius 5.146–55

illud item non est ut possis credere, sedis
esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis.
tenvis enim natura deum longeque remota
sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur,
quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum, 150
tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet.
tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum.
quare etiam sedes quoque nostris sedibus esse
dissimiles debent, tenues de corpore eorum;
quae tibi posterius largo sermone probabo. 155

Context: the world is not divine

Here and at 5.18–24 Lucretius effectively locates the gods in the μετακόσμια or *intermundia*. For a list of references to this doctrine, see the note on Cicero, *ND* 1.18 (13G 2) in Pease [329], to which add Philodemus, *De deis* iii, 8.31. As Bollack [123] rightly observes, in Epicurus' writings the term occurs only in a non-theological context (*Ep. Pyth.* 88–9).

154 **corpore** Here, as at D 76, Lucretius' naive reading of Epicurus' theology immediately puts him in conflict with the latter's technical doctrine that the gods do not have actual bodies (E 7). Significantly, the naive reading occurs only in Lucretius' poems, generally acknowledged to be original compositions, whereas the correct Epicurean account is found in A, from one of the main expository sections, in which he is certainly following a Greek Epicurean source.

m Actius 1.7.37 (Usener 355, part)

Ἐπικουρίως ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀσπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως. ὃ δ' αὐτοὺς ἄλλας τίτλους φύσιν κατὰ γένος ἀφθάρτους τάσδε, τὰ ἄτομα τὸ κενόν τὸ ἀπειραν τὰς ὁμοιότητας αὐταὶ δὲ λέγονται ὁμοιομερείαι καὶ στοιχεῖα.

1 τοὺς 103 πάντας τοὺς (A)HC

1–2 Cf. G.

2–3 If we identify τὸ ἀπειραν with τὸ πᾶν, then we have here the three imperishables listed at 14H 1, plus 'gods' and 'similarities'. On the interpretation adopted in vol. 1 it can be explained why these last two were excluded from the strict list in 14H but admitted on another occasion. Gods and similarities differ in being not discrete entities but types. Also, their 'imperishability' belongs primarily within the survival time of the human race (although the infinity of the universe could perhaps be held to guarantee the existence of human beings in other worlds and eras). On the theory in A 2, E 7 and G, similarities and gods are not identical, it is the imperishability of the former that grounds that of the latter. The stock of similar images never runs out.

3-4 **ὁμοιομέρεια καὶ στοιχεῖα** The meaning of *ὁμοιομέρεια* in Epicureanism is uncertain (cf. *Nat.* 29.27-7; 30.7.5, 12.5, 28.4). Here it might mean similarities of structure (as found among *εἶδηλα*, cf. E 7). The Epicurean *στοιχεῖα* are atoms (18C 2); these likewise offer infinitely many tokens of each type (12B 2).

24 Death

A Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 124-7

(1) συνέβηξε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει· στερήσεις δὲ ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. (2) ὁθεν γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θυγῆτον, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθείσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον. (3) οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινόν τῷ
5 κατελιφῶτι γνησίως τὸ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. (4) ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών, ἀλλ' ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλον. ὁ γὰρ παρὼν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ. (5) τὸ φρικτωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ παρέστιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τότε
10 ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἐστὶν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδὴ περ περὶ οὓς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἱ δ' οὐκέτι εἰσίν. (6) ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν θάνατον ὅτε μὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν φεύγουσιν, ὅτε δὲ ὡς ἀνάπαντι τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν (κακῶν αἰροῦνται. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν) οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται
15 τὸ ζῆν οὔτε δοξάζεται κακὸν εἶναι τι τὸ μὴ ζῆν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σιτίον οὐ τὸ πλεῖον πάντως ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἰρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται. (7) ὁ δὲ παραγγέλλων τὸν μὲν νέον καλῶς ζῆν, τὸν δὲ γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν, εὐήθης ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι μελέτην τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν
20 καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν. (8) πολὺ δὲ χεῖρων καὶ ὁ λέγων "καλὸν μὲν μὴ φύναι, φύντα δ'" ὅπως ὠκίστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι." εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεποιθὼς τοῦτο φησιν, πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν; ἐν ἐταίμῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἦν βεβουλευμένον αὐτῷ βεβαίως· εἰ δὲ μωκόμενος, μάταιος ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις.

4 *ἄπειρον* Aldebrandinus *ἄπειρον* could 14-15 suppl. Usener

Context: immediately following 23B. This sequence of topics, god followed by death, matches to the first part of the *tetrapharmakos* (25f) and RS 1 and 2: see vol. 1, 156-21-2. The quotation is from Theognis (425, 427 West).

B Epicurus, *SF* 31

πρὸς μὲν τὰλλα δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον αἰκοῦμαι.

for safety as a dominant goal of human activity, cf. 22C.

C Epicurus, RS 14-21

(1) [19] ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσῃν ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπεραυμένος, εἴαν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ. (2) [20] ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβεν τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεθήμεν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐφυγεν τὴν ἡδονὴν, οὐδὲ ἤνικα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὥς ἠλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν. (3) [21] ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδῶς οἶδεν ὥς εὐπάριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδοιαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδέν 10 προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

γ καὶ σὰρξ καὶ οὐδὲν διελίξαι ὁ προσεδεθήμεν F προσεδεθήμεν B; ante jP προσεδεθήθη <οὐ> μήν Usener προσεδεθήμεν| Müll. u <τὸ> Casaubon

D Diogenes Laertius 10 22 (Usener 138)

ἤδη δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέει τήνδε ἐπιστολήν· "τὴν μακαρίαν ἀγόντες καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί στραγγιγνικὰ τε παρηκολουθῆκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθῃ ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. αὐ 5 δὲ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παιδῶν Μητροδώρων."

Context: life of Epicurus.

The imperfects (and pluperfect) are of the 'epistolary' variety: the letter is censured to suit the time of reading, not the time of writing.

E Lucretius 3.830-911

- (1) nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, 830
quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur.
(2) et velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri,
ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis,
omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu
horrida contremuere sub alis aethenis oris, 835
ita dubioque fuere uicorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset tetraque manique,
sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animae
dissidium fuerit quibus e sumus uniter apti,
scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus cum, 840
accidere omnino poterit sensumque inuovere,
non si terra mari miscetur et mare caelo.
(3) est iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam

distractast animi natura animaeque potestas, nil tamen est ad nos qui compectu coniugioque corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti.	845
(4) nec, si materrem nostram collegerint aetas post obitum rursusque redegerit ut sita nunc est atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.	850
et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante qui fuimus, <nil> iam de illis nos adficiet angor. nam cum respicias immensi temporis omne praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai	855
multumodis quam sint, facile hoc accredere possis, semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse.	[865]
nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente;	[858]
inter enim iectast vitae pausa vageque	860 [859]
decerrant passim motus ab sensibus omnes.	[860]
(5) debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst,	[861]
ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, cui male possit accidere, id quantum mors eximit, esseque prohet	[862]
illum cui possint inconvoluta conciliari,	[863]
scire licet nobis nil esse in morte timendum nec miserum fieri qui non est posse neque hilum differre an nullo fuerit iam tempore natus, mortalem vitam mors cum immortalis ademit.	865 [864]
(6) proinde ubi se videas hominem indignariet ipsum,	870
post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto aut flammis interficiat malisve ferarum, scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse caetum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum.	875
non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde, nec radicatus e vita se tollit et eicit, sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse. vivid enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum, corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque,	880
ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illum nec remouet satis a protecto corpore et illum se fingit sensuque suo contaminat adians. hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se	885
qui possit vivid sibi se lugere peremptum	

stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere. nam si in morte maluim malis morsuque ferarum tractari, non inuenio qui non sit acetbum ignibus impositum calidis torrescere flammis aut in melle situm suffocari atque rigere frigore, cum summo gelidi cubar aequore saxa, urgetive superbie obtritum pondere terrae. (7) "iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati praenipere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque praesidium. misero misere" aiunt "omnia ademit una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae." illud in his rebus non addunt "nec tibi earum iam desiderium rerum super insidet una." quod bene si videant animo dicusque sequantur, dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque. (8) "tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi quod superest cunctis privati' doloribus aegris. at nos horrifico cinerum te prope busto insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet." illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem. cur quisquam aeterno possit tabescere luctu.	890 895 900 905 910
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Context: immediately following 14H, and opening Lucretius' famous diatribe against the fear of death.

847-67 For a similar argument, cf. *ibid.* 670-8.

F Lucretius 3.966-1023

(1) nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra materies opus est ut crescant postera saecula; quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur; nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque. sic aliud ex alio numquam desistet oriri vitaeque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri temporis exponit post mortem densque nostram. numquid tibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur quicquam, non omni somno securus exeat?	970 975
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- (2) atque ea nimirum quaecumque Acherunte profundo
 prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis.
 nec miser impendens magnum timet aere saxum 980
 Tantalus, ut famas, cassa formidine torpens;
 sed magis in vita divum metus urget inanis
 mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors.
- (3) nec Tityon volucres ineunt Acherunte iacentem
 nec quod sub magno scrutentur pectore quicquam 985
 perpetuam aetatem possunt reperire profecto.
 quamlibet immani propectu corporis exstet,
 qui non sola novem dispessis iugera membris
 obtineat, sed qui terrar totius orbem,
 non tamen aeternum poterit perferre dolorem 990
 nec praebere cibum proprio de corpore semper.
 sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem
 quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor
 aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae.
- (4) Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est 995
 qui petere a populo fascis saevasque securis
 imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit.
 nam petere imperium quod inanest nec datur unquam,
 atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem,
 hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 1000
 saxum quod tamen e summo iam vertice rursum
 volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi.
- (5) deinde animi ingrata naturam pascere semper
 atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam,
 quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 1005
 cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores,
 nec tamen explentur vitai fructibus unquam.
 hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo florente puellas
 quod memorant laticem percutsum congerere in vas,
 quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur. 1010
- (6) Cerberus et Furiar iam vero et lucis egestas,
 Tartarus horridos eructans faucibus aestus,
 qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto.
 sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis
 est insignibus insignis, scelerisque luella. 1015
 carcer et horribilis de saxo iactu' deorsum,
 verbera carnifices robur pax lammina caedae:
 quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis
 praemetuens adhibet simulcos tonetque flagellis,
 nec videri interea qui terminus esse malorum 1020

possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis
 atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant.
 hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita.

Context: shortly after E

G Lucretius 3.1087-94

nec prorsum vitam ducendo demimus hilum
 tempore de mortis nec delibare valemus,
 quo minus esse diu possimus forte perempti.
 proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecula;
 mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit,
 nec minus ille diu iam non erit, ex hodierno
 lumine qui finem vitae fecit, et ille,
 mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante.

Context: the close of Lucretius' diatribe against the fear of death.

25 Philosophy

A Epicurus, Ep. Men. 122

(1) μήτε νέος τις ὦν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρον ὑπάρχων κυψύεται
 φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδεὶς ἔστιν οὔτε ἄριωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ
 ψυχὴν ὑγιαίνειν. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχει ὥραν ἢ
 παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὁμοίως ἔστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ
 παρῆναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. (2) ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέω καὶ
 γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν
 γεγονότων, τῷ δὲ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ἢ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν
 μελλόντων· (3) μελεταί· οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιῶντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴπερ
 παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπώσεως δὲ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ
 ταύτην ἔχειν. ἃ δέ σοι συνεχῶς παρήγγιλλον, ταῦτα καὶ πράττε καὶ μελέτα, στοιχεῖα
 τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταύτ' εἶναι διαλαμβάνων.

Context: general protreptic prefaced to the doctrinal main body of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, which continues with 23B.

B Epicurus, RS 11-13

(1) [11] εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑψηφαί ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ
 θανάτου, μὴ ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἢ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὄρους τῶν
 ἀληθδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδόμεθα φυσιολογίας. (2) [12]
 οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ
 σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ
 ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκραιούς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν. (3) [13] οὐθὲν

ὀφελος ἦν τῇ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἀνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

2 τε τὸ μὴ καταθεῖν Lachetier τετὸλόμητο καὶ codd 3 ὑποπτεύουσι τι Usener: ὑποπτεύμενοι τε Lind. ὑποπτεύουσι SV 40

C Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 31 (Usener 221)

κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὃς οὐ μὴδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος (εἰ) μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων θεραπεύει, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.

2 (εἰ) Nauck 3 θεραπεύει Mar. -ειν cod.

Context: culmination of a long string of ethical quotations from Epicurus.

For the Epicurean medical metaphor, cf. Gigante [271], Nussbaum [270]

D Epicurus, SV 29, 54

(1) [29] παρησία γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολόγῳ χρησιμδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ βουλοίμην, κἄν μὴδεὶς μέλλῃ συνήσειν, ἢ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις καρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον. (2) [54] οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' οὕτως φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ἡγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡγιαίνειν.

1 χρησιμδεῖν Usener χρησάμην δεῖ cod.

E Epicurus, SV 45

οὐ κόμπου οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικούς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ' ἀσθάρους καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονούντας.

2 3 ἀλλ' ἀσθάρους Leisipold: ἀλλὰ σθάρους cod

F Athenaeus 388A (Usener 117)

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν μνησθήσομαι τοῦ φιλαλθεστάτου Ἐπικούρου· ὅστις ἐγκυκλίῳ παιδείᾳ ἀμύητος ὢν ἐμσκήριζε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν παρερχομένους, τιμύτας φωνὰς προϊέμενος. "μακάριζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησαι."

1 παιδείας Schweighäuser αἰτίας codd

Context: a catalogue of famous courtesans. Epicurus is here being introduced as an unsophisticated type (the portrait continues directly with the fragment of Timon also cited at 38), in preparation for a scurrilous reference to his courtesan mistress Leontion.

3 οὗτος 'So and so': Athenaeus has forgotten the name, but we supply it in the vol. 1 translation, thanks to Plutarch, *Contra Ep.* 1094b, who summarizes the

same letter, with the information that it was addressed to one Apelles. The same summary also confirms the correction παιδείας for αἰτίας.

G Diogenes Laertius 10.6 (Usener 163, part)

ἐν τε τῇ πρὸς Πυθακλέα ἐπιστολῇ γράφειν: "παιδεῖαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τᾷκάτιον ὑράμενος."

1 παιδεῖαν Ff, uet.; παιδῶν Bf, uet. 1P φεύγε τᾷκάτιον ὑράμενος Usener 163. 1P uet. (Diogenes Laertius 10.6). Contra Ep. beai (10.5B) φεύγετε κατιδιωραμεν B. φεύγετε κατιδιωραμεν c17c

H Plutarch, *Contra Ep. beai* 10.5B–C (including Usener 20)

καίτοι ἅλλα μὲν ὥς ἡμῖν ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ εἴρηται μουσικὴν δὲ ὅσας ἡδονὰς καὶ χάριτας οἷος φέρουσιν ὁπιστρέφοντες καὶ φεύγουσιν καὶ βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν τις ἐκλάθοιτο, δι' ἀπορίαν ὧν Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, φιλοθέωρον μὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπυρραῖς καὶ χαίροντα παρ' ὄντινόν τι ἕτερον ἀκροάμεσι καὶ θεάμασι Διονυσιακοῖς, προβλήμασι δὲ μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασι οὐδὲ 5 παρὰ πύτον διδοὺς χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλείων παλαιῶν στρατηγικὰ δεγνήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βιωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς συμπαθείς ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ παιητικῶν προβλημάτων περιωραμένους.

Context: attack on the alleged Epicurean preference of sordid to cultural pleasures (including, shortly before, examples of F and G).

I Epicurus, *SI* 27, 41

(1) [27] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις τελειωθείσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνόν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μύθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις. (2) [41] γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ 5 μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὁρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφίεντας.

1 μάθησιν Winkler, -as uet. 4 δεῖ Epicurus δεῖν uet. 5 λήγειν Usener λήγειν uet. ὁρθῆς Harpocration ὁρθῆς uet.

J Philodemus, *Advertus sophistas* 4.7–14

καὶ διὰ | π[ρ]οτὸς ἔστω | κ[αὶ] π[ρ]οταχῇ | παρὰ π[ρ]ομνο[ν] | ἢ τετραφάρμακος·
"ἄφρονον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ]ποπτον ὁ θάνατος· καὶ | τὰ γὰρ θὸν μὲν εὐκτητ[ον], | τὸ
δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ] | τέρητον."

1 ὁ[τα] π[ρ]οτὸς Compositi ἔστω Vossius παρὰ π[ρ]ομνο[ν] Compositi παρὰ π[ρ]ομνο[ν] 1 παρὰ π[ρ]ομνο[ν] 1 παρὰ π[ρ]ομνο[ν] 1
[For sig. a, cf. note on 20B]

Context: uncertain.

For text and fuller apparatus, see Gigante [147], 260 n.

K Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.168–9 (Usener 219)

ἐπαγγέλλονται γάρ τέχνην τινὰ περὶ τὸν βίον παραδίδειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ἐπίκουρος
μὲν ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν
εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιούσαν.

Context: 'Is there an art of life?'

1 ἐπαγγέλλονται *Sc. οἱ δογματικοί.*

2 διαλογισμοῖς For the term, cf. Sedley [126], 13, and 24D 5.

26 The philosophical curriculum

A Actius I prooem. 2 (SVF 2.35)

οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ ἔφαπαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἀσκήσιν ἐπιτηδείαν τέχνην· ἐπιτηδεῖον δὲ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτην τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικὴν· δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερὴς ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἧς τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· καὶ φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατασχολημένον περὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, λογικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν.

2 ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης ABC. *inutilis ordinae vulgo*

1 2 For this definition of wisdom, cf. G 5, which adds 'knowledge of causes', with discussion by Kretzler [478], 130–1; Long [429], 308–10, Kald [381], 275.

2 ἀσκήσιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης The expression is awkward. We interpret ἐπιτηδεῖον as shorthand for περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτηδείου. It is not clear to us why this adjective rather than the familiar συμφέρον or ὠφέλιμον is used. On ἀσκήσις, see especially Epictetus, *Disc.* 3.12.

3 μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτην By 'single' and 'highest', as γενικωτάτας shows, the top of a division of virtue is meant (see vol. 1, 103), with physics, ethics, and logic the three most comprehensive species.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.39–41

(1) τριμερὴ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ Περί λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ α' Περί λόγου καὶ ἐν τῷ α' τῶν Φυσικῶν . . . καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος καὶ Ησσειδώνιος. (2) ταῦτα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὁ μὲν Ἀπολλόδορος τόπους καλεῖ, ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος καὶ Εὐδρόμος εἶδη, ἄλλοι γένη. (3) εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῶν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὅσταις μὲν καὶ νευροῖς τὸ λογικὸν προσμοιοῦντες, τοῖς δὲ σαρκωδεστέροις τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ πάλιν ψῶ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὸ λογικόν, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἠθικόν, τὰ δ' ἐσωτάτω τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ ἀγρῶ παμφόρῳ τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμόν τὸ λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἢ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν. ἡ πόλει καλῶς τετεχεισμένη καὶ κατὰ λόγον διοικουμένη. (4) καὶ οὐθὲν μέρος τοῦ ἐτέρου προκεκρίσθαι,

καθὰ τινες αὐτῶν φασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι αὐτά. καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν μικτὴν
 ἐποιοῦν. ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λόγικον τάττουσι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ
 φυσικόν, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἠθικόν· ὧν ἐστὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ *Περὶ λόγου* καὶ 15
Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ Εὐδρόμος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἱππολεμαεὺς
Διογένης ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρχεται, ὁ δ' Ἀπολλόδιωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά,
Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ *Πασειδώνιος* ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχονται. . . ὁ δὲ
Κλεάνθης ἐξ ἑτέρων φησὶ, διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν,
 φυσικόν, θεολογικόν. ἄλλοι δ' οὐ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα μέρη φασίν, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς 20
 τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ *Ταρσεύς*.

1 φασιν FR, φησὶν B 3 τῷ² F, τῇ BP 5 δὲ¹ om F 8 ἐκτός P (usc.). ἔξω Γ: om. BP 10
 <οὐ> τὰ μὲν Attm 12 προκεκρίσθαι codd. ἀποκεκρίσθαι Cohen 13 ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι P
 ἀνημερίχθαι BF 21 τῆς C: om. cell.

Context: the opening of Diogenes' doxography of Stoicism.

6 12 For another account of these omiles, cf. S.E., *M.* 7.17 19.

12 προκεκρίσθαι On the retention of the MSS reading, see Kidd [381], 274–5.

C Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1035A (SVF 2.42, part)

τὰ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ *Περὶ βίων* ἔχοντα κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως: “πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι
 κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημμένα τρία γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου
 θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικά τὰ δ' ἠθικά τὰ δὲ φυσικά· εἴτα τούτων
 δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικά· δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικά· τρίτα δὲ τὰ
 φυσικά· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ 5
 τελετάς ἡγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις.”

4 δεῖν τάττεσθαι Xén/B δεῖν προτάττεσθαι A. δεῖ προτάττεσθαι ABγE ὁ τούτου χρ. τούτων cell.

Context: Chrysippus' inconsistency in specifying the curriculum of C but regularly departing from this order in his writings.

2 On the origins of the tripartite division of philosophy, cf. Cherniss [326] ad loc.

6 τελετάς Chrysippus sought to derive τελεταί from τελευταῖος; cf. SVF 2.1008. For discussion of his conception of theology, see Mansfeld [496], 134–6.

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.19 (Posidonius fr. 88, part)

ὁ δὲ *Πασειδώνιος*, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστά ἐστιν
 ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν φυτῶν
 κεχώρισται, ζῶν μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἡξίαν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἵματι μὲν καὶ
 σαρξὶ τὸ φυσικόν, ὁστέοις δὲ καὶ κούροις τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν.

Context: discussion of the divisions of philosophy. On Posidonius' preference for the ζῶον image, cf. Kidd [381], 273–5.

E Ammonius, *In Ar. An. pr.* 8.20–2; 9.1–2 (SVF 2.49, part)

οἱ μὲν *Στωικοὶ* τὴν λογικὴν οὐ μόνον ὄργανον οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι καλεῖσθαι

φιλοσοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐδέ μόνιον τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ μέρος . . . φασιν ὅτι αὐτὴ ἡ φιλοσοφία τὴν λογικὴν ἀπαγεννᾷ καὶ ταύτῃ μέρος ἂν εἴη αὐτῆς.

Context: discussion of those who do not make logic an *ὄργανον*

2 **μόριον=μέρος** Cf. Ammonius, *ibid.* 8.34–5 (not in *SVF*): μέρος δὲ μορίον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὸ μέρος μέγα μέρος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μόριον μέρος ἐστίν καὶ τοῦ μέρους μέρος· οἷον μέρος μὲν ἐστὶν φιλοσοφίας τὸ θεωρητικόν, μόριον δὲ τὸ θεολογικόν. Philoponus, in his treatment of the same point, *In Ar. An. pr.* 6.19–7.9 (not in *SVF*), says that *μόριον* refers to 'that which shares the matter and goal of that of which it is a *μόριον*', 6.31–2. As reported by him, the Stoics inferred that logic is a *μέρος* of philosophy by eliminating the possibilities of its being a *μόριον* of physics or ethics.

F Seneca, *Ep.* 88.25–8 (Posidonius fr. 90, part)

(1) multa adiuvant nos nec ideo partes nostri sunt; immo si partes essent, non adiuverant, eibus adiutorium corporis nec tamen pars est. aliquid nobis praestat geometria ministerium: sic philosophiae necessaria est quomodo ipsi faber, sed nec hic geometriae pars est nec illa philosophiae. (2) praeterea 5 utraque fines suos habet; sapiens enim causas naturalium et quaerit et novit, quorum numeros mensurasque geometres persequitur et supputat. qua ratione consent caelestia, quae illis sit vis quaeve natura sapiens scit: cursus et recursus et quasdam observationes per quas descendunt et adlevantur ac speciem interdum stantium praebent, cum caelestibus stare non liceat, colligit mathematicus. quae causa in speculo imagines exprimat sciet sapiens: illud tibi geometres 10 potest dicere, quantum abesse debeat corpus ab imagine et qualis forma speculi quales imagines reddat. (3) magnum esse solem philosophus probabit, quantus sit mathematicus, qui usu quodam et exercitatione procedit. sed ut procedat, impetranda illi quaedam principia sunt; non est autem ars sui iuris cui precarium fundamentum est. philosophia nil ab alio petit, totum opus a solo excitat: mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficialia est, in alieno aedificat; accipit 15 prima, quorum beneficio ad ulteriora perveniat.

1 *ante*: Madvig, *maior* vsd2.

3 *post*: *ut* vsd2.

8 *observationes*: Benzet; *observationes* vsd2.

9

stantium: P.; *stantium* QVb.

Context: the difference between philosophy and *liberales artes* – geometry, medicine etc.

Seneca in our extract is answering an anonymous objection that the *liberales artes*, because they assist philosophy, should be included as one of its parts. Posidonius has already been named in section 21 of the same letter, and Kidd [382], 8–10, gives strong reasons for taking him to be Seneca's source in **F**.

G Seneca, *Ep.* 89.4–5

primum itaque, si [ut] videtur tibi, dicam inter sapientiam et philosophiam quid intersit. sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae; philosophia sapientiae amor est et affectatio: haec eo tendit quo illa pervenit . . . sapien-

iam quidam ita finierunt ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam; quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas.

5

1 ut om. Φ 2 *ostendit* Cornelissen *ostendit* codd 3 *quidam* B: om. Φ ⁶

Context: the scope and division of philosophy

2 **perfectum** Cf. 63D.

4-5 See note on A 1-2.

H Stobaeus, 2.67.5-12 (SVF 3.294)

φιλομουσίαν δὲ καὶ φιλογραμματίαν καὶ φιλεπείαν καὶ φιλοκυνηγίαν καὶ καθάλου καὶ κατ' ἐγκυκλίους λεγόμενας τέχνας ἐπιτηδεύματα μὲν καλοῦσιν, ἐπιστήμης δ' οὐκ ἐν ταῖς σπουδαίαις ἔχει ταῦτα καταλείπουσι, καὶ ἀκολουθῶς μόνον τὸν σοφὸν φιλόμουσον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ φιλογράμματος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τό τε ἐπιτηδεύμα τοῦτον ὑπογράφουσι τὸν τρόπον· ὁδὸν διὰ τέχνης ἢ μέρους ἀγούσαν ἐπὶ <τὰ> κατ' ἀρετῇν.

5

1 καὶ κατ' codd. πάσης τῆς (Lauter: καὶ τῆς Usener 3 <τε> post ἐν Heeren 4 ἢ μέρους Usener: ἡμέρου codd (τὰ) Wachsmuth

Context: doxography of Stoic ethics.

2 **καὶ κατ'** The MSS reading should be retained: φιλομουσία etc. are called ἐπιτηδεύματα and not ἐπιστήμαι, whether they are thought of quite generally, or treated specifically as items of the standard curriculum (ἐγκυκλίους τέχνας). Early Stoics (cf. 67B 2, SVF 1.349-50) had insisted on the uselessness of the standard curriculum, at least when detached from philosophy. The later strategy, as set out here, was to make the wise man the only proper practitioner of this and other 'pursuits'; cf. also SVF 3.73B-40.

ONTOLOGY

27 Existence and subsistence

A Seneca, Ep. 58.13-15 (SVF 2.332, part)

Stoici volunt superponere huic etiam aliud genus magis principale . . . primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur "quid"; quare videatur subiciam. in rerum, inquit, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt. et haec autem quae non sunt rerum natura complectitur, quae animo succurrunt, tamquam Centaursi, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falso cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam.

5

Context: a basic lesson in metaphysics, primarily Platonist.

1-2 The apparent disagreement among the Stoics as to whether 'something' or 'existent' (referred to by *huit*, 1) constitutes the highest genus (cf. 30C 4) is mirrored in Sextus' vacillation on the point. At PH 2.86-7 he makes it 'something' but in the corresponding argument at M. # 32H¹ it is 'existent'.

5 The epistemological status of these mythical creatures is that of figments, φαντάσματα: see 39A B.

6 *imaginem . . . substantiam* The Greek original may be ἐμφασις . . . ἐπόστασις (cf. ps.-Aristotle, *De mundo* 4, 305a28ff.; ps.-Plutarch, *Plac.* 894B), the latter standardly being used to designate corporeal existence. If so, Seneca is not here following the restricted Stoic use of ὑφίστασθαι (see vol. 1, 164). Cf. id. *NQ* 1.15.6

B Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 301.19–25 (S1F 2.329)

οὕτω δεικνύουσιν ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τί οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς γένος τοῦ οὗτος τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τί, ὁῖον ὅτι καὶ ὄν· εἰ δὲ ὄν, τὸν τοῦ οὗτος ἀναδέχαιο ἂν λόγον. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι νομισθεῖσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον λέγεσθαι διαφεύγουσιν ἂν τὸ ἡγορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τί γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φαῖναι εἶναι, κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἀσωμάτων.

Context: commentary on *Top.* 1v 1, 121a10. With regard to the principle that a species admits the definition of its genus but not vice versa, Alexander observes that there can be no higher genus to which ὄν or ἐν belongs.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 1.17 (SVF 2.330)

καὶ μὴν εἰ διδάσκεται τί, ἤτοι διὰ τῶν οὐτινῶν διδασχθήσεται ἢ διὰ τῶν τινῶν. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τῶν οὐτινῶν οὐχ οἶόν τε διδασχθῆναι· ἀνιπτόστατα γὰρ ἔστι τῇ διανοίᾳ ταῦτα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς.

Context: 'Can anything be taught?'

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.218 (SVF 2.331, part)

ὥσθ' οὗτοι μὲν πῶμα ποιοῦσι τὸν χρόνον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς φιλόσοφοι ἀσώματον αὐτὸν ᾤθησαν ὑπάρχειν· τῶν γὰρ τινῶν φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἶδη καταριθμοῦνται ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον. ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ ὁ χρόνος γίνεται, ὅτι πρὸς τῷ ἀσώματι ὑπολαμβάνει τὸν χρόνον, ἔτι καὶ καθ' αὐτό τι νοούμενον πρᾶγμα δοξάζουσι τοῦτον.

Context: a brief doxography of theories of time. The Stoic theory is presented here and refuted at *ibid.* 234–7; cf. also 51F with note.

1 οὗτοι: Aenesidemus and Heraclitus

3–4 For the same list, cf. Plutarch, *Col.* 1116B.

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.409–10 (SVF 2.85, part)

(1) ὥσπερ γὰρ, φασίν, ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁπλομάχος ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενος τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ρυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἄπωθεν ἐστὼς καὶ πῶς κινούμενος ἐν ρυθμῷ παρέχει ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς μίμησιν, (2) οὕτω καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἕνα μὲν οἰοεὶ φαύοντα καὶ θιγγάνοντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν,

ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινῶς τὸ σῶμα, ἐνία δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχει φύσιν, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς φαντασιουμένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὁποῖά ἐστι τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες πιθανῶ μὲν χρῶνται παραδείγματι, οὐ συνήγουσι δὲ τὸ προκείμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὀπλομάχος εἰσὶ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἰδύνατο φαντασίαν ἐμπικρεῖν τῷ παιδί· ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἀσώματος καθιστήσκει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐζητεῖτο εἰ δύναται φανταστικῶς τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. 10

Context: argument against the notion of demonstration (on which see 36B; 42), on the ground that, being an incorporeal λεκτόν, it cannot act upon us (cf. 45), and hence cannot produce a cognitive impression (cf. 40). The portion quoted gives the Stoic reply (1–8), followed by Sextus' very reasonable rejoinder.

F Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 66,32–67,2 (SVF 2.369, part)

αἱ δέ γε Στωικοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἀξιούσιν τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τινα ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὑπὲρπλαγμένα παραλαμβάνουσιν. ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα, εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιά καὶ πῶς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα.

Context: comparison of the tenfold division of genera in Aristotle's *Categories* with those of other philosophers. The word *γένη* is thus dictated by context, and is not strong evidence for a specifically Stoic usage of the term.

It is also unlikely that the Stoic theory was evolved with Aristotle's *Categories* in mind. There is no sign that this work was even generally known until the rediscovery of Aristotle's school treatises in the first century B.C. There then quickly followed a spate of commentaries and critiques, including one by the Stoic Athenodorus, who did not treat it as a rival to the Stoic theory, but, interpreting it as an exercise in linguistic analysis, argued that ten divisions were *too few* for the purpose (Simplicius, *ibid.* 18,26ff., 62,24–7, 128,5–8).

Plotinus' long discussion of the four Stoic genera in *Enn.* 6.1.25–30 is excluded from the testimonies in 27–9. He certainly knew their names (SVF 2.371), but it is hard to feel that his criticisms relied on much more than intelligent guesswork.

G Galen, *Method. med.* 10.155,1–8 (SVF 2.322, part)

τὴν γὰρ μικρολογίαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἣν ἐκομφεύσαντό τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων . . . παραιτοῦμαι λέγειν τὰ νῦν . . . λέγειν δὲ μικρολογίαν, ἐν ᾗ διαιροῦνται κατὰ γένη τὸ τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ὕφεστός.

Context: refutation of the suggestion that disease does not really 'exist'. Galen is almost certainly referring to Stoic doctrine, but his target cannot itself be Stoic: no Stoic would deny that disease 'exists'. His remark is ostensibly made by way of justification for a switch on his own part from εἶναι (154,12) to ὑπάρχειν (155,1). This makes it less certain that he is referring to the Stoic distinction *ἡμεῖς τε ὄν* and ὕφεστός rather than to distinctions within either class.

28 The first and second genera

A Plutarch, *Comm. noi.* 1083A 1084A

(1) ὁ τοῖνυν περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρχαῖος· ἡρώτηται γάρ, ὡς φησι Χρυσίππος, ὑπ' Ἐπιχάρμου· τῶν δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ οἰομένων μὴ πάνυ ῥάδιον μὴδ' αὐτόθεν ἔτοιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀπορίαν πολλὰ κατητιᾶσθαι (οὗτοι καὶ) κατεβόησαν ὡς τὰς προλήψεις ἀναιρουμένων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας (φιλοσοφούντων· αὐτοὶ δ' οὐ μόνον οὐδὲ τὰς ἐννοίας) φιλάττουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰσθησιν προσδιαστρέφουσιν. (2) ὁ μὲν γάρ λόγος ἀπλούς ἐστι καὶ τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι· τὰς ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ρεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν μεθιείσας τὰ δὲ ποθεν ἐπιόντα προυδεχομένας, οἷς δὲ πρόσσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς ἢ πλήθεσι ταῦτά μὴ διαμένειν ἀλλ' ἕτερα γίνεσθαι, ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις (καὶ ἀφόδοις) ἐξῆλλαγῃ τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης· αὐξήσεις δὲ καὶ φθίσεις οὐ κατὰ δίκην ὑπὸ συνηθείας ἐκνευκῆσθαι τὰς μεταβολῆς ταύτης λέγεσθαι, γενέσεις [δὲ] καὶ φθοράς μᾶλλον αὐτὰς ὀνομάζεσθαι προσήκον· ὅτι τοῦ καθεστῶτος εἰς ἔτερον ἐκβιβάζουσιν τὸ δ' αὖξεσθαι καὶ τὸ μειοῦσθαι πάθῃ σώματος ἐστὶν ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαμένουτος. (3) οὕτω δὲ πως τοῦτων λεγομένων καὶ τιθεμένων, τί ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ πρόδικοι τῆς ἐναργείας οὗτοι καὶ κανόνες τῶν ἐννοιῶν· ἕκαστον ἡμῶν δίδυμοι εἶναι καὶ διφυῆ καὶ διττόν· οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς Μολιουίδας οἰοῦνται, τοῖς μὲν ἡνωμένους μέρεσι τοῖς δ' ἀποκρινομένους, ἀλλὰ δύο σώματα ταῦτόν ἔχοντα χρῶμα, ταῦτόν δὲ σχῆμα, ταῦτόν δὲ βάρος καὶ τόπον (τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμως δὲ διπλὴ καίπερ) ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ὀρώμενα πρότερον· (4) ἀλλ' οὗτοι μόνον εἶδον τὴν σύνθεσιν ταύτην καὶ διπλὴν καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν, ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὰ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ (ιδίως ποιός), καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ρεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ' αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον μήτ' ὅλως οἶόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τάναντία θατέρω, συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συντηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον αἰφασθαι· καίτοι λέγεται μὲν ὁ Λυγκεῖς ἔκείνος διὰ πέτρας καὶ διὰ δρυὸς ὄραν, ἑώρα δὲ τις ἀπο σκοπῆς ἐν Σικελίᾳ καθεζόμενος τὰς Καρχηδονίων ἐκ τοῦ λήμενος ναὸς ἐκπελοῖσας, ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ἀπεχούσας δρόμον· οἱ δὲ περὶ Καλλικράτη καὶ Μυρμηκίδην λέγονται δημιουργεῖν ἄρματα μυίας πταροῖς καλυπτόμενα καὶ διατορεύειν ἐν ἀησιόμῃ γράμμασιν ἔπη τῶν Ὀμήρου (5) ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐν ἡμῶν ἑτερότητα καὶ (δια)φορὰν οὐδεὶς διεῖλεν οὐδὲ διέστησεν, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἡσθόμεθα διττοὶ γεγονότες καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰεὶ ρέοντες μέρει τῷ δ' ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι τελευτῆς οἱ αὐτοὶ διαμένοντες. (6) ἀπλούστερον δὲ ποιοῦμαι τὸν λόγον· ἐπεὶ τέσσαρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέσσαρ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο πρὸς τὴν ἀποτίμωσιν. (7) εἴ γε τοῦ μὲν Πενθέως ἀκούοντες ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ λέγοντος ὡς ἑδύο μὲν ἡλίους ὄρᾳ, διττὰς δὲ Θῆβας· οὐχ ὄρᾳ αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ παρορᾷν λέγοντες, ἐκτρεπόμενον καὶ παρακινεῖν τοῖς λογισμοῖς· τούτους δ' οὐ μίαν οὐλίαν,

ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα καὶ δένδρα πάντα καὶ σκεύη καὶ ὄργανα 40
καὶ ἱμάτια διττά καὶ διφυῆ τιθεμένους οὐ χαίρειν ἑώμεν, ὥς παρανοεῖν
ἡμᾶς μάλλον ἢ νοεῖν ἀναγκάζοντας, (κ) ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἴσως αὐτοῖς
συγγνωστὰ πλάττουσιν ἑτέρας φύσεις ὑποκειμένων· ἄλλη γὰρ οὐδεμία
φαίνεται μηχανὴ φιλοτιμουμένοις σῶσαι καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰς αὐξήσεις.

1 4 suppl. Pohlenz 5 suppl. Bernardakis 8 τὰ μὲν . τὰ δὲ Wyttenbach τὰς μὲν . τὰς δὲ
codd 10 suppl. Heitsch 14 ἐκβαλῶσιν Wyttenbach ἐκβιάζουσι codd 16 ἐπαργίας
Isonikos ἐπαργίας codd 18 ὁῦνται τοῖς μὲν Pohlenz αἰῶμενοι codd 20 suppl. Cher-
niss 23 (ὡς ποιεῖς) Sedley (cf. C 2 3); ποιότης Wyttenbach 32 suppl. Wyttenbach

For Epicharmus' version of the Growing Argument (αὐξανόμενος λόγος), see 23 B 2 DK. For its survival into Pyrrhonic scepticism, cf. S.E., *PH* 3.82–4. For more recent versions, cf. J. Locke, *An essay concerning human understanding* 2.27.3; D. Hume, *A treatise of human nature* 1.4.6. The title varies in its grammatical form: cf. A 1 and B 1. 'Growing Argument' is found in Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 559b, and *Vita Thesi* 23, and like many puzzle titles (cf. vol. 1, 229) must have a deliberate double meaning: an argument about a growing man, which itself grows, hydra-like, by constantly generating new individuals.

21 7 Cherniss ad loc. aptly compares Aristotle, *GC* 1.5, 321b22–4, on which see Anscombe [403]. Note, however, that Aristotle's 'measure' (ibid. 24 5) is an analogue for form, not matter as in the Growing Argument (already in Epicharmus, and cf. A 2, D 5). This discrepancy contributes to the impression that Epicharmus did not directly influence Aristotle's discussion.

B Ἀποσ., in *Plat. Theaet.* 70.5: 26

τὸν δὲ | [περὶ] τοῦ αὐξανόμενου | [λ]όγον ἐκείνησιν | [μ]ὲν πρῶτος *Πυθα-*
γόρας, ἐκείνησιν | [δὲ] καὶ *Πλάτων*, ὥς ἐν | [τοῖς] εἰς τὸ *Συμπόσιον* | [ύ-
πε]μνήσαμεν· ἐπὶ [χει]ροῦσι δὲ εἰς αὐτὸ | [καί] οἱ ἐξ *Ἀκαδημείας*, |
μ[α]ρτυρόμενοι μὲν | ὅτι ἀρέσκονται τῷ | εἶναι αὐξήσεις, διὰ δὲ | τὸ τοὺς
Στωϊκοὺς κατὰσκευάζειν τοῦτο, | οὐ δεόμενον ἀποδείξω[ς] διδάσκοντες 5
| ὅτι, ἐάν τις τὰ ἐναργῆ | θέλῃ ἀποδεικνύ[ναι], ἕτερος εἰς τὸ ἐνα[ρ]τίον
πιθανωτέρων | εὐπορήσει λόγων.

Context commentary on Plato, *Theaet.* 152d–e, where the flux doctrine is attributed to nearly all the old thinkers. These include Epicharmus, and in commenting on this shortly afterwards (71.12ff.) our commentator seems to link the citation of his name directly to the Growing Argument.

The Academics' purpose in using the argument looks much more weakly sceptical here than in A 2 and 8. Whereas A represents the Carneadean Academy, B seems to echo the school's later approach under Philo of Larissa (especially *ἐναργῆ*, 6: cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.34), whose follower the author may have been (Tarrant [633]).

1 2 Pythagoras is mentioned as the supposed master of Epicharmus. Plato's detractors alleged that Epicharmus had anticipated his flux doctrine (D.L. 3.12), and in shifting its origin yet further back to Pythagoras, an acknowledged forerunner of Plato, our Platonist is no doubt reclaiming it.

C P. Oxy. 3008

|σαι δ' εἶναι, τῆς περὶ ἑκαστον | λεγομένης τῶν σωμάτων | δυνάδος
 ἀδιάνγνωστον αἰσθῆσει τὴν δι|είφοραν ἐχούσης. | εἰ γὰρ σῶμα μὲν ἰδίως
 ποιῶν οἶον Πλάτων, σῶμά θ' ἡ | οὐσία τοῦ Πλάτωνος, διαφορά | δὲ
 φαινομένη τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε σχήματος οὔτε | χρώματος οὔτε
 μεγέθους οὐ<τέ> | μορφῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βάρους ἴσον | καὶ τ[ύ]πος ὁ αὐτὸς 5
 ἀμφοτέρων, τίς διαιρούντες ὄρω | καὶ | χαρακτῆρῃ νῦν μὲν | φήσομεν
 αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος | νῦν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ἀντιταμ|βάνεσθαι τῆς Πλάτωνος, | εἰ
 μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν τις διαφο|ρά, λεγέσθω μετὰ ἀποδεί|ξεω|ς· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲ λέγ-
 ειν |

The readings are those of P. Parsons, apart from θ' ἡ in 5, which is based on our own autopsy of the papyrus.

The argument is very close to that of B, and a common source may be suspected.

D Stobaeus 1.177.21 179.17 (19 = Posidonius fr. 96)

(1) Ποσειδώνιος δὲ φθορὰς καὶ γενέσεις τέτταρας εἶναι φησιν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων
 εἰς τὸ ὄντα γινομένης. (2) τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς <τὰ>
 οὐκ ὄντα, καθάπερ εἶπομεν πρόσθεν, ἐπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὐσαν. (3)
 τῶν δ' εἰς <τὰ> ὄντα γινομένων μεταβολῶν τὴν μὲν εἶναι κατὰ διαίρεσιν,
 τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ σύγχυσιν, τὴν δ' ἐξ ὅλων, λεγομένην δὲ 5
 κατ' ἀνάλυσιν. (4) τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
 γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς
 οὐσίας γινομένους. ἀκολουθῶν δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συμβαίνειν.
 (5) τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν οὐτ' αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ
 ἀφαιρέσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιούσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων. (6) 10
 καὶ συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν οἶον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος καὶ αὐξήσεις
 καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι. (7) διὸ καὶ πιναμένειν τὴν ἐκάστου ποιότητα [τὰ]
 ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσιν ἐπιδεχομένων
 ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων. (8) ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν
 φασι δύο εἶναι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια, τὸ μὲν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν, 15
 τὸ δὲ <τι> κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ. τοῦτο γάρ, ὡς πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, τὴν
 αὐξῆσιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. (9) μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταῦτόν τὸ τε ποιοῦν
 ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν [δ] ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μὴδ' ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ
 μόνον αὐτὸ ταυτόν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν
 τόπον, τὰ δ' ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μὴδ' ἐν 20
 μέρεϊ θεωρεῖσθαι. (10) τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ταῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ κατὰ τὸ ἰδίως ποιοῦν καὶ
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, δῆλον εἶναι φησιν ὁ Μνήσαρχος· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν συμβεβηκέναι. (11) εἰ γὰρ τις πλάσας ἵππον λόγου χάριν
 συνθλάσειεν, ἔπειτα κύνα ποιήσειεν, εὐλόγως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἰδόντας εἰπεῖν ὅτι 25
 ταῦτ' οὐκ ἦν πάλαι, νῦν δ' ἔστιν· ὥσθ' ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ
 λεγόμενον. (12) τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας καθόλου νομίζειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς
 εἶναι ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀπίθανον εἶναι φαίνεται· πολλάκις γὰρ συμβαίνει τὴν
 μὲν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως εἰ τύχοι τῆς Σωκράτους, τὸν δὲ

Σωκράτην μηδέπω ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀναίρεσιν ὑπαμένειν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, αὐτὸν δὲ μηκέτ' εἶναι.

30

1 ἀπεργασαν codd. 1: 151.14ff. ἀπέσπασαν codd. 1: 178.3: ἀπέργασαν Diels. ἀπέργασαι εἰς Heeren. ἀπέργασαι δὲ Usener. 9 δὲ codd. γὰρ Heeren. 10 11 de interpunktion: μέτρων [καὶ] συμβαίνει ἐπὶ (δὲ) τῶν Heeren. 15 (ὥς) ἐπὶ Heeren. 16 παρὰ τοῦ γὰρ codd. 1: nrr. Cantab. 17 δὲ Diels. τε codd. 19 τὴν οὐσίαν codd. τῆς οὐσίας ccr. Cod. Vat. 25 τὸ δὲ καὶ codd. τὸ τε [καὶ] Heeren.

The passage is generally thought to derive from Arius Didymus' *Epitome*. Both Stoics cited were pupils of Panaetius (died 109 BCE); the unspecified 'they' are probably the Stoics of their time.

6-8 It is unclear why qualified individuals should not also be subject to generation and destruction by ἀλλοιώσεις (contrast e.g. Philo, *Act. mundi* 113), and indeed Boetius had held that loss of a thing's dominant quality did amount to its destruction (SIF 3 Boethius 7). Perhaps the normal Stoic concentration on living individuals led Posidonius to suppose that this would only happen in the event of death (cf. 12-14), which is a form of division (of soul from body, 45D).

9-10 The reports of Zeno and Chrysippus in **q** also deny growth and diminution to primary matter, but the resemblance to the doctrine given here is misleading. Their point is that the *sum* of matter in the world has everlasting fixity, whereas individual portions of it lose their identity through division and fusion. Here, on the other hand, it is the portion of matter constituting an individual that is excluded as a proper subject of growth and diminution, in deference to the Growing Argument.

13 The regular supplement (ὥς) is unnecessary. The qualification, ἐπὶ τῶν κτλ., is probably added to allow for the existence of imperishable ἰδίως ποιοί, like Zeus (cf. O).

19 The weakly attested correction τῆς οὐσίας is usually preferred: but the substance (=substrate) is part of the qualified individual, and not vice versa.

19-21 Cf. S.E. at M 9.336 and in 60G 3; Seneca, *Ep.* 113.4-5 (SIF 3 307, part).

E Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 48,11-16

ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπυρίαν λέων ἡ Πορφύριος (1) "διττόν". φησὶν, "ἐστὶν τὸ ὑποκειμένον, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους" (2) ἢ τε γὰρ ἄποιοι ὦλη, ἣν δυνάμει καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, πρῶτόν ἐστιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαίνόμενον, (3) καὶ δεύτερον, ὃ κοινῶς ποιοῦν ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται. ὑποκειμένον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοῖς ἐπιγινωμένοις ἢ κατηγορουμένοις κατ' αὐτῶν."

5

Context: difficulties concerning Aristotle's distinction between καθ' ὑποκειμένου and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, *Cat.* 2, 1a20ff.

The examples at 5-6 may be Aristotelian and not Stoic, but the reporting seems in general reliable (cf. A 4). Dexippus, *In Ar. Cat.* 23.25ff. (SIF 2.374) seems to be nothing more than a slight expansion of Porphyry's words.

F Iamblichus, *De anima* (Stobaeus 1.367.17-22 = SIF 2.826, part)

ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωντος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι

σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νοοῦσι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητος συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν προυποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι προτιθέασιν, ἐκ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων σύνθετον φύσιν ἀνομοίων συνάγουσιν.

5

G Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 2R.18–19 (SVF 2.398)

καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινῶς ποιоὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται.

Context: appeal to alleged Peripatetic and Stoic support for a theory of immanent universals. Needless to say, the Stoic position amounts to very much less than that. For their treatment of universals, see 30.

H Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 222.30–3 (SVF 2.378, part)

οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσιν διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἐννόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα ἀπολῆγουσαν, οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ' ἣν ποιῶν ὑφίσταται γένεσις.

1 ἐννόημα Peterson: ἐν νόημα endd

Context: commentary on *Cat.* 8b26, the meaning of ποιότης.

Simplicius' subsequent criticisms of this Stoic definition of quality (*ibid.* 222.33–223.11) show that it is quoted verbatim from a Stoic source, not in Simplicius' own words.

2 ἐννόημα Certainly the right reading, cf. *ibid.* 223.6, and 30 below.

3–4 Cf. 47S 5.

I Simplicius, *In Ar. De an.* 217.36–218.2 (SVF 2.395)

... εἰ γε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνθέτων τὸ ἀτομωθὲν ὑπάρχει εἶδος, καθ' ὃ ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Στωᾶς λέγεται ποιόν, ὃ καὶ ἀθρόως ἐπιγίνεται καὶ αὐτὸ ἀπογίνεται καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν παντὶ τῷ τοῦ συνθέτου βίῳ διαμένει, καίτοι τῶν μορίων ἄλλων ἄλλοτε γινυμένων τε καὶ φθειρομένων.

2 ποιόν Nagelock: ποίος endd

Context: the individuation of souls.

2 The masculine ποιός, despite the grammatical awkwardness, may be the right reading, as so often in these texts

J Dexippus, *In Ar. Cat.* 30.20–6

ἀλλ' εἰ εἶδος ἔστι τὸ κατὰ πλείονων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἔστι κατηγορούμενον, τίνι διαφέρει ὁ ἄτομος καὶ εἰς τοῦ ἀτόμου καὶ ἐνός· ἐν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἔστι καὶ οὗτος κακείνος· οἱ μὲν οὖν λύοντες τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην κατὰ τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅτι ὁ μὲν φέρε γρυσότητα ἢ ξανθότητα ἢ ἄλλη συνδρομὴ ποιότητων ἀφώρισται, ἄλλος δὲ σιμιάτητι ἢ

5

φαλακρότητι ἢ γλαυκότητι, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερος ἐτέραις, οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκοῦσι λύειν.

Context: the meaning of *ἁτομον*.

1-2 The definition is that given for *γένος* at Aristotle, *Top.* 1.5, 102a31-2.

συνδρομῇ ποιότητων This theory is not explicitly assigned to the Stoics, but note that (a) Simplicius' *ἄθροως* (I 2 above; *ἄθροισμα* is a standard doublet for *συνδρομῇ*) helps to confirm that the Stoics saw a peculiar quality as some sort of collection or compound, (b) the same theory is used in passing by Porphyry (*In Ar. Cat.* 129.8-10), who certainly made some use of Stoic metaphysical material (cf. Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 2.8-9); (c) a version of the *συνδρομῇ* theory is perhaps already detectable in Carneades (69E 16. 29), who standardly drew on Stoic doctrine in the construction of philosophical positions. However, the doctrine as presented here is a weak one. It is hard to see how any common quality beyond those constituting the individual's species could be guaranteed to last from birth to death, as on the Stoic theory it must if it is to be part of the peculiar quality.

4-6 The language is a little sloppy: 'or' must be understood in an inclusive sense throughout if the idea of a *συνδρομῇ* is meant to emerge.

K Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 271.20-2 (SVF 2.383)

ἀλλ' οὐδέ ἡ τῶν Στωικῶν δόξα λεγόντων σώματα εἶναι καὶ τὰ σχήματα, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιά, συμφωνεῖ τῇ Ἀριστοτέλους δόξῃ περὶ ἀχημμάτων.

Context: comparison of various views on the metaphysical status of shape, derived from a discussion by Iamblichus.

L Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 217.32-218.1 (SVF 2.389, part)

(1) οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. (2) σφάλλονται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεσθαι τὰ αἴτια τοῖς ἀποτελουμένοις ἢ ἐ' αὐτῶν ὁμοούσια εἶναι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινὸν λόγον τῆς αἰτίας ἐπὶ τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ὑποτίθεσθαι. (3) πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν σωματικῶν ποιότητων, αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος . . . ;

Context: shortly after 29g, among the introductory remarks on *Cat.* 8. Cf. *ibid.* 209.1ff.

1-2 What are the incorporeal qualities of incorporeals? One might think of, e.g., the truth or falsity of a proposition.

2-5 Cf. especially 55A. If Simplicius' report is to be trusted, we must read into it a distinction between *αἴτιον* and *αἰτία*. The former is, for the Stoics, a cause in the true sense, a body acting upon a body. So the claim about causes here must be used solely to justify the claim that the qualities of bodies are corporeal. The further claim about *αἰτία*, 'explanation' (cf. the Stoic definition at 55A 5), which Simplicius perhaps chooses as a metaphysically less circumscribed notion, will then be added to extend the point, by parity of reasoning, to incorporeals.

3 ἀποτελούμενοις. The active verb, 'tender', is constructed with double accusative, ἀποτελεῖν τι τοιοῦτο. Since the ἀποτελεσμα is standardly the 'effect', the ἀποτελούμενον will presumably be the 'thing affected'. It is this, and not the effect, which in Stoic theory is of the same essence as the αἰτίον: see 55A–B.

M Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 214,24–37 (SVF 2.391, part)

(1) καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις τὴν αὐτὴν αἰ ἀπορίαν
προσαγάγοιεν τῷ λέγοντι λόγῳ κατὰ ποιότητα πάντα τὰ ποιά λέγεσθαι.
(2) τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἐκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι ἐπὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων τὰ
ἐκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν, (3) ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν οἷον νεῖος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
κατὰ διάστασιν οἷον στρατοῦ μηδὲν εἶκαι ἐκτὸν μηδὲ εὐρίσκεσθαι 5
πνευματικὴν τι ἐν ἐπ' αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἓνα λόγον ἔχον, ὥστε ἐπὶ τινα ὑπόστασιν
ἔλθεῖν μίας ἕξεως. (4) τὸ δὲ ποιὸν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκ συναπτομένῳ θεωρεῖται
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐκ διεστώτων· ὥς γὰρ εἰς γραμματικὸς ἐκ ποιῆς ἀναλήψεως καὶ
συγγυμνασίας ἐμμόνως ἔχει κατὰ διαφοράν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χορὸς ἐκ ποιῆς
μελέτης ἐμμόνως ἔχει κατὰ διαφοράν. διὸ ποιά μὲν ὑπάρχει διὰ τὴν 10
κατάταξιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἑνὸς ἔργον (συντέλειαν) συνεργίαν, (5) δέχα δὲ
ποιότητός ἐστιν ποιά· ἕξις γὰρ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅλως ἐν
διεστώσεσι οὐσίαις καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐχούσαις συμφυὴ πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔνωσιν
ἐστιν ποιότης ἢ ἕξις.

11 ἐνὸν ἔργον (συντέλειαν) ἔσται ἐν ἔργῳ Atom

Context: problems that arise from the assumption that quality is prior to the qualified individual. Cf. SVF 2.306–8, and 475. For a quality as ἐκτὸν, 'liavable', cf. note on 30A 6 7

N Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 212,12–213,1 (SVF 2.390, part)

(1) τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν τινες τριχῶς τὸ ποιὸν ἀφοριζόμενοι τὰ μὲν δύο
σημαινόμενα ἐπὶ πλεόν τῆς ποιότητος λέγουσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡτοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς
μέρος συναπαρτίζειν αὐτὴ φασιν. (2) λέγουσιν γὰρ ποιὸν καθ' ἓν μὲν
σημαινόμενον πᾶν τὸ κατὰ διαφοράν, εἴτε κινούμενον εἴη εἴτε ἰσχύμενον
καὶ εἴτε δυσαναλύτως εἴτε εὐαναλύτως ἔχει· κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον ὁ 5
φρόνιμος καὶ ὁ πύξ προτείνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τρέχων ποιοῖ. (3) καθ' ἕτερον δὲ
καθ' ὃ οὐκέτι τὰς κινήσεις περιλαμβάναν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰς σχέσεις, ὃ δὴ
καὶ ὠρίζοντο τὸ ἰσχύμενον κατὰ διαφοράν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ φρόνιμος καὶ ὁ
προβεβλημένος. (4) τρίτον δὲ εἰσηγόν εἰδικώτατον ποιὸν καθ' ὅτι οὐκέτι
τοὺς μὴ ἐμμόνους ἰσχυμένους περιλαμβάναν οὐδὲ ἦσαν ποιοὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς 10
ὁ πύξ προτείνων καὶ ὁ προβεβλημένος· (5) καὶ τούτων δὲ τῶν ἐμμόνους
ἰσχυμένων κατὰ διαφοράν οἱ μὲν ἀπηρτισμένους κατὰ τὴν ἐκφοράν αὐτῶν
καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ νειαν εἶσι τοιοῦτοι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀπηρτισμένους, καὶ τούτους μὲν
παρητοῦντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀπαρτίζοντας καὶ ἐμμόνους ὄντας κατὰ διαφοράν
ποιοὺς ἐτίθεντο. (6) ἀπαρτίζειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκφοράν ἔλεγον τοὺς τῇ 15
ποιότητι συνεξισουμένους, ὥς τὸν γραμματικὸν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον· οὔτε

γάρ πλεονάζει οὔτε ἁλλέλειπε ταύτων ἑκάτερος παρὰ τὴν ποιότητα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φίλοσος καὶ ὁ φίλοιος. οἱ μὲντοι μετὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοιοῦτοι, ὥσπερ ὁ ὀσφογάγος καὶ ὁ οἰνόφλυξ, ἔχοντες μέρη τοιαῦτα δι' ὧν ἀπολαύουσιν οὕτως λέγονται. διὸ καὶ εἰ μὲν τις ὀσφογάγος, καὶ φίλοσος πάντως· εἰ δὲ φίλοσος, οὐ πάντως ὀσφογάγος· ἐπιχειπόντων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν δι' ὧν ὀσφογαγεῖ τῆς μὲν ὀσφοφαγίας ἀπολέλυται, τὴν δὲ φίλοσον ἔξιν οὐκ ἀνῆρσηκεν. (7) τριχῶς οὖν τοῦ ποιοῦ λεγομένου ἡ ποιότης κατὰ τὸ τελευταῖον ποῖον συναπαρτίζει πρὸς τὸ ποῖον. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀρίζωνται τὴν ποιότητα σχέσειν ποιοῦ, οὕτως ἀκουστέον τοῦ ὁρον ὡς τοῦ τρίτου ποιοῦ παραλαμβανομένου· μοναχῶς μὲν γὰρ ἡ ποιότης λέγεται κατ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Στωικούς, τριχῶς δὲ ὁ ποῖός.

Context: introductory comment on *Cat.* 8.

4 κατὰ διαφορὰν Distinguishing by some intrinsic feature, as opposed to πρὸς τί πως ἔχον. 29C; 5.E., *M.* 8.161-2, 10.263-5. **κινούμενον, ἰσχύμενον** The standard Stoic distinction between processes and states; cf. 54T, etc. For the two senses of *σχέσις*, see on 29g below.

15-23 The point is that for each type of quality there are two corresponding ποῖα, definable as (a) possessing the quality, and (b) using it. For example, the quality φρόνησις is matched by the φρόνιμος (16-17) under (a), and his counterpart under (b), not specified here, is the φρονῶν (*Philo., Log. alleg.* 1.67 = SVF 3.263). The technical expression ἀπαρτίζειν κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν may point to Antipater as the Stoic author of the present set of distinctions; cf. 32C 1. E.

O Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1077C-E (including SVF 2.112)

(1) ἀκούσαι τοῦνυν ἔστιν αὐτῶν καὶ γράμμασιν ἐντυχεῖν πολλοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαίους διαφορομένων καὶ βοῶντων ὡς πάντα πράγματα συγχέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλαξίαις, ἐπὶ διεῖν οὐσιῶν ἓνα ποῖον εἶναι βιαζόμενοι. (2) καίτοι τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων οὐ διανοεῖται, καὶ τοῦναντίον οἶεται θαυμάσιόν εἶναι καὶ παράδοξον, εἰ μήτε φάττα φάττη μήτε μελίττη μελίττα μήτε πυρῶ πυρὸς ἢ αὐκῶ, τὸ τοῦ λόγου, σῶκον ἐν τῇ παντὶ χρόνῳ γέγονεν ἀπαράλλακτον. (3) ἐκεῖνα δ' οὕτως παρὰ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔστιν, ἃ λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν, ἐπὶ μιᾷ οὐσίας δὴ ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποῖους καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἓνα ποῖον ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους. εἰ γὰρ δύο, καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέτταρες ἔσονται καὶ πέντε καὶ ὅσους οὐκ ἂν τις εἴποι περὶ μίαν οὐσίαν· λέγων δ' οὐκ ἐν μέρεσι διαφόροις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμοίως περὶ ὅλην τοὺς ἀπείρους. (4) λέγει γοῦν Χρῦσιππος εἰκέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἀφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἴθ' ἡμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾷ τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους.

See Chermis [326], ad loc., for invaluable commentary.

3 ἀπαραλλαξίαις See note on 52C 6.

13 14 For the world as ἰδίως ποῖός, cf. 44F 6.

P Philo. *Aet. mundi* 47–51 (including SVF 2.397)

ἡνική δὲ τοσούτων δόξης ἀληθοῦς διήκαρτον, ὥστε λεγῆσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ τῇ πρηνείᾳ ψυχῇ
 δ' ἔστι τοῦ κόσμου φθορὰν ἐπιφέροντες ἐξ ὧν ἀνακόλουθα φιλοσοφῶσι. (1) Χρύσιπ-
 πος γοῦν ὁ δοκιμώτατος τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ ἀϋξανομένου*
τεραπεύεται τι τοιούτου (2) προκατασκευάσας ὅτι δύο ἰδίως ποιούς ἐπὶ
 τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμύχανον συστήναι, (3) φησὶν "ἔστω θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὸν
 μὲν τινα ὀλόκληρον, τὸν δὲ χωρὶς ἐπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐτέρου ποδός, καλεῖσθαι
 δὲ τὸν μὲν ὀλόκληρον Δίωνα, τὸν δὲ ἀτελῆ Θέωνα, κάπειτα ἀποτέμενεσθαι
 Δίωνος τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν ποδοῖν." (4) ζητουμένου δὴ, πότερος ἐφθάρται, τὸν
 Θέωνα φάσκειν οἰκειότερον εἶναι. (5) τοῦτο δὲ παραδοξολογούντος μᾶλλον
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀληθεύοντος. πῶς γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀκροατηριασθεὶς μέρος, ὁ Θέων,
 ἀνῆρπασται, ὁ δ' ἀποκοπεῖς τὸν πόδα Δίων οὐχὶ διεφθάρται; (6)
 "δεόντως" φησὶν "ἀναδεδράμηκε γὰρ ὁ ἐκτμηθεὶς τὸν πόδα Δίων ἐπὶ τὴν
 ἀτελῆ τοῦ Θέωνος οὐσίαν, καὶ δύο ἰδίως παιοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου
 οὐ δύναται εἶναι. τοιγαροῦν τὸν μὲν Δίωνα μένειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸν δὲ
 Θέωνα διεφθάρθαι." "τὰ δ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν πτεροῖς ἀπικόμενα"
 φησὶν ὁ τραγικός· ἀπομαζόμενος γὰρ τις τὸν τύπον τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐφαρμόσας τῷ παντὶ
 κόσμῳ δεῖξει σαφέστατα καὶ αὐτὴν φθειρομένην τὴν πρόνοιαν· ἀκόπει δ' ὧδε· ὑποκεῖσθαι ὁ
 μὲν ὥσαντι Δίον ὁ κόσμος· τέλος γάρ· ὁ δὲ ὥσαντι Θέων ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ, διότι τοῦ
 ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀφαιρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ Δίωνος ὁ پاὺς, οὕτως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 κόσμου ὅταν αὐτὸ σωματοειδές· οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη λέγειν ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος οὐκ ἐφθάρται ὁ το
 σώμα ἀφαιρεθεὶς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ ἀποκοπεῖς τὸν πόδα Δίων, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ, ὥσπερ
 Θέων ὁ μὴδὲν παθών· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος ἐπ' ἐλάττω οὐσίαν ἀνέδραμεν, ἀφαιρεθέντος
 αὐτῷ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐφθάρθ' ὁ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι δύο ἰδίως ποιούς εἶναι περὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπικείμενα. ἔκθεσμον δὲ τὸ λέγειν φθεῖρεσθαι τὴν πρόνοιαν· ἀφθάρτου δὲ
 ὑπαρχούσης, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι φθάρτοι εἶναι

4 ἰδίως ποιούς *Asiatic edition* could 1, ἰδίως ποιῶν *Asiatic edition* could ἐπ. *EPH* in *peri*
MC 2) ἰδίως ποιούς *Asiatic edition* *Asiatic edition* could

Context: attack on the Stoic theory of the conflagration (46)

5ff. τὸν μὲν Chrysippus had clearly introduced Dion and Theon before the excerpted passage, it is Philo's failure to explain this that has led to confusion about how they are related to each other (see vol. 1, 175).

12. Γοτ ἀνατρέχειν ἐπὶ = 'collapsing into', 'become co-extensive with', cf. Mousas. *Ell.* 6.1.30

q Stobaeus 1.132,27–133,11; 133,18–23 (SVF 1.87 and 2.317, and Posidonius fr. 92)

Ζήνωνος. ἡσέον δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πάσαν αἰδῶν καὶ οὔτε πλείω γινομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω· τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ αἰετὰ διαμείνουν, ἀλλὰ διαιριεῖσθαι καὶ συγχέεισθαι διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντός λόγον, δι' ἐνὶο εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷον περ καὶ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα Χρυσιπποῦ Στωικοῦ. τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ὑφισταμένων πρώτην ὕλην· ταύτην δὲ αἰδῶν, οὔτε αὔξειεν αὐτὴ μείψει

28 The first and second genera

ὑπομένουσαν, διαίρεσιν δὲ καὶ οὐγχυσιν ἐπιδεχομένην κατὰ μέρη, ὥστε φθορὰς γίνεσθαι ἐκ τινων μερίων εἰς τινα, οὐ κατὰ διαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῇ συγχύσει τινῶν γινομένων ἐκ τινος. ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Πτολεμαῖος τὴν τῶν ὀλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτὸν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ' αὐτὴν· αἰεὶ δ' ἐν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν <αὐτὴν> οὕτως κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινόει μόνον.

7 τινων Diels. τῶν codd 10 <αὐτὴν> Hitzel

Cf. 44D E, and 50B 1 For comment, see note on D 9 10.

4 ἐν-σπέρμα Cf 46B 2.

29 The third and fourth genera

A Alexander, *Mantissa* 118,6–8 (SVF 2.823)

ὅτι μὴ μία ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν πῶς ἔχουσιν ποτὲ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι, ποτὲ δ' ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ μέρος δεικτέον . . .

Context: argument for a plurality of powers of the soul.

Alexander characterizes the opposing unitarian view in terminology which sounds pointedly Stoic. Chrysippus' intellectualist view makes all thoughts and emotions modifications of a single rational power of the mind; cf. SVF 3.257, and 53. An earlier mention of the doctrine (*In Ar. De an.* 27,4–8) names Democritus, but in the present passage the language is more Stoic, and Alexander goes on (*ibid.* 12–15) to attack the distinctively Stoic view of the nutritive soul as merely φύσις (see vol. 1, 319–20).

B Seneca, *Ep.* 113.2 (SVF 3.307, part)

virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens.

Context: proof of the Stoic paradox that virtues are living beings (cf. 61E).

Almost the identical analysis is found in a different context at S.E., *At.* 11.23 (SVF 3.75, part)

C Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 165,32–166,29 (SVF 2.403)

οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ ἀνθ' ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦντας, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι τιθέντες, τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι ἀντιδιαμερούσιν τοῖς καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφορὰν, πρὸς τι μὲν λέγοντες τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅσα τοιῶσδε διατίθωνται, πρὸς τι δὲ πως ἔχοντα οἶον δεξιὴν, πατέρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· κατὰ διαφορὰν δὲ φασι τὰ κατὰ τι εἶδος χαρακτηριζόμενα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄλλη τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔννοια καὶ ἄλλη τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν, οὕτως ἄλλα μὲν τὰ πρὸς τί ἐστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα. ἀντιστραμμένη δὲ ἐστὶν τῶν συζυγιῶν ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ συνπαρχει τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα διαφορὰς ἔχει τινάς, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν· οὐ μόνον τοῖς κατὰ διαφορὰν τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ συνπαρχει· τὸ γὰρ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν διαφορὰς μὲν ἔχει, καθ' ὅς χαρακτηρίζεται, οὐ μέντοι καθ' αὐτὰ

ἔστιν τιμωῦτα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, ὅπερ ἀντίκειται τοῖς κατὰ διαφορὰν, πάντως καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δεξιὸς καὶ πατὴρ μετὰ τοῦ πύλιν ἔχειν καὶ πρὸς τί εἶσιν. τὸ δὲ γλυκύ καὶ πικρὸν πρὸς τι ὄντα κατὰ διαφορὰν ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα ἐναντία τοῖς κατὰ διαφορὰν ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα ἀδύνατον καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι ἢ κατὰ διαφορὰν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσεως ἡρτῆται μόνης· τὰ μὲντοι πρὸς τι καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπύλυτα, κατὰ διαφορὰν δὲ πάντως ἔσται· μετὰ γὰρ τίνος χαρακτήρος θεωρεῖται. (1) εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, πρὸς τι μὲν λέγουσιν, ὅσα κατ' οἰκείον χαρακτήρα διακείμενά πως ἁπονεύει πρὸς ἕτερον, πρὸς τι δὲ πως ἔχοντα, ὅσα ἐφέυκεν συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἀνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιωσέως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ διαφορὰν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρὸς τι μόνον ἔσται τοῦτο, ὡς ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνούσαν διαφορὰν, κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῆται, πρὸς τί πως ἔχον ἔσται. (2) ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἐξωθέν τινων προσδέονται πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διὸ καὶ μηδεμίαν γενομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτο ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐδὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου μεταστάντος· τὸ δὲ γλυκύ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοῖα γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. (3) εἰ τοίνυν καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὰ παθόντα μεταβάλλει κατὰ τὴν ἄλλου πρὸς αὐτὰ σχέσιν, δηλὸν ὅτι ἐν τῇ σχέσει μόνῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ οὐ κατὰ τινὰ διαφορὰν τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα.

Context: introductory remarks on the category of relation.

It has been claimed by Graeser [400] that we have here a rival set of four Stoic 'categories': πρὸς τι, καθ' αὐτό, κατὰ διαφορὰν, and πρὸς τί πως ἔχον. But apart from the last, which belongs to the standard foursome, these are all terms used in elucidating and subdividing the second genus, the ποῖόν.

The special use of πρὸς τί πως ἔχον explained here, perhaps of Academic origin (cf. Sandbach [304]. 42), is arguably also to be found at Aristotle, *Cat.* 7, 322b 13.

7 The precise force of ἀντεστραμμένη here is unclear to us, although the terminology is evidently influenced by Aristotle, *De int.* 13, 22232–4. If, as one would expect, it means 'reciprocal', an οὐκ should perhaps be added before it, since the 'sequence of dependencies' which follows in 7 14 is in fact non-reciprocal: all καθ' αὐτὰ are κατὰ διαφορὰν, but not vice versa, and all πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα are πρὸς τι but not vice versa.

D Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034E–1035A (SVF 2.550, part)

ἀρκεί δ' εἰς τοῦτο παραθέναι λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου *Περὶ κινήσεως*. ὑπεπὼν γὰρ ὅτι τέλειον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν οὐ τέλεια δὲ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη τῇ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ διελλών ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν συμμόνην καὶ τὴν συνοχήν τὴν αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν μερῶν πάντων πεφυκότος, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίλυσιν καὶ τὴν θρύψιν, ταῦτ' ἐπείρηκεν "οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μερῶν ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἔχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανόν πάσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ

κόσμον μένουν, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὐτως αἰνούμενός πρὸς αὐτὸν, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσαν.”

Context: immediately following 49f (q.v.). An attempt by Plutarch, having interpreted a Chrysippean argument as implying that all body tends towards the centre of space, to show that he elsewhere takes a contradictory view, that body tends towards its *oike* centre, i.e. the centre of the corporeal κόσμος.

The doctrine quoted in 2–3 is apparently used here to explain why the function of the moving parts of the world is to hold the whole together.

E. Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.10–15 (SVF 3.259, part)

καίτοι πάνταυθα εἴ τις ἐπεξέρχοιτο τῷ λόγῳ τὰ τε περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τέτταρσι βιβλίοις ὑπὸ Χρυσαίππου γεγραμμένα βασανίζων ὅσα τε καθ' ἐν ἄλλο διήλθεν, ᾧ δείκνυσιν ποιάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐλέγχων τὸν Ἀρίστωνος λόγον, οὐχ ἑνὸς ἢ δυοῖν, ἀλλὰ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἂν δεηθείη βιβλίων. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ πάνταυθα λόγος εἰς βραχὺς ἐπιστημονικὸς ἐλέγχων τὸν Χρῦσαιππον οὔτε τἀληθῆ πρσβεύοντα καὶ μηκύνοντα περιττῶς ἀλλὰ οἱ μῆτε παιδευθέντες ἐν ἀποδεικτικῇ μεθόδῳ μὴτ' ὅλους γνόντες ὅποια τίς ἐστι, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει τῶν ὑπὸ Χρυσαίππου γραφέντων βιβλίων προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν ἀληθῆ νομίζουσι πάνθ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτά (1) καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅτως ἐστὶ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ ἐκεῖνο τὸ βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυσιν ποιάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἀλλὰ ὅτι τῷ μίαν ὑποθεμένῳ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν λογικὴν τε καὶ κριτικὴν ὀνομαζομένην, ἀνελόντι δὲ τὴν ἐπιθυμητικὴν τε καὶ θυμειδῆ, καθάπερ ὁ Χρῦσαιππος ἀνείλε, μάχεται τὰ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον εἰρημένα ταυτί, μέμψαιτο ἂν τις αὐτῷ (2) τὸ μέντοι καταβάλλεσθαι τὴν Ἀρίστωνος αἴρεσιν ἀληθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν γεγραμμένων οὐκ ἂν τις μέμψαιτο. νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείουσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν. (3) ὁ τοῖνυν Χρῦσαιππος δείκνυσιν οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τι σχέσει γινόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας, ὡς ὁ τῶν παλαιῶν ἡβούλετο λόγος. ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ βραχὺ παρατρέψας ὁ Χρῦσαιππος ἑτέραις λέξει διήλθεν ἐν τῷ ποιάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς τε ἐπιχειρήμασιν οὐ πρόπονσι τῷ τὸ λογικὸν εἶναι μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς θετικῶν, τὸ παθητικὸν δὲ ἀνηρηκόσι.

Context: an extended critique of Chrysippus' psychology.

10–13 For Galen's relentless polemic against Chrysippus' psychological monism, cf. 651, M P.

F. Seneca, *Ep.* 121.10 (SVF 3.184, part)

“constitutio”, inquit, “est, ut vos dicitis, principale animi quodammodo se habens erga corpus . . .”

Context: exposition of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις at 57B 2. Even a new-born animal is conscious of its own constitution. But, opponents are represented as saying, how can it be clever enough to grasp something whose definition is so sophisticated?

The Greek original will have been: *σύστασις ἔστιν ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς τὸ σῶμά πως ἔχον*. 'Constitution' belongs neither to the soul nor to the body, but consists in a relationship between the two.

g Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 217,21-5

καὶ οἱ μὲν τοσούτων μόνον πλεονάζειν τὸ πως ἔχον τοῦ ποιῶ ὑποτίθενται, καθ' ὅσον τὸ πως ἔχον παρεξέτεται καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα καὶ περιλαμβάνειν ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν ἴσταντο ἐπὶ μῖνων τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν· οἱ δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ τεχνολογίαν ἐπεισήγουν.

Simplicius is discussing certain 'Academics' (identity uncertain – perhaps the school of Eudorus?), whose views seem to be a synthesis of Stoic and Platonist metaphysics (*ibid.* 217,8–32, cf. 209,10–15). The fact that these heirs to Stoic ontology were left in some perplexity as to the difference between *ποιῶν* and *πως ἔχον* underlines the Stoics' own lack of clarity on the point.

The difficulty may at first seem to be exacerbated by the fact that *σχέσις*, the cognate noun of *πως ἔχον*, is also one species of the 'qualified' (28N 3). But we in fact have here two quite distinct senses of the word. In the former, it is cognate with the active *ἔχειν*, 'be disposed', and is translated 'disposition'. In the latter, it corresponds to the passive *ἴσχεσθαι/ἔχεσθαι*, literally 'be held' in such and such a condition (by contrast with *κινεῖσθαι*, 'be in a changing condition'), and is translated 'state'.

30 Universals

A Stobaeus 1.136,21–137,6 (S/F 1.65)

Ζήνωνος· (1) τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μῆτε τινὰ εἶναι μῆτε ποιὰ, ὥσανει δέ τινα καὶ ὥσανει ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· (2) ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα ὑποπιπτόντων εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, ἵππων, κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόσων λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι. (3) ταύτας δὲ οἱ Στωικοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασιν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ὥς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν.

1 Ζήνωνος (καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) Νίχθ φασὶν ἔφην 1¹

1 There is something puzzling about the order *μῆτε τινὰ... μῆτε ποιὰ*. If concepts are not *τινὰ* (on which see 27), it will go without saying that they are not *ποιὰ* either. But although the reverse order would seem more natural, this one is not unparalleled; cf. Plato, *Thr.* 152d2–6. One possibility is to understand 'not somethings, let alone qualified things'. A second is to take *τινὰ* as *mere* somethings, implying non-corporeal particulars, and *ποιὰ* as qualified corporeal entities. On this reading the text would echo the almost certainly correct claim in D that Stoic *ἐννοήματα* are neither bodies nor incorporeals. On the other hand, it is hardly a natural reading, and in any case the important proof in E that universals are not *τινὰ* is concerned with *τινὰ* as particulars, not as incorporeals. A third – the likeliest interpretation is that by *ποιὰ* here are really meant, as so often (cf. 28K, O, P), not quality-bearing individuals but the qualities themselves. Hence the object of this

passage (which compares closely with Aristotle, *Eur.* 5, 3b13–16) will be to eliminate the two metaphysical statuses most likely to be assigned to universals by those who hypostatize them: that of discrete entity (Plato) and that of enmattered quality (very approximately, Aristotle).

2 **φαντάσματα** See 39A–B, and j below.

4 The same examples of forms are given slightly earlier in the text, in a summary of the Platonic theory (Stobaeus 1.135,23–136,2).

6–7 These notoriously disputed lines become intelligible once three points are appreciated. First, ἡμᾶς picks up ἀνθρώπων (4) and refers to individuals in general *qua* members of species like man. Second, the purpose of the μέν . . . δέ contrast is to distinguish the relationships in which individuals stand to two quite different but easily confused entities, universal concepts and general terms. Cf. Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 209,10–14 (reporting the Academics steeped in Stoic doctrine who also feature in 29g), where the full list is: ποιότητα ἔχειν, ἐννοήματος μετέχειν, πτώσεως τυγχάνειν, and κατηγορήματα συμβεβηκέναι (τινί), also E 2. Third, πτώσεις can serve as a generic term for declinable expressions (see vol. 1, 201), especially nouns and pronouns, of which προσσηγορίαι will be mentioned here as one species. As for πτώσεως τυγχάνειν, this is simply to 'bear' such designations; see also note on 33B.

B Aetius 1.10.5 (SVF 1.65)

οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωικοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν.

Cf. A 1.

C Diogenes Laertius 7.60–1

(1) γένος δέ ἐστι πλειόνων καὶ ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων σύλληψις, οἷον ζῶον· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέλαβε τὰ κατὰ μέρος ζῷα. (2) ἐννόημα δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τι ὄν οὔτε ποιόν, ὥσανεὶ δέ τι ὄν καὶ ὥσανεὶ ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος. (3) εἶδος δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ γένους περιεχόμενον, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ζώου ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιέχεται. (4) γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὁ γένος ὃν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. (5) εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὁ εἶδος ὃν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης.

οἷον τὸ ὄν: Forcely om. F: οἷον τοῦ B¹ οἷον τι τί Egl.

Comment: explanation of Stoic terms relating to definition and classification. Cf. 32.

4 **ἀνατύπωμα** This word apparently occurs nowhere else. The implication of the -μα termination is that this is not a physical printing (τύπωμα) in the soul, but the product, content, or intentional object of that imprint, a stereotype or pattern created in thought. For a similar opposition between τύπωμα and φάντασμα, see 39A–B.

6 Cf. note on 27A 1–2. But the text here is very insecure.

D Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 359,12–16 (SVF 2.329)

αὕτω δειχθήσεται μὴδὲ τὸ τὴν γένος ὄν τῶν πάντων· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς γένος ἢ ἐπίσης οὗτος αὐτῷ ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν· εἴ γε τὸ μὲν ἐν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ

ἐννοήματος· τὸ δὲ τί κατὰ μίανων αιωμάτων καὶ ἡσοομάτων· τί δὲ εἰκόσημα
μῆδέτερον τούτων κατὰ τοὺς ταῦτα λόγους τας.

Commentary on Aristotle, *Top.* II 6, 127a26

Alexander is probably wrong to suppose that all *τίνα* must be either corporeal or incorporeal: see vol. 1, 165. But he is right both that *εἰκόσηματα*, being mental constructs, are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, and that they are not even *τίνα* (cf. **A 1, C 2, E**).

E Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 105,7–20 (SCT 2.278)

ἄξιον δὲ ζητεῖν κατὰ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτοῖσι δίδοντας τοῖς εἰδεῖσι καὶ γένεσιν εἰ δὴ θήσεται τάδε
εἶναι (1) καὶ γὰρ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας εἰ τόδε τι μὴ θήσεται.
(2) συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνθήειαν τῶν Στωικῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν
ποιῶν, πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ' αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὕτινα τὰ κοινὰ
παρ' αὐταῖς λέγεται καὶ ὅπως παρὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν τὰ μὴ πάσι οὐσίαν τόδε
τι σημεινέιν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν οὕτιν νόμισμα γίνεται, παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς
λέξεως, (3) οἷον "εἰ τις ἐστὶν ἐν Ἀθήναις, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Μεγάρῳις.
(ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν Ἀθήναις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐν Μεγάρῳις)"
(4) ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ τις ἐστίν· αὐτὰρ ἐστὶ τις ὁ κοινός· ὥς τινα δὲ αὐτὸν
ἐλάβομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος
"οὕτις" κληθεῖς, ὃ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ ἀποφαινοῦτος ἐστὶν· "ἄγω εἰμὶ, οὐκ εἰ
ἄνθρωπος δὲ εἰμὶ ἐγώ· ἄνθρωπος ἄρα σὺ οὐκ εἰ" καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς ταῦ ἀποφαινοῦτος ταῖς
ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀντίτοις λέγεται· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐπ' αὐτεῖς τῶν ἐν μένῳ γέγονεν οὐκ ἔ
παραγωγὴ ὅστις τῷ οὐτεῖ ὥς τις ἐχρήσατο

§ suppl. Kallibosch

Commentary on Aristotle, *Cat.* 5, 3b.14ff

For the οὐτες puzzle, cf. **37B 5, D.1, 1–82, 187**, Elias, *In Ar. Cat.* 128, Philoponus, *In Ar. Cat.* 72, 4b.10ff. These last two are no doubt right to see in it an echo of the story at *Odyssey* 9. "Odysseus swaps from the Cyclops by making his enemies announce 'No-One is killing me' – but there is no resemblance in detail.

§ Kallibosch's supplement is guaranteed by Elias and the Philoponus scholium, cited above. All three texts share a common source. Cf. also D.1. 7–187.

§ 9. *ἄνθρωπος* could be translated 'a man', but that would not explain Simplicius' ensuing diagnosis of the puzzle and its title in terms of the distinction between *κοινός* and *τις*, since 'a man' would designate an individual *κοινός* *ποιός*, not an *εἰκόσημα*. It must be taken as 'man', as in 'Man has been to the moon', although it may be doubted whether the difference was very apparent to the Greek ear. Elias (loc. cit.) has a similar diagnosis. The absurd conclusion is meant to demonstrate the error of treating a universal as a particular discrete entity – the error of which Aristotle frequently accuses Plato. Thus treated, it fails to obey basic logical laws. See further, **E**

17–24. The sophism which Simplicius adds is instead elsewhere (Giellius, N.3 18–13). But it is not an example of the οὐτες, whose major premise must consist of an indefinite and a definite proposition (D.1. 7–82, cf. **37B 5**; these terms are explained at **34H**), and it is unlikely that the Stoics would regard it as comparable, since 'man' this

time occupies the predicate position and signifies a corporeal *κατὰ φύσιν ποιός*, not a universal *ἐννόημα*.

F Sextus Empiricus 7.246 (SVF 2.65, part)

(1) οὔτε δὲ ἀληθείς οὔτε ψευδεῖς ἦσαν αἱ γενικαί· (2) ὡν γὰρ τὰ εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα, τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα, (3) οἷον τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, ἀλλ' ὁ γενικός ἀνθρώπος οὔτε Ἕλληνας ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πάντες ἂν οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους ἦσαν Ἕλληνες, οὔτε βάρβαρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

Context: continuation of 39G, the Stoic classification of *φαντασίαι*.

Since the truth value of a *φαντασία* derives from that of the proposition implicit in it (see vol. 1, 240), it seems to follow from this passage that 'Man is Greek' is neither true nor false, and hence not a well-formed proposition. Cf. E. Aristotle in *De int.* 7, by contrast, allows a proposition like 'Man is white', with a universal subject, to be true, so long as 'is white' is true of some individual man or men.

G Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 104,17–23 (SVF 2.361)

ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα [sc. ἐπιστημὴν εἶναι], εἴτε βέοι κατὰ πᾶν, ὡς ὁ Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, εἴτε γίνονται μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ φθίνοιο, διαμένοντες δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔσαν διὰ τὴν εἰδητικὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς Ἠλᾶτων ἐθέλει, εἴτε καὶ ὄντα τις αὐτὰ καλοῖ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης εἰώθεν, εἴτε καὶ μόνον εἶναι λέγοι, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν, ὁμοῦ τό γε ἐπιστημὴν εἶναι τῶν ἀτόμων παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐστὶν ἀπεγνωσμένον, εἰ μὴ τις ἐπιστημὴν ἐθέλοι καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν.

1 <δ> εἴτε Usener

Context: attempt to deny, contrary to Aristotle, *Metaph.* M.4, 1028b12ff., that Plato's theory of Forms owed any special debt to Heraclitus: on the crucial premises all philosophers agree. But lines 4–6 show scant understanding of Stoic epistemology (see especially 41).

H Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 105,21–5 (SVF 2.364)

... ὡς ὅρα τὰ εἶδη παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς τούτοις ἀνδράσιν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρυσίππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωικῶν ὕστερον ᾤκησαν (πολλαῖς γὰρ διαφοραῖς διέστηκε τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη τῶν ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λεγομένων), οὔτε . . .

1 χρῆσιν Petersen: ῥῆσιν codd

Context: commentary on *Metaph.* A.9, 992b7.

I Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.8–11 (SVF 2.224)

(1) τὸν γὰρ ὄρον φασὶν οἱ τεχνουργοὶ ψιλῇ τῇ συντάξει διαφέρειν τοῦ καθολικοῦ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα, καὶ εἰκότως· ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν "ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικόν ἄνητόν" τῷ εἰπόντι "εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνον ζῶον

ἐστὶ λογικὸν θνητόν" τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει, τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον.
 (2) καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο, συμφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὸ καθολικὸν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
 εἶναι περιληπτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ εἶδη τοῦ ἀποδιδομένου
 πράγματος διήκειν, οἷον τὸν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κατ' εἶδος
 ἀνθρώπους, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ἵππους. ἐνὸς τε ὑποταχθέν-
 τος ψεύδους ἐκάτερον γίνεται μοχθηρόν, τὸ τε καθολικὸν καὶ ὁ ὅρος. (3)
 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὡς ταῦτα φωναῖς ἐξηλλαγμένα κατὰ δυνάμιν ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, ὥδε
 καὶ ἡ τέλειος, φασί, διαίρεσις, δύναμιν ἔχουσα καθολικὴν, συντάξει τοῦ
 καθολικοῦ διενήνοχεν. ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῷδε διαιρούμενος "τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν
 Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι" ἴσον τι λέγει τῷ "εἰ τινὲς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἢ Ἕλληνες εἰσιν
 ἢ βάρβαροι." ἐὰν γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος εὗρισκται μῆτε Ἕλλην μῆτε βάρβαρος, ἀνάγκη
 μοχθηρὰν μὲν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν, ψεύδος δὲ γίνεσθαι τὸ καθολικόν. διόπερ καὶ τὸ
 οὕτως λεγόμενον "τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, τὰ δὲ τούτων
 μεταξύ" δυνάμει κατὰ τὸν Χρύσιππον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καθολικόν "εἰ τινὰ
 ἐστὶν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα ἢτοι ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὰ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδιάφορα". τὸ μὲντοι
 γὰρ τοιοῦτον καθολικὸν ψεύδος ἐστὶν ὑποτασσομένου τινὸς αὐτῷ ψεύδους.

Context: logical diagnosis of the ethical division in 16–17, for which see 58A 1

τ **τεχνογράφοι** A rare word, perhaps 'writers of technical handbooks'. A τέχνη is often especially concerned with classification and definition of terminology (e.g. 70B), and that is probably Sextus' point in using the word here. They are not specified as Stoics, but the identification becomes clear in 17

3 On the force of εἰ here, see vol. 1, 194.

17 **τινὰ** This has the technical function (see 27) of designating particulars, thus making it clear that the division of types is being rewritten as a conditional ranging over all token things.

j Actius 4.11.4–5 (SVF 2.83, para)

ἐστὶ δ' ἐννόημα φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζώου· τὸ γὰρ φάντασμα ἐπειδὴν λογικῇ
 προσπίπτῃ ψυχῇ, τότε ἐννόημα καλεῖται, εἰληφὸς τοῦ νοήματος παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ· διόπερ τοῖς
 ἀλόγοις ζώοις οὐα προσπίπτει, φαντάσματα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν· οὐα δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦτα
 καὶ φαντάσματα κατὰ γένος καὶ ἐννόηματα κατ' εἶδος· ὥπερ τὰ θηρία καὶ οἱ στατήρες
 αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει θηρία (καὶ) στατήρες· εἰν δὲ εἰς πλοῖον δοθῇ μίσθισιν,
 τῆνικαὶ πρὸς τῷ θηρίῳ εἶναι καὶ νοῦλα λέγεται.

Context: continuation of 39E, on the Stoic theory of the development of conceptions.

This text is completely out of step with all the other evidence on ἐννόηματα. It represents them as any figments of a rational mind, implicitly including fictional individuals like Pegasus. It is easy to see how the mistake has arisen. The source has taken a standard description of an ἐννόημα as φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζώου (cf. A 1, C 2), mistaken it for a complete definition, and tried to explain it accordingly (for the explanation, with its 'fate' example, cf. SVF 1.376, conjecturally attributed to Aristotle), overlooking the fact that the term is restricted to universal concepts.

LOGIC AND SEMANTICS

31 Dialectic and rhetoric

A Diogenes Laertius 7.41-4

(1) τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικὴν. τιτὺς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὀρικὸν εἶδος τὸ <τε> περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὀρικὸν περιαιροῦσιν. (2) τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλιμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπενθύνουσι. (3) καὶ τὸ ὀρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἔννοιων τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. (4) τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εἰ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων (5) καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτῇ καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων· ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὀρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. (6) καὶ τὴν μὲν ῥητορικὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τριμερῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι συμβουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ δικανικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμισαστικόν. εἶναι δ' αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰς τε τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν λόγον εἰς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον. (7) τὴν δὲ διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν, ἀξιωματῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ἁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτιῶν καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα συφισμάτων. (8) [- 37C] (9) εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δέικνται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ συλοκισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατὰ τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων.

2 <τε> Usener 3 περιαιροῦσι FP, περιδιαιροῦσι B 11 εἶναι om F 15 δὲ F om BF 26 καὶ λέξεων om F.

Context: the beginning of Diogenes' doxography of the logical part of Stoicism.

2 τὸ <τε> Either Usener's addition of τε, or Apell's insertion of καὶ after εἶδος, is necessary, in order to distinguish definitions from criteria; cf. 3-7.

6 ἐπίγνωσιν Cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* 2.20.21, λαβίων τις παρὰ τῆς φύσεως μέτρα καὶ κανόνας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας

6-7 For the connexion between definition and ἐννοια, cf. 32D, F. H 8, and vol. 2, 194.

8 20 On the two definitions of dialectic, see Long [421], 102-6.

10-15 Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.3, 1358b7 (the three kinds); 1.1, 1354b18 (προοίμιον, διήγησις), III.1, 1403b20 (ὑπόκρισις); III.2, 1414a30 (τάξις); III.9, 1419b10 (ἐπίλογος).

17 21 See 39A, 33F.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.46–8 (SVF 2.130, part)

(1) αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἵδει
 περιέχουσαν ἀρετάς· (2) τὴν τ' ἀπροπτωσίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε δεῖ
 συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ· (3) τὴν δ' ἀνειαυσιότητα ἰσχυρὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ
 εἰκός, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδοῖναι αὐτῷ· (4) τὴν δ' ἀνελεγχίαν ἰσχύϊ ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε
 μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα· (5) τὴν δ' ἀματαιότητα ἔξιν
 ἀναφέρουσιν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. (6) αὐτὴν τε τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ καταλήψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἔξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει
 ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. (7) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν
 σοφὸν ἄπτωτον εἶσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ· τὸ τε γὰρ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεύδος
 διαγιγνώσκεισθαι ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πιθανόν τό τ' ἀμφιβόλως λεγόμενον
 διευκρινεῖσθαι· χωρὶς τ' αὐτῆς οὐκ εἶναι ἰδῶ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. (8)
 διατείνειν δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι προπέτειαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γινόμενα, ὥστ'
 εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκασιότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγνιμάντους ἔχοντας τὰς
 φαντασίας. οὐκ ἄλλως τ' ὁξύν καὶ ἀγχίνουσι καὶ τὸ ὅλον δεινὸν ἐν λόγοις
 φανήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ
 διαλογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ προκειμένα διαλεχθῆναι καὶ πρὸς
 τὰ ἐρωτώμενα ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅπερ ἐμπείρου διαλεκτικῆς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι

5 ἀπάγεσθαι BP. ἀπάγεσθαι F 10 ἀπ' BFP. ὑπ' dgr εἰς προκειμένα P. προκειμένα B. λεγόμενα F

Context: immediately following 40C.

2–8 For these epistemological terms, cf. 41, especially C, D, G; and for discussion of the dialectical virtues, see Long [421], 107–16.

13–14 For the moral significance of using impressions correctly, cf. 62K; 63E

C Diogenes Laertius 7.83 (SVF 2.130)

(1) καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς οἱ Στωικοί, ἵνα μάλιστα κρατύνωσι
 διαλεκτικόν· αἰεὶ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῆς ἐν λόγῳ
 θεωρίας ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὐτὰ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ
 ἥθικοῦ (εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ λογικόν τί δεῖ λέγειν)· (2) περὶ τ' ὀνομάτων
 ὀρθότητος, ὅπως διέταξαν οἱ νόμοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. (3)
 δυοῖν δ' οὐδὲν συνεθεῖναι ταῖν ὑποπιπτούσαιν τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἣ μὲν τί ἑκαυτὸν
 ἔστι τῶν ὄντων σκοπεῖ, ἣ δὲ τί καλεῖται.

1 ἵνα κρατύνωσι F! τὰ κρατύνωσι B τὰ κρατύνουσι dgr ἵνα κρατύνουσι C! dgr 2 αἰεὶ P μόνον B
 [κατ' ἕν] οἱ B 3 αἰεὶ F οἱ B! 3 τε BP οἱ F τόπου dgr ὡς τυπώσιν 4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 τὰς λογικῶν τι δεῖ λέγειν περὶ [τ] ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, πῶς τὰ αἰετ' ὁξύν ὁρατὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις πᾶν
 ἂν ἔχει εἰπεῖν, dubitanter A! om

Context: the conclusion of Diogenes' doxography of Stoic logic.

It seems possible to make sense of this important passage without emendation (rejecting Long [421], 104). We take τοιοῦτοι, i. closely with ὅσα, 'the Stoics are like this in their logic, in order to . . .'. The development of thought from πάντα γὰρ strongly favours reading αἰεὶ, not μόνον, in line 2. In 2–4 the wise man's omnipresent dialectic is justified by its contribution to all three parts of philosophy. Then, at περὶ τ'

ὀνομάτων εἰπεῖν, 4-5. Diogenes makes a new point about Stoic dialectic – its lack of concern with historical linguistics. (For the terminology, cf. Plato, *Crat.* 383a, 384d.) As we point out in vol. 1, 195, the early Stoics' interests in etymology were less fanatical than is sometimes supposed, and the subject is notably absent from Diogenes' programme of dialectical studies, cf. A. The fact, however, that it was a fashionable Hellenistic subject will account for the explicit reference to its exclusion from the wise man's concerns. As a student of language, he confines his interest to σημαίνόμενα and φωνή (A 7), which are probably what is meant by the two συνήθειαι, 6. For Chrysippus' use of συνήθεια in the sense 'linguistic practice', cf. SBH.

D Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 1.8-14 (SVF 2.124)

ἡμᾶς δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προειδέναι ὅτι τὸ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ὄνομα οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνόμενον πάντες οἱ φιλόσοφοι φέρουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀρίζοντο τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὐ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ εὐ λέγειν ἐν τῷ τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγουμένοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου κατὰ τῆς τελειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτό· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ σοφὸς κατ' αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός.

Context: necessary preliminaries to the study of dialectic. After the Stoics, Alexander refers to Plato.

3 This definition, when compared with A 7-9, seems to conflate dialectic with rhetoric: cf. Long [421], 102-3, but note also G

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 2.7 (SVF 1.75, part)

εὐθεν γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτω διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη "τούτῳ", κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστρόφην τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἴδιωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμειως αἰνιττόμενος.

Context: survey of philosophers' accounts of rhetoric.

For Zeno's hand simile illustrating epistemological states, cf. 41A.

F Cicero, *Top.* 6

(1) cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis, unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. (2) Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt, iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia quam διαλεκτικὴν appellant, inveniendi artem quae τοπικὴ dicitur, quae et ad usum prioris erat et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt.

1 partim vulgo om. ad?

Context: the beginning of Cicero's treatment of 'topics'.

4-6 Against Cicero's claim, which he repeats at *De or.* 2.159 and *Fin.* 4.10, cf. *εὑρεσεν*, A 13, and vol. 1, 189.

G Cicero, *De or.* 2.157-8

ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Graeco *διαλεκτικήν* appellaret?

Context: the embassy from Athens to Rome in 156/5 B.C., headed by Carneades, Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus

On Carneades' lectures for and against justice on this occasion, cf. 68M.

H Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1047A-B (SVF 2.297-8)

(1) τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὀρίζεται τέχνην περὶ κόσμον καὶ εἰρομένον λόγον τάξιν· ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ ταῦτα γέγραφεν· "οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου καὶ ἀφελοῦς κόσμου θεῖν οἶομαι ἐπιστρέφεσθαι (ἀλλὰ) κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν αἰκείων ὑποκρίσεως κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβαλλούσας τάσεις τῆς φωνῆς καὶ σχηματισμοῦ τοῦ τε προσώπου καὶ τῶν χειρῶν." (2) οὕτω δέ τις φιλότιμος ἐνταῦθα περὶ τὸν λόγον γενόμενος πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ, περὶ τῆς τῶν φωνηέντων συγκρούσεως ὑπειπών, οὐ μόνον φησὶ ταῦτα παρετόν τοῦ βελτίονος ἔχονμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιάς ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ νῆ Δία σολοικισμούς, ἐφ' οἷς ἄλλοι ἂν αἰσχυρθεῖσιν οὐκ ὀλίγοι. 5

1 κόσμον Xylander κόσμου τοῦτο καὶ εἰρομένου λόγον Μετίτις καὶ εἰρομένου λόγου τοῦτο· εἰρομένου λόγου καὶ Wittenbach, Cherniss 2 καὶ? Xg: om: ceti 3 (ἀλλὰ) κατὰ τὸν λόγον Sandbach· κατὰ (κατὰ γέν) τῶν λόγων W: om: 4 τάσεις XgB, στάσεις ceti. 5 περὶ τὸν λόγον| λόγον om. aB, καὶ περιττός A[Lucr.]; ByEn 7 ὑπειπών| ἐπειπών XgB

Context: example of Chrysippus' flagrant self-contradiction. There is a full discussion of details in Cherniss [326] ad loc.

I Cicero, *Fin.* 4.9 (SVF 1.47)

quid? ea quae dialectica nunc tradant et dicunt, nonne ab illis instituta aut inventa sunt? de quibus etsi a Chrysippo maxime est elaboratum, tamen a Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis.

εἰ μὲν Schiche: om: ABER: om: NV: et Ozelli invenita non del: Madvig

Context: the Stoics' contributions to logic.

1 *illis* The early followers of Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1045F-1046A: in his *On dialectic* book 3 Chrysippus defended the subject's importance by appealing to the seriousness with which it was taken by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and their later followers down to Polemo and Strato.

2 For a study of Zeno's work in logic, cf. Rist [343]

J Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.8.12 (including SVF 1.51)

τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος. τί τέλος; μὴ τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. ποία θεωρήματα; μὴ τι τὰ περὶ τοῦ πῶς πῶγων μέγας γίνεται ἢ κόμη βαθεῖα; (οὐ,) ἀλλὰ μάλλον

ἂ Ζήνων λέγει, γνάναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποιόν τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἀρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλλα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκολουθὰ ἔστιν. 5

1 (οὐ.) ἄλλα *Utr end*

Context: the philosopher's profession.

4 5 While Epictetus may be using Zeno's name loosely, this could be a genuine reminiscence of the school's founder. What are τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα? Not 'parts of speech' in the linguistic sense, as at *SVF* 2.148. Bouhóffer [312], 127 n. 7, renders, 'die Grundgesetze des Denkens'. On the evidence of 39E 4 and 53V, we should think more specifically of ἐνοεῖαι and προλήψεις. For the general implications of ἀρμόττεται and ἀκολουθία, cf. Long [426], 95–104.

K Stobaeus 2.22.12–15 (*SVF* 1.49)

Ζήνων τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας εἰκάξε τοῖς δικαίοις μέτροις οὐ πυρὸν
οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν σπονδαίων μετροῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄχυρα καὶ κόπρια.

1 δικαίους AS, εἰκαίους B

Context: miscellany of philosophers' remarks on dialectic.

L Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034a

(1) πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα "μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσης"
ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων τοιούτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος· (2) "εἴτ' ἀπέδειξεν ὁ
πρότερος εἰπών, οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος (πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ
ζητούμενον), εἴτ' οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν (ὁμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδ' ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς
ἢ ὑπακούσας ἑτερέτισεν). (3) ἦτοι δ' ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν. (4) οὐκ 5
ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος." (5) τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας
αὐτὸς ἀντέγραφε μὲν πρὸς τὴν *Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν* ἔλκε δὲ σοφίσματα,
καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν
τοὺς μαθητάς.

1 μηδὲ Basil: μήτε γ' ἀρκεῖται

Context: Plutarch cites Zeno's argument in order to claim that it made Zeno's criticisms of Plato superfluous.

1 The fame of this hexameter verse is shown by the complexity of its transmission; cf. Cherniss [326] ad loc.

7 For Zeno's criticism of Plato's *Republic*, cf. vol. 1, 435. He also wrote a book of λύσεις and two of ἔλεγχοι, D.L. 7.4

M Diogenes Laertius 7.25 (*SVF* 1.279)

καὶ πρὸς τὸν δείξαντα δ' αὐτῷ Διαλεκτικὸν ἐν τῷ θερίζοντι λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὰ
διαλεκτικὰς ιδέας πυθέσθαι, πῶς εἰσπράττεται μισθοῦ ἀκούσαντα δὲ
ἐκατόν, διακοσίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι, τοσοῦτον ἥσκει φιλομάθειαν

Context: life of Zeno.

1 For this argument, cf. 37C.

N Diogenes Laertius 7.160-1 (SVF 1.351, part)

τὸν τε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀγῆρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ' οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰοικέναι δὲ τοὺς διαλεκτικούς λόγους τοῖς ἀραχνοῖς, ἃ καίτοι δοκούντα τεχνικὸν τι ἐμφαίνειν, ἄχρημά ἐστιν

1 οὐδὲν B¹ οὐδέ F

Context: life of Aristo.

1-2 See also SVF 1.352-7, with discussion by Joppola [346], 63-9a

3-4 See also SVF 1.391-4.

O Diogenes Laertius 7.182-4 (with omissions; = SVF 2.9, 2.1, part)

πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατεξανιστάμενον Κλεάνθου Διαλεκτικὸν καὶ προτείνοντα αὐτῷ σοφίσματα, "πέπαισο", εἶπε, "παρέλκων τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἀπὸ τῶν πραγματικωτέρων, ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρότεινε τοῖς νέοις" . . . τέλος δ' Ἀρκεσίδαω καὶ Λακτύδῃ, καθά φησι Σωτίων ἐν τῷ ὁγδόῳ, παρσγενόμενος ἐν Ἀκαδημαίᾳ συνεφιλοσόφησε· δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἐπεχειρήσε, καὶ περὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ πληθύν τῇ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν αὐτάσκει χρηομένους

1 παρέλκων PP παρε- B¹ήσκει! 2 τὸ νέος B¹ τοὺς νέους τοι τα προτείνει F 3 αὐτάσκει P ἐνοτάσει B, στάσει F

Context: life of Chrysippus.

5-6. This set of arguments is turned against Chrysippus by Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1036A-E (= P, part): for his six books κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας and his seven ὑπὲρ [i.e. bet. for MSS περὶ] . . . cf. D.L. 7.198

6-7. An intriguing item, which is spoiled by the 1968 mis-translation of αὐτάσκει by 'method'. In mathematics, αὐτάσκει normally means 'construction' (cf. Proclus, *In Eucl.* 1.419, 15-420, 12), and it refers to the composition of geometrical figures in 14.6a DK. Given Aristotle's well-attested interest in mathematics (cf. Long [602]), this testimony rings true, though its precise sense seems impossible to determine.

P Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1035F-1037B (with omissions; = SVF 2.127, 270, 129)

(1) τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία διαλέγεσθαι καθόλου μὲν οὐ φησιν ἀποδοκιμαῖζειν, χρήσθαι δὲ τούτῳ παραινεῖ μετ' εὐλαβείας, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλὰ διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανόν· (2) "τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει" φησί "τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς δ' βούλονται· τοῖς δ' ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζόμενοι καθ' ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσάμεθα, τὰ ἐναντία, στοιχειοῦν καὶ καταστοιχίζειν τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, ἐφ' ὧν καιρὸς ἐστι μνησθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανόν καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις" . . . (3) ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ Περὶ βίων, ταῦτα γράφων· "οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε δ' οὐδέ τοὺς ἐναντίους ὑποδεικτέον λόγους αὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία

πιθανά ἀλλ' εὐλαβουμένους μὴ καὶ περισπασθέντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὰς καταλήψεις ἀφώσιν, οὔτε τῶν λύσεων ἱκανῶς ἂν ἀκούσαι δυνάμενοι καταλαμβάνοντες τ' εὐαποσείστως· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τάλλα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ῥαδίως προείναι ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Μεγαρικῶν ἐρωτημάτων περισπώμενοι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πλείονων καὶ δυναμικωτέρων ἐρωτημάτων". . . (4) ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἱερὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου χρήσεως εἰπών, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα χρῆσθαι καθάπερ οὐδ' ὄπλοις, ταῦτ' ἐπείρηκε· "πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν εὕρεσιν δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τούτων συγγένειαν, εἰς τὰναντία δ' οὐ, πολλῶν ποιούντων τοῦτο", πολλοὺς δὲ λέγων ἴσως τοὺς ἐπέχοντας.

2 τινῶν Χρ. οὕτω cetl. 6 κατασπουχίζεν vel κατασπυχίζεν codd: κατασπυχίζεν (Cheranus 11n οὐδὲ (τὰ) πρὸς Pohlenz, Cleiniss 12 οὐτε Reiske οὐδὲ codd 20 συγγένειαν codd. συγγενοσύην Pohlenz, Cheranus 11h Empereur. δι codd

Context: Chrysippus' inconsistency in propounding the doctrine of **P** when in fact his own arguments against common sense (see note on **O** 5-6) were stronger than those for it.

- 3 4 A certain allusion to the sceptical Academy; cf. vol. 1, 446
6 ὁμολογουμένως A reference to the ethical end: cf. 63A-B.
11-13 Cf. B 2 6.

Q Diogenes Laertius 7.180 (SF 2.1. part)

οὕτω δ' ἐπίδοξος ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐγένετο, ὥστε δοκεῖν τοὺς πλείους ὅτι εἰ παρὰ θεοῖς ἦν διαλεκτική, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη ἦν ἢ ἡ Χρυσαίπειος.

Context: life of Chrysippus.

R Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.7.2-5, 10 (= 37J 2)

(1) ζητοῦμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης πῶς ἂν εὖροι ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν. (2) οὐκοῦν ἡ ταῦτο λεγέτωσαν, ὅτι οὐ συγκαθῆρκε εἰς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἢ ὅτι συγκαθεῖς οὐκ ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ μὴδ' ὡς ἐτυχεν ἐν ἐρωτῇ καὶ ἀποκρίσει ἀναστρέφασθαι, ἢ τούτων μῆδέτερον προσδεχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι ἐπίσκοφίν τινα ποιητέον τῶν τόπων τούτων, περὶ οὓς μάλιστα στρέφεται ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις. (3) τί γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ; ἀληθῆ τιθέναι, τὰ ψευδῆ αἰρεῖν, <πρὸς> τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπέχειν. ἄρ' οὐν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον μαθεῖν; . . . οὐκ ἀρκεῖ.

1 εὖροι Meibom: εἰροῖ 5 3 ἢ Schenkl. μὴ 5 * <πρὸς> Meibom, cf. Epictetus *Diss.* 3.1.2 For discussion of Epictetus' assessment of logic, cf. Long [421]. 119-21.

S Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.17.7-8

ἂν δὲ μὴ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστὶ μόδιος μὴδὲ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον τί ἐστὶ ζυγός, πῶς ἔτι μετρηταί τι ἢ στήσαι δυνησόμεθα; ἐναυθα οὖν τὸ τῶν

ἄλλων κριτήριον καὶ δεῖ ὑὸ τὰλλα καταμανθάνεται μὴ καταμεμαθηκότες
μηδ' ἠκριβωκότες δυνήσόμεθα τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβῶσαι καὶ καταμαθεῖν;

Context: discussion of the proposition that logic is necessary. Epictetus explains here why the Stoics make it the first subject of study. Cf. *Diss.* 2.11.13

T Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.23.44–6

τί γάρ κωλύει φράζοντα ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀτυχεῖν; τί δὲ κωλύει συλλογισ-
μοὺς ἀναλύνοντα ὡς Χρῦσιππος ἀθλιον εἶναι . . . ταῦτα ὅταν λέγω πρὸς
τινας, οἶονταί με καταβάλλειν τὴν περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ τὴν περὶ τὰ
θεωρήματα. ἐγὼ δ' οὐ ταύτην καταβάλλω, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ταύτ' ἀκαταληκ-
τικῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰς αὐτῶν ἐλπίδας.

5

4–5 ταύτ' ἀκαταληκτικῶς Upt. and (corr.) ταῦτα ἀκαταληκτικῶς S. 5 αὐτῶν Κοιτῆς: αὐτῶν ουδ

Context: the proper use of the faculty of speech.

32 Definition and division

A Diogenes Laertius 8.48

τοῦτον ὁ Φαβρινῶς φησιν ὅροις χρήσασθαι διὰ τῆς μαθηματικῆς ὕλης,
ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ Σωκράτην καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνῳ πλησιάσαντας, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ'
Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ τοὺς Στωικούς.

Context: life of Pythagoras.

B *Schol. Dion. Thrac.* 107.5–7 (*SIF* 2.226, part)

(1) ὁ δὲ Χρῦσιππος λέγει ὅτι ὁρος ἐστὶν ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις, τουτέστιν ὁ τὸ
ἴδιον ἀποδιδούς. (2) ὁ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωικός λέγει "ὁρος ἐστὶ λόγος
κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκφερόμενος", τουτέστι κατ' ἀντιστροφὴν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὁρος
ἀντιστρέφειν θέλει.

3 ἀντιστροφὴν h: ἀναστροφὴν c

Context: prolegomenon to the τέχνη of Dionysius Thrac. Before seeking the definition of τέχνη, we must seek the definition of 'definition'!

1 τουτέστιν ὁ The masculine is odd, and the entire clause barely amplifies what precedes. Perhaps read τουτέστιν ὁ (λόγος ὁ)?

C Diogenes Laertius 7.60 2

(1) ὁρος δὲ ἐστὶν, ὡς φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ὄρων, λόγος
κατ' ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, (2) ἢ, ὡς Χρῦσιππος ἐν τῷ
Περὶ ὄρων, ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις. (3) ὑπογραφή δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος τυπωδῶς εἰσάγων
εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἢ ὄρου ἀπλούτερον τὴν τοῦ ὄρου δύναμιν προσεινεγ-

μένος. (4) [= 30C] (5) διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἶδη τομή, 5
οἷον "τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα." (6) ἀντιδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι
γένους εἰς εἶδος τομὴ κατὰ τοῦναντίον, ὥς ἂν κατ' ἀπύφασιν, οἷον "τῶν
ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὰ." (7) ὑποδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι
διαίρεσις ἐπὶ διαίρεσει, οἷον "τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δ' οὐκ
ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα." (8) 10
μερισμὸς δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς τόπους κατὰτάξεις, ὥς ὁ Κρίνιος· οἷον "τῶν
ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα."

3. ἴδιον Aristot. ἡ B (31¹). om. F 4. ἡ ὅρου Sedley ἡ ὅρου add

Comment: survey of Stoic dialectic (see on 33A)

D. Galen, *Def. med.* 19.348,17–349,4

τινὲς δὲ καὶ οὕτως ὥρισαντο· "ὅρος ἐστὶ λόγος κατ' ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτι-
ζόντως ἐκφερόμενος", ἢ "ὅρος ἐστὶ διὰ βραχείας ὑπομνήσεως εἰς ἔννοιαν
ἡμῶν ἄγων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς φωναῖς πραγμάτων."

2–3. The same definition is cited at 5 E., *PH* 2.212. There is no firm evidence that
it is Stoic (especially given its somewhat Epicurean ring, cf. 17C 1, E 3), beyond
Galen's coupling of it with the first definition, attested as Stoic in C 1, and the similar
language at F, H 8 and I 1.

E. Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 42,27–43,2 (*SVF* 2.228, part)

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅρον εἶναι λόγον κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενον,
ἀνάλυσιν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἐξάπλωσιν τοῦ ὁριστοῦ καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς,
ἀπαρτιζόντως δὲ τὸ μῆτε ὑπερβύλλειν μῆτε ἐνδεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοιεν τὸν
ὅρον διαφέρειν τῷ ἴδιον ἀποδόσεως.

2. ὁριστοῦ ὁριστικοῦ A

Comment: commentary on *Top* 1.5, 101b39, definition of ὅρος as λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
σημαίνων. Alexander has just criticized Antisthenes and 'some of the Stoics' for being
varied to regard a definition as conveying just τὸ τί ἦν. His objection is that 'what it
is' may be stated with a formula which fails to convey what the thing's being consists
in. The present remark seems to continue this criticism of the Stoics alluded to, who
must either be, or include, the circle of Antipater, cf. C 2, for the upshot, see vol. 1,
194. Alexander's criticism must be assuming the broad Aristotelian use of ἴδιον for
'peculiar characteristic', a class of which essential, and thus definitional, characteristics
form a sub-class (*Top* 1.5, 101b19–23); whereas Stoic usage of the term suggests that
they have this sub-class itself in mind.

3. ἀπαρτιζόντως. For the explanation given here of this term, cf. 28N 6.

F. Augustine, *Civ. dei* 8.7 (*SVF* 2.106, part)

etiam ipsi Stoici, qui cum vehementer amaretur solertiam disputandi, quam dialecticam
nominant, a corporis sensibus eam ducendam putarunt, non auscullantes autem

concupere notionēs, quas appellant ἐννοίας, earum rerum scilicet quas definiendo explicant; hinc propagari atque connecti totam discendi docendique rationem.

5

Context: condemnation of Stoic philosophy for its reliance on the senses, by contrast with Platonism.

G Galen, *Adv. Lyc.* 3.7 (*SVF* 2.230, part)

ἐν γάρ τοι τῇ γνώσει τῶν διαφορῶν ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων αἱ τέχναι συνίστανται. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πλείστον μὲν κἀν τῷ [περὶ] Φιλήβου διήλθεν ὁ Πλάτων εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· ἐφύλαξε δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν γνώμην Ἀριστοτέλης, Θεόφραστος, Χρύσιππος· καὶ Μνησίθεος, καὶ οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ, διήλθεν ἐν τῷ περὶ τέχνης γράμματι τὴν αὐτὴν λόγον.

5

Context: attack on Lycus for maintaining that 'one heat does not differ from another' 2–3. See Plato, *Philebus* 12c–19a.

4 Μνησίθεος Distinguished Athenian doctor, fourth century B.C.

H Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.53

(1) dicamus igitur utilem insaniam? tracta definitiones fortitudinis: intelleges eam stomacho non egere (2) fortitudo est igitur "affectio animi legi summae in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans". (3) vel "conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis rebus quae formidolosae videntur subeundis et repellendis". (4) vel "scientia rerum formidolosarum contrariarumque et omnino neglegendarum conservans earum rerum stabile iudicium". (5) vel brevius, ut Chrysippus (nam superiores definitiones erant Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici; sunt etiam omnino omnes fere similes, sed declarant communis notionēs alia magis alia) (6) quomodo igitur Chrysippus? "fortitudo est" inquit "scientia rerum perferendarum"; (7) vel "affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore". (8) quamvis licet insectemur istos, ut Carneades solebat, metuo ne soli philosophi sint. quae enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam? qua aperta quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aut oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existimet sine rabie quicquam fortiter facere posse?

5

10

15

Context: Cicero's defence of the Stoic treatment of πάθη (see 65).

For further Stoic material on definitions of courage, cf. 61C D. H

I Diogenes Laertius 7.199–200

(1) ἠθικοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἐννοιῶν σύνταξις πρώτη· (2) Ὑπογραφή τοῦ λόγου πρὸς Θεόπορον α', Θέσεις ἠθικαὶ α', Πιθανὰ λήμματα εἰς τὰ δόγματα πρὸς Φιλομαθὴ γ', Ὁρων τῶν τοῦ ἀπείρου πρὸς Μητροδωρον β', Ὁρων τῶν τοῦ φαύλου πρὸς Μητροδωρον

β', Ὅρων τῶν ἀναμέσεων πρὸς Μητροδώρον β', Ὅρων τῶν πρὸς 5
Μητροδώρου κατὰ γένος ζ', Ὅρων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας πρὸς
Μητροδώρου α' β'. (3) σύνταξις δευτέρα: Περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸς
Ἀριστοκλέα γ', Περὶ τῶν ὁρων πρὸς Μητροδώρου ζ'. (4) σύνταξις τρίτη:
Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὁρθῶς τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιλεγόμενων πρὸς Λαοδάμαντα ζ',
Ἰθιανὰ εἰς τοὺς ὅρους πρὸς Διοσκουρίδην β', Περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν πρὸς 10
Γοργιππίδην β', Περὶ τῶν διαιρέσεων α', Περὶ ἐναντιῶν πρὸς Διονύσιον
β', Ἰθιανὰ πρὸς τὰς διαιρέσεις καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ Περὶ τῶν
ἐναντιῶν α'. (5) σύνταξις τετάρτη: Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα
ζ', Ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα δ'.

1 δι' ὁρθῶσαν B: δι' ὁρθῶσαν P

1 **διάρθρωσιν** As the following titles show, the idea is that it is definitions that 'articulate' our natural conceptions. This notion of articulation (cf. P, H 5 and 8, 40G 2; Cicero, *Top.* 31, *Or.* 116) becomes prominent in the work of Epictetus and also in later Academic philosophy, e.g. Anon. *In Plat. Theat.* 47.33ff., where it is a development of the Platonic theory of recollection. In the absence of clear evidence for it in early Stoicism, we cannot be entirely confident that the heading here dates back to Chrysippus' own time.

J Origen, *Cels.* 1.24 (SVF 2.146)

... ἐμπέπει εἰς τὸ προκείμενον λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρητος, ὁ περὶ 5
φύσεως ὀνομάτων πότερον, ὡς οἰεῖται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἰσὶ τὰ
ὀνόματα ἢ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένους τῶν
πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὼ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινα
τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν.

Context: attack on Celsus' view that it makes no difference if God is called 'Zeus', or by any other local name for the supreme deity. In the sequel, Origen adds the Epicurean theory of the origin of language (see 19) to the list.

1 **Ἀριστοτέλης** The reference will be to *De int.* 3, 16219; 4, 1721 2.

33 Sayables (*lekta*)

A Diogenes Laertius 7.57 (SVF 3 Diogenes 20, part)

διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἥχος ἐστὶ, λέξις δὲ τὸ 5
ἐναρθρῶν μόνον. λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος αἰεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι,
λέξις δὲ καὶ ἀσήμαντος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ
τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι· προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ
πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.

2 λέξις ἐστὶ dg om B1P 3 δὲ καὶ dg μὲν γὰρ B1P 4 σήμαντος dg: σημαντος γινεται B1P

Context: doxography of Stoic dialectic, possibly derived from a handbook by Diocles of Magnesia (D.L. 7.48; cf. 39A), first century B.C., though the extension of Diogenes'

excerpt beyond D.L. 7.49 is disputed. The Stoic philosopher chiefly cited by Diogenes in the first part of this survey is Diogenes of Babylon, who wrote a book *Περὶ φωνῆς* (D.L. 7.55, 57).

1 **λέξις** Defined as *φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον "ἡμέρα"*, D.L. 7.56.

2 **λόγος** Defined as *φωνὴ σηματική ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη*, D.L. 7.56; cf.

D. Most editors accept Casaubon's supplement, *οἷον "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ"*, after *ἐκπεμπομένη*. This may be right, but there is no reason to think that a *λόγος* has to be a 'complete sayable', F 3.

3 **βλῆτορι** This, together with *σκινδαφός* (S E., M. 8.133), was the standard example of a meaningless word. Cf. Galen 8.662 Kühn, where the corresponding verbs are coined, to express his indifference to terminology used to describe the action of the pulse.

5 **λεκτά** The Stoics appear to have invented this usage of the term. Thereafter it became grammarians' jargon for distinguishing the semantic aspect of a word from its sound; cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.* 136,32.

B Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.11–12 (SVF 2.166, part)

(1) ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῷ
σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ
δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. (2) καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης
προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τὸ τε
σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν
φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίῳ, σημανόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς
δηλούμενον καὶ οὐ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμέ-
νου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαίονσι καί περ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες,
τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίῳ. (3) τούτων δὲ δύο
μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνήν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἀσώματον,
ὥσπερ τὸ σημανόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν, ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ
ψεῦδος.

... τὴν σημανόμενον Bekker: τὰ σημανόμενα could

Context: doxography of truth.

1–3 Sextus (M. 8.13) attributes the second option to Epicurus and Strato; he discusses the third in 137–8, but explicitly doubts its having nameable proponents (13).

5 **τυγχάνον** For the interpretation of this term, see vol. 1, 201. If, as suggested there, something is so called because 'it bears a case' (*πτώσεως τυγχάνει*), we can understand why *πτώσεις* were called *τεκταί* (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 209.10ff.) by the Stoicizing 'Academics', who feature in 29g (Ps.-Ammonius' explanation of *τυγχάνοντα*, included in SVF 2.236, is completely fanciful.) *ὀνόματος*, οἱ *προσηγορίας*, *τυγχάνειν* is commonly used for 'to bear a name' (e.g. 39A 6; 72N 4; S E., M. 8.80; Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 32.10; 73.14; 386.29), and *πτώσεως τυγχάνειν* (which occurs in Q) is merely the generic counterpart of this.

6 What the bare name 'Dion' signifies is not a *λεκτόν* or something with a truth value, but 'a peculiar quality' (see M). Sextus should have cited an *ἀξίωμα* in order to make his point properly; cf. E. and Long [426], 77 with n. 11.

7-8 **παροφισταμένου** Cf. C, F 2.

9-11 Cf. E 2, and for the corporeality of *φανή*, H.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.70 (SVF 2.187, part)

ῥηίζουσιν αἱ Στωικαὶ κοινὰς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὀφιστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἐστὶ λόγῳ παραστήσαι

Context: detailed criticism of the views outlined in B.

2-3 **λογικὴν φαντασίαν** This comprises the *φαντασίαι* of rational animals, which are identified with 'thought processes' (*ῥηήσεις*), 39A 6

D Diogenes Laertius 7.49 (SVF 2.52, part: - 39A 2)

προηγείται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκκαλητικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ.

Context: see 39A 1, which explains the sequence *προ*... *εἴθ'*: *φαντασία* is the starting-point of any mental act, and therefore prior to assent, cognition etc.

E Seneca, *Ep.* 117.13

(1) "sunt" inquit "naturae corporum, tamquam hic homo est, hic equus; has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativae corporum. (2) hi habent proprium quiddam et a corporibus seductum, tamquam video Catonem ambulante: hoc sensus ostendit, animus credit. corpus est quod video, cum et oculos intendi et animum, dico deinde: 'Cato ambulat', non corpus" inquit "est quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum. (3) sic cum dicimus 'sapientiam', corporale quiddam intellegimus; cum dicimus 'sapit', de corpore loquimur, plurimum autem interest utrum illud dicas an de illo."

* *est* non *φάντασμα* B = *quiddam* *est* illud *est* illud *est* illud

Context: exposition of the Stoic distinction between 'goods', which are corporeal (e.g. *sapientia*), and the incorporeal sayables expressed by the corresponding verbs (e.g. *sapere*), cf. J 9-11 on *φρόνησις/φρονεῖν* etc.

2 **motus animorum enuntiativi** Cf. *διάνοια ἐκκαλητικὴ*, D. *enuntiativus* appears to be coined by Seneca to translate *ἐκκαλητικός* or *προφορικός*.

7 *ῥηῖσθαι* is Cicero's translation of *ῥηζίζωμαι* in 37H 34, in 38G 2 and 70G possibly he uses *enuntiatum* and *enuntiare*.

9 **illud** For the correction to the neuter, cf. *corpus*, s. 8.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.63

(1) ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων τόπῳ τέτακται ὁ περὶ λεκτῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιωματῶν καὶ συλλογισμῶν λόγος καὶ ὁ περὶ ἑλλειπῶν τε καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ ὁρθῶν καὶ ὑπέρτων. (2) φασὶ δὲ

[τὸ] λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. (3) τῶν δὲ
 λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωικοί, τὰ δ' ἑλλιπῆ. ἑλλιπῆ
 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον "γράφει"
 ἐπιζητοῦμεν γάρ, "τίς;" αὐτοτελῆ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένῃν ἔχοντα τὴν
 ἐκφοράν, οἷον "γράφει Σωκράτης". ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἑλλιπέσι λεκτοῖς
 τέτακται τὰ κατηγορήματα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς αὐτοτελέσι τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ οἱ
 συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα.

10

4 τοῖ δὲ Ἀριστ. S.F. 2.1.80

Context: see on A.

1-3. As is clear from 9-10, propositions and syllogisms are only two of the species of complete sayables; cf. D.L. 7.66-8, which includes imperatives, oaths and addresses. For further species of predicates, cf. D.L. 7.64.

6 γράφει. There is nothing grammatically incomplete about γράφει as an expression. Hence Detel [433], 279, is correct to reject 'writes' as a translation in favour of 'he (she, it) i.e. someone writes'. But what is expressed by γράφει is an incomplete λεκτόν, and not, as Detel suggests, an 'indefinite simple proposition' (341f. 7).

10. For the difference between ἐρωτήματα and πύσματα, cf. D.L. 7.66.

G Diogenes Laertius 7.64 (S.F. 2.183, part)

ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ κατηγορήμα τὸ κατὰ τινος ἀγορευόμενον ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν
 περὶ τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὥς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλοδώρον φασιν, ἢ λεκτὸν ἑλλιπὲς
 συντακτὸν ὁρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν.

1 ὁρθῇ ἢ πλῆρῃ ὁ συντακτὸν λέγει

Context: immediately after F

The material difference, if any, between these three accounts of 'predicate' is unclear. (Kneale [405], 144, unaccountably writes of 'two definitions'.) Nor do we know whether περὶ τινος ἢ τινῶν, 2, simply refers to singular or plural subjects or whether some more subtle point is intended.

H Diogenes Laertius 7.55-6

ζῶον μὲν ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἀήρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένως, ἀνθρώπου δ' ἔστιν
 ἐναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὥς ὁ Διογένης φησὶν, ἥτις ἀπὸ
 δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν τελειοῦται. καὶ σῶμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ τοὺς
 Στωικούς, ὥς φασιν Ἀρχέδημος ἔν τῃ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ
 Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι· ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ
 φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων.

5

Context: see on A.

1-2. For animal and human ὁρμή, cf. 53A. P. R. U.

3. For the age of rational maturity, see note on 39E 9-11.

5-6. For similar arguments deducing corporeality, cf. 45C. D. 60S.

I Stobaeus 2.88,2-6 (SVF 3.171)

(1) *πάσας δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν.* (2) *ἤδη δὲ ἄλλω μὲν εἶναι συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμὰς· καὶ συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιώμασί τισιν, ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα, τὰ περιεχόμενά πως ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν ταῖ συγκαταθέσεις*

2 ἄλλω Wachsmuth: ἄλλων codd. 4 αἱ συγκαταθέσεις del. Meincke. αἷς συγκαταθεσάσαι Wachsmuth. καὶ συγκαταθεσάσαι Usener

Context: account of Stoic doctrine of ὁρμή.

The most thorough discussion of this passage and its implications, which are of crucial importance for understanding the Stoic theory of action, is Inwood [547], 56-66, cf. also Long [434]. Unfortunately, the text is both corrupt and obscure in parts. Perhaps the chief difficulty is to ascertain the force of *τὰ περιεχόμενά πως*, 4. Interpretation should start from 1: every ὁρμή is a συγκατάθεσις; i.e. every ὁρμή is an act of assent. But plainly not every act of assent is a ὁρμή. Hence, in spite of the identity asserted in 1, there must be something about a ὁρμή (or a hormetic assent) which is not covered simply by its being a συγκατάθεσις. This is explained as 'actually' (ἤδη) a difference between the objects of the two faculties: we assent to certain propositions, but our ὁρμαὶ are ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα. ἐπὶ recalls the standard account of ὁρμή as a movement of soul towards something, 53Q. In assenting, we approve the truth of a proposition – e.g. 'I should exercise'. On a Stoic analysis, genuine assent to this proposition will be accompanied by an impulse to exercise. And, from 53R, the linguistic form that the impulse takes is seen to be imperatival, 'Exercise!'. Hence, it seems, our impulse is not directed to the whole proposition. Having given it our assent, what we are impelled towards is not, 'I should exercise', but exercising, the action to which our assent to the whole proposition impels us. It is perhaps this focus on the predicate of the proposition which accounts for the qualification *τὰ περιεχόμενά πως*. The predicate expressing the desirable action is contained in the proposition; but the proposition itself is not atomic, and thus its predicate can be isolated as the proper object of ὁρμή. For two suggestive parallels for this use of περιέχειν, cf. S.E., PH 2.112, 144.

J Stobaeus 2.97,15-98,6 (SVF 3.91)

(1) *διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ αἰρετὸν καὶ αἰρετέον, οὕτω καὶ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ὀρεκτέον καὶ βουλευτὸν καὶ βουλευτέον καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν καὶ ἀποδεκτέον. αἰρετὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ βουλευτὰ καὶ ὀρεκτὰ (καὶ ἀποδεκτὰ τὰγαθὰ· τὰ δ' ὠφελήματα αἰρετέα καὶ βουλευτέα καὶ ὀρεκτέα) καὶ ἀποδεκτέα, κατηγορήματα ὄντα, παρακείμενα δ' ἀγαθοῖς.* (2) *αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὰ αἰρετέα καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ βουλευτέα καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τὰ ὀρεκτέα. κατηγορημάτων γὰρ αἱ τε αἰρέσεις καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ βουλήσεις γίνονται, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ὁρμαί·* (3) *ἔχειν μέντοι αἰρούμεθα καὶ βουλόμεθα καὶ ὁμοίως ὀρεγόμεθα τὰγαθὰ, διὸ καὶ αἰρετὰ καὶ βουλευτὰ καὶ ὀρεκτὰ τὰγαθὰ ἐστὶ. τὴν γὰρ*

φρόνησιν αἰρούμεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ 10
σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορήματα.

1 4 suppl. Heine 9 τάπηθ' Useneri ἀγαθὰ Uddé.

Stobaeus repeats the gist of this material at 2.78.7–12 (= SVF 3.89).

3 ὁρεκτά For the connexion of ὁρεξίς with 'goods', cf. note on 56C 2.

3–4 Heine's supplement draws on Stobaeus, 2.78.13–16: τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα 5
ἐστὶν ὑπομενέα καὶ ἐμμενέα . . . τὰ δὲ ὠφέληματα πάντα ὑπομενεέα καὶ
ἐμμενεέα. The distinction between -τός adjectives, which refer to ἀγαθὰ, and -τέος
adjectives, which refer to ὠφέληματα, is difficult to elucidate, but seems to amount to
the following. The good, as primarily instantiated in virtue, is corporeal (cf. 60S).
Virtuous actions, such as φρονεῖν, though also describable as 'good' (cf. 60G), are
incorporeal predicates of someone who 'has' φρόνησις. They, unlike the virtues
themselves, are not 'choiceworthy etc. things', but 'what should be chosen etc.' in the
sphere of action. The Stoics reported here seem to have authorized ὠφέλημα as the
term to describe the beneficial result of virtuous actions, to distinguish this from the
goodness of the virtues themselves, on which it depends. Cf. 60G 20–2, where a
similar point is made by treating 'good' in reference to virtuous actions as a secondary
and different usage from its application to virtue. For further discussion, cf. Long
[434], 86–90.

6 8 κατηγορημάτων . . . ὅρμαι For the connexion between these, see I.

10–11 Cf. 55A 3, B, for a similar distinction in cause-effect relations.

K Anthonius, *In Ar. De int.* 43,5–15 (FDS 776, part)

λεγόντων δὲ πρὸς αὐτοῖς τῶν Περπατητικῶν ὡς τὰς μὲν ἄλλας εἰκότως λέγομεν πτώσεις 5
διὰ τὸ πεπτωκέναι ἀπὸ τῆς εὐθείας, τὴν δὲ εὐθεῖαν κατὰ τινὰ λόγον πτώσιν ὀνομάζειν
δίκαιον ὡς ἀπὸ τίνος πρσοῦσαν. (ἄλλων γὰρ ὅτι πάσων πτώσιν ἀπὸ τίνος ἀνωτέρω
τεταγμένου γίνεσθαι προήκει), ἀποκρίνονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ
νόηματος τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ αὕτη πέπτωκεν· ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχομεν τὸ 5
Σωκράτους νόημα δηλώσει βουλόμενοι, τὸ Σωκράτους ὄνομα προφερό-
μεθα· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ἀνωθεν ἀφεθὲν γραφεῖον καὶ ὀρθὴν παγὲν
πεπτωκέναι τε λέγεται καὶ τὴν πτώσιν ὀρθὴν ἐσχηκέναι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
καὶ τὴν εὐθεῖαν πεπτωκέναι μὲν ἀξιούμεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνοίας, ὀρθὴν δὲ εἶναι
διὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν προφοράς. 10

Context: disagreement between Stoics and Peripatetics on whether the nominative
should be called a πτώσις.

L Schol. Dion. Thrac. 230,24 8 (FDS 781, part)

εἰ ὀρθή, πῶς πτώσις; ὅτι πέπτωκεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου καὶ γενικοῦ εἰς τὸ
εἰδικόν· ὀρθή δέ, ὅτι οὐπω ἐκινήθη εἰς πλάγιον, ἢ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ
καλούμενα παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ὀρθὰ ῥήματα, ἃ εἰσιν ἐνεργητικά, οἶον
"Σωκράτης τύπτει".

Context: the nominative case.

The first part of this explanation can hardly be Stoic. What is said in 2–4 about the connexion between the nominative and active verbs may illustrate ἀρχέτυπον, K 10; such verbs start from or depend on (ἐξ αὐτῆς) a nominative noun as their subject.

M Diogenes Laertius 7.58 (SVF 3 Diogenes 22, part)

ἐστὶ δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαῖον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον “ἄνθρωπος”, “ἵππος”. ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης· ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου σημαῖον ἀσύνθετον κατηγορήμα, ὡς ὁ Διογένης, ἦ, ὡς τινες, στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπρωτον, σημαῖον τι συντακτὸν περὶ τινος ἢ τινῶν, οἷον “γράφω”, “λέγω”.

Context: see on A.

1 **λόγου** The Stoics treated what are today called ‘parts of speech’ as parts of ‘language’ (λόγος not λέξις, cf. A). This is in line with their interest in establishing correspondence between the phonetic aspect of discourse and λεκτά; cf. Frede [418], 59–67, who translates λέξις by ‘dicuon’ and λόγος by ‘speech’.

2–3 **ποιότητα** Cf. 28G–H.

4–5 **ἀσύνθετον, ἄπρωτον, συντακτὸν** Three ways of indicating what a verb means in abstraction from its subject or syntactical function.

In the text which follows this extract the remaining two ‘parts of language’ are defined: ‘conjunction’ (σύνδεσμος) and ‘article’ (ἄρθρον), to which Antipater added as a sixth part (D.L. 7.57) ‘adverb’ (μεσότης).

N Ammonius, *In Ar. De int.* 17,24–8 (FDS 702, part)

ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διδάσκει διὰ τούτων, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ προηγουμένως καὶ προσεχῶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν σημαίνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι τὰ νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τούτων μέσων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον δεῖ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπινοεῖν μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑποτιθέμενοι λεκτὸν ἡξίουσιν ὀνομάζειν.

For detailed discussion, cf. Long [426], 79–82. The Aristotelian commentators’ inability to view Stoic λεκτά independently of Aristotle’s theory of meaning is equally evident in Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 10,3 (cf. 397,8) and Ammonius, *In Ar. An.* pr 68,4.

O Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.26.5 (FDS 763, part)

ἡ πτώσις δὲ ἀσώματος εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται· διὸ καὶ τὸ νόμισμα ἐκεῖνο οὕτως λέγεται· “ὦ λέγεις, διέρχεται σου διὰ τοῦ στόματος”, ὅπερ ἀληθές, “οἰκίαν δὲ λέγεις, οἰκία ἄρα διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται”, ὅπερ ψεῦδος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν οἰκίαν λέγομεν σῶμα οὔσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πτώσιν ἀσώματος οὔσαν, ἥς οἰκία τυγχάνει.

Context: two lines after 55C.

Despite the difficulties of reading it as Stoic (see vol. 1, 201), Clement’s claim that

πτώσεις 'is agreed to be incorporeal' cannot, in view of the close proximity of 53C, be dismissed as easily as Frede [418]. 31-2 tries to do by reference to Clemen's own non-Stoic convictions. Moreover, we find it difficult to make sense of Frede's own claim that 'cases are the qualities that are said by Diogenes Laertius [=M] to be signified by proper names and common . . . nouns' (ibid.). How could cases, which on any analysis are functions of language, be the corporeal qualities of external objects? For an attempt to defend the Stoic tenor of the passage, see Graeser [430], 85-6.

P Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 2.81-3

(1) λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ συστάσει
δυνάμει (2) οὐσία μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἄξιωμα γὰρ
ἐστὶ καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν
ἀποφαντική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα
χεὶρ πυγμῇ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα· ἐστὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα)· (3)
συστάσει δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπλὸν τί ἐστιν, οἷον "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι", ἡ
δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ <τῆς> πολλῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως συνίσταται· (4) δυνάμει
δέ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως, διόπερ
τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν
φάουλῳ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φάυλον ἀληθὲς τι εἶπεῖν.

τ <τῆς> Bekker γνώσεως codd γνώσεων I

Context: refutation of the 'doctrinaire' philosophers' views on ἀλήθεια and ἀληθές.

The same doctrine is reported more fully at S.E. M. 7.38-45, and attributed there to τινες καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς. For detailed discussion, cf. Long [426], 98-102, and [429].

q Porphyry (Ammonius, *In Ar. De int.* 44.19-45.7; *SVF* 2.184)

τὸ κατηγοροῦμενον ἥτοι ὀνόματος κατηγορεῖται ἢ πτώσεως, καὶ τούτων ἑκάτερον ἥτοι
τέλειόν ἐστιν ὡς κατηγοροῦμενον καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκείμενου αὐταρκές πρὸς γένεσιν
ἀποφάνσεως, ἢ ἑλλίπες καὶ προσθήκης τινὸς δεόμενον πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ποιῆσαι
κατηγοροῦμενον. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὀνόματος τι κατηγορηθὲν ἀπόφανοι ποιῇ, κατηγορήμα καὶ
σύμβλημα παρ' αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζεται (σημαίνει γὰρ ἄμφω τούτῳ), ὡς τὰ περιπατεῖ, οἷον
"Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ". ἂν δὲ πτώσεως, παρασύμβαμα, ὡς παρὰ παρακείμενον τῷ
συμβήματι καὶ ὃν οἷον παρακατηγορήμα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ μεταμέλει, οἷον "Σωκράτει
μεταμέλει". τὸ μὲν γὰρ μεταμελεῖται σύμβαμα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μεταμέλει παρασύμβαμα οὐ
δυνάμενον ὀνόματι συνταχθὲν ἀπόφανοι ἐργάσασθαι, οἷον "Σωκράτης μεταμέλει"
(οὐδεμία γὰρ τοῦτο ἀπίψαναι), ἀλλ' οὔτε κλίσιν ἐπιδέξασθαι διυάμενον, ὡς τὸ περιπατῶ
περιπατεῖς περιπατεῖ, οὔτε συμμετασχηματισθῆναι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν
"τούτῳ μεταμέλει", οὕτως καὶ "τούτοις μεταμέλει". καὶ πάλιν ἂν μὲν τὸ τοῖ ὀνόματος
κατηγοροῦμενον δέηται προσθήκης πτώσεως ὀνόματος τινος πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀπόφανοι,
ἐλαττον ἢ κατηγορήμα λέγεται, ὡς ἔχει τὸ φιλεῖ καὶ τὸ εὖναι, οἷον "Πλάτων φιλεῖ"
(τούτῳ γὰρ προστεθὲν τὸ τινά, οἷον Δίωνα, ποιεῖ ὥρτισμένην ἀπόφανοι τὴν "Πλάτων
Δίωνα φιλεῖ"), ἂν δὲ τὸ τῆς πτώσεως κατηγοροῦμενον ἢ τὸ δεόμενον ἑτέρῳ συνταχθῆναι

παραγέρ πτώσεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀπὸφανοῖν, ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα λέγεται, ὡς ἔχει το μέλει, οἷον “Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδου μέλει”. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καλοῦσι ῥήματα, καὶ τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τούτων παράδοσις.

υ σοκράτης ὁ σωκράτης cett

Context: Apuleius is commenting on Aristotle's distinction between ὄνομα and πτώσεις. At 44,11 he cites Porphyry for the observation that impersonal verbs such as μεταμέλει constitute propositions when combined with a πτώσις, i.e. an oblique case, but are unsyntactical when combined with an ὄνομα, i.e. a noun in the nominative. At this point he quotes Porphyry's account of the Stoics' treatment of the matter. Porphyry uses these terms in their Aristotelian senses, ignoring the Stoics' extension of πτώσις to the nominative; cf. **K L**.

2 μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου A predicate when 'combined with a subject' is complete and has all it needs to constitute a proposition; cf. **F 3, G**.

6-12 παρασύμβαμα/παρακατηγόρημα 'Sub-attribute/sub-predicate', describing the relation of impersonal verbs to the dative of the noun.

14 ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα 'An incomplete predicate', for which, in addition to the example given here, cf. **63B 2**.

34 Simple propositions

A Diogenes Laertius 7.65 (*SVF* 2.193, part)

ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος· ἡ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὡς ὁ Χρυσίππος φησὶν ἐν τοῖς Διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις, “ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποφαντὸν ἢ καταφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, οἷον ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, Δίων περιπατεῖ.” ὀνόμασται δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιόυθαι ἢ ἀθετεῖσθαι.

Context: doxography of Stoic dialectic; see note on **33A**.

1 ἀξίωμα ψεῦδος This is called a 'definition' by Cicero at **37H 40**, and Simplicius. In *Ar. Cat.* 406,21-2, and an 'outline account' (ὀρογράφου) by Sextus, *M* 8.12 (see vol. 1, 193-4 for the difference between these). It certainly marks off ἀξιώματα from other complete λεκτά; cf. **B**. But it lacks the specificity of Chrysippus' definition in tb 2, since the Stoics did not confine 'true' and 'false' to propositions, but applied them to arguments and impressions as well (**36A-B, 39G**). So ὁ-ψεῦδος should perhaps be interpreted as 'that which is *primarily* true or false'; cf. Frede [407], 40-1.

1 2 ἡ πρᾶγμα κτλ. For the same definition (substituting λεκτὸν for πρᾶγμα), cf. **35C 2**.

2 ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ Well explained by Frede [407], 37, as a reference to the intrinsic requirements of an ἀξίωμα as distinct from the extrinsic circumstances which are also necessary for its actual expression.

2 4 ἀξίωμα-ἀθετεῖσθαι This passage bristles with problems. First, it is not clear how ἀξίωμα-περιπατεῖ is connected with what precedes. One possibility, suggested to us by Jonathan Barnes and Michael Frede, is to invert <ᾗ> either after ἑαυτῷ or after ὅροις. Secondly, as Frede [407], 38-40, has noted, ἡ ἀθετεῖσθαι is utterly

inappropriate to the derivation of ἀξίωμα from ἀξιοῦσθαι. Thirdly, 'being rejected' would only have point if one of the words ἀποφαντόν or καταφαντόν meant 'capable of being denied'. But both words should mean 'capable of being asserted'. The text would be greatly improved by excising ἡ καταφαντόν and ἡ ἀθετεῖσθαι.

B Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.74 (SVF 2.187, part)

πλὴν ἰκανῆς οὐσης ἐν τοῖς λεκτικῇς διαφορᾷς, ἵνα τι, φασὶν, ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡ ψεῦδος, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρὸ παντὸς λεκτὸν εἶναι, εἴτα καὶ αὐτοτελές, καὶ οὐ κοινῶς ὅποιονδῆποτε οὖν ἀλλ' ἀξίωμα· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο, καθὼς προείπον, λέγοντες ἦται ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα.

Context: survey of the species of αὐτοτελῆ ἀξιώματα

C Cicero, *Fat.* 38

quod autem verum non est, qui potest non falsum esse? aut, quod falsum non est, qui potest non verum esse? tenebitur id, quod a Chrysippo defenditur, omnem enuntiationem aut veram aut falsam esse; ratio ipsa coget et ex aeternitate quaedam esse uera, et ea non esse nexa uetus aeternis, et a fati necessitate esse libera.

2 post *tenebitur* (<igitur>) Christ, <ergo> Davies

Context: Cicero supports the Stoic principle of bivalence against the Epicurean denial of it, but resists Chrysippus' claim that it entails determinism. See 37G and vol. 1, 229, 235, 343.

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.85–6

(1) φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τι, ψεῦδος δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δὲ τι. (2) ἐρωτώμενοι δέ, τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, λέγουσι τὸ καταληπτικὴν κινεῖν φαντασίαν· (3) εἴτα περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐξεταζόμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἐπ' ἴσης ὃν ἀγνωστον, ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες "καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ φαντασία ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον."

Context: as B.

For a defence of the Stoics against this charge of circular reasoning, and discussion of the term ὑπάρχον, cf. Long [426], 91–4. On the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, see 40

E Diogenes Laertius 7.65 (SVF 2.193, part)

ὁ γὰρ λέγων "ἡμέρα ἐστίν", ἀξιῶν δοκεῖ τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι. οὐσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθὲς γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὐσης δέ, ψεῦδος.

1 οὖν om. T

Context: immediately following A.

F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.103

πρὸς τοῦτοις ὅταν λέγωσι τὸ μὲν "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" ἀξίωμα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ "οὐχ ἔστι" ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ" ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ "οὐχὶ οὐχ ἔστιν" ἀληθές, ἐπιστήσῃσι <τις>, πῶς μία οὐσα καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπόφασις τοῖς μὲν ἀληθεῖσι προσελευσάσα ψευδῇ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσιν ἀληθῇ.

2 τό δὲ Bekker: ἀνὶ δὲ τοῦ codd 3 <τις> Bekker

Context: refutation of the doctrine of ἀπλὰ ἀξιώματα.

2-3 οὐχί For the translation, 'Not. it is day', etc., cf. G. and Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 402.1-8, where the Stoic negation of 'Socrates is white' is reported as οὐχὶ Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός, not Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐστὶ λευκός.

G Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.88-90 (*SVF* 2.214, part)

(1) οὐ πάντῃ δέ γε δύνανται παραστήσῃσι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἡμῖν οἱ Στωικοί· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἐστὶ γινώριμα. (2) φυσὶ γάρ "ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποφάσκει πλεονάζει", οἷον "ἡμέρα ἐστίν -- οὐχ ἡμέρα ἐστίν." τοῦ γὰρ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" ἀξιώματος τὸ "οὐχ ἡμέρα ἐστίν" ἀποφάσκει πλεονάζει τῇ οὐχί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀντικείμενόν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ. (3) ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, ἔσται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντικείμενα, τὸ τε "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ <καὶ φῶς ἐστίν>" καὶ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" καὶ οὐχὶ φῶς ἐστίν" τοῦ γὰρ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν <καὶ φῶς ἐστίν>" ἀξιώματος ἀποφάσκει πλεονάζει τὸ "<ἡμέρα ἐστίν καὶ> οὐχὶ φῶς ἐστίν". (4) οὐχὶ δέ γε κατ' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀντικείμενά ἐστι <ὧν> τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποφάσκει πλεονάζει. (5) ναί, φασίν, ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτῳ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι, σὺν τῷ τὴν ἀπόφασιν προτετάχθαι τοῦ ἐτέρου· τότε γὰρ καὶ κυριεύει τοῦ ὅλου ἀξιώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν καὶ οὐχὶ φῶς ἐστίν", μέρος οὐσα τοῦ παντός, οὐ κυριεύει πρὸς τὸ ἀποφατικόν ποιῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.

7 10 suppl. Arum 11 πλεονάζει Arum: πλεονάζειν codd 14 ἀποφατικόν AB ἀποφατικόν NLEVR

Context: refutation of **D** 1

12 προτετάχθαι Cf. Apuleius, *De int.* 177.26 7. *solum autem obdicationum vocant, cui negativa particula praepositur.* In the preceding lines Apuleius observes that the Stoics counted 'pleasure is not a good' as an affirmative proposition.

Note too the distinction between 'contradictions', τὰ ἀποφατικῶς ἀντικείμενα (e.g. ἡ ἀρετὴ and ἡ οὐκ ἀρετὴ) and 'contraries', τὰ ἐναντία (e.g. ἡ ἀρετὴ and ἡ κακία), *SVF* 2.175.

H Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.93-8 (*SVF* 2.205)

(1) τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀπλά, τὰ δ' οὐχ ἀπλά. (2) καὶ ἀπλά μὲν ὅσα μὲντ' ἐξ ἑνός ἀξιώματος δις λαμβανομένου

συνέστηκεν, μήτ' ἐξ ἀξιώματων διαφερόντων διὰ τινός ἢ τινῶν συν-
 δέσμων, οἷον "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, [ἢ] νύξ ἔστιν, Σωκράτης διαλέγεται". πᾶν δ
 τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶν ἰδέας . . . (3) τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν τινὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα ἐστίν, τινὰ
 δὲ ἀόριστα, τινὰ δὲ μέσα, (4) ὠρισμένα μὲν τὰ κατὰ δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενα,
 οἷον "οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος κάθηται" (δείκνυμι γὰρ τινὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
 ἀνθρώπων). (5) ἀόριστα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει
 μόριον, οἷον "τίς κάθηται", (6) μέσα δὲ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντι "ἄνθρωπος
 κάθηται" ἢ "Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ." (7) τὸ μὲν οὖν "τίς περιπατεῖ"
 ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περιπατούντων
 κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται. (8) τὸ δὲ "οὗτος
 κάθηται" ὠρισμένον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀφώρικε τὸ δεικνύμενον πρόσωπον.
 (9) τὸ δὲ "Σωκράτης κάθηται" μέσον ὑπῆρχεν, ἐπεὶ περ οὔτε ἀόριστόν
 ἐστὶν (ἀφώρικε γὰρ τὸ εἶδος), οὔτε ὠρισμένον (οὐ γὰρ μετὰ δείξεως
 ἐκφέρεται), ἀλλ' ἔοικε μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ τε ἀορίστου καὶ
 τοῦ ὠρισμένου. (10) γίνεσθαι δὲ φασὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἀληθές, τὸ "τίς
 περιπατεῖ" ἢ "τίς κάθηται", ὅταν τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εὐρίσκηται, τὸ
 "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ"· μηδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
 καθημένου οὐ δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ "τίς κάθηται" ἀόριστον.

4 διαφερόντων <καὶ> Kimbalky 5 ἢ del. Bekke: 2 τινι Fabricius τῶς codd

Context the dialecticians' account of ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα. For the legitimacy of treating οἱ διαλεκτικοί as including the Stoics, cf. vol. 1, 205 n. 1.

3-5 As an example of δις λαμβανόμενου, cf. D.L. 7.68 (reading διφορούμενου for διαφορούμενου, with Frede [407], 50). 'If it is day, it is day'; and for διαφερόντων, 'If it is day, it is light'.

6-7 ὠρισμένα, ἀόριστα. Theophrastus (cf. Antoninus, *In Ar. De int.* 90, 12-14) used this terminology to distinguish between 'Socrates is just' and 'Man is just', which the Stoics classed together as μέσα.

7 κατὰ δεῖξιν. Frede [407], 54-61, argues that Chrysippus also allowed anaphora to make a proposition 'definite', e.g. οὗτος in 36B 40-2, taking the δεῖξις there to be anaphoric, since Zeus cannot literally be pointed to. But the Zeus of the example could be a statue; and Frede's other arguments for extending the Stoics' use of δεῖξις beyond demonstrative reference are not compelling, cf. Lloyd [436], and Goulet [437], 176-8.

9-10 ἀόριστον-μόριον. As in G 13, κυριεύει indicates that the relevant term must 'govern' the proposition, meaning here that e.g. τις must be its subject. The Stoics also counted the definite article as an 'indefinite term': cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *De synt.* 1.111, and Frede [407], 63-4.

§ Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.100 (*SVF* 2.203, part)

καὶ δὴ τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ", τότε φασὶν ἀληθές ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκη τὸ κατηγορημα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν.

5 συμβεβήκη N συμβιβηκεν text

Context: see on F.

3 συμβεβήκη τὸ κατηγορήμα Cf. 51B 4

J Galen, *Plac.* 2.2.9–11 (SVF 2.895, part)

(1) ἃ δ' οὖν ὑπὲρ τῆς "ἐγὼ" φωνῆς ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Χρύσιππος ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαλεγόμενος . . . (2) "οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, κατὰ τοῦτο δεικνύντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ᾧ ἀποφαινόμεθα τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, τῆς δειξέως φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκείως ἐνταῦθα φερομένης" (3) καὶ ἀνευ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα τοιαύτης δειξέως νεύοντες εἰς αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, 5 εὐθὺς καὶ τῆς ἐγὼ φωνῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆς ὑπογεγραμμένην δείξιν συνεκφερομένης. (4) τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ προφερόμεθα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν κατασπώντες τὸ κάτω χεῖλος εἰς αὐτοὺς δεικτικῶς· ἀκολουθῶς δὲ τῇ τοῦ γενείου κινήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος νεύσει καὶ τῇ 10 τοιαύτῃ δείξει ἢ ἐξῆς συλλαβῇ παράκειται οὐδὲν ἀποσηματικὸν παρεμφαίνουσα ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκείνος συντέτευχεν."

3 ᾧ ἀποφαινόμεθα *scripsimus* τῷ φαίνεσθαι M. ᾧ φαίνεσθαι *ceci* ᾧ ἀποφαινόμεθα *Petsion.* τῷ ἑαυτῶν ἀποφαινέσθαι *Epistemon* τὴν *om.* C. 5, 8 αὐτοῖς *Kuhn* αὐτοῖς *codd.* 10 11 παρεμφαίνουσα *Ald* ἀπὸ μὲν σημαίνουσα M: παρενημαίνουσα *ceci*

Context: criticism of Chrysippus' use of 'inappropriate premisses' in his arguments for proving that the soul's ἡγεμονικόν is in the heart. At *Plac.* 2.2.7, Galen refers to an earlier refutation of this same etymology in his lost work *On the correctness of names*.

11 ἐκείνος The second syllable -κεν- is meant, cf. Galen, *Plac.* 2.2.16–17. See also note on K 13–15.

K Diogenes Laertius 7.69–70 (SVF 2.204)

(1) ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ἀξιωμασίῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ καταγορευτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον . . . (2) <καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἀποφατικὸν μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ 5 συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ μορίου> καὶ ἀξιώματος, οἷον "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν". εἶδος δὲ τούτου τὸ ὑπεραποφατικόν. ὑπεραποφατικὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν ἀποφατικοῦ, οἷον "<οὐχὶ> οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ". τίθησι δὲ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν". (3) ἀρνητικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀρνητικοῦ μορίου καὶ κατηγορημα- 10 τος, οἷον "οὐδὲις περιπατεῖ". (4) στερητικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ στερητικοῦ μορίου καὶ ἀξιώματος κατὰ δύναμιν, οἷον "ἀφιλάνθρωπος ἐστὶν οὗτος". (5) κατηγορικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς καὶ κατηγορηματος, οἷον "Δίῳν περιπατεῖ". (6) καταγορευτικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς δεικτικῆς καὶ κατηγορηματος, οἷον "οὗτος περιπατεῖ". (7) ἀόριστον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀόριστου μορίου ἢ ἀόριστων μορίων <καὶ κατηγορηματος>, οἷον "τίς περιπατεῖ", "ἐκείνος κινεῖται". 15

3 4 suppl. Egh et Goulet 4 ἀξιώματος BHP ἀποφατικὸν μὲν *de* 5 οὐχὶ¹ add Goulet 11 Δίῳν τε · οὗτος *codd.* 14 suppl. Hicks

Context: see on 33A.

1-3 On the correctness of counting the three negatives as ἀπλὰ ἀξιώματα, cf. Frede [407], 69–70. The Stoics appear to have coined the terms ἀρητηκός and καταγορευτικός.

3-4 For the text supplied, cf. Goulet [437], 179–80.

9 κατὰ δύναμιν Probably 'potential', in the sense that φιλόφρωνος ἔστιν οὗτος could be uttered in a different context; cf. Goulet [437], 181–3.

10 κατηγορικόν The term simply means 'assertoric' or 'affirmative' (contrasted with στερητικός by Aristotle, *An. pr.* 1.4, 26a18), but its definition indicates that it differs from καταγορευτικόν, 11, in lacking a 'deictically' expressed subject. Hence Δίων, not οὗτος, should be read in 11, and κατηγορικόν corresponds to μένον in the terminology of H 10.

11–15 These lines have generated much discussion, the chief problem being the apparent absence of an example to illustrate ἀορίστων μορίων, cf. Frede [407], 59–60. Goulet [437], 194-5 n. 49, ingeniously suggests that ἐκείνος may have been regarded as a composite pronoun on the evidence of Apollonius Dyscolus, *Protr.* 58, 3. We find Hicks' supplement, which assumes a haplography from 12, as convincing as any suggestion. Thus τὴν περιπατεῖ and ἐκείνον κινεῖται will be two examples of 'indefinite propositions' formed ἐξ ἀορίστων μορίων. The Greek grammarians regarded ἐκείνος as exactly similar to οὗτος, taking both pronouns to be capable of referring either deictically or anaphorically; cf. Lloyd [436], 294 n. 7. But J 11 along with this text shows that the Stoics' view was different. Cf. Pachtel [435], 242–3.

35 Non-simple propositions

A Diogenes Laertius 7.71–4

(1) τῶν δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμάτων συνημμένον μὲν ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ Χρυσίππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησὶ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ συνεσθὸς διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι". (2) παρασυνημμένον δέ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρίνις φησὶ ἐν τῇ 5 Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἐπεὶ" συνδέσμου παρασυνήπται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀξιώματος καὶ λήγον ἐἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον "ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν". ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφ' ἐσθάναι. (3) συμπεπλεγμένον δέ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τινων συμπλεκτικῶν συνδέσμων συμπέπλεκται, οἷον "καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι 10 καὶ φῶς ἔστι". (4) διεξευγμένον δέ ἔστιν ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἥτοι" διαζευκτικοῦ συνδέσμου διέζευκται, οἷον "ἥτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νῦν ἔστιν". ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος αὐτὰς τὰ ἕτερον τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ψεῦδος εἶναι. αἰτιώδες δέ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ "διότι", οἷον "διότι ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν". οἷον κὶ γὰρ αἰτιῶδες ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. διασαφούν δέ τὸ μάλλον ἀξίωμα ἔστι τὸ 15 συντασσόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφούντος τὸ μάλλον συνδέσμου καὶ τοῦ (<"ἥ">) μέσῳ τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ταυτομένου, οἷον "μάλλον ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νῦν ἔστι". διασαφούν δὲ τὸ ἥττον ἀξίωμα ἔστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προκειμένῳ, οἷον "ἥττον νῦν ἔστιν ἢ ἡμέρα ἔστιν". (5) ἔτι

τῶν ἀξιωματίων κατὰ τ' ἀλήθειαν καὶ ψεύδους ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν,
 ὡν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικόν, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ" καὶ τὸ 20
 "οὐχ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ". (6) συνημμένον αὖν ἀληθές ἐστιν οὐ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ
 λήγοντος μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ". τοῦτ'
 ἀληθές ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ "οὐχὶ φῶς", ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι, μάχεται τῷ
 "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ". συνημμένον δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ
 λήγοντος οὐ μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, Δίῳν περιπατεῖ". 25
 τὸ γὰρ "οὐχὶ Δίῳν περιπατεῖ" οὐ μάχεται τῷ "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ". (7)
 παρασυνημμένον δ' ἀληθές μὲν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς εἰς
 ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον "ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἡλίος ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ γῆς". ψεῦδος δ'
 ὃ ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον "ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστὶ,
 Δίῳν περιπατεῖ", ἂν ἡμέρας οὐστος λέγῃται. αἰτιώδες δ' ἀληθές μὲν ἐστὶν ὃ 30
 ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οὐ μὴν ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον
 ἀκόλουθον, οἷον "διότι ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ". τῷ μὲν γὰρ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ
 "φῶς ἐστὶ". τῷ δὲ "φῶς ἐστίν" οὐχ ἔπεται τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν". αἰτιώδες δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ὃ
 ἦτοι ὑπὲρ ψεύδους ἀρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει ἢ ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον
 ἀκόλουθον, οἷον "διότι νῦν ἐστὶ, Δίῳν περιπατεῖ". 35
 16 (4) Arrium 35 ἀκόλουθον Suda ἀνάκολουθον codd.

Context: immediately following 34K.

1-5, 21-6 That this criterion of a sound conditional was authorized by Chrysippus seems probable not only because it appears here in a standard handbook account but also because the argument at 38E treats Chrysippus as accepting it and as taking its consequences to be escapable only by avoiding the conditional formulation altogether. See Frede [407], 82ff. But there is no reason to attribute its actual authorship to Chrysippus, and B 4's failure to name him (contrast B 2-3, where the authors of two other criteria are named) counts against any such attribution. The criterion is often interpreted as equivalent to 'strict implication', which analyses 'If *p*, *q*' as 'not possibly both, *p* and not-*q*'. But this latter notoriously carries the paradox that if *p* is impossible the conditional comes out sound for any value of *q* whatsoever; and that paradox is in B 3 rightly seen as an embarrassment for the Theodorean criterion, not the Chrysippean (see B 4). It is better to suppose that the notion of 'conflict' or incompatibility is taken as primitive in Stoicism (see Stopper [63], 283-6): it is well expressed by the later Stoics represented in Philodemus, *Sign.* (e.g. at 18F), with the formula that if you eliminate *q* you *eo ipso* eliminate *p* (see further vol. 1, 96, 264-5). For a 'logical' or 'conceptual' reading of this incompatibility, see Frede [407], 80-93; Sedley [243], 242-56; against, Sorabji [459], 266-70.

5-9, 27-30 For the subconditional see Burnyeat [484], 218-20; Sedley [243], 242-3.

13-15, 30-5 οἰονέειν 14 is superficially explained by the fact that in Stoic theory propositions, as incorporeals, cannot strictly speaking be causes (55). Little else is clear about these 'causal' propositions. The conditions set out hardly seem appropriate to cause-effect relations, in which cause is as often inferable from effect as the reverse (e.g. 51H).

B Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 2.110–13

(1) ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον ἀκατάληπτον εὐρεθήσεται. (2) ὁ μὲν γὰρ Φίλων φηοῖν ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον ἡμέρας οὔσης καὶ ἐμοῦ διαλεγομένου τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι", (3) ὁ δὲ Διόδωρος, ὁ μῆτε ἐνεδέχετο μῆτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος· καθ' ὃν τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον συνημμένον ψεύδος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρας μὲν οὔσης ἐμοῦ δὲ σιωπήσαντος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος καταλήξει, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές "εἰ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, ἐστὶν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα". ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα" εἰς ἀληθές καταλήξει κατ' αὐτὸν τὸ "ἐστὶν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα". (4) οἱ δὲ τὴν συνάρτησιν εἰσάγοντες ὑγιὲς εἶναι φασὶ συνημμένον, ὅταν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντι μάχηται τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ· καθ' οὗς τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα συνημμένα ἐστὶ μοχθηρὰ, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν". (5) οἱ δὲ τῇ ἐμφάσει κρίνοντές φασιν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστὶ συνημμένον οὗ τὸ λήγον ἐν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ περιέχεται δυνάμει· καθ' οὗς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστὶ" καὶ πᾶν [τὸ] διαφορούμενον ἀξίωμα συνημμένον ἴσως ψεύδος ἐστὶ· αὐτὸ γάρ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχεσθαι ἀμήχανον. (6) ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικριθῆναι ἀμήχανον ἴσως εἶναι δόξει.

Context: attack on signs, cf. C, and 42.

2 Philo is mentioned as the author of the criterion, but Sextus is quite aware that it had some currency in the Stoa too: C 3.

4–5 Modern interpreters standardly apply Diodorus' own definition of 'possible' (38A–C) to this criterion, thus reducing it to 'the one which never has a true antecedent and a false consequent'; and Sextus' ἀεὶ in 9 may imply the same assumption. But this leaves it unclear why Diodorus in fact chose the more cumbersome phraseology recorded (for which cf. 37A 4, probably also representing Diodorus' school), and Denyer [463] may well be right to guess that Diodorus deliberately chose a formula which did not presuppose his definition of 'possible' precisely because his Master Argument, which proved that definition, had to use a relatively uncontroversial notion of 'following' in its premises (38A 4). The survival here of the unreduced version might thus be evidence that Diodorus' original formulation of his criterion retained favour with logicians who did not accept the conclusion of the Master Argument.

11–14 See on A 1–5.

14–16 The definition has a Stoic echo in 36G 4, but this use of ἐμφανισθεῖς and ἐμφαίνεσθαι is most commonly found in medical texts (e.g. Galen 10.126.8 Kühn).

16–18 There is no need to take this as anyone's doctrine: it is just part of Sextus' mischievous attempt to make the dogmatists the cause of their own undoing.

C Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 2.104–6

(1) αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διεληφέναι δοκῶντες, οἱ Στωικοί,

βουλόμενοι παραστήσαι τὴν ἐννοιαν τοῦ σημείου, φασὶ σημείον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγίει συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος. (2) καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀξίωμα φασιν εἶναι λεκτὸν αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. (3) ὑγιὲς δὲ συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον ἦτοι ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν", ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτερωτὴ ἐστίν ἡ γῆ", ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ ἐστίν ἡ γῆ, πέταται ἡ γῆ", ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἐστίν ἡ γῆ". τούτων δὲ μόνον τὸ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος μοχθηρὸν εἶναι φασιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὑγιή. (4) προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐν συνημμένῳ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές ἡγούμενον. (5) ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ "γάλα ἔχει αὕτη" τοῦ "κεκύηκεν αὕτη" δηλωτικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ "εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὕτη, κεκύηκεν αὕτη".

Context: attack on signs; cf. 42.

2-4 For the definition, see Burnyeat [484], 222-3.

4-5 Cf. 34A.

5-12 For the attribution of this Philonian criterion (cf. B 2) to the Stoics, see also S.E., M. 8 245-7, 449, D.L. 7.81.

14-16 The example is already in Plato, *Menexenus* 237c and Aristotle, *An. pr.* II.27.

D Gellius 16.8.10-11 (FDS 967, part)

item quod illi *συμπεπλεγμένον*, nos uel "coniunctum" uel "copulatum" dicimus, quod est huiusmodi: "P. Scripto, Pauli filius, et bis consul fuit et triumphavit et censura functus est et collega in censura L. Mummi fuit," in omni autem coniuncto si unum est mendacium, etiam cetera vera sunt, totum esse mendacium dicitur.

Context: some introductory information on dialectic, reflecting Stoic logic.

E Gellius 16.8.12-14 (FDS 976)

(1) est item aliud, quod Graeci *διεξευγμένον* *ἀξίωμα*, nos "disiunctum" dicimus. id huiusmodi est: "aut malum est voluptas aut bonum aut neque bonum neque malum est." (2) omnia autem, quae disiunguntur, pugnantia esse inter sese oportet, contrariaque opposita, quae *ἀντακείμενα* Graeci dicunt, ea quoque ipsa inter se aduersa esse. (3) ex omnibus, quae disiunguntur, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera. (4) quod si aut nihil omnium verum, aut omnia plurave quam unum vera erunt, aut quae disiecta sunt non pugnant, aut quae opposita eorum sunt contraria inter sese non erunt, tunc id disiectum mendacium est et appellatur *παρὰ διεξευγμένον*. (5) sicut hoc est, in quo, quae opposita, non sunt contraria: "aut curris aut ambulas aut stas." nam ipsa

quidem inter se aduersa sunt, sed opposita eorum non pugnant; "non ambulare" enim et "non stare" et "non currere" contraria inter sese non sunt, quoniam "contraria" ea dicuntur, quae simul vera esse non queunt; possis enim simul eodemque tempore neque ambulare neque stare neque currere.

Context: as D.

For other evidence on the *παράδειγμα*, see Frede [407], 98–100.

36 Arguments

A Diogenes Laertius 7.76–81

(1) λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κρίνιν φασι, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λήμματος ἢ λημμάτων καὶ προσλήψεως καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· φῶς ἄρα ἐστὶ." λήμμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ"· πρόσληψις τὸ "ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν"· ἐπιφορά δὲ τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἐστὶ". (2) τρόπος δέ ἐστιν οἰονεῖ σχῆμα λόγου, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, 5
 "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." (3) λογότροπος δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων σύνθετον, οἷον "εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." παρεισῆχθη δὲ ὁ λογότροπος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς μακροτέραις συντάξεσι τῶν λόγων μηκέτι τὴν πρόσληψιν μακρὰν οὔσαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ συντόμως 10
 ἐπενεγκεῖν, "τὸ δὲ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." (4) τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀπέραντοι, οἳ δὲ περαντικοί. ἀπέραντοι μὲν ὧν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐ μάχεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· περιπατεῖ ἄρα Δίων." (5) τῶν δὲ 15
 περαντικῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λέγονται περαντικοί· οἱ δὲ συλλογιστικοί. συλλογιστικοί μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἥτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κινὰ τι τῶν θεμάτων ἢ τινα, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, "εἰ περιπατεῖ Δίων, <κινεῖται Δίων· ἀλλὰ μὴν περιπατεῖ Δίων> κινεῖται ἄρα Δίων." (6) περαντικοί δὲ εἰσιν εἰδικῶς οἱ συνάγοντες μὴ 20
 συλλογιστικῶς, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, "ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νῦν ἐστὶν." (7) ἀσυλλόγιστοι δ' εἰσιν οἱ παρακείμενοι μὲν πιθανῶς τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οὐ συνάγοντες δέ, οἷον "εἰ ἵππος ἐστὶ Δίων, ζυγὸν ἐστὶ Δίων· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἵππος οὐκ ἐστὶ Δίων· οὐκ ἄρα ζυγὸν ἐστὶ Δίων." (8) ἐτι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσι λόγοι οἱ δι' ἀληθῶν συνάγοντες, οἷον "εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ 25
 ὠφελεῖ, ἡ κακία βλάπτει· <ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφελεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ· ἡ κακία ἄρα βλάπτει>." (9) ψευδεῖς δὲ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν λημμάτων ἔχοντες τι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀπέραντοι ὄντες, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶν· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· ζῇ ἄρα Δίων." (10) καὶ δυνατοὶ δ' εἰσὶ λόγοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι· (11) εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρήζειν ἀποδείξεως, 30
 ἄλλοι μὲν παρ' ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, δι' ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται· οὔτινες λαμβάνονται ἐπὶ τῶν περαντικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλο-

γισμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τροπικῶν. (12) πρῶτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ συνημμένον καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, ἄφ' οὗ ἀρχεται τὸ συνημμένον, καὶ τὸ λήγον ἐπιφέρει, οἷον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." (13) δεύτερος δ' ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν." ἡ γὰρ πρόσληψις γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. (14) τρίτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ δι' ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἐπιφέρων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ, οἷον "οὐχὶ τέθηκε Ἠλάτων καὶ ζῇ Ἠλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τέθηκε Ἠλάτων· οὐκ ἄρα ζῇ Ἠλάτων." (15) τέταρτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ διεξευγμένου καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "ἦτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον." (16) πέμπτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ διεξευγμένου καὶ <τοῦ> ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ ἀντικειμένου καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον "ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἢ νύξ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν." 35 40 45 50

2 ἡ λημμάτων see Beier καὶ πρόσληψις see Erii 18 suprl Αισίου 26 7 suprl Αισίου 48 suprl Shorey

Context: shortly after 38D.

1-2 λήμμα normally just means 'premise' (cf. B 1-2), and Cinus' narrower usage, if accurately reported, is exceptional. But emendation does not help: Beier's excision (see apparatus) wrongly restricts Stoic arguments to precisely two premises, and Egli's would sanction the heretical one-premise argument (see C 7, D).

30-50 Cf. especially D.E., M. 8.223-6.

B Sextus Empiricus, PH 2.135-43

(1) ἐστίν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλίπτων ἀδελφῶν. σαφέστερον δὲ ὁ λέγων οὖν ἔσται διὰ τούτων. (2) λόγος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς· τούτου δὲ λήμματα μὲν εἶναι λέγεται τὰ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος συμφώνως λαμβανόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐπιφορὰ δ' ἡ συμπέρασμα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευαζόμενον ἀξίωμα. οἷον ἐν [τούτῳ] τῷ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν" τὸ μὲν "φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν" συμπέρασμα ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ λήμματα. (3) τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ ἀσύνακτοι, συνακτικοὶ μὲν, ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου λημμάτων συμπεπλεγμένον, λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν αὐτοῦ, ὑγιὲς ᾖ, οἷον ὁ προειρημένος λόγος· συνακτικός ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ταύτῃ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ "φῶς ἔστιν" ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἔστιν." 5 10

ἔστιν>." ἀσυνακτοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες. (4) τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν 15
εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον
ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς, ὡς προειρήκαμεν,
ὕγιες ᾖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ
συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθές ὑπάρχῃ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἡγοούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ.
ἀληθές δὲ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐστὶ τὸ πάντα ἔχον ἀληθῆ, ὡς τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, 20
καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἐστίν". (5) οὐκ ἀληθεῖς δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες. ὁ
γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος "εἰ νύξ ἐστὶ, σκότος ἐστίν" ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἐστίν· σκότος
ἄρα ἐστίν" συνακτικός μὲν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τὸ συνημμένον ταῦτα ὕγιες ἐστίν· "εἰ
νύξ ἐστὶ, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστὶ, σκότος <ἐστὶ, σκύτος> [ἄρα] ἐστίν", οὐ μέντοι
ἀληθής. τὸ γὰρ ἡγούμενον συμπεπλεγμένον ψευδὸς ἐστὶ, τὸ "νύξ ἐστὶ, καὶ 25
εἰ νύξ ἐστὶ, σκότος ἐστὶ", ψευδὸς ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν "νύξ ἐστίν". ψευδὸς γὰρ
ἐστὶ συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ψευδὸς. (6) εἰνέναι καὶ ἀληθῆ λόγον
εἶναι φασι τὸν δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθές συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα. (7)
πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀποδεικτικοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ
ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μὲν οἱ διὰ προδηλῶν ἀδηλόν τι συνάγον- 30
τες, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος λόγος "εἰ
ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν" οὐκ ἐστὶν
ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, προδηλόν
ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἰδρώτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ
πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἰδρώτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας· εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ 35
πόροι" ἀποδεικτικός ἐστὶ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον ἀδηλόν, τὸ "εἰσὶν ἄρα
νοητοὶ πόροι". (8) τῶν δὲ ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον
ἀγοισιν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς
ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. (9) οἷον· ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ
μνήμης ἡρτήσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τίς σοι (θεῶν) εἶπει 40
ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· αὐτοσί δὲ ὁ θεός (δείκνυμι δὲ καθ'
ὑπὸ θεοῦ τὸν Δία) εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος".
συνκατατιθέμεθα γὰρ τῷ συμπεράσματι οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τῶν
λημμάτων ἀνάγκην ὡς πιστεύοντες τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει. (10) οἱ δὲ οὐ
μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἀγοισιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ 45
συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτες, εἰσὶ
νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δευτερον ἄρι". τὸ γὰρ μὲν τοῦς
ἰδρώτας ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ πόρου εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προειληφθῆαι ὅτι διὰ
ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι. (11) ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ
λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικός καὶ ἀληθής καὶ ἀδηλόν ἔχον· 50
συμπέρασμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων
κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορᾶν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδηλόν.

5 δ' ἢ Sedley δὲ codd. 14 15. 24 suppl. et del. Mates. 31 καὶ λημμάτων vel Brunschwig

Context: critique of the position of demonstratives.

It is argued by Ebert [412] that this passage, along with the parallel Mt. 8:300-15 and

411–23, represents the Dialectical school, not, as usually assumed, the Stoics. It would nevertheless be good evidence for the Stoics, who (cf. *M.* 8.411) adopted at least the essentials of the same theory.

For analysis, see the outstanding studies of Brunschwig [444] and Barnes [445]. On most points we have been persuaded by Barnes.

3 This, despite *A* 1.2, is what became the standard Stoic definition of argument; cf. e.g. *D.L.* 7.45.

30 Barnes [445], 180 argues that since the premises must be 'pre-evident' there cannot be sequences of proofs, in which the naturally non-evident conclusion of one proof might become a premise of the next. But even if he is right in denying that a 'revealed' proposition might be held to become 'pre-evident' in the required sense, the series of proofs could be expressed as a single complex syllogism analysable by the third or fourth *θέμα*, in which case no 'revealed' proposition would feature as a premise – e.g. 'If *p*, *q*; if *q*, *r*; but *p*, therefore *r*', where *q* is an *ᾄθλων*.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.429–34, 440–3

(1) τοῖων φασὶ τετραχῶς γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀπέραντον λόγον, ἤτοι κατὰ
διάρτησιν ἢ κατὰ παρολκὴν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἡρωτηθῆαι σχήματι ἢ
κατὰ ἔλλειψιν. (2) ἀλλὰ κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἔχη κοινωνίαν
καὶ συνάρτησιν τὰ λήμματα πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, οἷον
ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν
ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου οὔτε τὸ "εἰ
ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἔχει τινὰ σύμπνοιαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ "πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
πωλοῦνται", οὔτε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν", ἀλλ' ἕκαστον
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διήρτηται. (3) κατὰ δὲ παρολκὴν ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ
λόγος, ὅταν ἐξωθέν τι καὶ περισσῶς παραλαμβάνηται τοῖς λήμμασι,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν
ὠφελεῖν περισσῶς συμπαρεῖληπται τοῖς ἄλλοις λήμμασι, εἴγε δυνατόν
ἔστιν ἐξαιρεθέντος αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν περιλειπομένων, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
φῶς ἔστιν" καὶ τοῦ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν", συνάγεσθαι τὴν ἐπιφοράν τὸ
"φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν". (4) διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἡρωτηθῆαι σχήματι ἀπέραντος
γίνεται (ὁ) λόγος, ὅταν ἐν τινι τῶν παρὰ τὰ ὑγιᾶ σχήματα θεωρουμένων
ἐρωτηθῇ σχήματι· οἷον ὄντος ὑγιούς σχήματος τοῦ τοιούτου "εἰ τὸ
πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον", ὄντος δὲ καὶ τοῦ
"εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον",
φαμέν τὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ σχήματι ἐρωτηθέντα "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον,
οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" ἀπέραντον εἶναι, οὐχ ὅτι
ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σχήματι λόγον συνερωτᾶσθαι δι' ἀληθῶν
ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα (δύναται γάρ, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστιν,
τὰ ἕξ ὅκτις ἐστιν" οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἕξ ὅκτις
ἐστιν"), τῷ δὲ δύνασθαι τινας λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τάττεσθαι μοχθηρούς,
καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν

ἡμέρα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φῶς." (5) κατ' ἔλλειψιν δὲ ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος,
 ὅταν ἔλλειψη τι τῶν συνακτικῶν λημμάτων. οἷον "ἦτοι κακόν ἐστιν ὁ
 πλοῦτος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος· οὐχὶ δέ γε κακόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος· 30
 ἀγαθόν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτος" ἔλλείπει γὰρ ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ τὸ
 ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον, ὥστε τὴν ὑγίη συνερῶτησιν τοιαύτην μάλλον
 ὑπάρχειν "ἦτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορον· οὔτε δὲ
 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος οὔτε κακόν· ἀδιάφορον ἄρα ἐστίν" . . . (6) τοίνυν
 ὑποτιγχάροντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ἐροῦσιν ὥς, εἴτερ ἀπέραντος ἐστιν ὁ 35
 λόγος κατὰ παρολκὴν, ἐφ' οὗ ἀρθέντος τινὸς λήμματος ἐκ τῶν περιλειπο-
 μένων συναγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά, ῥητέον ἀπέραντον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
 τρόπῳ ἐρωτώμενον, ἔχοντα δὲ οὕτως "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
 ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν." παρέλκει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
 συμπεράσματος κατασκευὴν τὸ τροπικόν τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, (φῶς ἐστι)", 40
 καὶ δύναται ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" μόνου συνάγεσθαι τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν".
 τοῦτο δὲ πρόδηλον μὲν ἦν καὶ αὐτόθεν, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκ τῆς ὥς πρὸς
 ἐκείνους ἀκολουθίας παραμυθεῖσθαι. ἦτοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν φήσουσι τῷ
 ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ἢ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, αὐτόθεν
 ὁμολογηθέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" συναγεται καὶ τὸ "φῶς 45
 ἐστίν", κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπόμενον αὐτῷ· ὅπερ ἦν συμπεράσμα. εἰ δὲ οὐκ
 ἀκολουθεῖ, αὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολουθήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται
 ψευδὴς τὸ συνημμένον, μὴ ἀκολουθοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λήγοντος τῷ
 ἡγουμένῳ. ὥστε θυεῖν θάτερον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ προειρημένῃ τεχνολογίᾳ, ἢ
 ἀπέραντον εὐρίσκεισθαι τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ ἠρωτημένον παρέλκοντος 50
 ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ τροπικοῦ, ἢ ψευδῇ πάντως διὰ τὸ ψευδὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ
 τροπικόν (7) τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν μὴ ἀρέσκειν τῷ Χρυσίππῳ μονολημμά-
 τους εἶναι λόγους, ὃ τάχα τινὲς ἐροῦσι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἔνστασιν, τελέως
 ληρῶδες. οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὥς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλ-
 μασις ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, οὔτε μαρτυρίᾳ προσέχειν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν εἰς 55
 οἰκείαν ἀπόρρησιν ἐκ μάρτυρος τοῦ τὸ ἐκατὶὸν λέγοντος· Ἀντίπατρος
 γάρ, τῶν ἐν τῇ Στωικῇ αἰρέσει ἐπιφανιστάτων ἀνδρῶν, ἐφ' ἡ δύνασθαι καὶ
 μονολημμάτους λόγους συνίστασθαι.

20 τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα το πλοῦτος. Mutschmann: τὸ πλοῦτος. οὐκ ἄρα το δεύτερον ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦτο
 Kochabek. 36 ἀπόρρησις ἐκ μαρτύρου ἀπάρησις ἐκ ἀπορρησίας ἐπὶ δὲ

Context: attack on the notion of demonstration. Stoic demonstration is a species of
 valid argument (cf. B), but by their own criteria of invalidity, it is argued, their basic
 argument forms come out invalid. Cf. also PH 2.146ff.

9 10. 34 52 For analysis, see especially Barnes [443].

56 8 Cf. D.

D Apuleius, *De mi.* 184.16-23 (FDS 1050, part)

in qua definitione concessis omnibus pluraliter dictum est, quia ex una acceptione
 non fit collectio. hinc Antipatro Stoeico contra omnium sententiam videatur

plena conclusio esse "vides, vivis igitur", cum sit illo modo plena "si vides, vivis; atqui vides; vivis igitur."

Context: discussion of Aristotle's definition of the syllogism at *An. pr.* 1.1, 24b18–20

For further evidence on Antipater's view, see **C** 7, and Hübner [121], *FDS* 1030–7. For his logical heterodoxy, cf **H** 2.

E Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.69

κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρυσίππον τὸν μάλιστα πολεμοῦντα τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις καὶ τῆς αἰοδήμου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. φησὶ γοῦν αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πέμπτῳ διὰ πλείονων ἀναποδείκτω, ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον ἐλθῶν καὶ τὰς δύο ὁδοὺς ἰχνεύσας δι' ὧν οὐ διήλθε τὸ θηρίον, τὴν τρίτην μηδ' ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὁρμήσῃ δι' αὐτῆς. δυνάμει γάρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογίζεσθαι φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος "ἤτοι τῆδε ἢ τῆδε ἢ τῆδε διήλθε τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῆδε οὔτε τῆδε· τῆδε ἄρα."

Context: the first Sceptic mode, based on differences between different animals' impressions (see **72B**). Sextus here resists the challenge that humans and irrational animals are not comparable

1 **πολεμοῦντα** Not corrupt, as commonly held. The Stoics are seen by Sextus (cf. *ibid.* 65) as leading proponents of the challenge under discussion (see above); yet even they, despite this antipathy to irrational animals, allow them some degree of rationality.

3 **διὰ πλείονων** Here 'with multiple disjuncts' (cf. **37I** 4), rather than 'with multiple premises' (cf **F** 1.2, **H** 1).

F Origen, *Cels.* 7.15 (*FDS* 1181, part)

ἴσται δὲ δύο συνημμένα λήγη εἰς τὰ ἀλλήλους ἀντικείμενα τῇ καλομένῳ "διὰ δύο τροπικῶν" θεωρημάτων, ἀντιρεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς συνημμένοις ἡγούμενοι, ὅπερ ἐν τοῦτοις ἐστὶ τὸ προλέγειν τοὺς προφήτας τὸν μέγαν θεὸν δουλεύειν ἢ νοσήσειν ἢ τεθνήξαι. συνάγεται οὖν τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα προείπον οἱ προφῆται τὸν μέγαν θεὸν δουλεύσειν ἢ νοσήσειν ἢ τεθνήξαι", καὶ ὑπάρχει γὰρ ὁ λόγος τριπλῶς ταυτῆς· εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τὸ δευτέρον· εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον φέρουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὕλης τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοας, λέγοντες τὸ "εἰ ἐπίσταται ὅτι τέθνηκας, (τέθνηκας· εἰ ἐπίσταται ὅτι τέθνηκας,) οὐ τέθνηκας." ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ὅτι τέθνηκας".

* *suppl.* Valerius

Context: criticism of Celsus for implicitly not excluding the possibility that the prophets could have predicted God's suffering evils.

G Sextus Empiricus, *M* 8.229–37

(1) οὐχ ἀπλοὶ δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν πεπλεγμένοι καὶ ἔτι χρεῖαν ἔχοντες τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους ἀναλύσεως, ἵνα γνωσθῶσι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ συνάγουσι. (2)

τούτων δὲ τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν εἰσὶ συνεπτῶτες, οἱ δὲ ἐξ
 ἀνομογενῶν, καὶ ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ δυεῖν πρώτων ἀναπο-
 δείκτων πεπλεγμένοι ἢ ἐκ δυεῖν δευτέρων, ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ
 5 πρώτων (καὶ τρίτου) ἀναποδείκτου συνεσταῖτες ἢ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου,
 καὶ κοινὸς οἱ τοῦτοις παραπλήσιοι. (3) ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν οὖν συνέστηκεν
 οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν) φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
 ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν." πέπλεκται γὰρ ἐκ πρώτων δυεῖν ἀναποδείκτων, ὥς
 ἀνιλύσαντες αὐτὸν εἰσόμεθα. (4) γνωστόν γάρ ὅτι θεώρημα διαλεκτικῶν
 10 ἐστὶν εἰς τὰς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀναλίψεις παραδιδόμενον τοιοῦτον "ὅταν
 τὰ τινος συμπεράσματος συνακτικὰ λήμματα ἔχωμεν, δυνάμει κάκεινα ἐν
 τοῦτοις ἔχομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα, κἂν κατ' ἐκφωρὰν μὴ λέγηται." (5) ἐπεὶ
 οὖν δύο ἔχομεν λήμματα, τό τε συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, (εἰ ἡμέρα
 ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστίν)", ὅπερ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ ἀπλοῦ ἀξιωματος τοῦ "ἡμέρα
 15 ἐστίν", λήγει δὲ εἰς οὐχ ἀπλοῦν συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς
 ἐστίν", καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν", ἐκ τούτων
 συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν πρώτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημ-
 μένῳ τὸ "εἰ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν". τοῦτ' οὖν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχομεν ἐν
 τῷ λόγῳ συναγόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκφωρὰν παραλελειμμένον, (6)
 20 τάξαντες μετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου προσλήψεως τῆς "ἡμέρα ἐστίν",
 ἔχομεν συναγόμενον τὸ "φῶς ἐστίν" πρώτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅπερ ἢ
 ἐπιφωρὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου. ὥστε δύο γίνεσθαι πρώτων ἀναποδείκ-
 των, ἓνα μὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν) φῶς ἐστίν·
 (ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· εἰ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν φῶς ἐστίν)", ἕτερον δὲ τὸν
 25 τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα
 ἐστίν." (6) τοιόσδε μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ χαρακτὴρ τῶν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν τὴν πλοκὴν
 ἔχοντων λόγων· ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν δὲ λοιπὸν ἐστὶ καθάπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ
 Αἰτιμοδῶμῳ περὶ σημείου ἐρωτηθεὶς, ἔχων δὲ οὕτως· "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα
 πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστὶ
 30 φαινόμενα, τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται· τὰ δέ γε σημεία οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι τὰ σημεία." (7) συνέστηκε γὰρ ὁ
 35 τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐκ δευτέρου τε ἀναποδείκτου καὶ τρίτου, καθὼς πάρεστι
 μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλύσεως, ἥτις σαφεστέρα μᾶλλον γενήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ
 τρόπου ποιησάμενων ἡμῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἔχοντος οὕτως· "εἰ τὸ
 πρώτων καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον· οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρώτων·
 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον." ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔχομεν συνημμένον ἐν ᾧ ἡγείται
 συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ πρώτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, λήγει δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ἔχομεν δὲ
 40 καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ "οὐ τὸ τρίτον", συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν
 καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρώτον καὶ τὸ
 δεύτερον", δευτέρῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν
 δύναμιν ἔγκειται τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ ἔχομεν τὰ συνακτικὰ αὐτοῦ λήμματα,
 κατὰ δὲ τὴν προφωρὰν παρείται. ὅπερ τάξαντες μετὰ τοῦ λειπομένου
 45

ἀήμματος, τοῦ πρώτου, ἔχομεν συναγόμενον τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" τρίτην ἀναποδείκτω. ὥστε δύο εἶναι ἀναποδείκτους, ἓνα μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον" οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ τρίτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον", ὅς ἐστι δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ἕτερον δὲ τρίτον τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα "οὐχὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον" ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον." ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τρόπου ἡ ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἀναλογεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου.

50

omnia supplementa secundum Kouhalsky

Context: defence of Arneudemetus' argument against evident signs, as syllogistically valid on Stoic principles

3 The subject, carried over from *ibid.* 228, is still strictly ἀναπόδεικτοι. Here, and possibly at *PH* 2.157, Sextus differs from all other sources (cf. A) in appearing to use this term to cover *all* valid syllogisms. (For discussion see Frede [407], 128–31.) But in both contexts he also seems to assume the normal restriction of the term to elementary syllogisms, and the apparently broader usage may be due to nothing more than carelessness of expression.

10–13 This 'dialectical theorem' resembles the 'synthetic theorem' which Alexander (*In Ar. An. pr.* 274) ascribes to Aristotle and (*ibid.* 284, 10ff.) equates in function with the second, third and fourth Stoic θέματα.

H Galen, *Plac.* 2.3.18–19

(1) νυνὶ δὲ πῶς μὲν οἱ διὰ δύο τριπλικῶν <ἢ> τριῶν ἀναλύονται συλλογισμοὶ καὶ πῶς οἱ ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες ἢ τινες ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ δευτέρῳ θέματι προσχρόμενοι, πολλοῖς ἐστὶ συντηχεῖν ἀκριβῶς ἡσκημένους, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλοις ὅσους διὰ τοῦ τρίτου θέματος ἢ τετάρτου συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύουσι. (2) καίτοι τούτων τοὺς πλείστους ἐνευτὶν ἑτέρως ἀναλύειν συντομώτερον, ὥς Ἀντίπατρος ἔγραψε, πρὸς τῷ καὶ περιεργίαν εἶναι οὐ μικρὰν ἀχρήστου πράγματος ἅπασαν τὴν τῶν τοιούτων συλλογισμῶν πλοκὴν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἔργῳ μαρτυρεῖ μηδαμόθι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ συγγραμμάτων εἰς ἀπόδειξιν δόγματος ἐκείνων δεηθεῖς τῶν συλλογισμῶν.

5

10

1 (ἢ) Bickl τριῶν M Ald.: om C 4 ἐπ' ἄλλοις could ἐν ἄλλοις Muller: ἄλλοις ἐφ' De Lacy ὅσους Bickl: ὅσους ceti

Context: criticism of Chrysippus' argument at 34J The Stoics are accused of incompetence at scientific demonstration, and of being too preoccupied with useless areas of logic.

1 For syllogisms 'with two hypothetical premises', cf. F 1.2.

2 For these 'tautologically valid' syllogisms, see Frede [407], 184–5, and *IDS* 1160–77.

2–5 For the first θέμα, see I, and for the third, J. The suggestions for the second and fourth adopted in vol. 1, 219–20 are based on those of Frede [407], 172–06, whose discussion should also be consulted for their use in reduction of the kinds of syllogism mentioned in 1.2.

I Apuleius, *De int.* 191,5–21 (*FDS* 1161, part)

est et altera probatio communis omnium etiam indemonstrabilium, quae dicitur per impossibile appellaturque a Stoicis prima constitutio vel primum expositum, quod sic definiunt: "si ex duobus tertium quid colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrario illationis colligit contrarium reliquo" veteres autem sic definiunt: "omnis conclusionis si sublata sit illatio, assumpta alterutra propositione tolli reliquam" quae res inventa est adversus eos qui, concessis acceptionibus, ad quod ex illis colligitur impulerent recusant, per hoc enim compelluntur ad impossibilia, dum ex eo quod negant contrarium aliquid invenitur et quod ante concesserant, posito contrarium simul esse vera impossibile est, ergo per impossibile compelluntur ad conclusionem, nec frustra constituerunt dialectici eum modum verum esse, cuius adversum illationis cum alterutra acceptione tollit reliquam.

Context: the reducibility of arguments to the indemonstrables.

For the Aristotelian *per impossibile* proof, see G. Patzig, *Aristotle's theory of the syllogism* (1959, Engl. transl. 1969), §29.

4 **veteres** These will be, as often, the Peripatetics.

J Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 278,11–14 (*FDS* 1167, part)

τοῦ δέ γε τρίτου καλουμένου θέματος ἡ περιοχὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔχει ὥδε "ὅταν ἐκ διέκτι τρίτον τι συνάγῃται, ἐνὸς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐξωθεν ληφθῇ συλλογιστικῶς, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐξωθεν τοῦ ἐτέρου συλλογιστικῶν τὰ αὐτὰ συναχθήσεται."

Context: commentary on Aristotle, *An. pr.* 1.25, 42a8, comparing the Stoic third θέμα to the synthetic theorem, which Alexander (ibid. 274) ascribes to Aristotle.

For another version, see Simplicius, *In Ar. De cath.* 2[16,34–17,9 = *FDS* 1168

37 Fallacy

A Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 2 229–35

(1) οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ σεμνύνοντες αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων, φαισὶν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστικὴ, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομέναις πιθανόταται, ὅθεν ὡς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις δὴ τῶν σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται διδάσκειν, (2) λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανόν καὶ δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἢ τοῦ ψευδῆ ἢ ὑμαιομένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσδεκτοι (3) οἷον ψευδὴ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ <τούτου> τοῦ σοφίσματος ἔχει "οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγορήματα πιεῖν" κατηγορήματα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀψύθιον πιεῖν οὐδεὶς ἄρα

δίδωσιν ἀψίνθιον πίνειν", (4) ἔτι δὲ ὁμοίον ψευδεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦτου "ὃ μῆτε ἐνδέχετο μῆτε ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὁ ἱατρός, καθὼ ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει" (οὐκ ἄρα αἰτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁ ἱατρός, καθὼ ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει)." (5) ἔτι δὲ ἀδελφὸν οὕτως "οὐχὶ καὶ ἡρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἀρτισοὶ εἰσιν" ἡρώτηκα δὲ τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἀρτισοὶ εἰσιν." (6) ἔτι δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες λόγους, οἷον "ὃ βλέπει, ἐστὶν· βλέπει δὲ φρενιτικόν· ἐστὶν ἄρα φρενιτικόν." "ὃ ὄρας, ἐστὶν· ὄρας δὲ φλεγμαινόντα τόπον· ἐστὶν ἄρα φλεγμαινόντα τόπον." (7) εἰτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν [ἡράν ἦτοι] παριστὰν ἐπιχειροῦσι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος, ὅτι ἄλλο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήνεκται. συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεισθαι κατηγορήμα, καὶ εἴται κατηγορήμα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὰ τὸ ἀψίνθιον. διὸ θεὸν ἐπιφέρει· "οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν", ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται "οὐδεὶς ἄρα ἀψίνθιον πίνει", ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγομένον ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων. (8) ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεύδους ἀπάγειν ὡς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὁκνεῖν αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι, συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα αἰτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁ ἱατρός, καθὼ ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει". οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα αἰτοπὸν ἐστὶν, ἀξίωμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ "ὃ ἱατρός, καθὼ ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει". διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αἴτιον. (9) ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἀπαγωγῇ, φασὶν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γένους τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστὶν. μηδενὸς γὰρ προηρωτημένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθές γίνεται, ψευδοῦς τῆς συμπλοκῆς οὕσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι ψεύδους τὸ "ἡρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον" ἐν αὐτῇ. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς γενομένης "ἡρώτηκα δὲ τί σε πρῶτον", διὰ τὸ ἡρωτηθῆναι πρὸ τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς πρότασις γίνεται ψευδῆς τοῦ ἐν τῇ συμπεπλεγμένῳ ψεύδους γενομένου ἀληθοῦς ὡς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῇ προσλήψει. (10) τοὺς δὲ τελευταίους, φασὶν εἶναι, τοὺς σολοικίζοντας λόγους, αἰτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν συνθήκειαν.

15 16 suppl. Bekker 22 ὅραν ἦτοι υπ. I

Context: criticism of doctrinaire treatments of fallacy.

The idea that this text may represent the Dialectical school we owe to Ebert [412]. Our suggestion in vol. 1, 230 that the school excluded ambiguity from its analysis of sophisms on doctrinal grounds may be thought to conflict with *PH* 2.236-9. But that section, on ambiguities, is quite separate from the preceding one on sophisms, and need not represent the same arguments.

9 πιθανόν Cf. M.

13 14 μῆτε ἐνδέχετο μῆτε ἐνδέχεται This unusual expression looks Diodoran; cf. 35B 3.

40 ψευδῆς is strictly incorrect. One would expect ἀδελφός or ἀπρόσδεκτος.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.192–8 (with omissions)

λογικού τόπου περί τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὸν κατ' αὐτὰς λόγον σύνταξις πρώτη *Περὶ τῶν ἐνικῶν καὶ πληθυντικῶν ἑκφορῶν ε'*, *Περὶ λέξεων πρὸς Σωσιγένην καὶ Ἀλίανδρον ε'*, (1) *περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς λέξεις ἀνωμαλίας πρὸς Δίωνα δ'*, *Περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰς φωνὰς σωριτῶν λόγων γ'*, *Περὶ σολοικισμῶν α'*, *Περὶ σολοικιζόντων λόγων πρὸς Διονύσιον α'*, *Λόγοι παρὰ τὰς συνηθείας α'*, *Λέξεις πρὸς Διονύσιον α'* 5
 ... (2) *σύνταξις τρίτη Πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαιρουμένους β'*, *Περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν πρὸς Ἀπολλᾶν δ'*, *Περὶ τῶν τροπικῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν α'*, *Περὶ συνημμένης τροπικῆς ἀμφιβολίας β'*, *Πρὸς τὸ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν Πανθοίδου β'*, *Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰς ἀμφιβολίας εἰσαγωγῆς ε'*, *Ἐπιτομή τῶν πρὸς Ἐπικράτην ἀμφιβολιῶν α'*, *Συνημμένα πρὸς τὴν εἰσαγωγὴν τὴν εἰς τὰς ἀμφιβολίας β'*. 10
 (3) *λογικὸν τόπον πρὸς τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς τρόπους* . *σύνταξις πέμπτη περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν ψευδόμενον εἰσαγωγῆς πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα α'*, *Λόγοι ψευδόμενοι πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν α'*, *Περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα ε'*. *σύνταξις ἕκτη Πρὸς τοὺς νομίζοντας καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ εἶναι α'*, *Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τομῆς διαλύοντας τὸν ψευδόμενον λόγον πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα β'*, 15
Ἀπαδείξει πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεῖν τέμνειν τὰ ἄριστα α', *Πρὸς τὰ ἀντειρημένα τοῖς κατὰ τῆς τομῆς τῶν ἁριστῶν πρὸς Πασύλον γ'*, *Λύσεις κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους πρὸς Διοσκουρίδην α'*, *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ψευδομένου λύσεως πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα γ'*, *Λύσεις τῶν Ἡδύλου ὑποθετικῶν πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα καὶ Ἀπολλᾶν α'*. *σύνταξις ἑβδόμη Πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν* 20
ψευδῆ τὸν ψευδόμενον λόγον α', (4) *Περὶ ἀποφάσκοντος πρὸς τὸν Ἀριστοκρέοντα β'*, *Λόγοι ἀποφάσκοντες πρὸς γυμνασίαν α'*, *Περὶ τοῦ παρὰ μικρὸν λόγου πρὸς Στησαγόραν β'*, *Περὶ τῶν εἰς τὰς ὑπολήψεις λόγων καὶ ἡσυχάζοντων πρὸς Ὀνήτορα β'*, *Περὶ τοῦ ἔγκεκαλυμμένου πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον β'*, *Περὶ τοῦ διαλεληθότος πρὸς Ἀθηνάδην α'*. (5) 25
σύνταξις ὀγδόη Περὶ τοῦ οὐτιδὸς πρὸς Μενεκράτην η', *Περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἁριστῶν καὶ ὠρισμένων λόγων πρὸς Πασύλον β'*, *Περὶ οὐτιδῶν λόγων πρὸς Ἐπικράτην α'*. (6) *σύνταξις ἐνάτη Περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἰσόλιν β'*, *Περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων Διαλεκτικῶν λόγων πρὸς Διοσκουρίδην ε'*, *Πρὸς τὸ Ἀρκεσιλάου μεθόδιον πρὸς Σφαῖρον α'*. 30

10 τὴν² Hübner τῶν codic

25 On the Elusive Argument, cf Sedley [11], 94–5.

C Diogenes Laertius 7.44 (= 31A 8)

ὦν εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους καὶ ἀληθεύοντας καὶ ἀποφάσκοντας σωρίτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἐλλειπεῖς καὶ ἀπόρους καὶ περαίνοντας, καὶ ἔγκεκαλυμμένους κερατίνας τε καὶ οὐτίδας καὶ θερίζοντας.

1 What is the difference between Lying Arguments and Truth-telling Arguments? The former is usually taken as the name for arguments beginning 'If someone says that he is lying, and says so truly . . .' (cf. H 5–6). In fact, though, the evidence

(FDS 1210–18) suggests that 'Lying Argument' is strictly used for arguments beginning 'If someone says that he is lying, and says so *falsely* . . .'. It thus seems a fair guess that the ' . . . says so *truly*' version is the Truth-telling Argument. If so, the two versions appear to have no philosophically interesting difference, and no doubt discussions of the 'Lying Argument' in fact applied to both.

D Diogenes Laertius 7.82.

(1) καὶ ἄποροι δὲ τινὲς εἰσι λόγοι ἐγκεκαλυμμένοι καὶ διαλεληθότες καὶ σωρίται καὶ κερατίδες καὶ οὐτίδες. ἔστι δὲ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος < . . . > (2) < ἔστι δὲ σωρίτης οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος > "οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν δύο ὀλίγα ἔστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ οὕτω μέχρι τῶν δέκα· τὰ δύο ὀλίγα ἔστι· καὶ τὰ δέκα ἄρα."

1 suppl. Sorley 5 δέκα¹ addd: μύριον Egh δέκα ἄρα addd: μύρια ἄρα < ὀλίγα ἔστιν > Egl

Context: shortly after 36A.

3–5 For a comparable Stoic use of negated conjunctions in Soritical arguments, cf. 62], with note.

5 No need to emend 'ten' to 'ten thousand'. Estimates of the borderline between few and many vary alarmingly, but in H 3 it is imagined as coming somewhere in the vicinity of ten. Ten is certainly many for children in a family or courses in a meal.

E Galen, *Med. exp.* 16.1–17.3

This work survives only in Arabic. The translation in vol. 1 is that of R. Walzer, with a few improvements by A. Bruce-Watt as reported by J. Barnes [450], 33–4.

F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.416

ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ σωρίτου τῆς ἐσχάτης καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῇ πρώτῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ παρακειμένης καὶ δυσδιορίστου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὅτι ἐφ' ὧν μὲν φαντασιῶν ὀλίγη τις οὕτως ἔστι διαφορά, στήσεται ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἡσυχάσει, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ πλείων προσπίπτει, ἐπὶ τούτων συγκαταθήσεται τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ὡς ἀληθεῖ.

Context: attack on the Stoic 'cognitive impression' (see 40).

The difficult argument appears to go as follows. Let '50 are few' be the last cognitive impression, and (this appears to have fallen out of the text here, but is made explicit at *ibid.* 419) '51 are few' the first non-cognitive impression. By applying the Stoic principle cited in the text, the sage may assent to '50 are few', as being far removed from the non-cognitive '10,000 are few'. But he cannot then reasonably withhold assent from '51 are few', which is not significantly different and is still far removed from '10,000 are few'. And once he has assented to one non-cognitive impression, he cannot avoid assenting to *any* non-cognitive impression, including '10,000 are few'. For, by analogy with their 'All wrong actions are equal' (590), the Stoics should hold that 'All non-cognitive impressions are equal'. (Note that the slide to '10,000 are few' is not, as commonly assumed, itself achieved by a Sorites.)

The argument is a curious one, and may rest on a misunderstanding. The Stoic principle cited in the text is far more plausibly interpreted as disallowing assent to the last cognitive impression, 'so are few.'

For the ἡσυχάζειν principle, cf. *Ph* 1.253, and **H** 3. The latter's greater precision in placing ἡσυχάζειν *before* the marginal cases begin deserves credence because of the passage's overall superiority in detail and accuracy. For ἡσυχάζειν as a dialectical tactic against a non-soritical sophism, see **S**.

G Chrysippus, *Quaest. log.* III, 9.7–12 (*SVF* 2.298, part)

καὶ ἕως τίνος δεῖ ταῦθ' ὑπακούειν παρέξει ἐπίστα]σιν κατὰ τὸν παρὰ
μικρὸν | λόγον. οἷον ἐ[πὶ] τοῦ | εἰ] δεῖ περὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως τεμεῖν· πιθανὸν
δὲ μηδὲ ταῦτο ἀπ[ό]ρ[η]χεν.

Context: a series of logical perplexities, listed without definitive solutions.

The above text slightly modifies the earlier reading of D.N. Sedley, reported by Barnes [450], n. 68, the improvement being owed to palaeographical advice from Catherine Arbetton. The condition of the papyrus is poor, and even the modified version should be treated with caution.

1 ἐπίστα]σιν 'Puzzlement' – a central notion in the book

1–2 παρὰ μικρὸν λόγον The Sorites; cf. **B** 22–3.

2 τεμεῖν Comparison with **B** 3 shows that *τομή* was a device, favoured by some, for the solution of puzzles. Our suggestion in vol. 1, 229 that it involves the analysis of a single proposition into constituent propositions is purely conjectural. Barnes' 'make a cut-off point' is tempting, but might be hard to square with **B** 3.

2–3 If the final sentence is assumed to have been restored correctly, it may mean 'But it is plausible that not even this is the case.'

H Cicero, *Acad.* 1.92–6

(1) sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne contra vos tota nata sit; quae primo progressa festive tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguum intelligentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. quid ergo istius vitii num nostra culpa est? (2) rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finem, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus, nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca magna parva longa brevia lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus non habemus. (3) "at vitiosi sunt soritae." frangite igitur eos si potestis, ne molesti sint; erunt enim nisi cavetis. "cautum est" inquit: "placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogatur verbi causa tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere" (id est quod ab his dicitur ἡσυχάζειν) "per me vel stercus licet" inquit Carneades "non modo quiescas, sed quid proficiet? sequitur enim qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget: "quo in numero conticisti, si ad eum numerum unum

addidero, multane erunt?" progrediere rursus quoad videbitur. quid plura; hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. "nihil me laedit" inquit; "ego enim ut agitator callidus priusquam ad finem veniam equos sustinebo, eoque magis si locus is quo ferentur equi praeceps erit. sic me" inquit "ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo." si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbe; si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. si quia obscura, concedo; sed negas te usque ad obscura progredi; <in> inlustribus igitur rebus insistis. si id tantum modo ut taceas, nihil adsequeris; quid enim ad illum qui te capere vult, utrum tacentem inretiat te an loquentem? sin autem usque ad novem verbi gratia sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis, etiam a certis et inlustrioribus cohibes adsensum; hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis. (4) nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augendi nec minuendi quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet, quid quod eadem illa ars quasi Penelopae telam retexens tollit ad extremum superiora; utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? (5) nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntiatur (id autem appellant *ἀξιωμα*, quod est quasi effatum) aut verum esse aut falsum. quid igitur haec vera an falsa sunt: "si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris <an> verum dicis?" haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicis; quod est odiosius quam illa quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus – sed hoc omitto, illud quaero: si ista explicari non possunt nec eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi est illa definitio, effatum esse id quod aut verum aut falsum sit? (6) rebus sumptis adiungam ex iis <eiusdem generis conclusionibus quarum una sit recta, ceteras ex his> sequendas esse, alias improbandas quae sunt in genere contratio. quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas: "si dicis nunc lucere et verum dicis, <lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere et verum dicis> lucet igitur"? probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis, itaque in docendo cum primum concludendi modum traditis, aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis, aut ars ista nulla est. vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis. "si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis; mentiris igitur." qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta.

41 2 suppl. Sedley 44 suppl. Manuinus

Context: Cicero's speech on behalf of the New Academy, here attacking Antiochus' faith in Stoic dialectic. The material probably derives from Chrysomachus (on whom see vol. 1, 448) and can be taken as authentically Carneadean.

11–13 Here, as in the simile at 20–3, the policy is: (a) stop *some way* before the true–false borderline. At 24–5 it is: (b) stop before the unclear cases. This latter Cicero at 25–9 interprets as: (c) stop *some way* before the unclear cases. He appears to be justified, for only thus can (a) and (b) come out as equivalent. That stopping before the borderline requires stopping *somewhere* before the unclear cases is obvious, since any

unclear case could be beyond the borderline. But if (h) were interpreted as 'Stop at the last clear case', that might sometimes involve stopping at a point adjacent to the true false borderline, contrary to (a).

(c) may itself appear problematic. There could surely be no possible risk in going on to assent to any remaining *problematic* cases (cf. 27-9). Chrysippus must be envisaging a second Sorites in which we slide unwittingly, not from true to false, but from clear to unclear cases. There *are* a last clear case and a first unclear case (F), but the unclear case may be lent a spurious air of clarity when considered in conjunction with the adjacent and barely distinguishable clear case. A Sorites pushes us nearer and nearer to the borderline between clear and unclear, and therefore, Chrysippus might say, the only safe precaution is to stop at a case which appears clear when considered independently of the Sorites context (that may indeed be the point made in the final words of F). That the stopping point is arbitrarily chosen does not matter. Similarly the question 'How near to a precipice is it safe to drive?' may in theory admit of a scientifically exact answer, but the obscurity or complexity of that answer renders prudent the simpler advice, 'Stay at least five yards away from it'.

35-6 For the form of the argument, see vii C.

30 Cf. 36, *inexplicabilia*. It is probably a mistake, then, to look for any definitive Chrysippean solution to the Lying Argument. One is sometimes claimed at *Quaest. log.* iii, 10.12-18 (SFF 2, pp. 106-7), but there is insufficient context there to justify the claim, and the aporetic nature of the work as a whole (see 'Context' note on G) is against it.

I Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1059D 1.

ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μετὰ πλείστης ἐπιμελείας καὶ δεινότητος οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ
ἀνατρέπει καὶ καταβάλλειν τὴν συνήθειαν, ὡς ἔνια γούν καὶ οὗτοι μαρτυρ-
οῦσιν οἱ τὸν ἄνδρα σεμνύνοντες ὅταν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου μάχωνται.
τὸ γὰρ ὁρίστων συμπεπλεγμένον τι δι' ἀντικειμένων μὴ φάναι ψεῦδος
εὐπόρως εἶναι λόγους δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸ φάναι τινὰς ἀληθῆ τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὰς
ἀγωγὰς ὑγιεῖς ἔχοντας, ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἔχειν
ἀληθῆ, ποῖαν ἔννοιαν ἀποδείξεως ἢ τίνα πίστewς οὐκ ἀνατρέπει πρὶ ἀληθινῶν;
τὸν μὲν γε πολὺποδὶ φασὶ τὰς πλεκτάνας αὐτοῦ περιβιβρώσκειν ὥρῃ
χειμῶνος, ἢ δὲ Χρυσαίπου διαλεκτικῇ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
αὐτῆς ἀναιρούσα καὶ περικύπτουσα τίνα τῶν ἄλλων ἐννοιῶν ἀπολέλοιπεν
ἀνύποπτον;

2 καὶ οὗτοι Chertuss. καὶ οὗτοι codd. καὶ αὐτοὶ Wyttenbach 4 ὁρίστων scriptum ὡς ἄρα codd.
ὁρίστων Wyttenbach

Context: opening moves of an attack on Chrysippus for violating the 'common conceptions'.

2-3 These internal Stoic critics are unidentified, but one might think of Antipater (cf. 36C 7, D, H; 38A 4).

4 ὁρίστων Cf. Cicero, *Fat.* 15, *negationes infinitarum conjunctionum*

5-7 The inference in question will presumably be that at H 34-9.

J. Eriquetus, *Diss.* 1.7.1, 10 21

περὶ τῆς χρειῆς τῶν μεταπίπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων

(1) ἡ περὶ τοὺς μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς, ἔτι δὲ τῷ ἡρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας καὶ πάντας ἀπλῶς τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους πραγματεία λαμβάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς περὶ καθήκοντος οὕσα. (2) [= 31R] (3) δεῖ δὲ μαθεῖν πῶς τί τιςιν ἀκόλουθον γίνεται, καὶ πότε μὲν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀκολουθεῖ πότε δὲ πλείουςιν κοινῇ. μὴ ποτε οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη προλαβεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν λόγῳ συντελεῖ ἀναστραφῆσθαι καὶ αὐτόν τε ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα καὶ τοῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι παρακολουθῆσιν μηδ' ὑπὸ τῶν σοφισμένων διαπλανηθῆσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνύοντων; οὐκοῦν ἐλήλυθεν ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν συνηγόντων λόγων καὶ τρόπων πραγματεία καὶ γυμνασία καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πέφηκεν. (4) ἀλλὰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐφ' ᾧ δεδιώκαμεν ἰγνῶς τὰ λήμματα καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ψεύδος δὲ ὃν οὐδὲν ἤττον συμβαίνει. τί οὖν μοι καθήκει ποιεῖν; προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος; καὶ πῶς οἶόν τε; ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι "οὐχ ἰγνῶς παρεχώρησα τὰ ὁμολογημένα"; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. ἀλλ' ὅτι "οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν παρακεχωρημένων"; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. τί οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτων ποιητέον; ἢ μὴ ποτε ὡς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ δανείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προσεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ δανείου καὶ μὴ διαλελῦσθαι αὐτό, οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν παραχωρεῖν τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον, τὸ δεδικέναι τὰ λήμματα, δεῖ δ' ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως αὐτῶν. καὶ δὴ μερόντων μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς τέλος ὅποια παρεχωρήθη πάσα ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἐπιμένειν καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτοῖς προσδέχεσθαι, (μὴ μερόντων δέ, οὐκέτι.) οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι οὐδὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς συγχωρήσεως τῶν λημμάτων ἀπέστημεν. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λημμάτων ἱστορῆσαι καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μετιβολὴν τε καὶ μεταπτώσιν αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐρωτῇσῃ ἢ τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢ τῷ συλλελογίσθαι ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ λαμβάνονται τὰς μεταπτώσεις ἀφορμὴν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνοήτοις τοῦ ταρασσεῖσθαι μὴ βλέπονσι τὸ ἀκόλουθον. τίνους ἕνεκα; ἐν' ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τοῦτῳ μὴ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον μηδ' εἰκὴ μηδὲ συγκεχυμένως ἀναστρεφώμεθα.

2 τῷ Parisinus gr. 1059. om. coll. 22 supplevimus

2 3 For μεταπίπτοντες and τῷ ἡρωτῆσθαι περιμένοντες, cf. A 5.9. K. ὑποθετικούς Hypotheses are not propositions (I.L. 7.66), but can function as premises in arguments. This raises issues about the status both of the hypothetical arguments (I.L. 7.196) and of the hypotheses themselves (Eriquetus, *Diss.* 1.7.22.9).

K Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 1299.36–1300.10 (I-FIS 1025)

ἐκ δὲ ταύτων τῶν λόγων, φησὶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, δυνατὸν ὁρμώμενον δεικνύναι τὰ περὶ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀξιώματα, ἃ μεταπίπτοντά τινες λέγουσιν ἀπεριγράφως, μὴ ὄντα τοιαῦτα. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τοιαῦτα: "εἰ ζῇ Δίον,

ζήσεται Δίωv." τοῦτο γάρ εἰ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι νῦν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς
 τοῦ "ζῇ Δίωv" καὶ λήγον εἰς ἀληθές τὸ "ζήσεται", ἀλλ' ἔσται ποτέ, ὅτε
 τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς οὐσης τῆς "ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῇ Δίωv" μεταπείσεται τὸ
 συνημμένον εἰς ψεύδους τῷ ἔσεσθαι ποτε, ὅτε ἀληθοῦς ὄντος ἐτι τοῦ "ζῇ
 Δίωv", οὐκ ἔσται ἀληθές τὸ "καὶ ζήσεται", οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τὸ ὅλον
 συνημμένον γίνετο ἂν ψεύδους μεταπίπτων· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ, ὅτε τὸ "ζῇ"
 ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ "ζήσεται", ἐπεὶ οὕτως ἀθάνατος ἂν εἴη ὁ Δίωv, οὐ μὴν
 ἔσται ὀρίσαντας εἰπεῖν, πότε οὐκ ἀληθές ἐσται ζῶντος αὐτοῦ τὸ
 "ζήσεται". διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀπεριγράφῳ καὶ ἀορίστῳ χρόνῳ λέγουσι γίνεσθαι
 τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιωμαίων μετάπτωσιν.

Context: discussion of Aristotle's analysis of the instant of change. It disposes of the Stoic example cited: there is no last instant at which Dim is alive.

2. Unusually, we have talk here of changing propositions, not arguments (contrast A 9. J). But of course changing arguments are so called by courtesy of propositions within them which change their truth value. Besides, Alexander's mention of the 'additional premise' at 6 shows that he does in fact have arguments in mind.

4-9. The conditional is treated as subject to the Philonian criterion of soundness; cf. 35.

L. Lucian, *Vita Lucii* 22 (SVF 2.287, part)

ΧΡΥΣΙΠΠΙΟΥ καὶ ἄλλα γὰρ σε διδάσκειν θαυμασιώτερα – τὸν θερίζοντα καὶ τὸν
 κυριεύοντα καὶ ἐπὶ πάσι τὴν Ἠλέκτραν καὶ τὸν ἐγκεκαλυμμένον. Ἠλέκτραν μὲν
 ἐκείνην . . . ἦ τὰ αὐτὰ οἶδέ τι ἅμα καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν· παρεστῶτος γὰρ οὐτῇ τοῦ Ὀρέστου ἐτι
 ἀγκῶτος, οἶδε μὲν Ὀρέστην, ὅτι ἀδελφός αὐτῆς, ὅτι δὲ οὗτος Ὀρέστης ἀγνοεῖ, τὸν δ'
 αὐτὸν ἐγκεκαλυμμένον καὶ πάννυ θαυμαστὸν ἀκούσῃ λόγον, ἀπόκριναί γάρ
 μοι, τὸν πατέρα οἶσθα τὸν σεαυτοῦ;

ΩΝΗΤΗΣ ναί.

ΧΡΥΣ. τί οὖν, ἦν σοι παραστήσας τινὰ ἐγκεκαλυμμένον ἔρωμαι "τοῦτον
 οἶσθα;" τί φήσεις;

ΩΝ. δηλαδὴ ἀγνοεῖν.

ΧΡΥΣ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ πατήρ ὁ σός, ὥστε εἰ τοῦτον ἀγνοεῖς,
 δῆλος εἶ τὸν πατέρα τὸν σὸν ἀγνοεῖν.

Context: Chrysippus, up for auction, is displaying his philosophical skills.

For the ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. cf. Sedley [11], 95-6. The Electra is apparently just a variant of it.

M. Diogenes Laetius 7.75

πιθανὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, οἷον "εἰ τίς τι ἔτεκεν,
 ἐκείνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί". ψεύδους δὲ τοῦτου· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἄρτις φύς ἐστι
 μήτηρ.

Context: immediately following 35A.

In Stoicism, πιθανός is often 'specious', of fallacies (as here), but also 'convincing' or 'cogent', of presumed truths. See further, 39G; 42E; 69D 3.

N Cicilius 11.12 1–3 (SIF 2.152; Diodorus fr. 7 Giannantonio, part)

(1) Chrysippus ait omne uerbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo uel plura accipi possunt. (2) Diodorus autem, cui Cronio cognomentum fuit, “nullum” inquit “uerbum est ambiguum, nec quisquam ambiguum dici aut sentit, nec aliud dici uideri debet, quam quod se dicere sentit is qui dicit. ut cum ego” inquit “aliud sensi, tu aliud accepisti, obscure magis dictum uideri potest quam ambigue, ambigui enim uerbi natura illa esse debuit, ut, qui id diceret, duo uel plura diceret, nemo autem duo uel plura dicit, qui se sensu unum dicere.”

O Ammonius, *In Ar. De int.* 38.17–20 (Diodorus fr. 7 Giannantonio, part)

... ὥς οὐκ ἀποδεχόμεθα τὸν Διαλεκτικὸν Διόδωρον πᾶσαν οἰόμενοι φωνὴν σημαντικὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πίστιν τοῦτου καλέοντα τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τινα οἰκετῶν “Ἀλλαμὴν” καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ συνδέσμῳ.

Context: comment on Aristotle's theory of signification.

That “every utterance is capable of signifying” depends in turn on Diodorus' equation of meaning with speaker's meaning (**N**), so that the slave example (cf. Plato, *Crat.* 384d) ultimately supports this latter thesis. (Although the example illustrates the randomness of names, the name is not chosen *entirely* at random. Diodorus was a master logician, and ἀλλά μὴ was a standard connective for introducing an additional premise, e.g. **36A**.)

P Diogenes Laertius 7.62

ἀμφιβολία δέ ἐστι λέξις δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονα πράγματα σημαίνουσα λεκτικῶς καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔθος, ὥσθ' ἅμα τὰ πλείονα ἐκδέξασθαι κατὰ ταύτην τὴν λέξιν.

Context: survey of stoic dialectic (see on **33A**)

Q Galen, *Soph.* 4 (SIF 2.153, part)

(1) τὴς δὲ διαφορᾶς τῶν λεγομένων ἀμφιβυλιῶν αὐτὰς ληπτέον· εἰσὶ γὰρ πρὸς τῶν χαριεστέρων λεγόμεναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡ'. (2) μία μὲν, ἣν κοινὴν ὀνομάζουσι τοῦ τε <δι>ηρημένου καὶ τοῦ <ἀ>διαιρέτου, οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ “ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ ΠΕΣΟΥΣΑ”· κοινὴ γὰρ αὕτη τοῦ τε αὐλητρίως ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ <δι>ηρημένου. (3) δευτέρα δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς <ὁμωνυμίαν>, οἷον “ἀνδρείος”, ἣ γὰρ χιτῶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος· (4) τρίτον δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις ὁμωνυμίαν, οἷον “ἀνθραιπὴς ἐστίν”· ἀμφίβυλος γὰρ ὁ λόγος, εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν εἴτε τὴν πτώσιν εἶναι σημαίνει. (5) τέταρτον δὲ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, ὥς “τίνος αὐ εἶ”· καὶ γὰρ ἐλλείπει τὸ διὰ μέσου, οἷον δεσπύτου ἢ πατρός. (6) πέμπτον δὲ παρὰ τὴν πλεονασμὸν, ὥσπερ ἡ ταιαύτη “ὀπηγόρευσε αὐτῷ μὴ πλεῖν”· τὸ γὰρ “μὴ” προσκεείμενον ἀμφίδοξον ποιεῖ τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε τὸ πλεῖν ἀπηγόρευσε εἴτε τὸ μὴ πλεῖν. (7)

ἐκτὴν φασίν εἶναι τὴν μὴ διυσαφούσαν τί μετὰ τίνος ἄσπιν μύριον
 τέτακται, ὡς ἐν τῷ "ΚΑΙΝΥΚΕΝΗΙΑΡΕΛΑΣΣΕΝ". τὸ γὰρ <η> στοιχεῖον
 ἂν γένοιτο <ῆ> πρῶτον ἢ τελευταῖον ἢ διαζευκτικόν. (8) ἐβδόμη δέ ἐστιν ἡ
 μὴ δηλοῦσα τί μετὰ τίνος τέτακται σημαντικὸν μύριον, ὡς ἐν τῷ
 "πεντήκοντ' ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς". (9) ὀγδόη <δ' ἢ> μὴ
 δηλοῦσα τί ἐπὶ τί ἀναφέρεται, ὡς ἐν τῷ "Δίω·ν <ἐστὶ καὶ> Θέων" εὐροις
 ἂν ἄδῃλον γάρ ἐστιν, εἴτε ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμφοτέρωθεν ὑπαρξιν ἀναφέρεται εἴτε ἐπὶ
 τοιοῦτον ὅσον ὁ Δίω·ν Θέων ἐστὶν ἢ πάλιν.

15

20

1 (δὶ)χηρημένοι: Ebbsen. ἐρημέτου cod. <δ' > διυμέτου Ebbsen 1 (δὶ)χηρημένου Kälhlfersch
 ἐρημέτου cod. <ῆμυνμῖαν> Atimn 9 ὡς "τίνος σε εἶ;" Sedley: ὁ ἐστὶν ὡς σοὶ cod.: <ὡς> σός
 ἐστὶν [ὡς] ὡός Gablet 14 If 2] 382 test Atimn καὶ νῦν καὶ μὴ παρέλπει cod 14 15
 supplementa secundum Gablet: 17 μετὰ τὸν At Soph. el. 1062 17-18 test. ed Chatterisana: πενήκοντ'
 ἀνδρῶν· p. λέπεται cod 18-19 Δίω·ν ἂν Sedley. Δίω·ν Θεων εὐροι cod Δίω·ν Θεων ἐστὶν ee
 Chatterisana

Context: Galen's defence of his own classification of linguistic fallacies against the Stoic one.

For detailed commentary, cf. Edlouw [453] and Ebbsen [454]. The latter usefully compares Theon, *Prog.* 81,30-83,13 (in Spengel, *Rhetoris Graeci* II), which seems to derive ultimately from the same classification.

The text is in poor shape. Some deficiencies may be attributable to Galen's memory, especially the two verse examples at 14 and 17. There is little doubt what the original hexameters were, but note that the MS reading at 14 just about scans, and although it gives poor sense, the unemended analytic comment is appropriate to it (because the MS μὴ ἢ 14 could be read as μ' ἢ). Again, the MS reading in 17, although not verse, conveys the gist (perhaps read *λείπει* or *λείπεται* for *λείπεται*) of a line already differently misquoted in chapter 1 of the work. So the emendations which we accept at 14-15 and 17 can be taken as an attempt to restore, not necessarily Galen's text, but the Stoic original on which it is based.

8 πρῶτον The genus of which 'noun' is a species – see vol. 1, 201. For *νόσιον*, the material entity, see especially 28. The same example, the double signification of *ῥόμος*, is used by Augustine, *De magistro* 8 [22] 45-52, p. 181. The ambiguity 'in complex expressions' is not ambiguity due to the construction itself (that is left for types 4-8), but still homonymy of a single word. How then does it differ from the preceding type? Probably 'equivocation in simple expressions', as *ἀνδρείος*, covers that kind which exists in simple expressions taken in isolation but is eliminated by the context; whereas 'equivocation in complex expressions' is a kind which may persist even within a broader linguistic context.

9 Gablet's more ingenious restoration (see apparatus) tries to identify the ambiguity with the sophism discussed by Aristotle at *Soph. el.* 179b39-180a7. But (a) it leaves τὸ διὰ μέσου with no obvious sense or function. And (b) it is based on the dubious expectation that a sophism rather than a routine example will be used to illustrate the type of ambiguity in question: against this, cf. the pedestrian example at 7, where the sophism of R was available if wanted.

13-15 The example, whether on the MS or on the emended reading, does not suggest much difference from the species of equivocations illustrated at 2-5. But it does contrast usefully with that at 15-17, the difference indicated being that between

construal of phonetic elements and construal of semantic elements. Apparently in this context conjunctions, like *ἤ*, are not considered 'semantic' – cf. Q.

17–20 Our emendation to the example is designed to fit the analysis which follows. What point does *τί ἐπὶ τί ἀναφέρεται* make? If this is meant to be interestingly different from the preceding type of ambiguity, one would expect the point to be that it is unclear which noun is the subject and which (if any) the complement. But if so, the use of *ἀναφέρεται* in 19 must be admitted to be untechnical and careless.

R Diogenes Laertius 7 187

"εἴ τι λαλεῖς, τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται· ἄμαξαν δὲ λαλεῖς· ἄμαξα ὅρα διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται."

Context: sophisms used by Chrysippus

Cf. 330 for virtually the same sophism

S Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 24,9–21 (FDS 1237)

καὶ λέγουσιν καλῶς, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται ὁμῶς τὸ ὁμώνυμον, ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλην ἐννοίῃν, σὺ δὲ ἄλλην περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος προβαλλώμεθα, ὥσπερ τοῦ κύων ὀνόματος ῥηθέντος ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν χερσαῖον, σὺ δὲ τὸν θαλάττιον ἐννοήσῃς διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ὁμωνυμίας συλλογισμοῖς ἡσυχάζειν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ παρακελεύονται, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ὁ ἐρωτῶν μεταγάγῃ τὸ ὄνομα· οἷον, εἴ τις ἐρωτᾷ εἰ ὁ χιτῶν ἀνδρείος, εἰ τύχῃ ἀνδρείος ὢν, συγχωρησόμεθα· κἂν ἐρωτήσῃ εἰ ὁ ἀνδρείος εὐφυχός, καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρησόμεθα, ἀληθὲς γάρ· εἰ δὲ συναγάγῃ ὅτι ὁ χιτῶν ἄρα εὐφυχός, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου διαστείλασθαι καὶ δεῖξαι [τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἥγουν τὴν εὐφυχίαν] ὅτι ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ χιτῶνος, ἄλλως δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχοντος λέγεται, ὥστε τὰ πράγματα κυρίως, οὐχὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
5
10
5 μεταγάγῃ J: ἐπαγάγῃ Kv

Context: commentary on *Cat.* 121, the definition of ὁμώνυμον. The puzzle addressed is why Aristotle's discussion focuses on the homonymous things themselves, not on the linguistic aspects of homonymy

4 οἱ διαλεκτικοί Here, as often, the term will refer primarily to Stoic logicians: the tactic of ἡσυχάζειν (4) is the hallmark of Chrysippus (cf. F. H)

38 Modality

A Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.19.1–5 (Theodorus fr. 24 Giannantoni, part)

(1) ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἡρωτησθαι φαίνεται·
(2) κοινῇ γὰρ οὕσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ [τῷ] "πάν
παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι" καὶ τῷ "δυνατὴ ἀδύνατον μὴ
ἀκυλοῦσθαι" καὶ τῷ "δυνατὸν εἶναι, ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὐτ' ἔσται", (3)
συνιδὼν τὴν μάχην ταύτην ὁ Πλάτωνος τῇ τῶν πρώτων διεῖν πιθανότητι
συνεχρήσατο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ "μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατὸν, ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν
5

ἀληθές οὐτ' ἔσται". (4) λοιπὸν ὁ μὲν τις ταῦτα τηρήσει τῶν δυεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι
 τέ τι δυνατόν, ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀληθές οὐτ' ἔσται, καὶ δυνατόν ἀδύνατον οὐκ
 ἀκολουθεῖ· οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθές ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν, καθάπερ οἱ
 περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν Ἀντίπα- 10
 τρος. (5) οἱ δὲ τὰλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν τ' ἔστιν, ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀληθές οὐτ'
 ἔσται, καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθές ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν, δυνατόν δ' ἀδύνατον
 ἀκολουθεῖ. (6) τὰ τρία δ' ἐκείνα τηρήσαι ἀμύχανον διὰ τὸ κοινὴν εἶναι
 αὐτῶν μάχην. ἂν οὖν τις μου πύθηται· "σὺ δὲ ποῖα αὐτῶν τηρεῖς;"
 ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα· παρείληφα δ' ἱστορίαν τοιαύτην, 15
 ὅτι Διόδωρος μὲν ἐκείνα ἐτήρει, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πανθοῖδην οἶμαι καὶ Κλεάνθην
 τὰ ἄλλα, οἱ δὲ περὶ Χρύσιππον τὰ ἄλλα.

On the Master Argument the best philosophical studies are perhaps those of Prior [436] and Denyer [463], and an invaluable survey of modern scholarship can be found in Giannantoni [462].

To Denyer we owe the following two points. First, any successful reconstruction must so interpret and use Proposition 1 that it will come out true when restated in terms of Diodorus' own eventual definition of 'necessary' as 'what, being true, will not be false' (C). Second, the inference from 'It neither is nor will be the case that *p*' to 'It has been false that it would be the case that *p*' is debatable. On a continuum theory of time, like that of the Stoics (see 50A), it could be argued that now might be the first time at which 'not-*p*' is the case and that, if so, there was no preceding instant at which 'It will be the case that *p*' was false. Diodorus (111.18-21) could himself avoid this by his thesis of time minima. The Stoics, on the other hand, unless they just missed the relevance of the objection, may have rejected it on the ground that 'It has been false that it would be the case that *p*', even if of indeterminate truth value at the outset, has become true by the stage in the argument at which it is appealed to. For such 'changing' arguments, cf. 37, especially J K.

Beyond this, in formulating the brief reconstruction in vol. 1 we have been motivated above all by the consideration that the argument, which was a favourite subject of learned conversation even at dinner (Plutarch, *Qu. conv.* 615A, *De sap. in* 113B-C, Epictetus, *Disc.* 2.19.8), cannot have been unduly complex in structure.

4 ἀκολουθεῖν Cf. on 35B 4-5

10 For Cleanthes, who wrote a work on this argument (ibid. A 19.9), cf. 16-17 and E 25.

16 For Panthoides the Dialectician, see also 37B 2, and D.L. 5.68.

B Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 183,34-184,10 (Diodorus fr. 27 Giannantoni, part)

{1} δύναται λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν δυνατῶν, τοῦ τε, ὃ Διοδώρειον λέγεται, ὃ ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔπται· τὸ γὰρ ἢ ὅν ἢ ἐσόμενον πάντως δυνατόν μόνον ἐκείνος ἐτίθετο· τὸ γὰρ ἐμὲ ἐν Κυρίῳ γενέσθαι δυνατόν κατ' αὐτόν, εἰ εἴην ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἢ εἰ πάντως μέλλοιμι ἔσεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ γενοίμην, οὐδὲ δυνατόν ἦν· καὶ τὸ τὸ παιδίον γενέσθαι γραμματικὸν δυνατόν, εἰ πάντως ἔσοιτο. οὐ 5
 εἰς κατασκευὴν καὶ ὁ κυριεύων ἠρωτῆται λόγος [ὃ] ὑπὸ τοῦ Διοδώρου. {2}

ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ Φίλωνα· ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ κατὰ φίλην λεγόμενον τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, κἂν ὑπὸ τίνος ἔξωθεν ἀναγκαίου ἢ γενέσθαι κεκωλυμένον, οὕτως τὸ ἄχυρον τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ βυθῷ δυνατόν· ἔλεγε καυθῆναι ὃν ἐκεῖ, καίτοι κωλυόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν περιεχόντων αὐτὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

1 ὁ ἢ Wallies: ἢ ὁ codd 2 ἀναγκαίου Wallies: ὅν codd

Context: commentary on Aristotle, *An. pr.* 1.14, 34a12ff., with Aristotle's position represented as midway between those of Diodorus and Philo.

4 The strange 'chaff' example recurs at *ibid.* 184, 12–18

C Boethius, *In Ar. De int.* 234.22–6 (Diodorus fr. 28 Giannantonio, *pass.*)

Diodorus possibile esse determinat, quod aut est aut erit; impossibile, quod cum falsum sit non erit verum; necessarium, quod cum verum sit non erit falsum; non necessarium, quod aut iam est aut erit falsum.

Context: commentary on *De interpretatione* 9, comparing the modal theories of Philo, Diodorus and the Stoics

2–3 It is generally assumed that *non . . . verum* and *non . . . falsum* are equivalent to, respectively, 'false' and 'true'. But perhaps the more cautious wording suggests that allowance is being made for the possibility of a proposition's losing its truth value altogether (cf. the Stoic notion of 'being destroyed' in F).

D Diogenes Laertius 7.75

ἐτι τε τὰ μὲν ἔστι δυνατόα, τὰ δ' ἀδύνατα· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. δυνατόν μὲν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθές εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων εἰς τὸ ἀληθές εἶναι, οἷον "ἢ Διοκλῆς"· ἀδύνατον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθές εἶναι, (ἢ ἐπιδεκτικὸν μὲν ἔστι τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές εἶναι), οἷον "ἢ γῆ ἵπταται". ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἔστιν ὅπερ ἀληθές ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ψεύδους εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιδεκτικὸν μὲν ἔστι, τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς τὸ ψεύδους εἶναι, οἷον "ἢ ἀρετὴ ὠφέλει". οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἔστιν ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἔστιν καὶ ψεύδος οἷον τε εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων, οἷον τὸ "περιπατεῖ Δίῳ".

3 3 add. Frede

Context: immediately following 37M.

We follow Frede [407], 107–17, both in his textual supplement and in his interpretation of the genitive absolutes as adding *further* conditions for a proposition's having the modal property in question (see vol. 1, translation). This, as he shows, is required if the four definitions are to come out as properly interdefinable.

E Cicero, *Fat.* 12–15

(1) vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro, valente

dialectico. magna luctatio est, deseras. si enim est verum, quod ita coniectitur: "si quis oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur", illud quoque verum est: "si Fabius oriente Canicula natus est, Fabius in mari non morietur." pugnant igitur haec inter se, Fabium oriente Canicula natum esse, et Fabium in mari moriturum; et quoniam certum in Fabio ponitur, natum esse cum Canicula oriente, haec quoque pugnant, et esse Fabium, et in mari esse moriturum. ergo haec quoque coniunctio est ex repugnantibus. "et est Fabius, et in mari Fabius morietur", quod, ut propositum est, ne fieri quidem potest. ergo illud, "morietur in mari Fabius", ex eo genere est, quod fieri non potest. omne ergo, quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. (2) at hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum, et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse, et quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. (3) tu et quae non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millensimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset. (4) at si ista comprobabis divine praedicta, et quae falsa in futuris dicentur, in iis habebis, ut ea fieri non possint, ut si dicatur Africanum Carthagine potiturum, et, si vere dicatur de futuro, idque ita futurum sit, dicas esse necessarium; quae est tota Diodori vobis inimica sententia. (5) etenim si illud vere coniectitur, "si oriente Canicula natus es, in mari non moriere", primumque quod est in conexo, "natus es oriente Canicula", necessarium est (fortia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut Chrysippo placet dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt immutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere), si igitur quod primum in conexo est, necessarium est, fit etiam quod consequitur necessarium. quamquam hoc Chrysippo non videtur valere in omnibus; sed tamen, si naturalis est causa, cur in mari Fabius non moriatur, in mari Fabius mori non potest. (6) hoc loco Chrysippus aestuans falli sperat Chaldaeos ceterosque divinos, neque eos usus esse conjunctionibus, ut ita sua percepta pronuntient, "si quis natus est oriente Canicula, is in mari non morietur", sed potius ita dicant, "non et natus est quis oriente Canicula, et is in mari morietur." o licentiam ioculare! ne ipse incidat in Diodorum, docet Chaldaeos, quo pacto eos exponere percepta oporteat.

19. 20. ut si ponitur secl. Christi

2-11 The argument is garbled here, but the same point is better argued at 21-7. For 'Fabius exists' to entail 'Fabius was born at the rising of the Dogstar' (as it must if Cicero's point is to be correct) would presuppose a variety of essentialism which cannot easily be attributed to the Stoics or to any other Hellenistic school.

11-15 Cf. A.

29. 33 For the use of the negated conjunction, cf. Frede [407], 85-6, Sorabji [459], 266-70; Sedley [243], 253. 5 and [440]

31. 34 *percepta* = 'illusions', cf. vol. 1, 264.

F Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 177,25–178,1 (SVF 2.202a, part)

Χρύσιππος δὲ λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον ἔπασθαι πρὸς
 μὲν τὴν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους εἰρημένην δεῖξιν οὐδὲν λέγει, πειράται δὲ διὰ
 παραδειγμάτων τινῶν οὐχ ὀγίως συγκειμένων δεικνύειν τοῦτο μὴ οὕτως
 ἔχον. φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ τῷ "εἰ τέθηκε Δίῳ, τέθηκεν οὗτος"
 δεικνυμένου τοῦ Δίῳτος ἀληθεῖ ὄντι τὸ μὲν ἡγούμενον (τὸ) "τέθηκε
 Δίῳ" δυνατόν εἶναι τῷ δύνασθαι ποτε ἀληθὲς γενέσθαι τὸ τεθυκέναι
 Δίῳνα, τὸ δὲ "τέθηκεν οὗτος" ἀδύνατον ἀποθανόντος γὰρ Δίῳτος
 φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἀξίωμα τὸ "οὗτος τέθηκεν" μηκέτ' ὄντος τοῦ τὴν δεῖξιν
 ἀναδεχομένου· ἐπὶ γὰρ ζῶντος καὶ κατὰ ζῶντος ἡ δεῖξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ(τε)
 τεθνεώτος αὐτοῦ ἔτι τὸ "οὗτος" οἶόν τε, μήτε πάλιν [ἢ] ὑφίσταται ὁ Δίῳ
 αἰς δύνασθαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθῆναι τὸ "τέθηκεν οὗτος", ἀδύνατον τὸ
 "τέθηκεν οὗτος".

5 suppl. Ald. 9 suppl. Wallies 10 ἢ δὲ Wallies 11 ὡς Wallies ἢ codd.

Context: comment on Aristotle, *An. pr.* 1.14, 34a10ff: the impossible does not follow from the possible. See also FDS 994–7, and context note on 52F.

G Cicero, *Fat.* 20–1

concludit enim Chrysippus hoc modo: "si est motus sine causa, non omnis
 enuntiatio, quod ἀξίωμα dialectici appellant, aut vera aut falsa erit; causam
 enim efficientis quod non habebit, id nec verum nec falsum erit; omnis autem
 enuntiatio aut vera aut falsa est; motus ergo sine causa nullus est. quod si ita est,
 omnia, quae fiunt, causis fiunt antegressis; id si ita est, fato omnia fiunt;
 efficitur igitur fato fieri quaecumque fiunt."

Context: comparison of Chrysippus and Epicurus on determinism (continued at 20E).

H Alexander, *Fat.* 176,14–24 (FDS 1009, part)

τὸ δὲ λέγειν μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι πάντων γινομένων καθ' εἰμαρμένην τὸ δυνατόν
 τε καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον τῷ δυνατόν μὲν εἶναι γενέσθαι τοῦτο δ' ὑπ' οὐδενός
 κωλύεται γενέσθαι, κἂν μὴ γένηται, τῶν δὲ καθ' εἰμαρμένην γινομένων οὐ
 κεκωλύσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα γενέσθαι, διὸ καίτοι μὴ γινόμενα ὁμῶς ἐστὶ
 δυνατόα, καὶ τοῦ μὴ κεκωλύσθαι γενέσθαι αὐτὰ ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν τὸ ἡμῖν τὰ
 κωλύοντα αὐτὰ [ἀν] ἄγνωστα εἶναι, πάντως μὲν τίνα ὄντα (ἂν γὰρ ἔστιν
 αἷτια τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα αὐτοῖς καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ
 μὴ γίνεσθαι τούτοις αἷτια, εἰ γε ὥς φασιν ἀδύνατον τῶν αὐτῶν
 περιεστώτων γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ ἡμῖν ἔστι γνώριμά τίνα
 ᾗ ἐστὶ, διὰ τοῦτο ἀκώλυτον αὐτῶν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι λέγουσιν), τὸ δὲ ταῦτα
 λέγειν πῶς οὐ παιζόντων ἐστὶν ἐν οὐ παιδιᾷς λόγοις δευόμενοις.

4 κεκωλύσθαι Ciceri κεκώλυται codd 6 ὅν V¹ del V² om A¹² 10 μὴ del Bruin

Context: argument against opponents (unnamed but clearly Stoics) who defend universal necessitation as compatible with human experience.

For commentary, cf. Sharples [333], 134–7.

2–3 This definition of 'possible' is probably just a loose or incomplete statement of the Stoic one at **D**. The vagueness suits Alexander's purpose, since it enables him to argue that *anything* that does not come about should on the Stoic definition be impossible, because somehow 'prevented' (6–9). Against this, a reasonable reading of **D** would allow us to take 'prevented' in a suitably restricted way which would exclude as a case of prevention the mere absence of a causal chain leading to the actualization of a possibility.

5–10 All that is with certainty attributed to the Stoics here is an appeal to our ignorance as proof that certain counterfactuals are not prevented. The inferences πάντως (6) ἀντikeίμενα (9) may be Alexander's own. And although he would have us believe that their not being prevented was claimed to consist in our ignorance of the preventing factors, the Stoics in question may either just have claimed that there genuinely were no such factors, and by way of proof challenged anyone to find them, or restricted 'prevented' to *evident* obstacles in order to prevent all relevant factors, however tenuous or negative (cf. previous note), from counting as obstacles. The latter explanation is (as Nicholas Denyer points out to us) supported by Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 196,2–4, where what seems to be the Stoic definition of 'possible' is set out as intrinsic fitness μηδένος φανέρου κωλύματος ἐνισταμένου.

I Ammonius, *In Ar. De int.* 131,20–32 (FDS 1252, part)

τοσαύτην οὖν δύναμιν ἔχοντες τοῦ θεωρήματος πρὸς πάντα ἡμῶν τὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι τῶν πάντων ἀναγκάζειν περιωρίμει λόγων τοὺς δοκοῦντας παρέχειν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπορίαν ἐκθέσθαι τε καὶ διαλύσαι. διὸ δὲ τοῦτοιαι ὄντων, τοῦ μὲν λογικωτέρου τοῦ δὲ πραγματεωδεστέρου, ὃ μὲν λογικώτερος προάγεται ὡς ἐπὶ τινος ἡμῶν ἐνεργείας, οὖν τῆς κατὰ τὸ θερίζειν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εἰ θεριεῖν, φησὶν, οὐχὶ τάχα μὲν θεριεῖς τάχα δὲ οὐ θεριεῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντως θεριεῖς, καὶ εἰ μὴ θεριεῖς, ὥσαύτως οὐχὶ τάχα μὲν θεριεῖς τάχα δὲ οὐ θεριεῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐ θεριεῖς· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦτοι θεριεῖς ἢ οὐ θεριεῖς· ἀνῆρηται ἄρα τὸ τάχα, εἴπερ μήτε κατὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν τοῦ θεριεῖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ θεριεῖν ἔχει χώραν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ ἐτέρων ἐκβαίνοντος, μήτε κατὰ τὸ ἐόμενον ὁποτέρου τῶν ὑποθέσεων· τὸ δὲ τάχα ἦν τὸ εἰσφέρον τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον· αἰχεται ἄρα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

Context: commentary on *De interpretatione* 9

For Stoic interest in the Mowing Argument, cf. *IL*, 7–25; **37C**, L 3. The last of these associates it with the Master Argument, whose origin in the Dialectical school of Diodorus is probably shared (**31M**).

1 θεωρήματος Aristotle's controversial qualification of the Law of the Excluded Middle in *De int.* 9. Ammonius himself interprets Aristotle not as rejecting the law for statements about future contingents, but as denying them 'definite' truth or falsity.

4 τοῦ δὲ The reference is to an argument for determinism based on divine foreknowledge, set out at *ibid.* 132,8–135,11.

39 Impressions

A Diogenes Laertius 7.49–51 (SVF 2.52, 55, 61)

(1) ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστί, καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος, προάγων τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. (2) προηγείται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητική 5 ὑπάρχουσα, ἧ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ. (3) διαφέρει δὲ φαντασία καὶ φάντασμα· φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας οἷα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, φαντασία δὲ ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοιώσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ β' Περὶ ψυχῆς ὑφίσταται. οὐ γὰρ δεκτέον τὴν τύπωσιν οἶνεῖ τύπον σφραγιστήρος, ἐπεὶ ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι 10 πολλοὺς τύπους κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι. νοεῖται δὲ φαντασία ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομειμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη καὶ ἐναποσφραγισμένη, οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. (4) τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς αἱ μὲν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ' οὐ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δι' αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δ' αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας 15 καθάπερ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λόγῳ λαμβανομένων. (5) τῶν δ' αἰσθητικῶν (αἱ μὲν) ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων μετ' εἴξεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως γίνονται. εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὥσανεῖ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. (6) ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων, ἄλογοι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων. αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ 20 νοήσεις εἰσὶν, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος. (7) καὶ αἱ μὲν εἰσι τεχνικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι· ἄλλως γοῦν θεωρεῖται ὑπὸ τεχνίτου εἰκῶν καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ ἀτέχνου.

γ τῷ β' A A.Long τῷ 1β BFP: τῷ δευτέρῳ H S.Lotig
 BP καὶ ἐπὶ τ τῶν ποτὶ ἄλλων om. Suda, secl. Egi
 Acim

16 καθάπερ BP: καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ F καὶ
 λαμβανομένων (τινές) Egh 17 (αἱ μὲν)

Context: opening section of Diocles of Magnesia's synopsis of Stoic dialectic; see note on 33A.

3 **συγκαταθέσεως** The noun is probably a Stoic coinage. For pre-Stoic uses of the verb, cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 501c (with δόξα as object), Aristotle, *Top.* III.1, 116a11; Epicurus, *SV* 29.

5–6 = 33D

7 **φάντασμα** This pejorative use of the term was canonized by Plato, e.g. *Rep.*, 2 382a, *Phd.* 81d, and especially, *Soph.* 266b. So too the Epicurean doxography in 16B 12, which contrasts with Epicurus' normally unloaded use of the word, e.g. 19A.

9–11 Explained fully by Sextus, *M.* 7.228–31, as Chrysippus' amendment of Cleanthes; see Rist [303], 136. Our translations of κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ as κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, and περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ as 'the same subject' (i.e. the recipient of the impressions), are justified by Sextus loc. cit.

11–13 See 40E 3

13-16 For the two sources of φαντασία, cf. Aristotle, *De an.* III.10, 433b29; III.11, 434a6. *De motu* 8, 702a19. For the apprehension of incorporeals, see 27E.

17 εἴξεις Similarly coupled with ἀνγκατόθεσις at 53S, cf. note on 53O.

18 ἐμφόσεις The Stoic use of this term (contrast the Academic, e.g. 69D 2) is exemplified in *SVF* 2 673 by the face of the man in the moon.

19 ἄλογαι Non-rational, as distinct from irrational, which characterizes disobedience to reason. These senses are distinguished in *SVF* 3.375.

21 νοήσεις See the excellent discussion by Frede [468], 68-71. Aristotle treats φαντασία as νοήσις τις in *De an.* III.10, 433a10.

22 τεχνικαί See 40I 2, N 4.

B Aetius 4.12.1-5 (*SVF* 2.54, part)

(1) Χρύσιππος διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων φησὶ τέτταρα ταῦτα. (2) φαντασία μὲν
 οὖν ἐστὶ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινώμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ
 πεποιηκός· οἷον ἐπειδὴν δι' ὄψεως θεωρῶμεν τὸ λευκόν, ἐστὶ πάθος τὸ
 ἐγγεγεννημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ <κατὰ> τοῦτο τὸ πάθος
 εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι ὑπόκειται λευκὸν κινεῖν ἡμᾶς· ὁμοίως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς
 καὶ τῆς ὁσφρήσεως. (3) εἴρηται δὲ ἡ φαντασία ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός· καθάπερ
 γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὐτὸ δείκνυσαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ
 φαντασία δείκνυσαι ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός αὐτήν. (4) φανταστὸν δὲ τὸ
 ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι αὖ
 δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανταστὸν. (5) φανταστικόν δὲ ἐστὶ
 διάκενος ἐλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὐδενός φανταστοῦ γινόμενον
 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκιαμαχοῦντος καὶ κενοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τὰς χεῖρας· τῇ γὰρ
 φαντασίᾳ ὑπόκειται τι φανταστὸν, τῷ δὲ φανταστικῷ οὐδέν. (6) φάντασμα
 δὲ ἐστίν, ἐφ' ὃ ἐλκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἐλκυσμὸν· ταῦτα
 δὲ γίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν μεγαυχολώντων καὶ μεμνηότων· ἀγνοῦν τραγικὸς Ὀρίστης
 αὐτὰν λέγει.

2 αὐτὸ τε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ Bonetate 172 aliqui codd. 3 τε ἀντικαθ' ἑαυτὴν 4 <κατὰ> Wyssendörff
 5 αὐτὸν αὐτὸ ABB 12 κενὸν Bonetate 172c

1-4 Cf. 70A 5-6, which supports the choice of αὐτὸ as the reading in line 2.
 6 ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός So already Aristotle, *De an.* III.1, 429a3.

15 φανταστικόν A further mark of the influence of Plato, *Soph.*, cf. 266d, 268c.

15-16 The omitted quotation is Euripides, *Or.* 255-9, Orestes being a favourite example of delusion; cf. G 9, 16F; 40E 5.

C Cicero, *Acad.* 2.21

{1} atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus talia secuntur ea quae
 non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: "illud
 est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum": animo
 iam haec tenemus comprehensa non sensibus. {2} "ille" deinceps "equus est, ille
 canis." {3} cetera series deinde sequitur maiora necens, ut haec quae quasi
 expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: "si homo est, animal est

mortale rationis particeps." (4) quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri <nec> disputari potest.

s (ne.) Plasherg: *disputari*(ne) A²B² <one> disp. V²

Context: an early stage in Lucullus' defence of Stoic epistemology on Antiochus' behalf.

Since the Stoics regarded all perception as taking place in the *ἡγεμονικόν* (cf. 53M), the distinction between *sensibus* and *animo* is potentially misleading. The general accuracy of the report, however, is assured by its closeness to Chrysippus in 53G. What the distinction amounts to is broadly analogous to Locke's distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas, whereby the former have their source in the sensible qualities of things and the latter are constructed by the mind out of the simple ideas by which it is affected via the senses. For a close parallel to C, cf. S.E., *M.* 7.344–5; and for its bearing on the relation between 'simple' (pre-rational) concepts and rational impressions, see Frede [468], 68–9.

7 quo e genere must refer back to *italia*, 1, and not, as *quo* could imply, to *cetera series*, 5.

D Diogenes Laertius 7.53 (SVF 2.87, part)

(1) κατὰ περίπτωσιν μὲν οὖν ἐνοήθη τὰ αἰσθητά· (2) καθ' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τινος παρακειμένου, ὡς Σωκράτης ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκόνας· (3) κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ αὐξητικῶς μὲν, (ὡς) ὁ Τιτυὸς καὶ Κύκλωψ· μειωτικῶς δέ, ὡς ὁ Πυγμαῖος. καὶ τὸ κέντρον δὲ τῆς γῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐνοήθη ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων σφαιρῶν· (4) κατὰ μετάθεσιν δέ, οἷον ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ στήθους· (5) κατὰ σύνθεσιν δὲ ἐνοήθη Ἱπποκένταυρος· (6) καὶ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν θάνατος. (7) νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν τινα, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. (8) φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. (9) καὶ κατὰ στέρησιν, οἷον ἄχειρ.

1 οὐδ' om. F 3 (ὡς) Hübner 8 δίκαιον indd.: καὶ ἂν Suds

Context: see on 33A.

For concept formation by methods 1–3 and 5, see S.E., *M.* 8.56–60, and the similar doctrine attested for Epicurus, 12F. For 1–4 in Stoicism, see 60D 1. For 7, see vol. 1, 165. For 8, see 60C.

E Aetius 4.11.1–4 (SVF 2.83)

(1) αἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς περ χάρτην εὐεργον εἰς ἀπογραφὴν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἐκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται. (2) πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. αἰσθόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμῃ γενῶνται, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος. (3) τῶν δὲ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικῶς γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως, αἱ δὲ ᾗδ' δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας·

αὐται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόνον, ἐκείναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. (4) ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ' ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων ἀνμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα.

2 εὐργάν Dich. εὐεργάν (-nē) codd. 4 αἰσθάνονται Diels αἰσθανόμενοι codd. 5 φαμέν GAB
 φαίν G. 6 φαντασίαν G: om (A)BC. ἐννοιών Reiske 7 ante τῶν lacunam star Sandbach
 θεωτικῶς G. θεωτικαί (A)BC. 9 μόνον vulg. μόναι codd.

Context: doxography of the origins of sensation and thought.

The striking similarities between this passage and Aristotle, *An. Ps.* II.19, 99b35–100a9 are noted by Sandbach [304], 31 2, concerned though he is to minimize Aristotle's influence on Stoicism; cf. also Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.1, 980a27–981a7.

3–4 The empiricist implications are fully developed in S.E., *M.* 8.56. 60 (SFF 2.88).

5 6 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.1, 980b21–30, αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μίᾳ ἐμπειρίας ἀποτελοῦσιν. Chrysippus defined memory as *θησαυρισμός φαντασιῶν*, SFF 1.64.

7 9 For this passage, and the difference between *ἐννοια* and *πρόληψις*, cf. Sandbach [470]. However, we cannot accept his (p. 26) and others' belief that κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους, 7, shows 'that something has fallen out after the preceding sentence' along the lines of D. The processes outlined in E 2 are quite sufficient to explain the plural *τρόπους*, while much of D does not fit the scope of *ἐννοια*. (Sandbach [304], 80 n. 118, has now retracted his belief in the text's deicticness.)

9–11 Cf. 53V and 33H 3, where fourteen is given as the age for rational maturity. The counting by sevens was traditional, cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* VII. 1333b34, 1336b40. Sandbach, loc. cit., suggests that Actus has confused 'the beginning of the growth of reason in the first seven years of life with its completion round the age of fourteen'.

F Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1084F–1085A (SFF 2.847, part)

φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἐννοία ἐστὶ, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. . . τὰς ἐννοίας (ἐν) ἀποκειμένας τινὰς ὀριζόμενοι νοήσεις, μνήμας δὲ μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς τυπώσεις.

2 (ἐν) ἀποκειμένας Politici

Context: the alleged incompatibility of the soul's volatile material with the requirements of stable impressions

2 νοήσεις See λογικαὶ φαντασίαι, A 6

G Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.242–6 (SFF 2.65, part)

(1) τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν εἰσι πιθαναί, αἱ δὲ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ πιθαναὶ ἅμα καὶ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι. (2) πιθαναὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ λεῖον κίνημα περὶ ψυχὴν ἐργαζόμεναι, ὥσπερ νῦν τὸ "ἡμέραν εἶναι" καὶ τὸ "ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι" καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας ἔχεται περιφανείας, (3) ἀπίθανοι δὲ αἱ μὴ τοιαῦται ἀλλ' ἀποστρέφουσαι ἡμᾶς τῆς ἀνγκαταθέσεως, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς· εἰ σκότος ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν." (4)

πιθαναί δὲ καὶ ἀπίθανοι καθεστᾶσιν αἱ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὅτε μὲν τοιαῖα γινόμεναι ὅτε δὲ τοιαῖα, οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀπόρων λόγων, (5) οὔτε δὲ πιθαναί οὔτε ἀπίθανοι καθάπερ αἱ τῶν τοιοῦτων πραγμάτων "ἄρτιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀστέρες· περισσοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες." (6) τῶν δὲ πιθανῶν ἢ ἀπιθάνων φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς. (7) ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσιν ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθὴ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἢ τοῦ "φῶς ἐστίν", (8) ψευδεῖς δὲ ὧν ἔστι ψευδὴ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ κεκλάσθαι τὴν κατὰ βυθοῦ κώπην ἢ μούρου εἶναι τὴν στοάν, (9) ἀληθεῖς δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς, ὅποια προσέπιπτεν Ὀρέστη κατὰ μανίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡλέκτρας (καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τινος προσέπιπτεν, ἦν ἀληθὴς, ὑπῆρχε γὰρ Ἡλέκτρα, καθὸ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, ψευδὴς, οὐκ ἦν γὰρ Ἐρινύς), καὶ πάλιν εἰ τις ἀπὸ Δίωνος ζῶντος κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος ὄνειροπολεῖται ψευδὴ καὶ διάκενον ἐλκυσμένον. (10) οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαί.

10 ἢ ἀπιθάνων del. Arnum 16, 17 προσέπιπτεν Bekker· προῦπιπτεν codd 21 εἰσιν s: ἦσαν cett

Context: exposition of Stoic accounts of φαντασία. After indicating the Stoics' difficulties in defining φαντασία, Sextus continues, 7.241: τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν πολλαὶ μὲν καὶ ἄλλαι εἰσὶ διαφοραί, ἀπαρκέσουσι δὲ αἱ λεχθησόμεναι.

Other differentiae that he might have mentioned will include those of 39A 4–7, a scheme wholly different in its content and sequence of simple disjunctions from the elaborate division of G, which continues at 40E with a division of true impressions into καταληπτικαί and οὐ καταληπτικαί.

10 According to the transmitted text, true impressions are a subdivision of πιθανῶν ἢ ἀπιθάνων. Since the examples of ἀπίθανοι in 3 are both of patent falsehoods while the examples in 7–9 are all of πιθαναί, and since the inclusion of both disjuncts would violate the proper procedure for definition by diairesis (on which see 32), there are grounds for deleting ἢ ἀπιθάνων, as von Arnim proposed, followed by the Loeb and Teubner editions. However, the retention of ἢ ἀπιθάνων is *prima facie* justified by the subsequent inclusion in the same division (40E 2) of true and non-cognitive impressions which often are unconvincing (fail to gain assent). This problem therefore raises a larger question concerning the coherence of the whole division in terms of πιθανόν, of which Diogenes Laertius (A and 40C) has no trace. Clearly the Stoics thought that a cognitive impression is normally convincing (for the exceptional case of its not being believed, cf. 40K 2); but there are good reasons for doubting whether this property was one that they wished to emphasize, since it never appears in their accounts of the attributes of a cognitive impression. Indeed, Stoic interest in πιθαναί φαντασίαι concentrates on their speciousness; cf. SVF 3.228, 229a, and 31B 2. Such considerations suggest that the diairesis in G and 40E may involve conflation of a Stoic classification of φαντασίαι πιθαναί ἢ ἀπίθανοι with a separate one of ἀληθεῖς and ψευδεῖς. Such a conflation could well account for the intrusive ἢ ἀπιθάνων, 10, as a clumsy attempt to tie the two divisions together. The importance of the πιθανὴ φαντασία from Carneades onwards (see 69D–E) may have infected reports of the Stoics on which Sextus drew, reflecting modifications within the Stoa

and Academic contributions. This would be all the more likely if Antiochus is Sextus' source here, as certainly elsewhere (cf. *Al.* 7.161, 201, and notes on 16E, 18A). For these reasons, we divide the material between G and 40E.

40 The criteria of truth

A Diogenes Laertius 7.54 (S¹F 2.105, Posidonius fr. 42)

(1) κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασι¹ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τοιούτῃ τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. (2) ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βόηθος κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· (3) ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἐνναία φυσικῇ τῶν καθόλου. (4) ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησὶ.

2 δευτέρᾳ Antim: δωδεκάτῃ codl. 3 πλείονα BF, πολλὰ F 4 αὐτόν Antim: αὐτὸν codl.

Context: immediately following 39D

1 καταληπτικὴν For the sense of the term, cf. Sandbach [474], 14–15.

2 ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος A truncated version of the standard formula, cf. C 4 3, E

4 7, 39A 11–13.

3–4 Boethius' list resembles the faculties cited as criteria of many philosophers by Sextus Empiricus (e.g. *Al.* 7 [41–49], probably deriving from classifications made by Antiochus. Cf. Long [477]).

5–6 αὐτόν seems to be the right reading, since Chrysippus was too senior to disagree with Boethius. On αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν, cf. Striker [9], 90–102. Although Chrysippus did pronounce, here and at 48C 3, on the criteria of truth, this was not in works with overtly epistemological themes, and the striking lack of attributions to him of epistemological works or doctrines (see Index of philosophers vol. 1, s.v. Chrysippus) leads us to wonder whether he made any innovations in this area of Stoicism, beyond its integration within the broader spectrum of dialectic (see vol. 1, 196).

7–9 The assumption that this is a bona fide piece of doxography (e.g. Pohlenz [298], 1, 62) will not survive a comparison with S¹F, *Al.* 7.89–140, a passage almost certainly of Posidonian origin (cf. especially 7.93, 115–21) and perhaps even from his work cited here. There the attribution of λόγος or ὀρθὸς λόγος as a criterion to various philosophers is offered not as straight doxography but as speculative interpretation of their methodology or isolated pronouncements; cf. especially 7.122ff. on Empedocles.

B Cicero, *Acad.* 1.40–1 (S¹F 1.55, 61, 60, part)

(1) plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi

impulsione oblata extrinsecus . . . sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. (2) visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae
5 propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile . . . (3) sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur.

Context: Varro's 'Antiochean' account of Zeno's divergences from Platonism. For what follows **B**, see **41B**.

1 *tertia . . . parte* i.e. logic.

7 **comprehendibile** Cicero offers this as a translation of *καταληπτόν*. With its passive sense, *καταληπτόν* should mean 'capable of being grasped', cf. its use at **68T**, and this suits *cerneretur*, 7. For suggestions about why *καταληπτός* replaces the usual term *καταληπτικός*, cf. Sandbach [474], 20–1 n. 13.

C Diogenes Laertius 7.46 (SVF 2.53, part)

τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὁνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινόμενων (1) τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· (2) καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ
5 ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· (3) ἀκατάληπτον δὲ ἣ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἣ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὴ τρανὴν μηδὲ ἔκτυπον.

2 τῶν τ. om. **BP** γινόμενων **BP** γινόμενων **F** 4 φασί **P** om. **BF**

Context: immediately preceding **31B**

1–2 See **39A** 8–11.

4–5 This formulation of the cognitive impression recalls its early Zenonian form (cf. **D** 4), omitting the clause οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, which Diogenes does include in **39A** 13. Also, in the more elaborate analysis of **E** 5–6, ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην is distinguished as a third attribute over and above being merely κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον.

7 For ἔκτυπον, cf. ἐκτύπων, the opposite of *σφιγχευμένους*, **69D** 4

D Cicero, *Acad.* 2.77–8

(1) quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid futurum esset si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. (2) ille credo nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset quod percipi posset. (3) quid ergo id esset? visum credo (4) quale igitur visum? tum illum ita definisse: ex eo quod esset sicut esset impressum et signatum et effectum (5) post requisitum etiamne si eius modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum (6) hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est cuius modi ab eo quod non est posset esse. (7) recte consensus Arcehilas ad definitionem additum,
5

neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; (8) incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a veto ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. (9) haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit.

Context: following 68O and continued at 69H.

In judging the historicity of Zeno's arguments with Arcesilaus, note Cicero's qualifications, *fortasse*, 1, *credo*, 2-3. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, it could appear that the Stoic who principally defended the epistemology against Arcesilaus was Antioch; cf. 7.162-3 and Long [622]. No doubt, however, attaches to the revision of the definition of the cognitive impression, 6-8, which Arcesilaus prompted, cf. E 23-6. For some novel suggestions about Arcesilaus' part in prompting the Stoics to refine Zeno's epistemology, cf. Torripolo [620], 323ff.

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.247-52 (SVF 2.65, part)

(1) τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ, (2) οὐ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἱ προσπίπτουσαι τισι κατὰ πάθος· μυρίοι γὰρ φρενιζόντες καὶ μελαγχολῶντες ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔλκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσούσας, ὅθεν οὐδὲ διαβεβαιούνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ συγκατατίθενται αὐτῇ. (3) καταληπτικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἄκρως γὰρ ποιούμενοι ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς ἰδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν ἔχειν συμβεβηκός. (4) ἂν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γίνεσθαι· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φαντασιῶν προσπίπτουσιν ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μεμνηότων, αἵτινες οὐκ ἂν εἴεν καταληπτικαί. (5) δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον· εἶναι γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰνδάλλονται, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμνηότος Ὀρέστου μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν. ἔλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, τῆς Ἥλέκτρας, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μῖνον γὰρ τῶν Ἑρινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι. (6) οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναεσφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ἰδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν ἀναμιάττηται. ὥς γὰρ οἱ γληφεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελομένων, καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγίδες αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς τοῖς χαρακτήρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσιν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν. (7) τὸ δὲ "οὔτε οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὑποῦσας ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασι κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὐρεθήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ φασὶν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόψει τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορὰ, ἐπειπερ καὶ εἴχεν τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιοῦτὴ φαντασία παρὰ ἄλλας φαντασίας

καθόπερ οἱ κερᾶσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημαί-
 τοῖναντίων φασὶ δύνασθαι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαρῆλλακτον εὐρεθῆσαι σθαι ψεύδος.
 8 παύσασθαι could. παύσμενος Kassel 9 αὐτοῖς Bekker: αὐτοῦς could 10 ὅν Bekker: ὅ could
 del Kischolsky 10 ὅ κατ' Bekker: ὅκ could 11 φαντασιῶν Arsch: φαντασιῶν could

30

Context: continuing 39C

The fullness of this account is impressive, by comparison with C. Notice, however, that while the two accounts agree on the two primary conditions which fail to make a *φαντασία καταληπτική* (C 6-7 and E 4-5), these *ἀκατάληπτοι φαντασίαι*, as C calls them, are not the same as the *οὐ καταληπτικαί* with which E starts. The latter unlike the former are all a subdivision of true impressions, with their failure to be *καταληπτικῆ* explained by their being experiences of abnormal people, 1-5. The focus on abnormal people continues as the first two attributes of the cognitive impression are laid out, 4-5. Impressions which are either *ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος* or, though they arise from what is, fail to represent the object, are false; and the examples of Orestes and Heracles make the presumption that normal people do not typically have such impressions. Then, at 6, the condition is specified which marks off cognitive impressions from impressions which may be true but fall short of being cognitive – the stamping and sealing of the object's properties on the impression. Here the focus is clearly on people quite generally, since there can be nothing pathological about having impressions from time to time that fail to meet this condition. On 7, cf. Frede [468], 81. We agree with him that this clause should not refer to some attribute of cognitive impressions over and above the previous ones, but that it spells out the distinctiveness those attributes confer on such impressions.

9 *ἰδιώματα* These need not be confined to *ἰδίως παρὰ*; cf. vol. 1, 194, for *ἰδίως* used of the distinguishing characteristic of a species or kind. For the interpretation of *πάντα*, see note on 41B 8.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.177 (SFF 1.625) and Athenaeus 3541 (SFF 1.624, part)

... (1) Σφαῖρος ὁ Βοσποριανός, ὃς προκοπὴν καὶ ἡγε- περιποιησάμενος λόγων εἰς
 Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἀπῆγε πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Φιλοπάτορα, λόγων δὲ ποτε
 γενομένου περὶ τοῦ διαζύσειν τὴν σοφὸν καὶ τοῦ Σφαίρου εἰπόντος ὡς οὐ
 διαζύσει, βουλόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐλέγξει αὐτόν, κηρίνας ῥόας ἐκέλευσε
 παρατεθῆναι· (2) τοῦ δὲ Σφαίρου ἀπατηθέντος ἀνεβόησεν ὁ βασιλεὺς
 ψευδεὶ συγκατατεθείσθαι αὐτὸν φαντασίᾳ, πρὸς ὃν ὁ Σφαῖρος εὐστόχως
 ἀπεκρίνατο, εἰπὼν οὕτως συγκατατεθείσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι ῥόαι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 εὐλόγων ἔστι ῥόας αὐτὰς εἶναι· (3) διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν καταληπτικὴν
 φαντασίαν τοῦ εὐλόγου . . . τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀδιόφυστον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὐλόγον
 (κῆν) ἄλλως ἀποβαίνειν.

3

177

2 ἀπῆγε F ἀπῆγε BF 10 (κῆν) Wolanski

Context: life of Sphaerus.

9-10 We have supplemented Diogenes' account by adding Athenaeus' explanation of the difference between *καταληπτικός* and *εὐλογος*. On the latter, cf. D L 7.76, *εὐλογον δὲ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ πλείονας ἀφορμὰς ἔχει εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὥσιν "βιώσονται αὖριον"*, and 59B 1. 69B.

G Plutarch, *Comm. noi* 1059B C (STF 2.33)

(1) εἰτά τις εἶπεν αὐτῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλ' ἐκ προνοίας θεῶν νομίζου μετ' Ἀρκεσίλαον καὶ πρὸ Καρνεάδου γενόμενον Χρύσιππον, ὃν ὁ μὲν ὑπῆρξε τῆς εἰς τὴν συνθήειαν ἔβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ὃ δ' ἡνθήσῃ μάλιστα τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν. (2) Χρύσιππος γοῦν ἐν μίᾳ γενόμενος ταῖς πρὸς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀντιγραφαῖς καὶ τὴν Καρνεάδου δεινότητα ἐνέφραξε, πολλὰ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει καταληπτῶν ὥσπερ εἰς πολυρκίαν βοηθήματα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τὰς προλήψεως καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ταραχὸν ἀφελὼν παντάπασιν καὶ διαμνηρῶσας ἐκάστην καὶ θέμενος εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφὲς ἐκκρῶνειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ περιβυῖσθαι βουλομένους μηδὲν περαινέειν ἀλλ' ἐλέγχεσθαι [βουλομένους] κακοεργούσας καὶ συζητούμενους.

10

2 *de* Leonius, *Bail.*, *olior* codl. 2 *de* Bartholomaeus Wittenbach *Amphitroos* codl. 2 *de* Boulemaïous² del. Beske

Context: Stoics' resentment of the older (sceptical) Academics' sophistry, cf. 8–10

3 **συνθήειαν** For this use of the term, cf. 310 A.

4–5 Chrysippus wrote a book against Arcesilaus' *μεθόδου*, 37B 6; for his comments on argument designed to induce *ἐποχή*, cf. 31P

6–8 This is not the claim that Chrysippus removed confusion surrounding the ideas of *ἐννοια* and *προλήψεις* (thus e.g. Sandbach [476], 22), but merely that he clarified individual concepts by 'articulating' them, i.e. by framing their definitions. Cf. 32H 5–8, and for the association of 'articulation' with definition, see 32I with note

H Sextus Empiricus, *M* 7.402–10

(1) τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην συγχαίρησεν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοῆς, τὸ δὲ ὅσα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ἀσυχώρητοι εἶναι, γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασιῶν ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων. (2) καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλλαξίας τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὐρίσκεισθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκαλουθῶν πράξεις ἐπιξεύνασθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀνυόμενος ποτὴν ἵδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δειμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνους ἢ μὲν διάχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς δειματούμενοις καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τρανό- τατα φαινόμενοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, οἷον Δίῳ μὲν ὡς Δίῳ, Θέῳ δὲ ὡς Θέῳ προσφερόμενοι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μαίᾳ τὸ παραπλήμιον πάσχουσι τινες. ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανεῖς, καὶ λαβῶν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκόλουθον πράξιν ταύτη φαντασία συνήψεν. ἀκόλουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοῖς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παιδὸς ἀνελείν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. (3) εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ ταῖς εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πράξιν συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφήρησι, λεκτέον ἀπαραλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους.

15

καὶ μὴν οὐ τὸν τρόπον ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν ὁ ἥμως, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων 20
 παιδῶν ὅτι Εὐρυστάθους εἰσὶ παῖδες. μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ προυπέκειτο καὶ ὠπαύτως ἔχοντι
 φαντασία. ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν παιδῶν ψευδής. ἐπ' ἴσης οὖν
 κινουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ὁμολογητέον ἀπαράλλακτον εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ· καὶ εἰ ἡ ἀπὸ 25
 τῶν τόξων λέγεται καταληπτική, ὅτι <ῆ> ἀκόλουθος αὐτῇ πράξις ἐπεξέχθη τοῖς τόξοις
 οὗτου ὡς τόξοις χρησαμένου, λεγέσθω καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν παιδῶν μὴ διαφέρειν ταύτης,
 παρώσον καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐπεξεύχθη ἔργον, τούτεστι τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἔχθρου παῖδας 30
 δεῖν ἀναιρεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτῃ μὲν ἡ ἀπαρραλλεῖα τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἀκαταλήπτων φαντασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐντονὸν ἰδίωμα περιέσταιται. (4) οὐδὲν δὲ
 ἦττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτήρα καὶ [ῆ] 35
 κατὰ τύπον. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς Στωικούς. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν
 ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν, διαφερόντων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀμήχανόν
 ἐστι διορίζειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς καὶ
 ἀκαταλήπτου· ὅλον δυεῖν ὧν ἄκρως ἀλλήλοισι ὁμοίων <εἰ> ἐναλλάξ τῷ 40
 Στωικῷ δίδωμι πρὸς διάκρισιν, [εἰ] ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἰσχύσει λέγειν
 ἀδιαπτύτως πότερον ἔν ἐστι τὸ δεικνύμενον ὧν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο; ὁ δ' 35
 αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῆ φαντασίαν ὁ
 σπουδαῖος καὶ (ὁμ)ως ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον
 ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἐὰν ἀπὸ
 Καστορος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκους φαντασισθῇ. ἐντέθειν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἐγκαταλιμμέ-
 νος συνέστη λόγος.

ε τοῦ Heitsen. τὸ codd. 19 ἐν <ῆ> Mutschmann 20 τόξων <ὡς τόξων> Heitsen 21
 κινουμένων N. κινουμένων codd. 24 <ῆ> Heitsen 25 ἡ del Bekker 30 ἐπὶ Bekker ἐπεξ-
 codd. 33 4 <εἰ> . [εἰ] Heitsen 34 σοφός <οὐ> Heitsen 37 καὶ <ὁμ>ως A.A. Long. καὶ ὡς
 codd. καίπερ Bekker: ὡς γὰρ Kayser

Context: report of Carneades' criticism of the cognitive impression.

1 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα. I.e. E 4-6.

3-6 πλεηκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς. Carneades is picking on the Stoics' own terminology; cf. K 17 : 8.

13-19. Carneades can be seen to draw first on the Stoics' analysis of a πιθανὸν ἀξίωμα (cf. 37M) and secondly to exploit the Stoics' concept of a καθήκον; cf. 59B where this concept is analysed in terms of ἀκόλουθον and εὐλόγον· assenting and then acting consequentially are no grounds for supposing that the agent has securely grasped something true.

39-40. For this argument, see 37B· D.

1 Cicero, *Acad.* 2.57

hi pugnes licet, non repugnabo, (1) quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant quas non habeat distinctas, retenturam adsensum nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum nisi quod tale fuerit quale falsum esse non possit (2) sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem qua vera a falsis possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus

adhibendus est: ut mater geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internoscēs si aduereris.

4 *et ad V² et V³: ad A²H | A³*

Context: Lucullus' defence of Stoic–Antiochian epistemology against New Academic criticism.

J Cicero, *Acad.* 2.83–5

(1) quattuor sunt capita quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci percipi
comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. et quibus primum est esse
aliquid visum falsum, (2) secundum non posse id percipi, (3) tertium inter
quae visa nihil intersit fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi possint alia non
possint, (4) quantum nullum esse visum verum a sensu profectum cui non
adpositum sit visum aliud quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit
(5) horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium omnes concedunt; primum
Epicurus non dat, vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis, omnis pugna
de quarto est. (6) qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum videbat, si Quantum se
videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum quod percipi non posset, quia
nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso; qua distinctione sublata quam haberet
in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Geminio consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam
quae falsa esse non possit? (7) negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura
esse; . . . ne sit sane: videri certe potest, fallit igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit
similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit, sublato enim iudicio illo quo oportet
agnosci, etiam si ipse erit quem videris qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota
iudicabis quia dicis oportere ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa . . . (8)
omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil esse idem quod sit aliud. Stoicūmst id quidem
nec admodum credibile, nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem qualis sit
pilus alius, nullum gratum. (9) haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo; ad id
enim quod agitur nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa te nihil differat an
internosci non possit etiam si differat.

18 *Stoicism et al. 1b: Stoicism: addit A¹V¹B¹ Stoicism: add. . . A³V²B²12*

Context: Cicero's account of the Academic strategy for undermining cognition.

8 For Epicurus' position, see 16.

18–20 For an excellent discussion of the bearing of this thesis (the identity of indiscernibles) on Stoic epistemology, cf. Frede [468], 77.

K Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.253–60

(1) ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν κριτήριον φασὶν εἶναι τῆς
ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθε-
σαν καὶ τὸ μὴδὲν ἔχουσαν ἐνυσημα. ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ καταληπτικὴ μὲν
προσπίπτει φαντασία, ἄπιστος δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξωθεν περίσταςιν. (2) οἷον ὅτε
Ἀδμήτω ὁ Ἡρακλῆς τὴν Ἀλκμήτιν γῆθεν ἀναγαγὼν παρέστυχε, τότε ὁ

Ἀδμήτος ἔσπασε μὲν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλκίσιτιδος,
 ἡπίσται δ' αὐτῇ· καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ Τροίης ὁ Μενέλαος ἀνακομισθεὶς εἴωρα τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην
 παρὰ τῷ Ἥρωϊ, [καί] καταλιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς κείνης ἐδυίλων, περὶ οὗ δακρυόεντος
 συνέστη πόλεμος, ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἰσχυρομεγαλύνῃ καὶ
 ἰσχυροφραγισμένην ἐλάβρανε φαντασίαν, οὐκ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ, ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν καταληπτικὴ
 φαντασία κριτήριον ἔπει μὴδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνσθημα, αὐταὶ δὲ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν, εἶχον δὲ
 ἰσχυροφάνει· ὁ τε γάρ Ἀδμήτος ἐλογίζετο ὅτι τέθνηκεν ἡ Ἀλκιμήδης καὶ ὅτι ὁ
 ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιά τινά ποτε ἐπιφοιτᾷ· ὁ τε
 Μενέλαος συνέωρα ὅτι ἀπολείλειπεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ φυλατταμένην τὴν Ἑλένην, καὶ οὐκ ἀπίθανον
 μὲν εἶσθαι Ἑλένην μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φάρου εὑρεθείσαν, φάντασμα δὲ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον. (3)
 ἐνθένδε οὐχ ἀπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεταί τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ καταληπτικὴ
 φαντασία, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὴδὲν ἔνσθημα ἔχῃ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οἶσα καὶ
 πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς
 συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μὴδενὸς δευμένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτην προσπίπτειν ἢ
 εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν. (4) διὸ δὴ καὶ πᾶς
 ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὴν
 τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μεταδιώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ὄρωτων, ὅταν ἀμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν. ἐντείνει γὰρ
 τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ ὀρωμένου ὡς τέλει μὴ πλανᾶσθαι,
 παρατρίβει τε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ, μέχρις ἂν τραπῇ
 καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην
 θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς καταλήψεως πίστιν. (5) καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως τοῦναντίον
 ἀδυνάτον ἔστι λέγειν, καὶ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀφιστάμενον τοῦ ἀξιούντος ὅτι
 φαντασία κριτήριον ἔστι, καθ' ἑτέρας φαντασίας ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο
 πάσχοντα βεβαιοῦν τὸ φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, (6) τῆς φύσεως οἰοεὶ
 φέγγος ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν
 ἀναδούσης καὶ τὴν δι' αὐτῆς γινομένην φαντασίαν. ἄτοπον οὖν ἔστι
 τοσαύτην δύναμιν ἀθετεῖν καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ φῶς αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. (7) ὃν
 γὰρ τρόπον ὁ χρώματα μὲν ἀπολείπειν καὶ τὰς ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, τὴν δὲ
 ὁραὴν ἀναιρῶν ὡς ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ ἀπιστον, καὶ φωνὰς μὲν εἶναι λέγων,
 ἀκοὴν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀξίων, σφόδρα ἔστιν ἄτοπος (δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐνόησαμεν
 χρώματα καὶ φωνὰς, ἐκείνων ἀπόντων οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι δυνατοὶ χρώμασιν ἢ
 φωναῖς), οὕτω καὶ ὁ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ὁμολογῶν, τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν τῆς
 αἰσθήσεως, δι' ἧς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιλαμβάνεται, διαβάλλων τελῶς
 ἔστιν ἐμβρόντητος, καὶ τοῖς ἀφύχοις ἴσων αὐτὸν ποιεῶν.

π καὶ δέ. Bekker 10 εἶκε . αὐτῇ Lachetier: εἶχε . αὐτὴν Loda 19 προσπίπτειν N:
 προσπίπτειν ceti 25 τε Mutschmann γὰρ cod. 28 καὶ ἀναγκῆς Hirtz: κατ' ἀνάγκην cod.

Context: following E.

1 νεώτεροι These Stoics, on the evidence of H, were answering Carneades' objections. Thus they probably included Antipater, and their rejoinder to the Academics was also repeated by Antiochus, compare K 17. 20, 27. 40 with N 5, O 3.

L Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.424

ἵνα γε μὴν αἰσθητικὴ γένηται φαντασία κατ' αὐτοὺς, οἷον ὁρατική, δεῖ
 πέντε συνδραμεῖν, τό τε αἰσθητήριον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ
 πῶς καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥς ἐάν τῶν ἄλλων παρύνταιν ἐν μόνον ἀπῇ, καθάπερ
 διάνοια παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, οὐ σωθήσεται, φαίνει, ἢ ἀντίληψις. ἐνθεν καὶ
 τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἐλεγόν τινες μὴ κοινῶς εἶναι κριτήριον, ἀλλ' 5
 ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ <τοῦτο> τὸν τρόπον ἐνστήμα.

5 πῶς codd.: πῶς Heintz 4 σωθήσεται| συνθήσεται N 5 εἶναι υπ ε 6 <τοῦτο>
 A.A.Long τῶπον codd.: τόπον Mutschmanni

Context: a few sections after (Academic-inspired?) criticism of the cognitive impression by means of the Sorites (including 37F).

2 **συνδραμεῖν** Cf. the *συνδρομή* of factors required by Carneades for the *ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία*, 69E 1–3.

6 **ἐνστήμα** See K.

M Cicero, *Acad.* 2.22

quod si essent falsae notitiae (ἐννοίας enim notitias appellare tu videbare) (1) si igitur
 essent eae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae qualia visa a falsis discerni non
 possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? (2) quo modo autem quid cuique rei
 consentaneum esset quid repugnaret videremus? (3) memoriae quidem certe,
 quae non modo philosophiam sed omnis vitae usum omnesque artes una 5
 maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur, quae potest enim esse
 memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendi-
 dit et tenet?

Context: following 39C and preceding 42B.

For *ἐννοιαί* and memory, cf. N 1; 39E F.

N Cicero, *Acad.* 2.30–1

(1) mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est,
 naturalem vim habet quam utendit ad ea quibus movetur. itaque alia visa sic
 attripit ut his statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur; cetera
 autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas
 Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant; (2) eo cum accessit ratio 5
 argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et
 perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta is gradibus ad
 sapientiam pervenit. (3) ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam
 aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam
 κατάληψιν . . . cum ipsam per se amat (ubi enim est ei veritas luce clarius) tum 10
 etiam propter usum. (4) quocirca et sensibus utitur et artes efficit quasi sensus
 alteros et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua
 re una vita omnis apta sit. (5) ergo i qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi haec

ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae, vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum perinde ut causa postulat dicere. 15

Context: Lucullus' recourse to natural teleology in defence of Stoic-Antiochean epistemology.

1 **mens . . . ipsa sensus est** We take *sensus* as a plural, since the senses are not something independent of the mind, nor would it be Stoic doctrine to describe the mind as a sense over and above the standard five; cf. note on 39C.

10 Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 3 17, *καταλήψεις . . . propter se ascendas arbitramur*.

12-13 **ex qua omnis** Virtue is *περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον τέχνη*, 61G 2.

13-16 Similarly K 5-7.

O Cicero, *Acad.* 2.37-8

{1} nam cum vim quae esset in sensibus explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adensione non potest. {2} deinde cum inter inanimatum et animal hoc maxime intersit quod animal agit aliquid (nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit), aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea quae est in nostra potestate sita reddenda adsensu. {3} at vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis quos neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt; ut enim necesse est lancem in libram ponderibus inpositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuus cedere. nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam adpareat (Graeci id οὐκείον appellant), sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non adprobare 5 10

7 (libram) liberam V¹, libra A²B²

Context: account of assent, in defence of Stoic-Antiochean epistemology.

1 The reference is to **N** and the sentences preceding it

3-5 On this attribution of assent to animals in general, cf. vol. 1, 322.

5 in nostra potestate. ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Stoicism sees no conflict between assent's being both 'in our power', as here, and necessitated (7-10); see 62G

7-8 The analogy with the balance is particularly appropriate for illustrating the criterion of truth; cf. 31S 1-2.

P Diogenes Laertius 7.52

ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ' αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων, λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους.

Context: immediately following **Q**

For αἰσθήσει . . . λόγῳ, see 39A 4, and for the examples of sensible qualities, 39C 1.

Q Diogenes Laertius 7.52 (SVF 2.71)

αἰσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ τ' ἄφ' ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διήκον καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν κατὰληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ' ἣν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἰσθησις καλεῖται.

Context: immediately following 39A

1-2 τὸ τ'—διήκον See 53H 1-2 with notes.

R Plutarch, *Comm. pol.* 1060A

βούλομαι ἀπολαύσαι τῆς ἀμύνης ἐλεγχομένους εἰς ταῦτόν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιδῶν, τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοιᾶς καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν. ἄφ' ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἴρεσιν ὡς σπερμάτιον ἀνα<βλαστειν> δοκοῦσι καὶ μόνῃν ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν.

2 τὸ Reiske. τῶν αὐτῶν 1 ὡς σπερμάτων ἀνα<βλαστειν> (hetmis ὡσημ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνα< . . . > codd)

Context: a few sections after G.

4 This recalls the Stoics' definition of the ethical end, cf. 63A.

S Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.22.1-3, 9-10

(1) <αἰ> προλήψεις κοινὰί πάσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶ καὶ πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται. τίς γάρ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθηναι, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστὶ [ἐστὶ] καὶ αἰρετόν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως δεῖ μετεῖναι καὶ διώκειν; τίς δ' ἡμῶν οὐ τίθηναι, ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον καλὸν ἐστὶ καὶ πρέπον, πότε οὖν ἡ μάχη γίνεται; περὶ τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις, ὅταν ὁ μὲν εἴπῃ
 "καλῶς ἐποίησεν, ἀνδρείος ἐστίν", <ὁ δ'> "οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀπονενοημένος." ἔνθεν ἡ μάχη γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. . . (2) τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν.

2 εἰσεῖ del c. 4 ὁ δ' αὖτ' s

Context: discussion περὶ τῶν προλήψεων.

8 ἐφαρμόζειν. On this fundamental theme in Epictetus, cf. Bonhöffer [311], 193.

T Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.337-332a

καίτοι τινὲς εἰσθαλὴν ἡμῶν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἵρεως, ἀρροικότερον ἐνίστασθαι, λέγοντες "ἥτοι νοεῖτε, τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἣ οὐ νοεῖτε. καὶ εἰ μὲν νοεῖτε καὶ ἔχετε ἐννοίαν αὐτῆς, ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις; εἰ δὲ οὐ νοεῖτε, πῶς ζητεῖτε τὸ μηδ' ἀρχὴν νοούμενον ὑμῖν;" ταῦτα γὰρ λέγοντες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν σχεδὸν περιτρέπονται, ἐπεὶ περ (1) τὸ μὲν παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου πρόληψιν καὶ ἐννοίαν δεῖν προηγεῖσθαι ὁμολογόν ἐστιν. πῶς γάρ τις καὶ ζητῆσαι δύναται μηδεμίαν ἐννοίαν ἔχων τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος; οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιτυχίῳ εἰσεται, ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν, οὔτε ἀστοχίῳ, ὅτι ἡστούχησεν.

(2) ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δίδομεν, καὶ τοσοῦτόν γε ἀπέχομεν τοῦ λέγειν ἔννοιαν μὴ ἔχειν παντὶς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, ὡς καὶ ἀνάπαλιν πολλές γ' ἐννοίας αὐτοῦ καὶ προλήψεις ἔχειν ἀξιούν, καὶ χάριν τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ταύτας διακρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κυριωτάτην ἀνευρεῖν εἰς ἐποχὴν καὶ ἀρρεψίαν περιήσασθαι.

Context: beginning of a refutation of the existence of proof.

Although Sextus' argument is specifically directed against the Epicureans, his objections in fact apply equally to the Stoics, who took over the concept of *προλήψεις* from Epicurus, cf. 23E 3.

41 Knowledge and opinion

A Cicero, *Acad.* 2.145 (SVF 1.66)

at vix negat quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. (1) et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. (2) nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, "visum" inquit "huius modi est"; (3) dein cum paulum digitos contraxerat, "adsensus huius modi"; (4) tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat, qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit; (5) cum autem laevam manum admovent et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.

4. contraxerat dett. Vici. : contraxerat A. comprehenderat N. compressit B

Context: the Stoic distinction between κατάληψις and ἐπιστήμη.

For discussion of the four epistemological states (sections 2–5), cf. Sandbach [474], 11–12; Long [3], 126–9; Gödder [479]. The modern tendency is to interpret them as picking out levels of cognition, not chronologically successive stages. However, Ioppolo [620], 319ff., argues that the latter was Zeno's doctrine, and was then modified to the former position by Chrysippus, in response to criticism by Arcesilaus.

1. *gestu*. Note also Zeno's use of the hand to illustrate the difference between dialectic and rhetoric, 31E.

B Cicero, *Acad.* 1.41–2 (SVF 1.60 part)

(1) quod autem erat sensu comprehensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existeret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. (2) sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. (3) e quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi

normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur; e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. (4) errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinionem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constans assensionis a virtute sapientiaeque removebat.

3 *conveniet* *pro* *scet* *in* *extrema* *F. excubet* *Plasberg* 6 *id* *id* *solum* *et* *C. huius* 12 *reperiuntur* *could*
aperiuntur *Manutius* *aperiuntur* *Davies*

Context: immediately following 40B.

2 **scientiam** See also C 4–5. H 1 2: 31B 7 8.

3 4 **ex qua—communis** Cicero's Latin is too compressed to elucidate the precise relationship Zeno is supposed to have posited between *inscientia* (ἀγνοια) and *opinio* (δόξα). The interpretation suggested in vol. 1, 257 ff., is close to that of Arthur [469], 77; but he seems not to recognize that *opinio* as used here could include an ignorant person's weak assent to cognitive impressions, cf. Long [3], 129, which is also misleading, however, in its attempt to restrict weak assent to such cases. See also Inppolo [620], 321–3.

5 6 Reading *solum* *et* for *sola*, Rackham in the Loeb edition translates 'He reckoned it neither as a right nor as a wrong impression, but said that it was only "credible"'. But *neque in rectis neque in pravis* must refer to right and wrong mental dispositions, i.e. *scientia/inscientia*, and *soli* makes excellent sense: κατάληψις, a mode of cognition which straddles scientific knowledge and ignorance, is to be trusted 'on its own' i.e. all by itself because it embraces everything necessary to a criterion of truth; for this use of *solum*, cf. Cicero, *Top.* 39, *sapientia efficit sapientis sola per se*.

8 **non-comprehenderet** According to 40E 6, by contrast, a cognitive impression has to represent all the impression's *ἰδιώματα*. Hence there is a *prima facie* conflict between the two passages. Note, however, that Cicero, 9, insists that cognition does apprehend everything *quod cadere in eam posset*, and it is reasonable to interpret this as meaning that e.g., a visual cognitive impression does apprehend all the visual properties of the sense object, though not of course any of its other properties. 40E 6 may not be intending to assert anything stronger than that.

11–12 Cf. 39C; 40N.

C Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.150–7

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀρκεσίλαν προηγουμένως μὲν οὐδὲν ὥρισαν κριτήριον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὠρίκηναι
 δοκοῦντες τοῦτο κατὰ ἀντιπαρεσχυγῆν τὴν ὡς πρὸς τοῖς Στωικῶν ἀπόδοσαν {1} τρεῖς
 γὰρ εἶναι φασὶν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ συζυγοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ
 τὴν ἐν μεθορίῳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν, {2} ὡν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι
 τὴν ἀσφαλὴ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, {3} δόξαν
 δὲ τὴν ἀσθενὴ καὶ ψευδῇ συγκατάθεσιν, {4} κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ
 τούτων, ἥτις ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· καταληπτικῇ
 δὲ φαντασίᾳ κατὰ τούτους ἐτύγχανεν ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν
 γένοιτο ψευδὴς. {5} ὡν τὴν <μὲν> ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι
 τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις, τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινὴν
 ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι. {6} ταῦτα δὲ

λεγόντων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντικαθίστατα, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξύ ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. (7) αὕτη γὰρ ἦν φασὶ κατάληψιν καὶ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία συγκατάθεσιν, ἥτοι ἐν σοφῷ ἢ ἐν φαύλῳ γίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐάν τε ἐν σοφῷ γένηται, ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἐάν τε ἐν φαύλῳ, δόξα, καὶ οὐδέν ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα ἢ μόνον ὄνομα μετείληπται. (8) εἴπερ τε ἡ κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις ἐστίν, ἀνυπαρκτὺς ἐστὶ, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἡ συγκατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεται ἀλλὰ πρὸς λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωματῶν εἰσὶν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις), δεύτερον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθὴς φαντασία εὕρισκεται οἷα οὐκ αὖ γένοιτο ψευδής, ὥς διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παρίσταται. (9) μὴ οὕσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται ἢν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία συγκατάθεσις. μὴ οὕσης δὲ κατάληψεως πάντ' ἐσται ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκατάληπτων ἀκολουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν. (10) σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτως. πάντων ὄντων ἀκατάληπτων διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ Στωικοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκατατίθεται τι, τῷ ἀκατάληπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκατάληπτῳ συγκαταθέσει δόξα ἐστίν. ὥστε εἰ τῶν συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφός, τῶν δοξαστών ἐσται ὁ σοφός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τῶν δοξαστών ἐστίν ὁ σοφός (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφροσύνης ἦν κατ' αὐτοὺς, καὶ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἰτιον)· οὐκ ἄρα τῶν συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστίν ὁ σοφός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περὶ πάντων αὐτὸν δεήσει ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν οὐδέν ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν· ἐφέξει ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός.

14 καταληπτικὴ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν Bekker: καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκαταθέσεις N καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν συγκατάθεσιν cett. 23 αὖ ποτὶ γὰρ N om. cett. αὕτη Mutschmann 23 καταληπτικὴ φαντασίᾳ Fabricius: κατὰ τὰ codd. 25 οὕτως Bekker οὕτως εἰ codd

Comment: doxography of the Academics on the criterion of truth.

5-6 Cf. B 3-4.

19-20 τῶν συγκαταθέσεις This is the Stoics' own position; cf. 33I.

29 δόξα. Cf. E 7.

30 2 Cf. 40D 1 2.

33 περὶ-ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν The hallmark of the Academic sceptre himself; cf. 6B.

D Anon. Stoic. (P. Herc. 1020), col. 4, col. 1 (SVF 2. 131, part)

(1) . . . ὅ[τ]ι τὴν [ἀ]πρὸς πτωσίαν | τιμῶμ[ε]ν καὶ τὴν [ἀνεί]καϊότη[τ]α, πρὸς δὲ | τὰς ἐναντίας δι[α]β[ε]βλήμεθα ὀρθώ[ς]. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ μί[ε]ν ἀπρὸς πτωσίᾳ διάθε[σ]ις ἀσυγκατάθετος πρὸ καταλήψεως, συγκαταθετικὴν κατὰ κρ... αἱ φαντασίᾳ καταλήπτῳ, ἰσχύουσα τ' ἐν φαντασίαις καὶ ἀνείκτον παρεχο[μ]έν[η] | ταῖς μὴ καταληπτικαῖς. δεῖ γάρ | τὸν ἀπρόπτωτον | ἀ- | ν[ε]λέ[κ]υστον τε εἶναι ὑπὸ φαντασίας | ἀκατάληπτου καὶ ἰσχύειν ἐν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ὥστε μὴ ἔλκεσθαι ἀπὸ φαντασιῶν ἀκατάληπτων | καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν | συγκαταθέσεων . . . (2) | τῷ δὲ μὴ | δ[ι]αξάξειν | τὸν σοφόν | πλείω | ἀκολουθεῖν | φάμεν τοιαύτᾳ· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ | μὴ δοκεῖν | αὐτῷ

μηδέν· ἡ γὰρ δόκη[σις] ἐστίν τι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς . . . (3) ταύτοις δὲ 10
 ὡς π[ρὸς] τὸν ἀκού[ου]σιν καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀποφύ[γε]ν ἀνεξάπατή[του] εἶναι καὶ
 ἀναμάρτητους κατ' ἀξίαν τε ζῆν καὶ πάντα πράττειν εὖ διὰ καὶ περὶ
 τὰς συν[κ]ατάθεσεις ὅπως γίνονται μὴ ἄλλως, ἀλλὰ μετὰ καταλήψεως
 πλείων γέγονεν ἐπιστοροφῇ.

[Four lines c. 10 we print Armin's text in SLF, with his restorations. Tiziano Dorandi kindly examined the papyrus for us and confirmed the correctness of these readings.]

11 π[ρὸς] τὸν ἀκού[ου]σιν 12 κατ' ἀξίαν τε ζῆν Capasso καταβ[ε]βηκεν 13 τε ζῆν μ[ε]ν

The context and nature of the book which contained these fragments are unknown.

1 [ἀ]προπρωσι[αν]. [ἀν]εικαιότ[η]τα Cf. 31B 2.4.

12 κατ' ἀξίαν τε ζῆν This restoration by Capasso [481], 465–6, is based upon a new autopsy of the papyrus. It is of unusual importance because Armin in SLF 2, 131 prints κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην, a reading he was persuaded to adopt by Crönert [482], 349–50, n. 2. In his first publication of the text, working purely from the apograph, Armin [480] had printed καὶ διὰ τε ζῆν. Eleven years later, Crönert examined the papyrus, and wrote: 'κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην zu verbessem sind (ἀρ[ι]στοτέλης der Pap.)', vgl. *Politik* Z. 1319a3 ἀναμάρτητοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπικεικός. As Capasso observes, Crönert's supposed parallel is not at all to the point, once its context is examined; and the papyrus, independently examined for us by Dr Dorandi, accords with Capasso's reading. Aristotle's name has no place in this text.

Capasso's restoration seems virtually certain, but we question whether he is right to take ἀξία as a technical reference to the Stoic concept of value. κατ' ἀξίαν ζῆν means too condensed to refer to anything as complex as the doctrine of 58D, to which he refers. We take the expression to mean 'live worthily', i.e. live as they should.

E Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1056E–I (SLF 2.993, part)

ἀνὴρ δὲ τοῦτων, εἰ μὲν αἱ φαντασίαι μὴ γίνονται καθ' εἰςμαρμένην (οὐδ' αἰτίαι εἶναι δέ τι τὴν
 εἰςμαρμένην) τῶν συγκαταθέσεων· εἰ δ' ὅτι ποιεῖ φαντασίαι ἀγωγούς ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθε-
 σιν, καθ' εἰςμαρμένην αἱ συγκαταθέσεις γίνεσθαι λέγονται, πῶς οὐ μάχεται πρὸς αὐτὴν
 πολλὰκις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις διαφόροις ποιούσα φαντασίας καὶ περισπώσας
 ἐπὶ τὰναντία τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτε τοὺς προστιθεμένους τῇ ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ 5
 ἐπέχοντας ἀμαρτάνειν λέγουσιν, αὐτὴν μὲν ἀδήλους εἰκῶσι, προσπίπτοντας, αὐ-
 τὴν δὲ ψευδεῖσι, διαψευδομένους, αὐτὴν δὲ κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτους, δοξάζοντας;

1 2 suppl. Chernius 3 προσπίπτοντας Salmasius, προσπίπτοντας codol.

Context: criticism of the Stoic doctrine of fate.

7 κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτους As Cicero [479], 88, has shown, κοινῶς (cf. *communis*, B 4), indicates that ἀκαταλήπτους embraces the two previous objects of assent, ἀδήλους which may be true or false, and ψευδεῖσι. He rightly criticizes Long [3], 129 n. 1, for restricting to what is false the scope of assent to ἀκαταλήπτα.

F Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1057A–B (SLF 3.177, part)

αὐτοὶ δὲ φησὶ Χρῆσιππος καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖν ἐμπαιεῖν φαντορίας καὶ τὸν
 σοφόν, οὐ συγκατατιθεμένων οὐδ' εἰκόντων δεομένους ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ

πραττόντων μόνον καὶ ὁρμώντων ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον· ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους
ὄντας ὑπ' ἀσθενείας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις.

Context: a few lines after E and immediately after 53S.

For the wise man's virtuous use of falsehoods, cf. Long [426], 99–101.

G Stobaeus 2.111,18–112,8 (SVF 3.548, part)

(1) ψεύδος δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτε φασὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν
ἀκατάληπτον τινὲ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτὸν μηδ'
ἄγνοιαν μηδέν. (2) τὴν γὰρ ἄνοιαν μεταπτώτην εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ
ἀσθενή. (3) μηδὲν δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ
βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. (4) διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν
μὲν ἀκατάληπτον συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενή· ταύτας <δ'>
ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· (5) δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ προπίπτειν πρὸ
καταλήψεως <καὶ> συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προπετὴ φαῦλον εἶναι καὶ
μὴ πίπτειν εἰς τὸν εὐφυῆ καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ σπουδαῖον.

1 μεταπτώτην codd. -αίη Heiser. 2 ἀκατάληπτον Wachsmuth: -ον codd. (δ') Heiser. 3
<καὶ> Salmasius. φαῦλον Wachsmuth: μᾶλλον codd.

Context: doxography of Stoic ethics.

6 ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενή Görler [470], 88–9, argues that this species of δόξα is
equivalent to Plutarch's 'yielding to ἄδεια' (E 6) and hence that it is a form of
assenting to ἀκατάληπτα. But this buys consistency between these testimonies at the
cost of misrepresenting Stobaeus. As we point out in vol. 1, 257ff., some of the
evidence, e.g. B 1, appears to envisage 'opinion' as a term which covers all epistemic
conditions of the non-wise man (cf. Ioppolo [620], 32 ff.), and in any case there is no
reason to confine the scope of 'weakness' so narrowly. ἀσθένεια is just the right term
to describe κατάληψις which is not ἀσφαλής, and hence lacks an essential attribute of
ἐπιστήμη. H 1 2.

H Stobaeus 2.73,16–74,3 (SVF 3.112, part)

(1) εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ
λόγου· (2) ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων, αἷον ἢ
τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικῇ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσιν· (3) ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα
ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον, ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· (4)
ἄλλην δὲ ἐξ ὧν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἣν τινὰ φασιν
ἐν τῷ καὶ δυνάμει κείσθαι.

1 ἑτέραν codd. ἑτέρας Wachsmuth. 2 ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν codd. κατάληψιν Wachsmuth. 3
ὑπάρχουσιν Heiser. -ον codd. 4 ἄλλως codd. ἄλλως Wachsmuth. 5 αὐτοῦ Meineke. οὐτοῦ P.
αὐτῶν F. ἔχουσιν Cantab. ἔχουσιν codd. 6 ἄλλην codd. ἄλλως Wachsmuth. 7 τῷ F. τῷ
μη P.

Context: doxography of Stoic ethics.

A series of unnecessary emendations by Wachsmuth has obscured the clear
movement of this text. Stobaeus reports four different senses of ἐπιστήμη, starting

with the most particular (a specific instance of utterly secure cognition) and concluding with the most general (the persistent *εἶς* of a knower).

2-3 ἡ λογικὴ. Sc. κατάληψις, from 1.

3-4 For the virtues as τέχναι and ἐπιστήμας, cf. 60K; 61D; and for βέλαιον as an attribute of virtuous actions, 59I.

I Stobaeus 2.68,18-23 (SVF 3.663)

ἐτι δὲ λέγονται πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεισθαι, ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μανία. τὴν δ' ἄγνοιαν εἶναι ἐναντίαν κακίαν τῇ σωφροσύνῃ· ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν ἀκαταστάτους καὶ πτωχίδεις παρεχομένην τὰς ὁρμὰς μανίαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ υπογράφουσι τὴν μανίαν οὕτως· ἄγνοιαν πτωχίδην.

5

1. ἐτι Cantei: ἐπεὶ τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ Ueener: αὐτοῦ κακί: 2. αὐτοῖς Cantei: αὐτὸ τοῦδ' 3. σωφροσύνη τοῦδ': φρονέσει Ueener 4. πτωχίδεις πτωχίδη Cantei: πτωχίδεις πτωχίδη τοῦδ'.

Context: doxography of Stoic ethics.

3 Ueener's widely accepted emendation is inappropriate. The vice opposite to every virtue is a form of ἄγνοια, Stobaeus 2.59,10-60,5, and the opposite to σωφροσύνη is wanted here because ὁρμαί are the field of this virtue, cf. Stobaeus 2.60,12. For πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν, cf. 29C-F. Surprisingly, the interrelation of the vices is here analysed in line not with Chrysippus' doctrine on the interrelation of the virtues, but with that of Aristo (29E, 61B-C).

42 Scientific methodology

A Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Gorg.* 12-1

(1) Κλεάνθης τοῖνυν λέγει ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ πάντα ἀνύουσα" (2) ἀτελής δ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ ὅρος, καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕξις τίς ἐστιν ὁδῶ πάντα ποιούσα· (3) ὅθεν ὁ Χρυσίππος προσθεὶς τὸ "μετὰ φαντασιῶν" εἶπεν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ προϊούσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν" . . . (4) Ζήνων δὲ φησὶν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἀγγεγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρησθον τῶν ἐν τῇ βίῳ."

5

1 ἀγγεγεγυμνασμένοι τοῦδ' 2 cf. 51E-52

Context: commentary on *Gorg.* 462b. Olympiodorus is comparing these definitions of τέχνη, which theoretic may be held to fulfil, with Plato's, which it does not.

The second and third definitions are reported and endorsed earlier (2.2), without explicit attribution to the Stoics.

1 ὁδῶ See note on 46A-1

2-3 Nature is sometimes defined as a certain sort of *εἶς* (43A-4), sometimes as πρὸς τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν (II.1. 7.136; cf. the definition of 'god' at 46A-1). The present description conflates these accounts. It presumably echoes Chrysippus' own criticism of Cleanthes' definition.

5-6 This definition of τέχνη, widely invoked in rhetorical handbooks and

elsewhere, was apparently taken over by Zeno from the Dialectical school, to which it is attributed by Synarius, *In Herm.* 2.6, t. 9, 18 Rabe; Marcellinus, *In Herm. Stoi.* 53, 30 Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* IV (οἱ Διαλεκτικοὶ φιλόσοφοι); *Prolegomena in Herm. Stoi.* 203, 21–4 Rabe. *Rhetores Graeci* xiv

B Cicero, *Acad.* 2.22

(1) ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio: non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse illum negabimus, sed enim alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus alterum non item. (2) cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aliud ut molatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea potest quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is qui fidibus utitur explere numeros et conficere versus . . . ?

Context: the indispensability of κατάληψις.

C Cicero, *Div.* 1.34

(1) tis igitur adsentior, qui duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt, unum quod particeps esset artis, alterum quod arte careret. est enim ars in iis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt. (2) carent autem arte ii qui non ratione aut coniectura observatis ac notatis signis, sed conicitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, quod et somniantibus saepe contingit et non numquam vaticinantibus per furorem.

Context: interim conclusion of the long catalogue of historical examples of scientific divination launched at *ibid.* 11.

D Cicero, *Div.* 1.82–3 (*SVF* 2.1192)

(1) quanti quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur; (2) “si sunt di, neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum scire quid sit futurum, aut non censent esse suae maiestatis praesignificare hominibus quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem di significare possunt. at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici) neque ignorant ea quae ab ipsis constituta et designata sunt: neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae eventura sint (erimus enim cautiore, si sciemus), neque hoc alienum ducunt maiestate sua (nihil est enim beneficentia praestantius) neque non possunt futura praenoscerere, non igitur sum di nec significant futura. sunt autem di, significant ergo. (3) et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam (frustra enim significarent), nec, si dant vias,

non est divination: est igitur divinatio.” (4) hac ratione et Chrysippus et Diogenes et Antipater utitur.

1: non 9. Ascensuaria 1521: si non 155d

For the logical form of the argument, cf. 36G 6–7. For Cicero’s reply to it, see *Div.* 2.101–6.

5: 7. For divine benevolence, see 54

E Cicero, *Div.* 1.117–18 (SVF 2.1210)

haec si tenemus, quae mihi quidem non videntur posse convelli, profecto hominibus a dis futura significari necesse est. sed distinguendum videtur, quoniam modo. nam non placet Stoicis singulis decorum fissis aut avium cantibus interesse deum; neque enim decorum est nec dis dignum nec fieri ullo pacto potest; sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, alia in fulgoribus, alia in omentis, alia in stellis, alia in somniantium visis, alia in furentium vocibus, ea quibus bene percepta sunt, si non saepe falluntur, male coniecta maleque interpretata falsa sunt non rerum vitio, sed interpretum inscientia.

Context: how does divination come to be possible?

F Cicero, *Acad.* 2.36

quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: “est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum, et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id quod significatur aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.”

Context: attack on the Philonian Academy’s professed reliance on the intellect *πιθανόν* (see vol. 1, 449).

3 **aut falsum . . . aut nihil** The disjunction caters for the alternatives of viewing sign and significate as propositions and as things, on which see especially Burnyeat [484], 211–14.

G Philodemus, *Sign.* 1.2–4.13

(1) καὶ μὴν δι’ αὐθὲν | ἕτερον κοινόν ἐστιν ἢ διότι | καὶ οὗτος τοῦ ἀδήλου καὶ μὴ οὗτος ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο δύναται. | τὸν γὰρ τοι νομίζοντα [ὡ]ς χρηστός | ὅδε τίς ἐστιν ἀνθρωπος ἕνεκα | τοῦ πλουτεῖν μοχθη[ρ]ῶι φάμεν | καὶ κοινῶι χρησθῆαι σημείω[ι] δι[τ]ὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν πλο[υ]τουήσας | ἀτόπους εὐρίσκεισθαι [πο]λλο[ύ]ς | δὲ χρηστοὺς ὡς[τ]ε τὸ ἴδιον εἴ[περ] | ἀναγκαστικὸν ἀδυνατεῖν ἀλλ[λ]ως ὑπάρχειν ἢ σὺν τῷ ὁ λέγου[μ]εν αὐτοῦ κατ’ ἀνάγκην εἶνα[ι], [τ]ἀφανές, οὐ σ[η]μειόν ἐ[σ]τι, μ[η]δ[ε]ν[ε] | ὁδεμ[η] . . . | ἀδελον. ὁ γ[ινέ]τα[ι] τῷ κα[τ]’ ἀνασκει[ν] ἡν[τ]ρόπωι | [τ]ῆς σημειώσεως. (2) εἴτε δὲ [πρ]ὸς | τ[ὴ] μοναχὰ | τὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν | φ[αν]ομέναις τ[ό]ποις οὐκ ἀναγ[κα]ζέιν ὁ διὰ τῆς β[ε]βαιότη[τος] | ἔοικεν τρόπος, εἰ[δ]ε[ν] λίθων[ε] πολλῶν

| καὶ παιτ|οδ|απῶν |οντ|ων ἐν ἐσ|τι τούτων εἶδος ἐπε|σ|πώμενον τὸν
 σῖδηρον, ἣν καλοῦσιν |μα|γ|νητιν λίθον, αἱ δ' Ἑρακλε|ῖται|, μόνον δέ
 καὶ τὰ ἡλεκτρον. |ἐ|λέκυσ|τικόν ἐστι τῶν ἀχύρων, |καὶ| τετράγωνος
 ἀριθμὸς εἰς |μόνος ὁ τέτταρ' ἐπὶ τέτταρα| τὴν περίμετρον ἴσην ἔχει
 τῷ |ἐμβαδῶνι πόθεν οὖν ἔχουμεν| εἰπεῖν ὥς οὐκ ἔπαι τι γένος 15
 | ἀνθρώπων ὃ μόνον οὐκ ἀποθνήσκει διαιρούμενον τὴν | καρδίαν, ὥστε
 μὴ κατ' ἀνάγ|κην εἶ|ναι λαβε|ῖν ἐκ τοῦ| τοὺς, παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους
 διαιρουμένους τὴν καρδίαν ἀποθνήσκειν| τὸ καὶ πάντας· καὶ σπάνια δ'
 εἰσιν παρ' ἡμῖν ἕνα, καθάπερ ὁ γενόμενος ἡμίπῃχς ἀνθρωπος | ἐν
 Ἀλεξανδρεῖα κεφαλὴν δέ | κολοσσα|κῆ|ν ἔχων ἐφ' ἧς ἐσφυροκό|πων, οὖν 20
 |ἐ|πεδείκνυνον οἱ ταρε|χευταί, |καὶ| ὁ γαμηθεὶς ὥς παρθένος |ἐν|
 Ἐπιδαύρῳ κάπειτα | γενόμεν|ος ἀνὴρ, καὶ ὁ γενόμενος ἐν |Κρή|τηι
 πηχῶν ὀκτώ| καὶ| τεττ|αρά|κοντα τοῖς ἐκ τῶν εὐ|ρεθέν|των ὁσίων
 σημειωμέ|νοις ἐτ'| δ' οὐδ' ἐν Ἀκώρῃ πυγμαίους δεικνύ|σους, ἀμέλει δ'
 ὡ|α|λ|όγους τοῖς οὖς| Ἀντώνιος νῦν | ἐξ Ὑρία|ς ἐκο|μίσατο . . . (3) 25
 ὅταν | δέ κατ|αξ|ιώμεν· ἐπεὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀ|νθρ|ω|ποι θνητοὶ εἰσι,
 καὶ τὸν πᾶντας, τὸ διὰ τὴν ὁμο|ότ|η|το|ν ἐλόμενοι κατὰ πάντα
 | τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀ|δῆ|λοις ὁμοίους | ὑπο|τιθέμ|εθα τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν, ὥσ|τε καὶ
 κατὰ τὸ θνητοῦς ὑπάρ|χειν, | τοῦ|του χωρῖς. εἰ μὲν γάρ | κατὰ | πᾶν|τα,
 καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ὃ | ῥ|θ|ότατα σημειωσόμε|θα. τοιοῦ|τος γάρ ὁ 30
 τρόπος εὔται | δῆ|π|ουθε|ν, ἔ|πε|ὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀ|νθρ|ω|ποι θνητ|οῖ εἰσιν,
 καὶ εἴ| | που κατ' ἄλλους τόπους εἰσιν ἄνθρ|ω|ποι τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν
 ὡμοιωμέ|νοι κατὰ τε τᾶλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ θνητ|οῖ εἶναι, θνητοὶ ἂν εἴησαν."
 τ|όδε| | γὰρ κατελί|πει· ἐν |τεν| τῷ σημείω|ει. τῆνι δ' ἐ διόσει τοῦ
 σημείου ἀφ' | οὗ πόλ|λ' αὐτῷ σημειούμε|θα, εἴ γε ἐκάτερα θ|ν|ητὰ 35
 ὑπο|τιθέμε|θα καὶ τοιοῦ|τό τι λέγομεν, | "ἐπεὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν θ|ν|ητ|οῖ εἰσιν
 ἀνθρ|ω|ποι, καὶ εἴ ποῦ | εἰσ|ιν θνητοὶ ἀ|νθρ|ω|ποι, θνητ|οῖ εἰσιν"; εἰ δ'
 οὐκ καὶ | κατὰ | τὸ θνητ|οῦς ὑπάρ|χειν ὁμο|ῖ|ους | ἐκείνο|ς ὑπο|τιθέμε-
 θα | π|ε|ρί ὧν ο|ημει|ούμε|θα, ἀλλὰ ταῦ|τ|η|ι |δι|α|λ|λάττω|τας| καὶ
 διαφω|ρᾶ|ν | παρ|έχου|τας, | σπερ| | ἐ| . . . |θα δῆ|λον ὡς οὐκ 40
 | ἔχει | τ|ῆ|ν ἀν|ά|γκην ἢ |ση|μείω|σις· | οὐκ αἴ|ρ' | ἀ|γα|γκαῖον εἶ|παι
 τοῖς ἐν ἀ|δῆ|λοις ἀνθρώπ|ους| εἶ|ναι θνητ|οῦς, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀλ|λου|ς, τοὺς
 κατὰ | μὲν| τᾶλλ' ὁμοίους| κατὰ δὲ τὸ | | θνητοῦς ὑπάρ|χειν διαλλ|άτ-
 τω|τας, καὶ| κατὰ τοῦτ' εἰοικέναι τοῖς, παρ' ἡμῖν. (4) καθό|λου τ' εἰ
 κατὰ | ἐ|ιοῖ, "ἐπεὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρ|ω|ποι | θνητ|οῖ εἰσιν, καὶ εἴ ποῦ 45
 εἰσιν ἀνθρ|ω|πο|ι θνητοῦς εἶναι": εἰ τοῦτο | μὲν ἴσον αὐτῷ τούτῳ,
 "ἐπεὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρ|ω|ποι ἢ | ἀνθρ|ω|ποι | καὶ καθό|λου τοῖ εἰσι
 θνητ|οῖ εἰσιν, καὶ τοὺς παντ|αχῇ θνητοῖς | ὑπάρ|χειν", ὁρθῶς ἀξιώσει
 τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ ἄλλω|ς συμ|βεβ|ηκότος | ταύτου τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώ|ποις,
 τοῦ θνητ|οῦς εἶναι, ἀξιώσει, "ἐπεὶ οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν εἰσι θνητ|οῖ, καὶ τοὺς 50
 πανταχῇ θνητοῖς, εἶνα|ι", ματαιῶς ἀξιώσει μὰ Δία | γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι οἱ
 παρ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν ὀλιγοχρόνιοι | καὶ | τ|οῖς Ἀκροθωῖται | ἐροῦμεν ὀλιγο-
 χρο|νίους εἶναι. δε|κτέον τοῖνυν | καὶ τ|οῖς ἀνθρώ|ποις | ἢ καὶ καθό| εἰσιν

ἀνθρώπου] εἰ θνητὸς ὑπάρχει|κ|, εἰ μέλλο|μ|εν ἀναγκαστ|ε|κ|όν τ|ὸ
 προ|κεί|μενον συστήσ|αι· δύναμ|ε|νο|ς δὲ κα||τ' ἀ|υ|ρακενὴν τοῦτο δε|κ 55
 νύ|ε|ς|ν, | τὸν κατὰ τ|ῆν ὁμοιότητ|α| παρήγομεν τρ|ό|πον|.

8 κα|τ'| ᾧ ῥῶσε τῆς Sedley: secundum pap. 2· ὁδόμενοι Sedley: ὁδοὺς (δοσαν) εἰ, De Lacy 29
 [τοῦ]του σοφισμοῦ [οὐ] τοῦ]του τῶν τῶν|ε|· ἢ τοῦ]του I. Gompertz 34 5 τ|ὸ|δε πᾶλ|λ'| τοῦ Sedley
 secundum pap.

For fuller apparatus, see De Lacy [12].

Context: catalogue of Stoic objections to the Epicurean Similarity Method, recorded by Philodemus from the lectures of his teacher Zeno of Sidon. Zeno's replies to the objections excerpted here run from 14.2 to 17.28.

τ κοινόν I.e. 'common to truth and falsity' (cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.33–4), rather than 'common to two or more significates', the more usual meaning of κοινὸν σημεῖον. See Sedley [243], 243–4.

9 25 For a comparable Pyrrhonist objection to induction, cf. 72C 9.

24 ἀμέλει δ' This signals what must for chronological reasons (cf. next note) be Philodemus' own addition to the Stoic list of examples.

25 ἐξ Ὑρίαις A south Italian town where Antony won an engagement in 40 B.C. (Appian, *BC* 5.54). Most scholars prefer to read the sequence of letters as representing ἐκ Σιρίας (for the controversy, see De Lacy [132], 163–4), which would suggest a reference to Antony's return from Syria in 34 B.C. But such an orthography would be quite uncharacteristic of Philodemus' papyri. There is therefore perhaps some support in these lines for dating the *De signis* to 40 B.C. or soon after.

34 ἐν τῷ σημείῳ The reference is not to the 'Since...' clause, but to the 'if...' clause at 32–3 (if the restoration εἰ is correct), recalling the official Stoic definition of a sign as the true antecedent in a certain kind of conditional (35C 7).

H Philodemus, *Sign*, 6.1–14

πότερον τὸ ἀπ|α|ράλλακτον| εἰς τῇ |σ|ημείωσιν παραληψόμεθα ἢ τὸ
 ὅμοιον ἢ τὸ πόσιν ἔ|χον προσεφέρε|ι|ν|, τὸ μὲν ὅν ἀ|παράλλακτον
 λέγ|ε|ιν γελοῖον· | τί γὰρ μάλλον ἔσται τὸ φανε|ρὸν τὰ φανούς σημεῖον ἢ
 ἀντιστ|ρ|ύ|φως· οὐκ ἔσται τε ἔτι τὸ μὲν φανε|ρὸν τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον,
 ἀπαρα|λ|λαξίως ὑπαρχούσης· εἰ δὲ τ|ὸ| ὅμοιον, πόθεν ἔξομεν εἰπ|εῖν| 5
 ὥς οὐχὶ καθ' ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν |καὶ πα||ραλλάτ|τ|ει τοῦ φαινομένου
 |ἀφ' |ο|ῦ ποιού|μ|εθα τὴν σημε|ί|ωσιν;

3 ἢ I. Gompertz: ὁ pap.

For fuller apparatus, see De Lacy [12].

Context: as G.

I Cicero, *Acad.* 2.99–100

et enim is quoque qui a vobis sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probabilia non comprehensa neque percepta neque ad sensa sed similia veri, quia nisi probet omnis vita tollatur quid enim, conscendens navem sapiens num comprehen-

sum animo habet atque percrepium se ex sententia navigaturum? qui potest? sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta probo navigo bono gubernatore hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse saluum.

Context: defence of the *φαντασία πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος* (cf. 69E 1 2) as an adequate basis for the conduct of life.

J Philodemus, *Sign.* 7.26–38

(1) ἐτι δὲ λε'γόν[τω]ν ὡς καὶ τὰ τερατώδη πρὸς [τω]ν ὁμοία κατ' αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ τί ἂ π[αρ] ἡμῖν ὁμοία τοῦτοις· οὐχ [ὕπ]ἀρχειν ἀποκόψομεν, (2) τῶν τε κ[ατ'] ἀνασκευὴν ἀποκόψ[ει]ω φησ[ίν], (3) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπαρκε[ῖν] ἡμῖν [τό τε] πεπεισθαι περὶ τ[ο]ύτω[ν] καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πε[ρί]ρας κατ[ὰ] τὴν εὐλογίαν, ὅν τρόπον ὅτι [γενη]σόμεθα πλέοντες ἰθέρ[ους] ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ [

3 ἐπαρκε[ῖν] Sedley ἐπαρκέ[σαι] 7 Gomperz

Context: as G.

For a defence of our reconstruction, see Sedley [243], 248ff

1 αὐτοὺς It is unclear whether the Stoics or the Epicureans are meant.

3 τῶν-φησ[ίν] This first part of Dionysius' reply is little more than a joke: the Epicurean remark quoted in 2 sounds like an appeal to the Stoic Elimination Method

4 τ[ο]ύτω[ν] Probably inferences based on similarity.

PHYSICS

43 The scope of physics

A Diogenes Laertius 7.148–9 (*SVF* 2.1022 and 2.1132)

(1) οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνιον μὲν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Χρυσίππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ θεῶν* καὶ *Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν* . . . (2) φύσιν δὲ ποτέ μὲν ἀποφαίρονται τὴν συνέχουσαν τὸν κόσμον, ποτέ δὲ τὴν φύουσαν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικούς λόγους ἀποτελούσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὀρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οἷων ἀπεκρίθη. ταύτην δὲ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.

Context: doxography of Stoic physics.

1 οὐσίαν The term does not refer here to the passive ἀρχή, as in 44B–C, but simply helps to state the thesis (cf. 54B) that the entire world is god, cf. 44F 1 4 for this sense of κόσμος

4 5 For this use of ἕξις, cf. συνέχειν, 47E, G. 12, and for σπερματικός λόγος, see 46A 2, B 4.

7 ἡδονῆς We know no other evidence that confirms or fully explains this

striking claim. For Stoic views on pleasure, see vol. 1, 421, and 57A 3, where pleasure is described as an *ἐπιγέννημα*, which arises only when nature has 'adopted the proper requirements for a creature's constitution'. That thesis is consistent with what is said here, cf. Göelet [538], 398. But that nature 'aims . . . at pleasure' is not what we expect to hear from philosophers who strenuously resisted the Epicurean claim that all creatures naturally pursue pleasure. Perhaps *ἡδονή* can be interpreted as a very general term for gratification or contentment: nature intends that creatures should be pleased with their constitution as well as finding it useful to them. It does not follow from this statement that creatures are designed to make pleasurable feelings one of their primary objectives.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.132

τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ σωμάτων τόπον καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπων καὶ κενοῦ. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν εἰδικῶς, γενικῶς δ' εἰς τρεῖς τόπους, τὸν τε περὶ κόσμου καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τρίτον τὸν αἰτιολογικόν.

2 καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ (132) τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τόπου κενῶ (132) 3 τόπους F. τῶντοις BF

Context: opening section of Diogenes' doxography of Stoic physics.

1 **σωμάτων** For the priority of bodies to *ἀρχαί*, see vol. 1, 268. Diogenes gives a detailed account of body in 7.135 (including 50E), treating it after *ἀρχαί* and along with mathematical concepts which fall under the last topic of his 'specific' division.

3 4 We omit D.L. 7.132.3 in which the first and third topics of the 'generic' division are subdivided.

44 Principles

A Sextus Empiricus, M. 9.332 (SUF 2.524, part)

καὶ δὴ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στωαῆς φιλόσοφοι διαφέρουν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὅλον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον, πᾶν δὲ τὸ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ ἔξωθεν κενόν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰ μὲν ὅλον πεπερασμένον εἶναι (πεπερασται γὰρ ὁ κόσμος), τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἄπειρον (τοιούτου γὰρ τὸ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου κενόν).

5

Context: doxography of 'whole' and 'all'

For the same doctrine, cf. SUF 2.522–3. On the void external to the world, see 49.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (SUF 2.300, part, and 2.299)

(1) δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχάς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. (2) τὰ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον αἰσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ αἰδίων ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἑκάστα. . . . (3) διαφέρειν δὲ φασιν ἀρχάς καὶ στοιχεῖα: τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγενήτους (καὶ) ἀφθάρτους, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν

5

φθείρεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σώματα εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμόρφους, τὰ δὲ μεμορφῶσθαι.

5 καὶ Σuda om Todd 6 σώματα inde: σώματος Σuda

Context: shortly after 43B.

2 **ἄποιον** Our translation, 'unqualified', is supported by ἀσχημάτιστος, C 2, and by D 5-6. Todd [493], 140-1, prefers 'inert' or 'not acting'; but this makes the term a trivial repetition of πάσχον, and fails to register the cardinal point that what qualifies matter is god. See also 28q 8-10 and 55E.

4 **στοιχεῖα** See 46-7.

6 **σώματα** Our reasons for preferring this reading are given in vol. 1, 273-4, and cf. 45G 2. Defenders of σώματος include Todd [493], 132-43, and, implicitly, Sandbach [296], 73-4. **ἀρχὰς** Hahn [488], 29ff., suggests that these were discussed 'probably after the account of cosmogony', because Diogenes' Stoic authorities for B 1 include Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν πρὸς τῷ τέλει. This is hardly decisive evidence for his suggestion; and even if it were true, the conceptual priority of the ἀρχαί would not be affected.

C Sextus Empiricus, M. 9.75-6 (SVF 2.311)

(1) ἡ τοίνυν τῶν ὄντων οὐσία, φασίν, ἀκίνητος οὐσα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ὑπὸ τινος αἰτίας ὀφείλει κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ σχηματίζεσθαι·
(2) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς χαλκούργημα περικαλλῆς θεασάμενοι ποθοῦμεν
μαθεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην ἅτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀκινήτου καθεστῶσης, οὕτω
καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων ὕλην θεωροῦντες κινουμένην καὶ ἐν μορφῇ τε καὶ
διακοσμήσει τυγχάνουσιν εὐλόγως ἂν σκεπτοίμεθα τὸ κινεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ
πολυειδῶς μορφοῦν αἷτιον. (3) τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι ἢ
δύναμιν τινα δι' αὐτῆς πεφοίτηκυῖαν, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πεφοίτηκεν. (4)
αὕτη οὖν ἡ δύναμις ἥτοι αὐτοκίνητος ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλης κινεῖται δυνάμει.
(5) καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρας κινεῖται, τὴν ἑτέραν ἀδύνατον ἔσται κινεῖσθαι μὴ
ὑπ' ἄλλης κινουμένην, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἐστὶ τις ἄρα καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτοκίνητος
δύναμις, ἥτις ἂν εἴη θεία καὶ αἰδίας. (6) ἡ γὰρ ἐξ αἰῶνος κινῆσεται ἢ ἀπὸ
τινος χρόνου. (7) ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου μὲν οὐ κινῆσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τις
αἰτία τοῦ ἀπὸ τινος αὐτὴν χρόνου κινεῖσθαι. αἰδίας τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ κινουσα
τὴν ὕλην δύναμις καὶ τεταγμένως αὐτὴν εἰς γενέσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς
ἀγούσα. ὥστε θεὸς ἂν εἴη αὕτη.

Context: doxography of god.

Though not explicitly attributed to the Stoics, this argument can be credited to them on the evidence of its content and context. In its reliance on analogy between artefacts and the world-order, it resembles 54C 6, an argument by Cleanthes, who is named a little later by Sextus (M. 9.88) as the author of another argument. But it is equally possible that C derives from Chrysippus; cf. Dragona-Monachou [528], 128.

9 **αὐτοκίνητος** This, or an equivalent term, is a standard attribute of cosmic nature, or the active principle. Cf. 43A 4-5, SVF 2.1133. The inference from self-movement to divinity has illustrious precedents. In Plato, *Phd.* 245c-e, Socrates

argues that something which has self-movement as its nature is everlasting, thereby inferring the immortality of soul. In *Phys.* viii, Aristotle rejects an infinite series of movers, and concludes, by an analysis of what self-movement involves, that there must be a prime unmoved mover.

D Calcidius 292 (SVF 1.88, part)

(1) Zeno hanc ipsam essentiam finitam esse dicit unamque eam communem omnium quae sunt esse substantiam, (2) dividuam quoque et usque quaque mutabilem. (3) partes quippe eius verti sed non interire, ita ut de existentibus consumantur in nihilum, sed ut innumerabilium diversarum etiam ceterarum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec ullam omnino qualitatem propriam fore censet fundamenti rerum omnium silvae, coniunctam tamen esse semper et inseparabiliter cohaerere alicui qualitate. (4) cumque tam sine ortu sit quam sine interitu, quia neque de non existente substituit nec consumetur in nihilum, non deesse ei spiritum ac vigorem ex aeternitate, qui moveat eam rationabiliter totam interdum, non numquam pro portione. 5 10

Context: doxography of 'matter', in discussion of Plato, *Tim.* 47c–48e

1 **essentiam** This term is Calcidius' translation of *οὐσία*. At E 3–4 he identifies *essentia* with 'prime matter'; see 28q where *πρώτη ὕλη* is described as everlasting and invariant in magnitude as distinct from its parts – the *ὕλη* of particular things. The identification of the passive *ἄρχή* with substance and prime matter is standard Stoicism (so correctly Etalim [488], 40, and not Lapidge [492], 243, who takes 'prime matter' to include both *ἄρχαί*).

2 **mutabilem** Cf. 50B 2–3

7–10 How does the everlastingness of substance support the inference that it 'never lacks breath and vitality'? We are probably to supply from 6–7 its constant connexion with 'some quality or other' (i.e. its constant connexion with the divine active *ἄρχή*)

E Calcidius 293

(1) ergo corpus universum iuxta Stoicos determinatum est et unum et totum et essentia. (2) totum quidem, quia nihil ei partium deest; unum autem, quia inseparabiles eius partes sunt et invicem sibi cohaerent; essentia vero, quia princeps silva est omnium corporum per quam ire dicunt rationem solidam atque universam, perinde ut semen per membra genitalia. (3) quam quidem rationem ipsum fore opificem volunt, cohaerens vero corpus et sine qualitate, patibile totum et commutabile silvam sive essentiam. (4) quae vertatur quidem nec intereat tamen neque tota neque partium excidio, ideo quia philosophorum omnium commune dogma est neque quid fieri ex nihilo nec in nihilum interire, licet enim cuncta corpora casu aliquo diffuant, silva tamen semper est et opifex deus, ratio scilicet, in qua sit fixum quo quidque tempore tam nascatur quam excidat. (5) proptereaque de existentibus genituram fieri et 5 10

in existens desinere quod finiatur immortalibus perseverantibus, a quo fit et item ex quo fit quod gignitur.

Context: immediately following D.

1 **corpus universum** The phrase seems to be an unusual expression for the passive ἀρχή. The language is confusing (see Waszink [494] ad loc.), but it can hardly refer to 'the whole', A, which includes the active ἀρχή; cf. D 1 2 **determinatum** Cf. 50B 1.

5 **ut semen** This image for the creativity of the active ἀρχή is standard; cf. 28q 4, SVF 1.107, and see 46A B for its cosmogonical application.

9 **commune dogma** The appeal to a philosophical consensus could reflect an early Stoic appeal to a κοινὴ ἔννοια. Cf. 40R; 48C 5.

12–14 These lines recall Empedocles (31 B 8; 11–12 DK), an authority the early Stoics acknowledged; cf. SVF 2, p. 137, 7–11.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.137–8 (SVF 2.526)

λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτὸν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὃς δὴ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως, κατὰ χρόνων ποιάς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς αὐτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννῶν· καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν [τῶν ἀστέρων] κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι· καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἁμφοῖν. 5
καὶ ἔτι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας ἦ, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ Μετεωρολογικῇ στοιχειῶσει, σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖτοις φύσκειν, ἢ σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων

5 χρόνων codd. χρόνων Suda 5 τῶν ἀστέρων del. Armin 8 θεῶν codd. στοιχείων Suda

Context: doxography of Stoic physics.

1–2 **τὸν ποιόν** For the expression, cf. Arius Didymus (SVF 2.528, p. 169, 17, 21): τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιόν. The account of κόσμος in line 6 appears to be identical. As the ἰδίως ποιός of all substance, god is identical to 'designing fire' (46A, D) and fireiness is the one quality always connected with substance through its connexion with god.

5 **τῶν ἀστέρων** should be deleted, as an intrusion from ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, 7, interpolated here to explain διακόσμησιν and ἁμφοῖν. In fact διακόσμησιν refers to the present world-order as a whole, and ἁμφοῖν to the combination of κόσμος in this sense and κόσμος in the first sense – god.

g Plotinus 2.4.1 (SVF 2.320, part)

καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμήσει καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν [sc. ὕλην] ἄγειν· καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῶν τὸν θεὸν ὕλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι.

1 αὐτῶν vel αὐτῷ codd. δέi. Vicinga. Armin

Context: discussion of ὕλη, with an attack on the Stoics for confining existing things to bodies.

This description of god appears to be a Plotinian distortion of the Stoic ἀρχαί and

the Stoic genus 'disposed', πῶς ἔχον; cf. 29, and see Rist [303], 259, Graeser [316], 36. Although the Stoics identified the *world* with 'their god' (αὐτῶν τὸν θεόν), 2, they did not describe god as 'a disposition of matter' but as the principle which causes matter to have its dispositions.

h Plato, *Soph.* 247d8–e4

ΞΕΝΟΣ λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [ταῖνα] κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφύκος εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ ἀμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἀν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπασι, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεται γάρ ὁρον [ὀρίζειν] τὰ ὄντα ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

1 ταῖνα om. B 3 ὀρίζειν del. Asi

Context: the Eleatic stranger advances the 'capacity to act or be acted upon' as an exhaustive mark of existing things, in response to the claim of the 'Gigants' that nothing unringible exists. See Long [3], 153, and cf. Aristotle, *Top.* vi.9, 139a4–8, vii.7, 146a21–32.

45 Body

A Cicero, *Acad.* 1.39 (SVF 1.90)

discrepabat [sc. Zeno] etiam ab usdem [sc. Academicis et Peripateticis] quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea [sc. natura] quae expers esset corporis – cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant – nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficetur posse esse non corpus.

5

Context: the speaker is Varro, who expounds Antiochus' interpretation of Zeno's deviations from the Academic–Peripatetic tradition.

B Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.263 (SVF 2.363)

τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν.

Context: refutation of the Stoic theory of *lekta* (cf. 33).

C Nemesisius 78.7–79.2 (SVF 1.518, part)

(1) ἔτι φησὶν· οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· (2) συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσούντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβομένης ὠχρόν· (3) σῶμα ἄρι τῇ ψυχῇ.

Context: survey and criticism of Stoic psychology.

Nemesisius is reporting a second argument by Cleanthes for the soul's corporeality. In the first argument, 76.14–77.3, Cleanthes reaches this conclusion by arguing that children resemble their parents in respect of soul as well as body, and that resemblance

and difference pertain to bodies but not to incorporeals; cf. 53C. For detailed discussion, see Hahn [488], 16–17.

3–4 Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 1.1, 403a18–19: ἅμα γὰρ τοῖτοις | κ. τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς πάσχει | τὸ σῶμα.

D Nemesius 81.6–10 (SVF 2 790, part)

{1} Χρύσιππος δὲ φησιν ὅτι ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος·
{2} οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· {3} οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· {4} ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· {5} σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

Context: shortly after C.

For the antecedents of this argument, cf. Hahn [488], 15–16. As was also the case with Stoic utilization of 44h, it exploits a Platonic point (death is the separation of the soul from the body, cf. *Phd.* 64c, 67c–d), to yield an un-Platonic conclusion. For the notion of contact as the relation between body and soul, see 53B 5–9.

E Diogenes Laertius 7.135 (SVF 3 Apollodorus 6, part)

σῶμα δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ, τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, εἰς μῆκος, εἰς πλάτος, εἰς βάθος· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεόν σῶμα καλεῖται.

Context: immediately following 44B.

2 στερεόν The term means solid as in 'solid geometry', and implies nothing about physical mass.

F Galen, *Qual. me.* 10.483, 13–16 (SVF 2.381, part)

διὰ τί δὲ μόνον . . . τοῦ σώματος τοῦτον ὅρον εἶναι φασιν τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ χροᾶν καὶ χυλὸν καὶ χυμὸν καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συμβεβηκότων ἕκαστον οὕτως ὀρίζονται;

Context: part of an argument against the Stoics for not extending this definition to include qualities such as colour and flavour.

The same definition is ascribed to Epicurus at *SE, M.* 1.21, though it does not occur in his extant writings. See also *M.* 11.226, *PH* 3.39, and Mueller [652], 75–7.

G Aristotle (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.14.1 = SVF 1.98, part)

στοιχείον εἶναι φησι | κ. Ζήνων | τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ' ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεόν, ὡς Πλάτων. ἀλλ' οὗτος ἅμφω σώματά φησιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, ἐκείνου τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀσώματον εἶναι λέγοντος.

1 φησι vel φασι eudē

Context: an excerpt from Zeno's doctrine of ἀρχαί, taken from book 7 of Aristotle, *On philosophy*

Aristocles is no doubt characteristic of his time (see note on 1F) in assimilating Plato to the Stoic scheme of ἀρχαί (cf. D.L. 3.69), but a reading of the *Timaeus* as making matter and god the two ἀρχαί had already been current by Zeno's day, as Theophrastus (4p. Simpl., *In 4th Phys.* 26.11–13. Diels, *Dox.*, 484–5) shows. And in other respects Aristocles' evidence (called 'suspiciously schematic' by Hahn [488], 50 n. 19) may be unimpeachable: cf. also Sandbach [304], 36.

It was probably in fact the doctrines of Xenocrates that mutated this (to us) 'moietizing' reading of Plato. They thus, either directly or via that reading of Plato, may in turn have influenced Zeno's choice of ἀρχαί, given his Platonic background (though he was too young to have studied with Xenocrates himself for ten years, D.L. 7.2). Xenocrates' own terms for his ἀρχαί were ἐν and ἀέναν (‘the ever-blowing’), but the former was also called Zeus and Nous, and the latter could be identified by doxographers with ὕλη; cf. Aetius 1.3.23, 1.7.30, and Sandbach [304], 33–6, who points out that the second Aetius passage ‘ascribes to Xenocrates a belief in two gods, the One, which he also called Zeus and mind, his primary god . . . and another, which was the soul of the universe. The continuation of the passage is mutilated, but contains the phrase . . . ἐνδεῖναι τοῖς ὕλικαῖς στοιχείοις . . . and ends with . . . ταῦτα χορηγῶντες [sc. Xenocrates] τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα μεταπέφρακεν παρὰ Πλάτωνα.’ Sandbach could have also mentioned Calcidius 294: *haec Stoici de silva deque iunus rerum partim a Platone usurpantes partim commentis*.

1 **στοιχεῖον** For this use of the term, cf. 47A 3–4. Although the Stoics regularly spoke of god as fire when referring to god's activity in the world, god is not called fire in the texts which specify him as one of the two ἀρχαί. Aristocles is probably correct, and philosophically sound, in treating fire, the foundational stuff, as something which has god and matter as its ἀρχαί. Cf. Sandbach [296], 73–4.

2 **ἄμφω σώματα** See note on 43B.

II Alexander, *Mixt.* 224.32–225.3 (SIF 2.310, part)

πείθειστος δ' ἂν τις τὸ λόγιον αὐτῶν ἐνταυθα τοῦ λόγου γενόμενος καὶ τὰ δύο ἀρχαὶ τῶν πάντων λέγονται εἶναι ὕλην τε καὶ θεόν, ὧν τὸν μὲν ποιοῦντα εἶναι τὴν δὲ πάσχουσαν, μεμῖχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ λέγειν τὸν θεόν, διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντα καὶ σχηματίζοντα αὐτήν, καὶ μορφοῦντα καὶ κοσμοποιούντα τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ.

1 ποιοῦντα *hic* *ποιεῖν* could 3 λέγειν *hic* *εἰ* *λέγει* could.

Context: part of an argument attacking the Stoics for making god and matter bodies such that god completely pervades matter.

Alexander's polemic does not cast doubt on the accuracy of his report here, cf. 44C 3; 46A 2, 47O.

46 God, fire, cosmic cycle

A Aetius 1.7.33 (SIF 2.1027, part)

(1) οἱ Στωικοὶ νοερόν θεόν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπεριεληφὸς <τε> πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους

καθ' οὓς ἅπαντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται, (2) καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν ἐνδιήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξεις.

5

1 γενέσθαι vel γένεσθαι coold ἐμπεριειληφός (τε) Diuher. ἐμπεριειληφός vel ἐμπεριειληφόντος coold. 3 ἅπαντα vel ἕκαστα coold ἐνδιήκον vel διήκον coold 4 5 κατὰ τὰς . παραλλάξαι coold. Athenagoras δι' ὅλης παραλλάξεις (vel παραλλάξ vel παραλλάξαι) coold; cf. Diels. *Dox. Graec.*, pp. 5, 31

Context: doxography of god.

1 2 πῦρ γενέσθαι Cf. D.L. 7.156, said of φύσις (cf. also 42A 2), and Cicero, *ND* 2.57, who attributes the notion of nature as 'designer' to Zeno. Intelligence is regularly attributed to the world (e.g. *SVF* 2.633), which on one Stoic usage of κόσμος is identical to god; cf. 44F and 47C.

1 ὁδῷ βαδίζον The metaphorical use of ὁδός = 'method' or 'system' goes back to Plato. Zeno's liking for it reappears in his account of τέχνη (*SVF* 1.72) as ἔξις ὁδοποιητικῇ (ὁδῷ ποιητικῇ, Festa); cf. 42A.

2 σπερματικούς λόγους A Stoic technical term (cf. B 4) whose significance is not restricted to cosmogony; cf. *SVF* 1.497, 2.780, 3.141. For its cosmic usage, see Origen, *Cels.* 4.48 (*SVF* 2.1074), which employs a Stoic allegory of the two ἀρχαί, god as Zeus = male, and matter as Hera = female: τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ ὕλη παραδεξιμένη ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῇ εἰς κατακύωσιν τῶν ὄλων. Cf. Hahm [488], 75–6.

4 προσηγορίας Perhaps a deliberate reminiscence of Heraclitus 22 B 67 DK, where god undergoes alteration just as fire is named according to the scent of different species. For different manifestations of πνεῦμα, cf. 47L, N.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.135–6 (*SVF* 1.102, part)

(1) ἔν τ' εἶναι θεόν καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία, πολλαῖς τ' ἑτέροις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι. (2) κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' αἰέρος εἰς ὕδωρ. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιοῦνδε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξῆς γένεσιν. (3) εἰτ' ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, αἶρα, γῆν.

5

Context: shortly after 45E.

3 τρέπειν recalls τροπή in Heraclitus, 22 B 31 DK; cf. Long [353], 139–41. Mention of air and water is confusing at this pre-cosmic stage. Air seems to be a phase in the subsidence of the conflagration, culminating in a pre-cosmic liquid state.

1 γονῇ The term almost certainly means seminal fluid here, as regularly in Aristotle; so Hahm [488], 60ff. In allegorical terms (cf. note on A 2), Zeus has intercourse with Hera (air), and 'through her' produces seminal fluid in which he is present as the fiery sperm. Lapidge [491], 166, takes γονῇ as 'womb', but this very rare use of the word hardly gives the right correspondence with τὸ ὑγρὸν

C Diogenes Laertius 7.142 (SVF 1.102, part)

(1) γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρός ἢ οὐσίας τραπῇ δι' ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρόν· εἶτα τὸ παχυμερές αὐτοῦ συστάν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ, τὸ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐξαραιωθῇ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλεόν λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ. (2) εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτὰ τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένῃ.

1 ὑγρόν PP ὑγρότητα B

This account of how the elements arise has a complex background; cf. Heraclitus 22 B 31 DK; Plato, *Tim.* 49b-c; and Hahn [488], 57ff. For parallel Stoic texts, see SVF 1.497, 2.579. For an excellent discussion of change in density as the principle of elemental change, see Hahn [495].

2 Although many editors accept ὑγρότητα, the expression τὸ παχυμερές αὐτοῦ points clearly to ὑγρόν as the right reading. Reading ὑγρότητα, we have no suitable noun for αὐτοῦ to refer to.

D Stobaeus 1.213.15-21 (SVF 1.120, part)

(1) Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιόν φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν ἕκαστον εἶναι νοερόν καὶ φρόνιμον, πύρινον (δὲ) πυρὸς τεχνικού. (2) δύο γὰρ γένη πυρός, τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνον καὶ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν, αὐξητικόν τε καὶ τηρητικόν, ὅον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷοις, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχὴ. (3) τοιούτου δὴ πυρός εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀστρῶν οὐσίαν. 5

2 πύρινον (δὲ) πυρὸς Diels, cf. Stob. 1.210, 13. πύρεον πῦρ ὡς vel πῦρ ὡς Todd

Context: doxography of astronomy.

On the two kinds of fire, cf. SVF 1.504, 2.422, 682. The doctrine and its philosophical antecedents are well discussed by Lapidge [492], 265-72, but it need not exclude, as he seems to think, the essential unity of all fire.

In crediting the heavenly bodies with intelligence, the Stoics agreed with Plato and Aristotle against Epicurus, and they opted for this region as the location of the world's 'commanding-faculty'; cf. 470, and Rist [303], 259ff.

E Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1052c-d (SVF 2.604, part)

(1) ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ προνοίας* τὸν Δία φησὶν αὐξεσθαι μέχρι ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ· "ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μὲν ἐστὶ ψυχῆς χωρισμός ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν αὖξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ βρῆτέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον." . . . (2) σαφῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γέγραφεν "αὐτάρκης δ' εἶναι λέγεται μόνος ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸ μόνος ἐν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἔχειν ὡν δεῖται, καὶ τρέφεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὖξεται, τῶν ἄλλων μορίων εἰς ἀλληλα καταλλαττομένων." 5

1 καταλλαττομένων Mezian, καταπαττομένων vel ἀλλὰ Todd

Context: Plutarch seeks to show that Chrysippus is inconsistent in attributing growth

to Zeus here, when he elsewhere – in book 3 of his *On gods*, cited at 1052B – denies that Zeus and the world require *τροφή*.

F Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1053B (*SVF* 2.605, part)

(1) καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται διόλου, (τὸν κόσμον διόλου) ζῆν καὶ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, σβεννύμενον δ' αὖθις καὶ παχυνόμενον εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τρέπεσθαι. (2) λέγει δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ προνοίας*: "διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὦν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθύς καὶ ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν· ὅτε δέ, μεταβαλὼν εἰς τε τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν, τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον."

1 suppl. Chetani 2 ζῶον (ἐμψυχον τὸν κόσμον) Pohlske

Context: supposed inconsistencies in Chrysippus' views about the relationship of heating and cooling to animation.

1–3 appears to be Plutarch's paraphrase of Chrysippus' own words in 4.7. Chrysippus is careful to say that the world's transformation into moisture and the residual soul is a change into body and soul *τρόπον* τινά. Plutarch, omitting this qualification, gives the misleading impression that the change is from a purely psychic into a purely corporeal state; cf. **B 2, H**.

G Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.14.2 = *SVF* 1.98, part)

(1) ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τινας εἰμαρμένους χρόνους ἐκπυροῦσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, εἴτ' αὖθις πάλιν διακοσμεῖσθαι. (2) τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθάπερ τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων· τὴν δὲ τούτων ἐπιπλοκὴν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν εἰμαρμένην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ νόμον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἀδιάδραστόν τινα καὶ ἀφνκτον. (3) ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρεν, καθάπερ ἐν εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ.

Context: immediately following **45G**

5–6 Cf. **55M 3** for a similar set of terms explaining *εἰμαρμένη*.

7–8 The conception of the world as a commonwealth or city is standard doctrine; cf. *SVF* 2.528, 645, 3.327, 333

H Origen, *Cels.* 4.14 (*SVF* 2.1052, part)

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῶν Στωικῶν θεός, ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικόν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν ἢ ἐκπύρωσις ᾗ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ᾗ διακόσμησις

Context: Origen contrasting his belief in the unchangeability of God with Epicurean and Stoic views.

I Alexander Lycopolis 19.2–4

τὸν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως . . . λόγον, ὃς "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεται" λέγων·
 "πᾶν τὸ καὶ ὄν ἔχον (ὅτι) καύσῃ ἅλιν καύσει· καὶ ὁ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστίν καὶ ὁ
 ἔχει οὐ καύσει;" ἐξ οὗ συνήγεται, ὡς ᾤετο, "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεται".

2 (ἀντ.) Brinkmann

Context: refutation of the Manichean conception of evil, to which Zeno's doctrine of the conflagration is likened. Alexander proceeds to remark that the conflagration is implausible because there is no evidence that the sun has so far destroyed anything.

Mansfeld has restored this important evidence, missed by Arnim, to general circulation; cf. [498] and [496], 148–52. He suggests that the passage 'must come from Zeno's work *On the whole*, i.e. the Universe (*Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου*) in which he treated the genesis and destruction of the universe'. For relevant Aristotelian material, cf. Mansfeld [496], 149ff.

2 ἔχον <ὅτι> καύσῃ Not 'having what it burns' (Mansfeld), but 'having something to burn', since καύσῃ is subjunctive.

3 If the argument is complete, the second premise must be taken to presuppose that 'what the sun has' is τὸ πᾶν. Why should Zeno regard this as plausible? Cleanthes regarded the sun as the world's commanding-faculty (470), deducing this from its being 'the largest heavenly body and its contributing most to the direction of the universe' (SVF 1.499); cf. L. Hence it must have been supposed that 'all the world' is available to the sun to burn.

J Diogenes Laertius 7.141 (SVF 2.589, part)

ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ὅτε γενητὸν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν
 δι' αἰσθήσεως νοουμένων, οὐ τε τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ
 μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτά· εἰς ἄλλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ
 κόσμος.

Context: a few lines before C.

In denying that the present world-order is everlasting, the Stoics differed radically from Plato and the Peripatetics. The grounds given here for its perishability correspond to the third of four considerations cited by Theophrastus according to Philo, *Aet. mundi* 117–31; the others are the earth's irregularity, the sea's recession, and the extinction of certain animal species. Theophrastus does not name any philosophers in this passage, but Zeller [500] gave good reasons for attributing the arguments to Zeno and for making Aristotle their target; cf. the confirmatory discussion by Graeser [340], 187–206, and reservations by Mansfeld [496], 144 n. 43.

K Eusebius, *Pt. ev.* 15.18.2 (SVF 2.596, part)

οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ περιόδους τὰς μεγίστας γινομένης φθορᾶς
 κυρίως παραλαμβάνουσι τὴν φθорάν οἱ τὴν εἰς πῦρ ἀνάλυσιν τῶν ὄλων
 δογματίζοντες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσιν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
 μεταβολῆς χρίνεται τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τῆς φθορᾶς.

Context: doxography of Stoic cosmology.

L Plutarch, *Comm. nos.* 1075D (SVF 1.510)

ἐτι τοίνυν ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρνώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρον τὸν ἥλιον (ὡς ἡγεμονικόν) ἐξομοιώσαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.

2 suppl. Cherniss. (τότε συσπύδοντ') Sandbach (ahn also) vac codd ἐξομοιώσαι codd.: -σιν Zeller, Arnim

Context: attack on the Stoics for introducing perishable gods, i.e. the heavenly bodies destroyed at the conflagration.

2 Cherniss' ingenious supplement for the 11-letter space in the MSS supplies a reason for the sun's assimilation of the other heavenly bodies in line with Cleanthes' doctrine; cf. 470, and more generally, F and H of this section. Other scholars have filled the space with an expression which anticipates Plutarch's subsequent criticism.

M Philo, *Aet. mundi* 90 (SVF 1.511)

ὅτι τὸν κόσμον ἐκπυρωθέντα γενέσθαι μὲν ἰσθρακι παραπλήσιον ἀμήχανον, ὡς δέδεικται, γινώδους πολλῆς αἰ ὑπολειφθείσης οὐσίας, ἥ δεήσει τὸ πῦρ ἔλλοχάν, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἐκπυρώσεως τότε κρατούσης, εἴ γε μένει τὸ στοιχείων βαρύτερον καὶ δυσαναλωτότατον ἐτι, γῆ μὴ διαλυθεῖσα, μεταβάλλειν δὲ ἢ εἰς φλόγα ἢ εἰς αὐγὴν ἀναγκαῖον, εἰς μὲν φλόγα, ὡς ᾤετο Κλεάνθης, εἰς δ' αὐγὴν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος.

5

3 εἴ γε cdd εἴτε codd

Context: criticism of the doctrine of conflagration.

N Plutarch, *Comm. nos.* 1067A (SVF 2.606)

ὅταν ἐκπυρώσῃαι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δὲ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τῆνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.

Context: an argument to show that the world's complete prudence during the conflagration is incompatible with the Stoic definition of φρόνιμος as ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμη; cf. 61H 1.

The absence of all evil from the universe during the conflagration is likely to be a genuine Stoic inference from the doctrine that Zeus and his providence are then coextensive with everything, 280 4. But the notion, found in later antiquity, that the purpose of the conflagration is to purge evil from the world, e.g. SVF 2.598, seems to be a mainly Christian interpretation – although Seneca comes close to it, NQ 3 28.7

O Seneca, *Ep.* 9.16 (SVF 2.1065)

qualis tamen futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur in custodiam connectus vel in aliqua gente aliena destitutus vel in navigatione longa retentus aut in desertum litus exiectus? qualis est levis, cum resolutio mundo et dis in unum confusus paulisper cessante natura adquiescit sibi cogitationibus suis traditus, tale quiddam sapiens facit: in se reconditur, secum est.

Context: the wise man's contentment at all times.

P Philo, *Act. mundi* 76-7

Βοηθὸς γοῦν ὁ Σιδώνιος καὶ Παναίτιος . . . τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς θεϊότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ἡυτομόλησαν. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἡνίκα νέος ἦν συνεπιγραφάμενος τῷ δόγματι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ὀφεί τῆς ἡλικίας ἐνδοιάσας ἐπιτοχεῖν.

5

z θεϊότερον σοφὸν ἀνώτερον Cumin

Context: see on M.

Panaetius' rejection of the conflagration, and defence of the world's eternity, are the most widely reported of all his doctrines; cf. van Straaten [323], 64-9. Unfortunately no evidence survives concerning his reasons for deviating from the earlier Stoic position.

47 Elements, breath, tenor, tension

A Stobaeus 1.129.2-130.13 (SVF 2.413, part)

(1) Χρυσίππου. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας στοιχείων τοιαῦτά τινα ἀποφαίνεται, τῷ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἡγεμόνι Ζήνωνι κατακολουθῶν, (2) τέτταρα λέγων εἶναι στοιχεῖα <πῦρ, αἶρα, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἐξ ὧν συνίστασθαι πάντα (καὶ ζῶα) καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα) καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαλύεσθαι. (3) τὸ δὲ κατ' ἐξηχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ ἔσχατον πάντα χεόμενα διαλύεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὴν εἰς ἄλλο χύσιν ἢ ἀνάλυσιν. . . (4) κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον αὐτοτελὲς λεγομένου τοῦ πυρὸς στοιχείου· οὐ μετ' ἄλλον γάρ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρότερον καὶ μετ' ἄλλων συστατικὸν εἶναι, πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύσπαιιν εἰς αἶρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ' ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ' ἐπὶ μάλλιν κατὰ τὸ ἀνίλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν. πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχωρμένης πρώτη μὲν γίνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δ' ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς αἶρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. (5) λέγεσθαι πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ αἶρα τὸ αἰρώδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπὰ. (6) τριχῶς δὲ λεγομένου κατὰ Χρυσίππου τοῦ στοιχείου, (7) καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τοῦ πυρὸς, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀνάλυσιν, (8) καθ' ἕτερον δέ, καθὸ λέγεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, αἶρ, ὕδωρ, γῆ (ἐπεὶ διὰ τούτων τινὸς ἢ τινῶν ἢ καὶ πάντων τὰ λοιπὰ συνέστηκε, διὰ μὲν τῶν τεττάρων, ὡς τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα συγκρίματα, διὰ δυοῖν δέ, ὡς ἡ σελήνη διὰ πυρὸς καὶ αἵρος συνέστηκε, δι' ἐνὸς δὲ ὡς ὁ ἥλιος, διὰ πυρὸς γὰρ μόνου, ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστὶν εἰλικρινές), (9) κατὰ τρίτον λόγον λέγεται στοιχεῖον

5

10

15

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εἶναι ὁ πρῶτον συνέστηκεν οὕτως, ὥστε γενεσιν διδόναι ἀφ' αὐτοῦ ὁδῶ
μέχρι τέλους καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὴν ἀνάλυσιν δέχεσθαι εἰς ἑαυτὸ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ ὁδῶ. 25

3-4 add Diels 5 δι' ἐπὶ καὶ Diels: ἐπὶ Heeren 7 δι' <καὶ> P 9 οὐ μετ' ἄλλου γὰρ Ius
transpos Heeren post πρῶτον, in, add 15 λέγεσθαι <δι> Heeren 16 δι' Wachsmuth: δι'
add

Context: doxography of ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα.

5 The addition of ἐπὶ is not only unnecessary; it also distorts the structure of the passage. Chrysippus is explaining different senses of the term στοιχεῖον. It would be premature to mention fire at this point, where an account is being offered which will help to explain why fire, 8-9, can be identified with the element κατ' ἔξοχην, an expression probably picked up by αὐτοτελῶς, 9.

6-9 The reference is to the initial generation of the elements air, water and earth, and their dissolution at the conflagration, cf. 46G.

8 The omitted passage is a redundant one, rightly excised by Wachsmuth.

9-15 Cf. 46C.

16-25 The three senses of στοιχεῖον correspond to the previous discussion as follows: the first (17-18) to 9-15; the second (18-23) to 1-5; the third (23-5) to 5-9.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.136-7 (SVF 2.580)

ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. τὰ δὲ
τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἀποιοῦν οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην. (1) εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ
θερμὸν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τὸν τ' ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. (2) ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ
πῦρ, ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν
γεννᾶσθαι, εἴτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων μεθ' ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἴτα τὸ ὕδωρ,
ὑπὸ στάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσσην ἡπάντων αἰθερῶν. 5

2 τὴν ἀποιοῦν FH(ort): τὴν ποιοῦν BF 4 ἔτι om. F

Context: two lines after 46B.

1 This corresponds to the first part of Aristotle's account of what most early philosophers took as the ἀρχή and στοιχεῖον of reality, *Metaph. A.* 2, 983b6-11.

2 ἀποιοῦν This seems a nominalism of the four elements; cf. Lapidge [492], 265. Elsewhere ὕλη is said to underlie them; and cf. Sextus, *M.* 10.312, who says that they are generated by the alteration of ἀποιοῦς ὕλη.

2-4 The allocation of these qualities to the elements goes back to the Sicilian doctor Philiston, contemporary with Plato; cf. Anon. Lond. 26.25, and discussion by Hahn [488], 98ff., [495]; Longrigg [503], 227-8.

C Cicero, *ND* 2.23-5, 28-30

(1) sic enim res se habet, ut omnia quae alantur et quae crescant continent in se vim caloris. sine qua neque ali possent nec crescere. nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo: quod autem alter et crescit motu quodam utitur certo et acquabili, qui quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et 5

extinguimur. (2) quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim esse ullum (hūm) tam gravem quin is nocte et die conticquatur: cuius etiam in reliquis inest calor is quas natura respuerit. tam vero venae et arteriae micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu. animadversumque saepe est cum cor animantis alicuius evolvim ita mobiliter palpitaret ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem. omne igitur quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum perpenentem. (3) atque id facilius cernemus toto genere hoc igneo quod tranat omnia subtilius explicato. omnes igitur partes mundi (tangam autem maximas) calore fuitae sustententur, quod primum in terrena natura perspicui potest. (4) ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundi etiam ipsam simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari, eoque magis quod intellegi debet calidum illud atque igneum ita in omni fusiū esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis et causa gignendi. a quo et animantia omnia et ea quorum stirpes terra continentur et nasei sūt necesse et augescere. (5) natura est igitur quae continet mundum omnem eumque tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa. habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis unde oriatur rerum appetitus: in arborum autem et ceterum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus inesse principatus putatur. principatum autem id duo quod Graeci *ἡγεμονία* vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praevians: ita necesse est illud etiam in quo sit totius naturae principatus esse omnium optimum omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque dignissimum. (6) videmus autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundi quod non pars universa sit) inesse sensum atque rationem in ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necesse est, et acriora quidem atque maiora. quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est, naturamque eam quae res omnes complexa teneat perfectione rationis excellere, eoque deum esse mundum omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri, atque etiam mundi ille terror parior perlicidior meliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec quae nota nobis sunt retinentur et videntur.

Context: survey of Stoic arguments concerning the existence and nature of god, in its transmitted form, the whole passage probably contains elements subsequent to Cleanthes, but its gist should be attributed to him and not to Posidonius, as Reinhardt [372], 60–177, maintained, cf. Solmsen [352]

17 The omitted lines cite evidence for the presence of heat in earth, air and water

36 *animantem esse mundum* is the final conclusion of this argument, ND 2 32.

D Nemesius 164,13–18 (SVF 2.418)

λέγονται δὲ οἱ Στωικοὶ τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικά, τὰ δὲ παθητικά: δραστικά μὲν αἶρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικά δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ.

Context: doxography of the elements

E Galen, *Nat. fac.* 106,13–17 (SVF 2.406)

καίτοι τοῦτοις μὲν, ὥς ἂν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν στοιχείων τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν χύσει τέ τισι καὶ πλήσειν ἀναφέρουσιν, εὐλογον ἦν ἀρχὰς δραστικὰς ποιήσασθαι τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, Ἀριστοτέλει δ' οὐχ οὕτως.

Context: Galen is discussing the views of philosophers and doctors who 'make the hot and the cold active, and the dry and the moist passive.' He observes that the Stoics were better justified than Aristotle in adopting this theory of change since they accounted for elemental change by rarefaction and condensation (i.e. processes caused by heat and cold respectively), whereas Aristotle explained it by the four qualities. See 46C, 55E, and Hahn [493], 48–9

F Galen, *Plen.* 7,525,7–14 (SVF 2.439) and 527,13–16 (SVF 2.440, part)

ποιεῖν δ' εἰς αὐτὸ λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔνεργεῖν εἰς αὐτὸ παρά τὴν ἑνοσίαν ἐστίν· οὕτως οὖν καὶ συνέχειν αὐτὸ. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μάλιστα εἰσηγησάμενοι τὴν συνεκτικὴν δύναμιν, ὥς οἱ Στωικοί, τὸ μὲν συνέχον ἕτερον ποιῶσι, τὸ συνεχόμενον δὲ ἄλλῃ τὴν μὲν γὰρ πνευματικὴν οὐσίαν τὸ συνέχον, τὴν δὲ ὑλικὴν τὸ συνεχόμενον· ὅθεν αἶρα μὲν καὶ πῦρ συνέχειν φασι, γῆν δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ συνέχεσθαι. . . οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἡροφιλείων οὐδ' οἱ νεώτεροι Στωικοὶ λέγουσι τινα ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ πῦρ συνέχειν αὐτὰ τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἑτέρου δεῖσθαι τοῦ συνέχοντος.

Context: Galen has been developing a thesis concerning the structure of bodily mass (*πλῆθος*). He distinguishes between *πλῆθος qua δύναμις*, 'the capacity of something to support bodily mass', and *πλῆθος qua ἔγχυμα*, 'the filling or contents of a body'. At the beginning of this extract, he insists on the necessity of making this distinction: 'something cannot activate or sustain itself'. He then cures the Stoic distinction between *συνέχον* and *συνεχόμενον* in support of his thesis.

6 We omit a long attack on the 'self-styled present-day followers of Herophilus' for their alleged failure to clarify the nature of the *συνεκτικὴ δύναμις*, which they defend. Galen accuses them of an infinite regress – 'they insist that everything needs something to sustain it'. He then, 6–8, groups them with recent Stoics, and attacks them both for holding that 'breath and fire sustain both themselves and the rest'. If he is claiming that Chrysippus refrained from attributing self-sustainment to air and fire, he is probably mistaken; cf. G.

G Plutarch, *Comm. nat.* 1083c–d (SVF 2.444, part)

γῆν μὲν γὰρ φασι καὶ ὕδωρ αὐτὰ συνέχειν οὐθ' ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ

μετοχῇ καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνότητά διαφυλάττειν· αἶρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὐτῶν τ' εἶναι δι' εὐτονίαν ἐκτικά, καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὰ μόνιμα καὶ οὐσιώδεις.

1 φασὶ Διαιτοι· τιθέντες Pohlenz; ἰσχυοὶ udd; 2 μετοχῇ W; μετοχῆς udd; 3 ἐκτικά Διαιτῶν· διακρατικά Pohlenz; ἐκτατικά codd

Context: Plutarch tries to maintain that these doctrines are inconsistent with the Stoic claim that earth and water are elements, cf. I 1

1 ἐνότητά Cf. J 6

3 δι' εὐτονίαν Cf. 48C 12.

H Galen. *Plac.* 5.3 8 (SVF 2.841, part)

τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα δύο μὲν κέκτηται μέρη τε καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ καταστάσεις, δι' ὧν ἀλλήλοις κεκραμ|μένα, τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμόν, εἴπερ δ' ἐτέρησι ὀνόμασι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐβέλοι τις αὐτὰ προσαγορεύειν, αἶρα τε καὶ πῦρ οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱκμάδα τινὰ προσεῖληφεν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἐν οἷς διαίτῃται.

1 2 καὶ καταστάσεις cf. Muller

Context: Galen tries to argue that Chrysippus is committed, against his will, to referring the health of the commanding-faculty to the proportion (συμμετρία) of the constituents of its πνεῦμα; cf. note on 53V for Galen's earlier attack on the same point.

I Alexander, *Mixt.* 224.14–27 (SVF 2.442)

(1) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ τὸ πνεῦμα γεγενῆς ἐκ πυρός τε καὶ αἰέρος διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκε τῶν σωμάτων (τῷ) πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς κεκράσθαι καὶ ἐκάστω αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτου ἡρτῆσθαι τὸ εἶναι, πῶς ἂν ἐτι ἀπλοῦν τι εἴη σῶμα; πῶς δ' ἂν, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ ἐκ τούτων συγκεῖται τοῖ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ πῦρ ἢ καὶ ὁ αἶρ εἴη, εἰ ὡν μεθυμένων τὸ πνεῦμα γίνεται, οὐ χωρὶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι τι σῶμα, εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἐκείνων μὲν ἢ γίνεσι τῷ πνεύματι, ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐκείναι εἶναι τι χωρὶς πνεύματος, οὐτ' ἂν ἐκείναι τι εἴη πρὸ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος γενέσεως, οὐτ' ἂν τὸ πνεῦμα γένοιτο, ἀν' ὧν, ἐξ ὧν ἢ γένεσις αὐτῷ πῶς δ' ἂν τις ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ ἐνρυχία τι θερμὸν εἶνα. Λέγει, (2) τίς δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἅμα κίνησις αὐτοῦ, καθ' ἣν συνεχεῖν τὰ ἐν οἷς ἂν ᾖ, ὅτ' ὡς φασὶ πνεῦμα κινούμενον ἅμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ εἰς αὐτό; καὶ κατὰ τί εἶδος κινήσεως γίνεται; κατ' οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶον τ' ἐπὶ κησάι τι ἅμα εἰς τὰ ἐναντία κινούμενον καθ' αὐτό

4 (τῷ) Ideler γ οἷον; Aphr. αὐτοῖς, οὐ udd; παρέχει udd; συνεχῆ Ideler ὅτ Aphr; ὡς udd; 10 πνεῦμα udd; πνεύματος Ideler κινούμενον Aphr; κινούμενον udd; αὐ τοῦ ἀπὸ udd; αὐτοῦ. ἀπὸ udd; εἰ Aphr. τι udd;

Context: objections to the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα.

1–8 Alexander tries to make difficulty by arguing that if the composite πνεῦμα is the cause of every body's existence, there could be no elements (simple bodies), including fire and air whose mixture constitutes πνεῦμα, and so no πνεῦμα either. The most promising rejoinder is the one suggested by Hahn [495]. Ancient critics.

wilfully or not, tend to confuse the Stoics' account of the formation of the elements, which is explained by rarefaction and condensation of prime matter (see **E**; 46C), with the qualities that *πνεῦμα* generates in water and earth, where the latter are treated as the matter of particular objects. Alexander is probably working from a passage in which the dependence of every body on *πνεῦμα* refers only to particular compound bodies and does not include the elements earth and water; Nemesius' criticism in **J** can be explained similarly. The Stoic position, as set out in **F** and **G**, makes water and earth the pre-existing material with which *πνεῦμα* blends, and which it causes to take on perceptible properties; cf. **M**.

J Nemesius 70,6-71,4

(1) εἰ τοίνυν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ οἷονδὴποτε, εἰ καὶ λεπτομερέτατον, τί πάλιν ἐστὶ τὸ συνέχον ἐκείνην, (2) ἐδείχθη γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα δεῖσθαι τοῦ συνέχοντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως ἂν καταστήσωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον. (3) εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωικοί, τοικίην τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἐνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας, ἐρωτητέον αὐτοῦς, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα κίνησις ἀπὸ τινὸς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως, τίς ἡ δύναμις αὕτη καὶ ἐν τίνι οὐσιάζεται;

Context: doxography of soul.

2-3 The 'proof' is that all bodies are naturally unstable and infinitely divisible, and therefore need soul as their uniting principle; cf. Nemesius 70,2-6.

4-8 This is the most precise surviving testimony concerning the internal effects of *πνεῦμα* within a compound body; cf. **G**, **M** 2.

K Galen, *Musc. mov.* 4 402,12-403,10 (SVF 2.430, part)

(1) ἔστω τις ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις ἐν ταύτῳ τόπῳ φαινόμενος μένειν. πότερον ἀκίνητος εἶναι τοῦτον λεκτέον, ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ κρεμάμενος ἄνωθεν ἔτυχεν, ἢ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω κίνησιν εἰς τοσοῦτον εἰς ὅσον ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν κάτω τὸ τοῦ σώματος βίηρος; ἐμοὶ μὲν τοῦτο ἀληθέστερον εἶναι δοκεῖ. στερήσας γοῦν αὐτὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ τῶν μυῶν τάννου, ταχέως ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ὄφει καταφερόμενον, ὥς δὴλον ὅτι τὴν σύμφυτον τῇ τοῦ πύματος βίῃ κάτω ῥοπὴν εἰς ἴσον ἀντεστήκου τῇ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τόνον ἄνω φορᾷ. (2) πότερον οὖν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀπάσαις καταστάσεσι ποτὲ μὲν κάτω ποτὲ δὲ ἄνω τὸ σῶμα φέρεται τάναντί τι πάσῃ ἐν μέρει, διὰ δὲ τὸ ταχέως τε καὶ ὀξυρρόπους γίνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ κατὰ βραχυτάτων διαστημάτων φέρεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις ἐν ταύτῳ φαίνεται τόπῳ μένειν, ἢ ὅντως ἓνα διὰ παντός τοῦ χρόνου κατέχει τόπον, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ διελθεῖν.

Context: is muscular activity to be explained by τοικίη κίνησις? At 4.402, 1-12, Galen illustrates his problem by the example of a swimmer who remains in the same place if his own movement against the current exactly counterbalances the current's strength.

For further discussion, cf. Sambutsky [490], 37-3.

I. Alexander, *Mixt.* 223.25–36 (*SF* 2.441, part)

(1) τοῦτου δ' οὕτως ἔχοντος, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ὑληθὲς εἴη τὸ πᾶν ἡνώσθαι τε καὶ συνέχεσθαι, πνεύματος τινος διὰ παντὸς διήκοντος αὐτοῦ; (2) ἔπειτα δ' εὐλογον μὲν ἦν ὁμοίαν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος σινοχὴν γινομένην ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι τοῖς σώμασιν· οὐχ οὕτως δ' ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ σωματίων τὰ μὲν ἐστι 5
 συνεχῇ, τὰ δὲ διωρισμένα. διὸ εὐλογώτερον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκείου εἶδους συνέχεσθαι τε καὶ ἡνώσθαι λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτό, καθὼς ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τὸ εἶναι, τὴν (δέ) συμπάθειαν αὐτῶν σήξεσθαι τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλα διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης κοινωνίαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ περικειμένου θείου σώματος αὐτοῖς φύσιν, ἣ τῷ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος δεσμῷ. (3) τίς γὰρ καὶ ὁ τόνος τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅφ' οὗ συνδούμενα τὴν τε συνέχειαν ἔχει τὴν πρὸς τὰ 10
 οἰκεία μέρη καὶ συνήπται τοῖς παρακειμένοις;

γ <δέ> Huns. γ αὐτοῖς A.A. Long, αὐτῷ addl. γ τῷ vel τὸ vocal δεσμῷ τὰ Armin. δεσμώντες addl

Context: problems posed by the Stoic concept of πνεῦμα, discussed shortly before those of I.

1–2 Alexander concludes that the unifying power of πνεῦμα throughout the world is excluded by the fact, as he claims, that some bodies, e.g. water, can never be mixed with it. The Stoics disagreed; cf. *SF* 2.721 on fish breathing the air which is blended with water when the elements are originally formed.

2–9 Here Alexander seeks to turn against the Stoics their acknowledgement of some bodies which are not unified, cf. 28M. For his own account of unity and interaction, cf. Todd [332] ad loc.

9 αὐτοῖς The only possible antecedent for αὐτῷ, the MSS reading, seems to be ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. That is very harsh in view of the second αὐτῶν in line 7, and constitutes copying of singular and plural occurs elsewhere, e.g. 224.24, where Ἀρδιὸν αὐτοῦ must be read in place of αὐτοῖς.

M. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1053F–1054B (*SF* 2.449)

(1) πάλιν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ ἔξεων* αὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἔξεις πλὴν ἀέρος εἶναι φησιν· “ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὸ σώματα· καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν ἔξει συνεχομένων αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν ἀκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ πικνότητα δ' ἐν λίθῳ λευκότητα δ' ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσι” . . . (2) καίτοι πανταχοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἀργόν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑπακείσθαι ταῖς 5
 ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις, οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης, εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν.

ὁ οὔσας vel οὐς δι' vocal. γ οὐς vel οὐς vocal

Context: the self-contradictory nature of Chrysippus' conception of air. He takes air to be naturally soft and dark, and yet makes it responsible for such qualities as the whiteness of silver and the hardness of iron.

5–8 Plutarch, following these lines, claims that the thesis about ὕλη and

πρώτης is incompatible with the natural qualities of air. If air is soft and dark, it should make mere matter soft and dark; if, on the other hand, air acquires different characteristics by being blended with each body, it is functioning some like matter than an active principle. Hahn [195], 48, convincingly suggests that Chrysippus is not referring here to prime matter (see 44) but to perceptible qualities generated in the water and earth which constitute the matter of compound bodies; cf. notes on 1.

N Galen, *Intr.* 14 726,7–11 (SVF 2.716, part)

τοῦ δὲ ἐμφύτου πνεύματος διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν· εἶσι δὲ οἱ καὶ τρίτον εἰσάγουσι, τὸ ἐκτικόν· ἐκτικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πνεῦμα τὸ συνεχὸν τοὺς λίθους, φυσικὸν δὲ τὸ τρέφον τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύχων αἰσθητικά τε ποιοῦν τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινούμενα πᾶσαν κίνησιν.

Context: the constitutive principles of living beings. At 14.697, 7, Galen identifies those who introduce the third πνεῦμα as Stoics. On N-O and their bearing on the Stoics' theory of the differences between plants, animals and humans, cf. Jong [2002], 43ff.

O Diogenes Laertius 7.138–9 (including SVF 2.634)

(1) τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδωνίου ἐν τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντας τοῦ τοῦ, καθά περ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· (2) ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μάλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον. δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξιν κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὁσίων καὶ τῶν νευρῶν· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· (3) οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησι Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύρις ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. (4) Χρύσιππος δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδωνίου ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν φασὶ τὰ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. ὁ μὲντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταύτῃ· ὁ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν (ὄν) λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν αἰέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν.

· διοικεῖσθαι B μὲν οὐκ εἰσάγουσι P · τὸ πέμπτῳ Fr. ant. 1 τοῦ γ' I τοῦ γ' B 1 τρίτῳ J 4 κεχώρηκεν B 1 ἐχώρησε Γ 12 μέντοι B 1 34 I 11 καθαρώτατον B 1 -τοῦ F (corr.) (ὄν) A A Long: lat. unde Anon.

Context: one line after 44F. On the theology of the whole extract, cf. C, 44F, 46A; 54A–B.

P Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.22–3 (SVF 2.458, part)

(1) ὁ γυνός καὶ διένοτος οὐμάτι νοῦς· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ μήλα ἐνδεκόμενον ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· πολλὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις, ἐκτικὴν φυσικὴν ψυχικὴν λογικὴν διανοητικὴν, ἀλλὰς κυρίας κατὰ τὴν οὐκ καὶ γένε· (2) ἡ μὲν ἕξις κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων

ἐστὶ λίθων καὶ ξύλων, ἧς μετέχει καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν εἰκότα λίθοις ὅστέα. (3) ἡ δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά· καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκότα φυτοῖς, 5
 ὀνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἐξίς ἥδη κινουμένη. (4) ψυχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ φύσις προσειληφύια φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν· αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἀναλογούν τι ἀλόγου ψυχῇ. πάλιν ἡ διανοητικὴ δύναμις ἰδία τοῦ νοῦ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ λογικὴ κοινὴ μὲν τάχα καὶ τῶν βειοτέρων φύσεων, ἰδία δὲ ὡς ἐν 10
 θητοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αὕτη δὲ διττὴ, ἡ μὲν καθ' ἣν λογικῶς ἔσμεν νοῦ μετέχοντες, ἡ δὲ καθ' ἣν διαλεγόμεθα

2 ψυχῆν A.A. Long φυτικῇ codd. ψυχῆν codd. · φαντασὶν Aton. λογικῇ uita. Aton. 9 ἡ λογικῇ ucl. Colson

Context: Philo interprets the nakedness of Adam and Eve (*Genesis* 2.25) as a reference to the faculties of the unembodied soul.

2 The reading *φυτικῇ* is almost certainly a scribal error derived from line 5. Some reference to *φύσις* is essential both doctrinally and to the structure of the passage. Philo conflates the mind's faculties, one of which is *λόγος* (cf. 53K), with the various faculties of *πνεῦμα* or divine *νοῦς*; cf. N, O 2, 2, Q 1.

2-3, 8-11 *λογικῇ, διανοητικῇ* Both terms seem to be Philonian amplifications of the Stoic triad, *ἐξίς, φύσις, ψυχῇ*. The Stoics, moreover, use *λόγος* and *διάνοια* indifferently to refer to the faculty of reason; cf. Bonhoffer [31], 123 ff. Colson may be right to delete ἡ *λογικῇ*, 9.

6 *ψυχῇ* Cf. 53A 4, P Q.

8 *ἀναλογούν ψυχῇ*. Cf. C 25 6.

Q Philo, *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 35-6 (SVF 2.458, part)

(1) τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐνεδήσατο ἔξει, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ λογικῇ ψυχῇ. (2) λίθων μὲν οὖν καὶ ξύλων, ἃ δὴ τῆς συμφύιας ἀπέσπασται, δεσμὸν κραταιότατον ἔξιν εἰργάζεται· ἡ δὲ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ' 5
 ἑαυτό· ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τείνεσθαι, ψαύσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνυκίμπει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρμήθη. (3) ἐξέως ὁ συνεχὴς οὗτος διαυλὸς ἀφθαρτος.

Context: interpretation of God's creative organization (*Genesis* 6.6).

1-2 Cf. N, O 2, P.

2-6 Cf. R 3

7 *ἀφθαρτος* The sense is presumably that the stone or log cannot exist without the incessant movement of its *ἐξίς*.

R Philo, *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesis* 2.4 (SVF 2.802)

Context: explanation of *Genesis* 6.14.

The only complete version of this work is a medieval Armenian translation from the Greek. Our version in vol. 1 is based upon Aucher's Latin translation (printed in SVF), and supplemented by comparisons with the more recent translations by

Marcus in the Loeb edition of Philo, vol. x, and Metcuer in vol. 346 of *Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, ed. Arnaldez, Pouilloux, Mondévrot

S Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 237.25–238.20 (SVF 2.393, part)

(1) ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν Στωικῶν συνήθειαν περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα καταμαθεῖν. δοκοῦσι γάρ οὗτοί τισιν ἀνάπαλιν τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὴν διαθέσειν τῆς ἕξεως μονιμωτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι· (2) τὸ δὲ ἀφορμὴν μὲν ἔχει τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπονομίας, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τὸ μονιμώτερον ἢ μὴ παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἢ τοῦτων εἰληπταὶ διαφορὰ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλας διαθέσεις· καὶ γὰρ τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι φασιν δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι, τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνανέτους. διὸ καὶ τὴν εὐθύτητα τῆς ῥάβδου, κἂν εὐμετάβολος ἢ δυναμένη κάμπτεσθαι, διαθέσειν εἶναι φασιν· μὴ γὰρ ἂν ἀνεθῆναι ἢ ἐπιταθῆναι τὴν εὐθύτητα μὴδὲ ἔχειν· τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον, διόπερ εἶναι διαθέσειν. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας καίτοι δυσκινήτους οὖσας [ἢ] μὴ εἶναι διαθέσεις. (3) καὶ εἰκόασιν τὴν μὲν ἕξιν ἐν τῷ πλάτει τοῦ εἶδους θεωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ διάθεσιν ἐν τῷ τέλει τοῦ εἶδους καὶ ἐν τῷ μάλιστα, εἴτε κινεῖτο καὶ μεταβάλλοι, ὥς τὸ εὐθὺ τῆς ῥάβδου, εἴτε καὶ μὴ. (4) μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχρην ἐκεῖνο ἐπιστήσαι, μὴ ἢ παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς σχέσις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν τῇ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει διαθέσει, κατὰ τὸ εὐανάλυτον καὶ δυσανάλυτον διισταμένη πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὕτως συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἀβέβαιον ὑγίειαν διάθεσιν εἶναι φησιν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωῆς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ, οὐ συγχωροῦσιν σχέσιν εἶναι· φέρειν γὰρ τὸ τῆς ἕξεως ἰδίωμα· τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσιν χαρακτηρίζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἐκτῶν ἐνεργείαις. (5) ὅθεν οὐδὲ χρόνου μήκει ἢ ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιοῦνται αἱ ἕξεις κατ' αὐτοὺς, ἰδιότητι δὲ τινι καὶ χαρακτῆρι, καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ ἐρριζωμένα μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἐρρίζωται, ἐν δὲ ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν ἰδίωμα τὸ ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς γῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἐπὶ τῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ εὐκινήτων ἢ αὐτὴ θεωρεῖται· ὅπως γὰρ τῷ γένει πολλὰ ποιὰ ὄντα ἐκλελυμένον ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἰδίωμα ἔχει καθ' ὃ εἰδοποιεῖται, ὥς ὁ αὐστηρὰν οἶνον καὶ ἡμυγδαλα πικρά καὶ Μολοτικὸς κύων καὶ Μελιταῖος, οἷς πᾶσιν μέτεστι μὲν ὁ γενικός χαρακτήρ, ἐπὶ βραχὺ δὲ καὶ ἀναιμῶς, καὶ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἕξει λόγους ἐπιμένει ἐπὶ μιᾷ καταστάσεως αὐτῇ, τὸ δὲ εὐκύνητον πολλάκις ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας ἔχει.

12 καίτοι Ἀριστ. ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ del. Arista

Context commentary on Aristotle, *Cat.* 8. 8b26 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσιν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῇ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι. Cf. 2 3

10 ἀρετὰς For the place of virtue in the Stoic genera (or so-called categories), cf 29B, E.

12 Since some virtues are τέχραι (cf 61D 1), the transmitted text could be

justified accordingly. But Atimni's suspicions were well founded. Simplicius is probably referring to the μέσαι τέχναι which, he says (SIF 2, p. 130, 20ff.), the Stoics acknowledged to admit of varying intensification. Moreover, τέχναι are regularly referred to as ἔξεις (cf. 42A), and those called ἐπιτηδεύματα (cf. 26H), e.g. prophetai, are specifically classed as ἔξεις and not διαθέσεις (SIF 3 104-5).

16 σχέσις Cf. 28 N 2 3

22-3 Cf. 28H.

T Plutarch, *Prim. frig.* 948D-1., 949B (SIF 2.430, part)

(1) ἐπεὶ τὸ πῦρ θερμὸν ἄρα καὶ λαμπρόν ἐστι, δεῖ τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῷ πυρὶ φύσιν ψυχράν τ' εἶναι καὶ σκοτεινὴν· ἀντίκειται γὰρ ὡς τῷ λαμπρῷ τὸ ζυφερόν οὕτω τῷ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρὸν· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ὁφείας τὸ σκοτεινὸν οὕτω τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀφ᾽ ἧς συγχυτικόν, ἥ δὲ θερμότης διαχεῖ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν τοῦ ἀπτομένου καθάπερ ἡ λαμπρότης τοῦ ὀριούτος. τὸ ἄρα πρῶτως σκοτεινὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρῶτως καὶ ψυχρὸν ἐστίν. ὅτι δ' αἴρ τὸ πρῶτως σκοτεινὸν ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ποιητάς λέληθεν' . . . (2) καὶ μὴν ἀπάντων γε τῶν γινομένων ὑπὸ ψυχρότητος ἐν τοῖς σώμασι σφοδρότατον καὶ βιαιότατον ἢ πῆξις οὕσα πάθος μὲν ἐστίν ὑδατος ἔργον δ' ἄερον· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ ὑδαρ εὐδιάχυτον καὶ ἀπαγὲς καὶ ἀσύστατον ἐστίν, ἐντείνεται δὲ καὶ συνάγεται τῷ ἀέρι σφιγγόμενον ὑπὸ ψυχρότητος.

Context: Stoic doctrine of τὸ πρῶτως ψυχρὸν

48 Mixture

A Diogenes Laertius 7.151 (SIF 2.479)

καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ δι' ὅλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκαταθήσεται, εἴτα συμφθαρήσεται.

1 δι' ὅλου A.A. Long διόλου·codd. δι' ὅλου Todd [332], 31 n. 45.

Context: immediately following 50B, discussion of the infinite divisibility of substance

1 δι' ὅλου For this, rather than δι' ὅλου, as the correct reading, cf. C 4^h, 51: 46A 3-4, 49A 2. The plural is used when the context is concerned with many bodies or substances, e.g. C 9, 41.

3 ἐπὶ ποσόν This phrase, preceding εἴτα, should mean 'for a while', rather than 'to a certain extent', Todd [332], 31 n. 47. Cherniss [326], 810 n., suggests ἐπὶ τοσούτον, comparing C 45.

4 συμφθαρήσεται This verb describes the effects not of κράσις but of σύγχυσις: cf. C 3. The appropriate word would be συγκαθρήσεται, and our translation in vol. 1 is modified accordingly.

B Plutarch, *Comm. noi.* 1078e (SVF 2.48v)

καὶ ταῦτα προσδέχεται Χρύσιππος εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος οἶνον σταλαγμὸν ἓνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν καὶ ἓνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτο θανμάζωμεν, εἰς ἅλου φησὶ τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμὸν.

Context: a few lines after **E**, ταῦτα refers to Chrysippus' acceptance of Plutarch's own illustration of the 'absurdity' of κράσις δι' ἅλου: that a single measure or drop of liquid, once fallen into the Aegean or Cretan sea, would be blended through and through with the whole of the Mediterranean sea and the Atlantic ocean.

Chrysippus' admission that οἶνον σταλαγμὸν ἓνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν has been regularly interpreted as a direct rejoinder to Aristotle, *GC* 1.10, 328a24–8: πολλὰ μὲν ὀλίγοις καὶ μεγάλοις μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ ποιεῖ μίξιν, ἀλλ' αὖξιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος: μεταβάλλει γὰρ θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, ὅλον σταλαγμὸς οἶνου μυριοῖς χοῦσιν ὕδατος οὐ μίγνυται. Αὐταὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει, εἰς τὸ πῶν ὕδωρ. Sandbach [304], 33–4, has recently argued that any influence from Aristotle 'can be confidently denied': Chrysippus' doctrine in **B**, Sandbach maintains, is shown by Plutarch's context to be his acceptance of Arcesilaus' polemical jest in **E**, substituting for the 'putrefied leg' the through-and-through blending with the sea of εἰς . . . τις κύσθος ἢ μία σταγὼν (*Comm. noi.* 1078n), 'a substitution which may well have been made by Laeydes or some other Academic'. Further, he argues, Chrysippus did not need Aristotle's account in *GC* above as the stimulus to his own very different suggestion of the effects for mixture of two ingredients with radically different volumes. 'The most familiar form of κράσις is that of wine and water, an everyday event in Greece'.

Neither of these points seems to us compelling. Sandbach is quite right to draw attention to the non-Aristotelian dialectical context of **E**. But that context does not show that Chrysippus' 'wine and sea' example reached him from Academic critics. Arcesilaus' joke about the putrefied leg could just as well be a more vivid way of illustrating the supposed absurdity of a doctrine already discussed in terms of the mixing of two liquids of different volumes. In any case, the principal reason for regarding 'through-and-through blending' as a rejoinder to Aristotle is not the identity of the 'wine and water' example but the fact (see vol. 1, 292) that Stoic theorizing about mixture has too many Aristotelian features to make its totally independent formulation seem plausible.

For a subtle defence of the Stoic theory against Plutarch's criticism in *Comm. noi.* 1078A, cf. White [505].

C Alexander, *Mixt.* 216.14–218.6 (SVF 2.473)

(1) ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χρυσίππου δόξα περὶ κράσεως ἥδε: ἡνωθῆναι μὲν ὑποτίθεται τὴν σύμψασιν οὐσίαν, πνεύματος τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ' οὗ συνεχέται τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν. (2) τῶν δὲ μίγνυμένων ἐν αὐτῇ σωμάτων τὰς μὲν παραθέσει, μίξεις γίνεσθαι λέγει, δύο τινῶν ἢ καὶ πλείονων οὐσιῶν εἰς ταῦτόν συντεθειμένων καὶ παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις, ὥς φησιν, καθ' ἀρμὴν, σιζήσεως ἐκάστης αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ

τοιαύτη παραθέσει κατὰ τὴν περιγραφὴν τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν τε καὶ
 ποιότητα, ὡς ἐπὶ κυάμιν φέρε εἶπειν καὶ πυρὼν ἐν τῇ παρ' ἀλλήλους θέσει
 γίνεσθαι· (3) τὰς δὲ τινὰς συγχύσει δι' ὧν τῶν τε οὐσιῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἐν αὐταῖς ποιότητων συμφθετημένων ἀλλήλαις, ὡς γίνεσθαι φησὶν ἐπὶ 10
 τῶν ἱατρικῶν φαρμάκων κατὰ σύμφθαρσιν τῶν μιγνυμένων, ἄλλου τινὸς
 ἐξ αὐτῶν γεννημένου σώματος· (4) τὰς δὲ τινὰς γίνεσθαι μίξεις λέγει δι'
 ὧν τινῶν οὐσίαν τε καὶ τῶν τούτων ποιότητων ἀντιπαρεκτείνουμένων
 ἀλλήλαις μετὰ τοῦ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐσίας τε καὶ ποιότητος σώζειν ἐν τῇ
 μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἥτινα τῶν μίξεων κρίσιν ἰδίως εἶναι λέγει· τὴν γὰρ δὴ καὶ 15
 πλείονων τινῶν συμπτῶν ὧν δι' ὧν ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὡς σώζειν
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τὴν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας,
 λέγει κρίσιν εἶναι μόνον τῶν μίξεων· εἶναι γὰρ ἴδιον τῶν κεκραμένων τὸ
 δύνασθαι χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ὃ μόνως γίνεται τῇ σώξει ἐν τῇ
 μίξει τὰ κεκραμένα τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις· (5) τὸ δὲ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι 20
 τῆς μίξεως πειράται πιστοῦσθαι διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ
 κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας φησὶν ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβεῖν ταύτας· (6)
 ἄλλην γοῦν φαντασίαν ἔχειν ἡμῖς τῶν καθ' ἄρμην συγκεκμημένων, καὶ ἄλλην
 τῶν συγκεκμημένων τε καὶ συνεφθαρμένων, καὶ ἄλλην τῶν κεκραμένων τε
 καὶ ἀλλήλοις δι' ὧν ἀντιπαρεκτείνουμένων οὕτως ὡς σώζειν ἕκαστον 25
 αὐτῶν τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν, ἣν διαφορὰν φαντασιῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴχομεν, εἰ πάντα
 τὰ ὅπως οὖν μιγνύμενα παρέκειτο ἀλλήλοις καθ' ἄρμην· (7) τὴν δὲ
 τοιαύτην ἀντιπαρέκτασιν τῶν κερναμένων ὑπολαμβάνει γίνεσθαι
 χωροῦντων δι' ἀλλήλων τὴν κερναμένων σωμάτων, ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν
 αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ κεκραμένῳ μέγρῳ· 30
 οὐκέτι γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο εἴη, κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ παρῆθεσιν τὸ γινόμενον εἶναι.
 (8) τοῦ δὲ τοῦτο οἶεσθαι γίνεσθαι πίστει φέρουσιν οἱ προιστάμενοι τῆσδε
 τῆς δόξης τὸ τε πολλὰ τῶν σωμάτων σώζειν τὰς ἐκείνων ποιότητας ἐπὶ τ'
 ἐλαττόνων ἐναργῶν ὅγκων καὶ ἐπὶ μειζόνων ὄντα (ὡς ὁρᾶν εὐτεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 λιθανωτοῦ, ὅς ἐν τῷ θυμῷσθαι λεπτυνόμενος ἐπὶ πλείστον τὴν αὐτοῦ 35
 φυλάσσει ποιότητα), εἰ τε τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι, ἃ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὴ οὐδ' ἐπὶ
 τι εἶναι μέγεθος ὑπ' ἄλλων βοηθούμενα ἐπ' αὐτὸ πρῦναισι· τὸν γοῦν χρυσὸν
 ὑπὸ τῶν μιγνυμένων φαρμάκων ἐπὶ πλείστον χεῖσθαι τε καὶ λεπτυνε-
 θαι, ἐφ' ὅσον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐλαυνόμενος οὐκ ἐδίνατο... (9) ὧν οὕτως
 ἐχόντων οὐδὲν φασὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ καὶ σώματά τινα βοηθούμενα ὑπ' 40
 ἀλλήλων οὕτως ἀλλήλοις ἐνούσθαι δι' ὧν, ὡς αὐτὰ σωζόμενα μετὰ τῶν
 οἰκείων ποιότητων ἀντιπαρεκτείνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ὧν ὅλα, κἂν ἢ τινα
 ἐλάττω τὸν ὄγκον καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα καθ' αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χεῖσθαι τε καὶ
 σώζειν τὰς οἰκείας ποιότητας· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸν κύαθον τοῦ αἶνου
 κερνασθαι τῷ ὕδατι τῷ πολλῷ βοηθούμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 45
 ἔκτασιν· (10) τοῦ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐναργεῖς χρώματα μαρτυρίαις τῷ
 τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δεχόμενον αὐτὴν
 σῶμα, δι' ὅλου τοῦ σώματος διήκειν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ σώζουσαν
 τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἄμειρον τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντος

σώματος), ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φυτῶν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχομένοις ὑπὸ τῆς ἕξεως. (11) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πῦρ ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν τοῦ σιδήρου λέγουσι, σώζοντος αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν. (12) καὶ τῶν στοιχείων δέ φασι τῶν τεσσάρων τὰ δύο, τὸ τε πῦρ καὶ τὸν αἶρα, λεπτομερῆ τε καὶ κοῦφα καὶ εὐτονα ὄντα, διὰ τῶν δύο, γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος, παχυμερῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ ἀτόνων ὄντων διαπεφοιτηκέναι ὅλα δι' ὅλων, σώζοντα τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν καὶ συνεχίαν αὐτὰ τε καὶ ἐκεῖνα.

4 παραθήσει μίξεις *Idoltr.* παραθέσεις μίξει *codd* ἡ ἀρμήν *Beun.* ὁρμήν *codd* ἡ ὁ θέσει γίνεσθαι *codd.* θέσει γίνεται *Beun.* θέσει· γίνεσθαι *Apelt.* *Todd* συγχύσει *Idoltr.* συγχύσει *ABC* ὕδατος *Beun.* 22 λαβὼν ταύτας *Beun.* λαβόντας *codd* 23, 27 ὁρμήν *Beun.* ὁρμήν *codd* 27 ἀλλήλους *Apelt.* ἀλλήλους *codd* 31 τῆς *Ra.* *om.* *ceti.*

Context: account of those who say ἡγίσθαι τὴν ὕλην.

For the relation of this evidence to other sources, cf. *Todd* [332], 30–65. For reasons given in vol. 1, 293, it may be doubted whether he is right to claim, 31, 36ff., that 'mutual co-existence' (ἀντιπαρεκτείνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, C 25, etc.) is an inaccurate description of the Stoic thesis of κράσις δι' ὅλου.

21 *καινῶν ἐννοιῶν* Cf. 40R and vol. 1, 252.

39 We omit a passage giving further examples.

46–50 Cf. vol. 1, 320 f.

53–6 Cf. 47F I.

D Stobaeus 1.155.5–11 (*SVF* 2.471, part)

οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοιούτων κράσεων διαμένουσιν αἱ ποιότητες τῶν συγκαθέντων, πρόδηλον ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐπιμηχανήσεως ἀποχωρίζεσθαι ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἐὰν γοῦν σπύγγον ἡλαιωμένον καθῇ τις εἰς οἶνον ὕδατι κεκραμμένον, ἀποχωρίσει τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ οἴνου ἀναδραμόντος τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς τὸν σπύγγον.

1 ἡλαιωμένον *Meincke.* ἡλαιούμενον *codd.*

Context: doxography of mixture. The full passage in Stobaeus corresponds closely to the gist of C, but it reserves the term κράσις for the ἀντιπαρέκτασις of moist bodies, using μίξις as a term to include such cases as fire pervading iron, 1.154.14–155.5. By using μίξις as a generic term, Alexander in C may have simplified his source, but nothing of interest seems to lie behind the Stobaeus terminology, and the activity of πνεῦμα, a dry body, is regularly presented as an instance of κράσις.

E Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078b–c (including *SVF* 2.465, part)

(1) ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη γιγνομένης ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τῆς ἀνακράσεως ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὰ μιγνύμενα γίνεσθαι καὶ ταῦτ' ὁμοῦ τῷ ἐκυπάρχειν περιέχεσθαι καὶ τῷ δέχεσθαι περιέχειν θάτερον· καὶ μηδέτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὸ πάλιν δυνατόν εἶναι συμβαίνει, ἀμφοτέρω τῆς κράσεως δι' ἀλλήλων διέναι καὶ μηδὲν ἐπιλείπεσθαι μηδενὸς μόριον ἀλλὰ <πάν> παντὸς ἀναμιμνησθαι βιαζομένης. (2) ἐνταῦθα δῆπου καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς

Ἀρκεσίλαου σκέλος ἦκει ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐπεμβαῖνον αὐτῶν μετὰ γέλιωτος.
εἰ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ κράσεις δι' ὅλων, τί κωλύει, τοῦ σκέλους ἀποκοπέντος καί
κατασαπέντος καί ῥιφέντος εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ διαχυθέντος, οὐ τὸν
Ἀντιγόνη μόνον στόλον διεκπλεῖν, ὡς ἔλεγεν Ἀρκεσίλαος, ἀλλὰ τὰς 10
Ξέρξου χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ὁμοῦ τριακοσίας τριήρεις
ἐν τῷ σκέλει ναυμαχοῦσας;

1 ἀπόρησι, Wittenbach; ἀπορίαις cod. 2 γέλιωσθαι vel γέλιουσθαι cod. 3 μηδέτερον Ἀττινι; μὴ
δ' ἄτερον cod. 4 συμβαίνειν δ' ἀρμότερα Wittenbach σιμβαίνειν δ' ἀρμότερα Ἀττινι; συμβαίνειν.
ἀμφοτέρω Pohlenz 5 <πάν> Madvig 6 ὁμοῦ Bernadakis δει τοῦ vel ὁμ cod.

Context: attack on the Stoics for making 'one body the place for another body, and body pass through body', 1077f; cf. F. Phutarch goes on to supply the transition to Chrysippus' rejoinder (see notes on B) by arguing that a single ladleful of the putrefied leg should, in consistency with Chrysippus' doctrine, extend throughout the whole Mediterranean.

10 Antigonius Gonatas is meant, ruler of Macedon and effectively of Greece during Arcesilaus' headship of the Academy.

F Themistius, *In Ar. Phys.* 104.9-19 (including SVF 2.468)

(1) ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος τὸν τόπον ἀποσεμνύνωμεν· σκέψαι
γάρ καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους οἷ' πρὸς τῷ μηδὲν αὐτῷ προστιθέναι καὶ
καθάπαξ αὐτὸν ἀναροῦσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐπιχειρήσεις . . . τί ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος
ἀποδιδόναι, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν περιαχθήσῃ· πρῶτον γὰρ εἰς 5
τί γένος ἀνάξεις τὸν τόπον; ἢ ὅλον ὅτι εἰς σῶμα; καὶ γὰρ ὁ τόπος ἐπὶ τρία
διέστηκεν. (2) ἀλλ' οὕτω τὸ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον ἀπαντήσεται· σῶμα γὰρ
διὰ σώματος χωρήσει δι' ὅλου καὶ δύο σώματα τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τόπον· εἰ
γὰρ καὶ ὁ τόπος σῶμα καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα καὶ ἴσα τοῖς
διαστήμασι μῆκος, τὸ σῶμα ἐστὶ ἐν ἴσῳ ἑτέρῳ σώματι. τοῦτο δὲ 10
Χρυσίππῳ μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος δόγμασιν ἐστίν, οἱ παλαιοὶ δὲ
ἀπάγουσιν ὡς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἐναργῶς.

Context: commentary on Aristotle's definition of τόπος, *Phys.* iv. 1.

Themistius refutes the suggestion that place can be defined as a body by showing that this leads to there being two bodies in the same place. It is only this last point that he ascribes to the Stoics. For the same argument, cf. Philoponus, *In Ar. Phys.* 505.10-15; for discussion of the Peripatetic criticism of the Stoics, see Todd [332], 73-88.

49 Place and void

A Stobaeus i.161.8-26 (SVF 2.503)

(1) Χρυσίππου· τόπον δ' εἶναι ὃ Χρυσίππος ἀπεφαίνεται τὸ κατεχόμενον δι'
ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἶόν <τε> κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι' ὅλου
κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπὸ τινός <εἴτε> ὑπὸ τινῶν. ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ οἴου τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ

ἀντος τὸ μὲν κατέχεται, τί δὲ μή, τὸ ὅλον (οὔτε) κενὸν εἶσθαι οὔτε τόπον, ἕτερον δὲ τε οὐκ
 ἀνομιεασμένον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν τοῖς κεναῖς ἀγγείαις λέγεσθαι παραπληρώως, τὸν δὲ τόπον 5
 τοῖς πλήρει· χώρην δὲ πότερον τὸ μείζον οἶόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ οἶον μείζον
 ἀγγεῖον σώματος, ἢ τὸ χωροῦν μείζον σώμα; (2) τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι
 λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ' εἶναι· τὸν δὲ τόπον
 πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι. καθάπερ δὲ τὸ πωματικόν
 πεπερασμένον εἶναι, οὕτως τὸ ἀσώματον ἄπειρον, ὃ τε γὰρ χρόνος ἄπειρος 10
 καὶ τὸ κενόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πέρις, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ
 μηδεὶός, οἶόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἄπειρόν ἐστι·
 περατοῦται δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκπληρούμενον· τοῦ δὲ πληροῦντος ἀρθέντος οὐκ
 ἔστιν αὐτοῦ νοῆσαι πέρας.

4 <τε> Diels 3 <εἴτε> Heeren 4 <οὔτε> Cantab. εἶσθαι· τόπον Diener ζητοῖ· τό-
 πος ovidd δέ τε Cantab. δέ τε could 5 ἀγγεῖαι Cantab. αἰτίαι could 7 ἀγγεῖον Cantab.
 αἰτίαι could 11 οὐδὲ Uxner: δέ IP καὶ Vat et Aug 12 αὐτοῦ Diels αὐτοῦ uidd.

Context: doxography of place and void

1-3 Chrysippus' first account of τόπος seems to differ only verbally from the one
 Sextus attributes to the Stoics in B 3-4 where ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτῶν
 should be interpreted as specifying the 'through-and-through' occupancy expressed
 here by δι' ὅλου. Chrysippus' second account, starting from τὸ οἶόν τε κατέχεσθαι,
 which is also an attribute of void (cf. B 1-2), makes it clear that void is potentially
 place. The unoriginarity of these Stoic formulations can be inferred from comparison
 with Aristotle, *Carl.* I.9. 279a14-15: ἐν ἅπαντι γὰρ τόπῳ δυνατόν ὑπάρχει σῶμα·
 κενόν δ' εἶναι φασιν ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔνυπάρχει σῶμα, δυνατόν δ' ἐστὶ γενέσθαι.

3-5 This conception of χώρα (cf. B 5-7) seems to be original. For Epicurus'
 different usage and etymology of χώρα, cf. 5.

5-7 ἀγγεῖον Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* IV 2, 209b28-30, etc.

9-12 Void is compared to 'nothing' in its lack of limit, but Hahn [488], 103, is
 incorrect to say that 'the Stoics and Aristotle agreed that there is nothing outside the
 cosmos'. For the Stoics, the void is 'something' (τε); cf. 27D: 43B.

B Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.3-4 (SIF 2.505, part)

(1) καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τὸ οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι
 μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτού-
 μενον ὑπὸ σώματος. (2) τόπον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ
 ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, καθὼς καὶ
 ἐκ τῆς μεταλήψεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστὶ συμφάνες. (3) χώρην δὲ φασιν εἶναι 5
 διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, κατὰ δὲ τι ἀκαθεκτού-
 μενον. ἐνίοι δὲ χώρην ἔλεξαν ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοῦ μείζονος σώματος τόπον.

3 4 τοῖ αὐτόν could here τὸ αὐτό A A 1010g

Context: doxography of place, room and void

5-7 Cf. A 3-7

C Cleomedes 8,10-14 (SVF 2.541)

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἶναι τινα ὑπόστασιν κενού. ἔστι δὲ ἀπλουστάτη αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπίνοια, αἰσώματος τε καὶ ἀναφύου ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε σχῆμα ἔχοντος οὔτε σχηματιζομένου, καὶ οὔτε τι πάσχοντος οὔτε ποιούντος, ἀπλῶς δὲ σώμα δέχεσθαι αἴου τε ὄντος.

2-3 καὶ ante οὔτε om. ML.

Context: conclusion of an argument to show the absurdity of claiming that nothing exists outside the κόσμος.

D Galen, *Diff. puls.* 8.674,13-14 (SVF 2.424, part)

οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τοιαύτην οὐδεμίαν [sc. κενὴν χώραν] ἐν κόσμῳ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἠνώσθαι τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν αὐτῇ.

Context: Galen is considering in what sense if any the pulse might be called κενός. The Pneumatic doctors' views, as reported here, seem good evidence for Stoicism, reasoning from the world's internal unity to the absence of void therein; cf. 48C 1

E Galen, *Qual. inc.* 19.464,10-14 (SVF 2.502)

ὅτι δὲ κοινόν ἐστι τοῦτο [δήλον] (λέγω δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν) σώματός τε καὶ κενού καὶ τόπου, Στωικοὺς μὲν ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἅτε κενὸ ἀπολιπόντας ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων πραγμάτων φύσει, καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν μὴ λέγωμαι.

1 δήλον del. Kaltschmidt

Context: Galen has just observed that resistance (ἀντίτυπον) must be added to three-dimensionality if σώμα is to be distinguished from place and void; cf. 45F from the same work.

3 Note Galen's non-Stoic use of ὄντων, in contrast with the use of ὄν in A and B. For the Stoics, place and void are τινά but not ὄντα; cf. 27

F Simplicius, *In Ar. De caelo* 284,28-285,2 (SVF 2.535)

(1) οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στωῆς ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κενὸν εἶναι βουλόμενοι διὰ τοιαύτης αὐτὸ κατασκευάζουσιν ὑποθέσεως. (2) ἔστω, φασίν, ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς ἐστώτῃ τινα ἐκτείνειν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω τὴν χεῖρα· (3) καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐκτείνει, λαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἐκτὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰς ὃ ἐξέτεινεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναίτο ἐκτείνειν, ἔσται τι καὶ οὕτως ἐκτὸς τὸ κωλύσαν τὴν τῆς χεῖρος ἔκτασιν. (4) καὶ πρὸς τῷ πέρατι πάλιν ἐκείνου σπᾶς ἐκτείνει, ὁμοίᾳ ἢ ἐρώτησις· (5) εἶναι γὰρ δειχθήσεται καὶ ἐκείνου τι ἐκτὸς ὄν.

Context: Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle, *Caef.* 1.9, 279a11, which denies that place, void or time exist outside the world.

The thought experiment is also reported, without attribution to the Stoics, by

Alexander (S¹F 2.536), on whom Simplicius certainly drew for his rebuttals at 285, 2.9 and 285,27–286,2. Lucianus records a similar argument to prove the world's infinity. **10B 3** The source for Stoics and Epicureans is likely to have been either Eudæmus, who credits the experiment to the Pythagorean Archytas (47 x 24 DK) as a proof of the existence of infinite body and place, or Archytas himself. Alexander, as reported by Simplicius at 285,27ff., argues, on Aristotelian lines, that the Stoics are not entitled to posit an infinite void: their definition of [infinite] void as 'capable of receiving body' (cf. **B 1**), would require the existence of an infinite body, an impossibility which they themselves admit. But the Stoics are not disturbed by this objection. Given their theory of modality (see **38E 3**), and their not being bound by the Aristotelian notion that every potentiality presupposes a corresponding actuality, they can perfectly well reply that the non-existence of an infinite body has no bearing on the limits of the void's capacity.

G Cleomedes 6,11–17 (S¹F 2.537)

εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύεται ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία, ὡς τοῖς χειριστάτοις τῶν φυσικῶν δοκεῖ, ἀνάγκη πλεονῆς ἢ μυριοπλασίονα τύπον αὐτὴν καταλαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ εἰς ἀτμὸν ἐκθυμιώμενα τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων. ὁ τοίνυν ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρνώσει ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκχεομένης καταλαμβανόμενος τόπος νῦν κενὸς ἔστιν, οὐδενός γε σώματος αὐτὸν πεπληροϊκότος.

εἰ ἐκχυμένης vel χυμένης void

Context: part of a series of arguments to prove the existence of void.

For the terminology describing the ἐκπύρνωσις, cf. **46K**; **47A**.

H Cleomedes 10,24–12,5 (S¹F 2.540)

(1) λέγεται κακεῖνο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰ ἦν ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου κενόν, χεομένη δι' αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἐπ' ἄπειρον διεσκεδιάσθη ἂν καὶ διεσκορπίσθη. (2) ἀλλὰ φήσομεν, ὡς μηδὲ τοῦτο δύναται παθεῖν· ἔξω γὰρ ἔχει τὴν συνεχόσαν αὐτὴν καὶ συντηροῦσαν. (3) καὶ τὸ μὲν περιέχον αὐτὴν κενόν οὐδὲν ποιεῖ· αὕτη δ' ὑπερβαλλούσῃ δυνάμει χρωμένη συντηρεῖ ἑαυτήν, συστελλομένη τε καὶ πάλιν χεομένη ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς φυσικὰς αὐτῆς μεταβολάς, ἄλλοτε μὲν εἰς πῦρ χεομένη, ἄλλοτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ κοσμογονίᾳ ὁρμῶσα.

αὕτη Z, qdlet, oδθη could εἰ ἐξω vel ἐξί τῆς could

Context: continuing an attack on the Peripatetic denial of void.

3 ἔξω Cf. **47F** **G**, **I**, **L–M**, **O**.

I Plutarch, St. rep. 1054f (S¹F 2.550, part)

οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ κενῷ διαφορὰν ἢ τὰ σώματα δευρὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δευρὶ προσάγεται, τὴν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου σύνταξιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὰ κέντρα καὶ τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ κενόντων καὶ φερομένων πανταχόθεν.

εἰ φερόμενος (σπιντατος τῶν περισσ.) P. Böhme, I. Boissac

Context: Plutarch cites Chrysippus' views on the void with the object of showing that they contradict Chrysippus' supposed belief that bodies naturally move to the centre *οὐ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς περιχώσεως τῆς οὐσίας χώρας*. I.e. Chrysippus is alleged to have both posited and denied that an infinite void can have a centre. For detailed discussion, cf. Hahn [488], 122–6, and the references given by Cherniss [326] *ad loc.*

Even if Chrysippus equivocated over the possibility of an infinite void's having a centre, his primary interest was to defend the Zenonian view (cf. J) that the world's stability is due to the natural tendency of all bodies to move towards its (the world's) centre. Cf. Furley [168], 20–1, and see 29D – the sequel to this passage.

J Stobaeus 1.166.4–22 (SVP 1.99)

(1) Ζήνωνος. τῶν δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντων τῶν κατ' ἰδίαν ἔξιν συνεστῶτων τὰ μέρη τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου μέσον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου· (2) διὸ περ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κόσμου τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ βίους ἔχοντα· (3) ταῦτ' οὐ δ' αἰτίον εἶναι καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μονῆς ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ, καὶ τῆς γῆς παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ περὶ τὸ τοῦτου κέντρον καθιδρυμένης ἰσοκρατῶς. (4) οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἄβαρῆ εἶναι ἠέρα καὶ πῦρ· τείνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτά πως ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τὴν δὲ σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. (5) παραπλησίως δὲ τοῦτοις οὐδ' αὐτὸν φασὶ τὸν κόσμον βάρος ἔχειν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ σύστασιν ἐκ τε τῶν βάρους ἔχόντων στοιχείων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀβαρῶν. (6) τὴν δ' ὅλην γῆν καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ἔχειν ἀρέσκει βάρος· παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν διὰ τὸ τὴν μέσσην ἔχειν χεῖρην (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου τούτου μένειν.

5 τῆς γῆς. Heeren: τῆ γῆ οὐδὲ. 5 ποιεῖσθαι. Diels: γίνεσθαι. Gais. 6 κατεῖσθαι. Meineke: κατεῖσθαι. 6 ἀνώφοιτα. Gais: ἀνώφωτα. cf. ἀνώφωτα. Gais.

Context: Cosmography of motion. For a very full discussion, cf. Hahn [488], 107–22, 249–59.

1–3 The argument of the whole passage starts from a thesis concerning what are elsewhere called 'united things', 28M 2, i.e. natural substances such as minerals, plants and animals. The parts, of which these are here said to consist, are the four elements. The gravity that is an attribute of each such united thing, in virtue of its constituent elements, is also an attribute of the world at large.

7–8 Furley [168], 20, takes the weightlessness of air and fire to be something distinct from 'positive lightness', treating the absence of the latter as the reason why these elements do not fly off into the infinite void. He is criticized on this point by Hahn [488], 132 n. 52, who cogently observes that the weightlessness of these elements needs to be regarded as an absolute, centrifugal property in order to explain their location at the world's periphery and the fact that they counterbalance the heavy elements in such a way that the world as a whole, 10–12, does not have weight. The centripetal tendency of air and fire, 8–9, should be regarded not as an intrinsic property countervailing their weightlessness, but as a necessary consequence of their indissoluble blending with earth and water.

50 Continuum

A Stobaeus 1.142,2-6 (SVF 2.482, part)

Χρύσιππος ἔφασκε τὰ σώματα εἰς ἀπειρον τέμνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῖς σώμασι προσεικότα, οἷον ἐπιφάνειαν, γραμμὴν, τόπον, κενόν, χρόνον· εἰς ἀπειρόν τε τούτων τεμνομένων οὔτε σῶμα ἐξ ἀπείρων σωμάτων συνέστηκεν οὐτ' ἐπιφάνεια οὔτε γραμμὴ οὔτε τόπος.

4 τόπος <οὔτε κενόν οὔτε χρόνος> Heeren

B Diogenes Laertius 7 150-1 (SVF 2.482, part)

σῶμα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ πεπερασμένη καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ. καὶ παθητὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς φησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἀτρέπτου, οὐκ ἂν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγένετο. ἐνθεν κάκεινος· (1) ἢ τε τομὴ εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστίν· (2) ἦν ἀπειρόν φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τι ἀπειρον, εἰς ὃ γίνεται ἡ τομὴ, ἀλλ' ἀκατάληκτός ἐστι). (3) καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ δι' ὅλου γίνεσθαι.

3 κάκεινος BP κάκεινος Γ· κάκ(ολοῦσ)ταῦν ὡς Αἰγίμ 4 ἦν ἀπειρον. <οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρον> Αἰγίμ

Context: the Stoic view of substance (cf. 28. 44–5). The text continues as 48A.

Despite the suspect text immediately preceding the translated portion, the general connexion of thought appears to be that the creative versatility of substance depends on its total fusion with the active principle, and hence implies its infinite divisibility

2 ὁ αὐτός Apollodorus.

3 ἐνθεν κάκεινος This, if sound, would introduce in the next six words a direct quotation from Antipater. But we are not confident enough of the reading to supply quotation marks.

C Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078E–1081A

ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ . . . (1) καὶ μὴν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν μὴτ' ἄκρον ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν σωμάτων μὴτε πρῶτον μὴτ' ἔσχατον <εἶναι> μηδὲν εἰς ὃ λήγει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος ἀλλ' αἰεὶ <τι> τοῦ ληφθέντος ἐπέκεινα φαινόμενον εἰς ἀπειρον καὶ ὀρίστον ἐμβάλλειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. οὔτε γὰρ μείζον οὐτ' ἔλαττον ἐστὶ νοεῖν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μέγεθος, εἰ τὸ προϊέναι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἀμφοτέροις ὡς <αὐτὺς> συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλ' ἀναιότητος αἰρεται φύσις ἀνίσων γάρ νοουμένων, τὸ μὲν προαπολείπεται τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέρεσι τὸ δὲ παραλλάττει καὶ περικεῖται. μὴ οὐσης δ' ἀναιότητος, ἔπειτα μὴ ἀνωμαλίαν εἶναι μηδὲ τραχύτητα σώματος· ἀνωμαλία μὲν γάρ ἐστι μιάς ἐπιφανείας ἀναιότης πρὸς αὐτήν, τραχύτης δ' ἀνωμαλία μετὰ σκληρότητος, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσιν οἱ σῶμα μηδὲν εἰς ἔσχατον μέρος περαίνοντες ἀλλὰ πάντα πλήθεις μερίων ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἐξάγωντες. (2) καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἐναργές ἐστι τὸν ἀνθρώπου ἐκ πλείονων συνεστηκέναι μορίων ἢ τὸν δάκτυλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ πάλιν τὸν κόσμον ἢ τὸν ἀνθρώπου; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίστανται καὶ διανοοῦνται πάντες, ἂν μὴ Στωκοὶ γένωνται· γεγρόμενοι δὲ Στωικοὶ

προαπολείπουσιν, ἔσται σώματος πέραν ἔχοντος μέρος ἀνευ πέρατος καὶ ἀπεράτων. εἰ γὰρ λέγει, ὅτι βιαζόμενος οὕτω <ταύτας κοίεσθαι οὐκ ἐστὶν τὸν κῶνον, ἐλέγχεται φάσκων> ἵς γὰρ ὑφοράται περὶ τὸν κῶνον ἀναχαράξεις ἢ τῶν πωμάτων ἀνισότης δῆπουθεν οὐκ ἢ τῶν ἐπιφανείων ἀπεργάζεται. ὁ γελῶν οὖν τὸ τὰς ἐπιφανείας ὑπεξαίρουμένον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐλεγχόμενῃ ἀπολείπειν δυναμικῶς. ἀλλ' ἂν μένουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, τί μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα πλάττειν, εἰ γὰρ ἐπιφάνειαν ἐπιφανείᾳ θῆσμεν μὴ ἴσην εἶναι μὴ ἄνισον, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔσται μεγέθει φάναι καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμῷ μὴ ἴσον εἶναι μὴ ἄνισον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσον καὶ ἀνισον μέσση, ὃ μᾶλλον ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔχοντας εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ κοῆσαι δυναμένους. . .

καὶ μὴν τὸ μῆενός ἀπτεσθαι μὴδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔστιν. οὐκ ἦσαν δὲ τοῦτο, ἀπτεσθαι μὲν ἀλλήλων τὰ σώματα μὴδενὶ δὲ ἀπτεσθαι. τοῦτο δ' ἀνάγκη προσδέχεσθαι τοῖς μὴ ἀπολείπουσιν ἐλάχιστα μέρη σώματος ἀλλ' αἰετὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἀπτεσθαι πρότεροι λαμβάνουσι καὶ μὴδέποτε ταῖς προσέγειν ἐπίκεινται πιναμένους. (6) ὃ γοῦν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προφέρουσι τοῖς τῶν ἡμερῶν προισταμένοις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὅλοις ὅλων ἀφήν εἶναι μῆτε μέρεσι μερῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀφήν ἀλλὰ κράσιν ποιεῖν, τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι δυνατόν, μέρη τῶν ἡμερῶν οὐκ ἔχοντων. (7) πῶς αὖν οὐκ αὐτοὶ τούτῳ περιπίπτουσι, μὴδὲν μέρος ἔσχατον μὴδὲ πρῶτον ἀπολείποντες; ὅτι νῆ Δία ψαῦειν κατὰ πέραν τὰ σώματα ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ μέρος λέγουσιν. (8) τὸ δὲ πέραν σώμα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἄψεται τοῖνυν σώμα σώματος ἀσωμάτων καὶ οὐκ ἄψεται πάλιν, ἀσωμάτου μετὰ ὄντος. εἰ δ' ἄψεται, καὶ ποιήσει τι καὶ πείσεται τῶν ἀσωμάτων τὸ σώμα· ποιεῖν γὰρ τι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τῷ ἀπτεσθαι τὰ σώματα πέφυκεν. εἰ δὲ ἀφήν ἴσχει τῶν ἀσωμάτων τὸ σώμα, καὶ συναφὴν ἔξει καὶ κράσιν καὶ συμφυσίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἐν ταῖς συναφαῖς καὶ κράσειν ἢ μένειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μὴ μένειν ἀλλ' ἐφθάρθαι τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων. ἐκάτερον δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔστι φθορὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀσωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως οὐδ' αὐτοὶ καταλείπουσι, κράσιν δὲ καὶ συναφὴν σωμάτων ἰδίους χρωμένων πέρασιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

2 add. Pohlenz: <μέρος εἶναι> Apatm 3 add. Dubois 6 add. Pohlenz 13 ταῦτα Wyttenbach: ἀπὲρ codd 17 ὁρᾶται Cherniss πρῶτες codd: προαίει Wyttenbach 27 οὐτ' <ἐξ> Rasmus adde codd 35 del Rasmus 37 suppl Sedley: ὑπάρχουσι in codd: <ἀδυνατόν μὴ ἔναι δυνατόν> Pohlenz: <ἀπλὸν μὴ ἔξ οὐκ ἀπλὸν> Cherniss 39 ἐκκεκλιμένας codd: ἐγκεκλιμένας Bernadakis 45 33 suppl. Wyttenbach 59 suppl Cherniss: ὑπάρχουσι in codd: <τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐλέγχεται, αὐτὸν ἐλέγχει φάσκων> Pohlenz 73 νῆ Δία ψαῦειν Wyttenbach μὴ δυναμικῶς codd: ἀλλήλων Cherniss: ὅλα ὅλων codd. 79 τῷ Cressen: καὶ codd. 80 ἔστιν ἄρ' Pohlenz: ἔτι γὰρ codd.

Context: following the critique of Stoic theory of mixture at 48B.

1 ἄκρον Cf the Epicurean usage at 9A 10, 9B 749, 9C 599.

37 Our conjecture to fill the lacuna left in the codd makes the comparison between the two classes less exact, but is required in logic because, for an argument, 'having its premises true' and 'having its premises false' are not straight contradictories (cf 36B 5): it could have some premises true and some false.

37 43 In vol. 1 we follow the same general interpretation as Hahn [508], 217–19, which is in fact facilitated by our retention of the MSS reading in 39 in preference to the standard emendation ἐγκεκλιμένας. If, as in the conc, we are to envisage the production of the two adjacent planes by physically cutting the pyramid parallel to

the base, there is no need to read Chrysippus as analysing the pyramid into parallel three-dimensional plates or laminae (Sambursky [490], 94, Hahm, loc. cit.).

43-50 For the vexed history of interpretation of Democritus' puzzle, see Cherniss [326], 820.

50-2 The first interpretation of Chrysippus' solution considered in vol. 1, 302 is that of Cherniss [326], 820-2. The second, which we favour, owes most to Sambursky [490], 93-5, and White [511]. For another reading, which relies on a different interpretation of Democritus' cone puzzle, see Hahm [508].

60-1 This is taken by Pohlenz and Cherniss in their editions to be a quotation from Chrysippus, referring to Democritus. Against, see Hahm [508], 214-17.

73 κρᾶσιν See 48.

D Proclus, *In Eucl. El.* I 89.15-21 (SVF 2.488)

ὅτι δὲ οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ψιλὴν ὕφεστίαναι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέρατα, λέγει τῶν σωμάτων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑπέλαβον, ἀλλ' εἶναι τινος φύσεως ἐν τοῖς οὐοι τοιαύδε καὶ λόγους αὐτῶν προστάται δημιουργικούς, ἀναμνηθεῖμεν δὲ εἰς τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ἀποβλέψαντες . . .

Context: commentary on Euclid's first definition, arguing that mathematical limits, among which the point is primary, are integral to the physical world.

Cf. 51F, where Proclus attributes to the Stoics, less plausibly, a similar view about time.

E Diogenes Laertius 7.135

ἐπιφάνεια δ' ἐστὶ σῶματος πέρας ἢ τὸ μήκος καὶ πλάτος ἔχον βάθος δ' οὐ ταύτην δὲ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πέμπτῃ *Περὶ μετεώρων* καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἀπολείπει. γραμμὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας πέρας ἢ μήκος ἀπλατὺς ἢ τὸ μήκος μόνον ἔχον. στιγμὴ δ' ἐστὶ γραμμῆς πέρας, ἥτις ἐστὶ σημεῖον ἐλάχιστον.

5

Context: immediately following 45E.

Cf. Mansfeld [344], 160, 166, who interprets Posidonius' thesis as the highly unorthodox one that a surface is a body, and links it with the doctrine that limits are bodies, reported without specific attribution by ps-Galen, *Hist. phil.* 23 (Diehl, *Dox.* 613.1-2). But Posidonius' view is just the standard Stoic view cited in D, and the ps-Galen reference could be to the Epicureans (cf. 9A-C). In having 'subsistence', limits differ from those other mental constructs, universals, which do not even subsist: 27C

F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 10.121-6, 139-42

(1) πρὸς τοῖτοις· πᾶσα κίνησις τριῶν τινῶν ἔχεται, καθάπερ σωμάτων τε καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων, σωμάτων μὲν τῶν κινουμένων, τόπων δὲ τῶν ἐν οἷς ἡ κίνησις γίνεται, χρόνων δὲ τῶν καθ' οὓς ἡ κίνησις γίνεται. ἦτοι οὖν πάντων τούτων εἰς ἀπείρους τεμνομένων τόπους καὶ χρόνους καὶ εἰς ἀπειρα σώματα γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, ἢ πάντων εἰς ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον

5

καταληγόντων, ἡ τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων, τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἡμέρες
καὶ ἐλάχιστον καταληγόντων. ἐάν τε δὲ πάντα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνηται, ἐάν τε
πάντα εἰς ἡμέρες καταλήγη, (ἐάν τε τινὰ μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνηται, τινὰ δὲ
εἰς ἡμέρες καταλήγη,) ἄπορος ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως εὐρεθήσεται λόγος. (2)
τάξει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης στάσεως ποιῶμεθα τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, καθ' ἣν 10
πάντα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεται. καὶ δὴ οἱ προεστώτες αὐτῆς φασὶ τὸ
κινούμενον σῶμα ὑφ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄθρουν μεριστὸν ἀνύειν
διάστημα, καὶ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ διαστήματος μέρος πρῶτον ἐπιλαμβάνειν
τῷ πρώτῳ αὐτοῦ μέρει καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἓν τὸ
ὅλον μεριστὸν διάστημα καὶ ἁθρόως διέρχεσθαι. (3) ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον καὶ 15
ποικίλως τοῖς φαινομένοις μαχόμενον. εἰ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τούτων
σωμάτων νοήσωμέν τινα κατὰ σταδιαίου τροχάζοντα διάστηματος,
πάντως ὑποπесеῖται ὅτι ὀφείλει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιστάδιον ἀνύειν
πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον· τὸ γὰρ ὑφ' ἓν ἀξιοῦν τὸ ὅλον
ἀνύειν τοῦ σταδίου διάστημα τελῶς ἄταπον. καὶ εἰ τέμοιμεν τὸ ἕτερον 20
ἡμιστάδιον εἰς δύο τεταρτημόρια, πάντως πρῶτον διελύσεται τὸ πρῶτον
τεταρτημόριον καὶ εἰ εἰς πλείονα τέμοιμεν, ὡσαύτως. κἂν κατὰ
πεφωτισμένου δὲ τροχάζη τοῦ σταδίου, φαίνεται ὡς οὐχ ὑφ' ἓν σκιάσει τὸ
στάδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τι πρῶτον μέρος, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον. καὶ εἰ
παραθέοι δὲ τῷ τοίχῳ μεμιλημένη τῇ χειρὶ τούτου ἐφαπτόμενος, οὐχ ὑφ' 25
ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τὸν ὅλον τοῦ σταδίου τοίχον μιλήσκει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τάξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον, ὅπερ οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
ἔδειξε πραγμάτων, τοῦτ' καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν προσδεκτὸς ἐστὶν ἡμῖν. . .
(4) ὥστε τὰ μὲν κατ' ἄθρουν διάστημα γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν οὕτως ἐστὶν
ἄπορον τοῖς προειρημένοις ἀνδράσιν· πολλῶν δὲ τούτου ἀπορώτερον τὸ μὴ 30
κατ' ἄθρουν γίνεσθαι μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον
πρότερον καὶ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον. εἰ γὰρ οὕτω γίνεται ἡ κίνησις,
πάντων εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων,
οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἵνα γάρ τι κινηθῇ πηχυαῖον διάστημα,
ὀφείλει τὸ πρῶτον ἡμίπηχυν διέρχεσθαι πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει 35
δεύτερον. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνύσῃ ἡμίπηχυν διάστημα, ὀφείλει τὸ
πρῶτον τεταρτημόριον τοῦ πηχυαίου διαστήματος διελθεῖν, εἴτα τότε τὸ
δεύτερον. ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰς πέντε διαιρεθῇ, (τὸ πρῶτον πεμπτημόριον), κἂν
εἰς ἕξ, τὸ πρῶτον ἑκτημόριον. παντὸς οὖν τοῦ πρῶτου μέρους ἄλλο πρῶτον
ἔχοντος μέρους διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομὴν, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε ἀρχὴν γίνεσθαι 40
κινήσεως διὰ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτα εἶναι τὰ μέρη τοῦ διαστήματος καὶ τὰ τοῦ
σώματος, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων λαμβανόμενον ἔχειν ἄλλα μέρη. (5) πρὸς μὲν
οὖν τοὺς εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι λέγοντας τὰ τε σώματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους
καὶ τοὺς χρόνους (αὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοῆς) ταῦθ' ἡμμοῖζε λέγειν.

* 9 add Bekker 38 add Bekker

Context: 'Does motion exist?' Cf. PH 3 76-81.

The 'divisible leaps' interpretation discussed in vol. 1 is proposed by Sorabji [22].

53, who compares Damascius ap. Simplic. *In Ar. Phys.* 796.32–797.13. For an interesting but mathematically anachronistic reading, see White [511].

G Proclus, *In Eucl. El.* I 395.13–21 (SVF 2.365)

τὰ δ' οὖν τοιαῦτα τῶν θεωρημάτων, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Γερμῖνος, ἀπείκαζεν ὁ Χρυσίππος ταῖς ἰδέαις. ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖναι τῶν ἀπείρων ἐν πέρασιν ὠρισμένοις τὴν γένεσιν περιλαμβάνουσιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ταύτοις τῶν ἀπείρων ἐν ὠρισμένοις τόποις ἢ περιλήψις γίνεται. καὶ διὰ τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον ἡ ἰσότης ἀνοφαίνεται. τὸ γὰρ ὕψος τῶν παραλλήλων τὸ αὐτὸ μένον ἀπείρων νοουμένων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς βάσεως παραλληλογράμμων πάντα ἴσα ἀλλήλοις ἀποφαίνει. 5

2 ἰδέαιε vel ἰδέαιε κοῦδ.

Context: commentary on Euclid, *Prop.* 35 theorem 25.

Mansfeld [344], 158ff. takes the comparison with Ideas to make a point about the unreality of mathematical objects. But what is compared to Ideas is the theorems themselves, not their objects, and the comparison is about universality, not metaphysical status.

51 Time

A Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 350.14–16 (SVF 2.510, part)

ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀριθμὸν κινήσεως εἶναι φησι τὸν χρόνον, τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἀπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπεν, Χρυσίππος δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως.

Context: commentary on Aristotle, *Cat.* 9. 11510, *περί τοῦ ποτέ καὶ πού.*

B Stobaeus 1.106.5–23 (SVF 2.509)

(1) Χρυσίππου. ὁ δὲ Χρυσίππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, καθ' ὃ ποτέ λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος· ἡ τὸ παρακολουθεῖν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει. (2) καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν χρόνον κινεῖσθαι τε ἕκαστα καὶ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα διττὸς λέγεται ὁ χρόνος, καθάπερ ἡ τε γῆ καὶ ἡ θάλαττα καὶ τὸ κενόν, τὰ τε ὅλα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτῶν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ κενὸν πᾶν ἀπείρων εἶναι πάντῃ καὶ τὸν χρόνον πάντα ἀπείρων εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπείρων εἶναι. (3) ἐμφανέστατα δὲ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι οὐθεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἀπείρων ἡ τομὴ τῶν συνεχόντων ἐστὶ, κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην καὶ πᾶς χρόνος εἰς ἀπείρων ἔχει τὴν τομήν· ὥστε μηθέν αὖ κατ' ἀρτισμὸν ἐνεστάναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι. (4) μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα, τὸν δὲ παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μὲν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, φείσιν ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται 10

μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλυμαι ἢ κῆθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

15

1. ὁ Ἄντων ἐν could 1. φησὶ Ἄντων. φασὶ could. 13. εἰδὼς could: εἰ μὴ Ἄντων. φησὶ Ἄντων 14. ρῶνα could. ρῶνα Ἄντων

Context: doxographyn of time, immediately following E.

11-13. For the difference between ὑπάρχειν and ὑφίστασθαι, cf. vol. 1, 164, and Long [426], 89-93; Sandbach [304], 79-80 n. 117; Sorabji [22], 22ff., translates ὑπάρχειν by 'exist', but acknowledges that existence should strictly not pertain to any time, since time is an incorporeal. For this reason we prefer the translation 'belong', which brings out Chrysippus' parallelism with the conditions under which predicates belong to subjects; cf. Lloyd [392], 232-4. As the time signified by *is* (cf. the question 'what time is it?'), the present is really here – belongs to the world as it is – as distinct from what has been or will be.

13. εἰσίν. No satisfactory emendation of this corruption has been proposed. Canter's εἰ μὴ, though often accepted, gives entirely the wrong sense since it makes ὡς-ὑπάρχει, 13-15, refer to the past and the future, whereas the ὑπάρχειν of predicates must correspond to that of the present. Since the sense seems complete without supplying a replacement for εἰσίν (cf. Arnim's conjecture), οὐδαμῶς εἶναι is worth considering: 'cannot belong in any way'.

C Plutarch, *Comm. noi* 1081C-1082A.

(1) παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι χρόνον εἶναι μέλλοντα καὶ παρωχημένον, ἐνεστώτα δὲ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρτι καὶ τὸ πρῶν ὑφίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὁλως μηδὲν εἶναι. (2) καὶ μὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐλάχιστον χρόνον μὴ ἀπολείπουσι μηδὲ τὸ νῦν ἡμέρες εἶναι βουλομένοις, ἀλλὰ ὁ τι ἂν τις ὡς ἐνεστώως οἴηται λαβὼν διανοεῖσθαι, τοῦτον τὸ μὲν μέλλον τὸ δὲ παρωχημένον εἶναι φάσκουσιν. (3) ὥστε μηδὲν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ὑπομένειν μηδὲ λείπεσθαι μῆριον χρόνον παρόντος, ἢν δὲ λέγεται παρ εἶναι τοῦτον τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ μέλλοντα τὰ δ' εἰς τὰ παρωχημένα διανέμνται. . . (4) οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὸ "ἄρτι" καὶ τὸ "μετὰ μικρόν" ὡς ἕτερα τοῦ "νῦν" μόρια, καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νῦν τίθενται καὶ νοσοῦσι καὶ νομίζουσι. τούτων <δ> Ἀρχέδημος μὲν ἀρμὴν τινα καὶ συμβολὴν εἶναι λέγων τοῦ παρωχημένου καὶ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου τὸ "νῦν" λέληθεν αὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἀναιρῶν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ νῦν οὐ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πέρας χρόνου πᾶν δὲ μῆριον χρόνου τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ νῦν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν φαίνεται μέρος ἔχων ὁ οὐμπας χρόνος ἀλλ' εἰς πέρατα διόλου καὶ συμβολὰς καὶ ἀρμὰς ἀναλυόμενος. (5) Χρύσιππος δὲ βουλόμενος φιλατεχνεῖν περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐν μὲν τῇ Περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ ἄλλοις τιαὶ τὸ μὲν παρωχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ ὑφίστασθαι φησὶ, μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεσθηκός, ἐν δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ καὶ τετάρτῃ καὶ πέμπτῃ Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τίθησι τοῦ ἐνεσθηκότος χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλλον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός. (6) ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ τοῦ χρόνου διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος, μῖλλον δὲ ὁλως τοῦ χρόνου

μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν ὑπάρχον, εἰ τὸ ἐνεσθηκὸς οὐδὲν ἔχει μέρος ὃ μὴ μέλλον
ἐστὶν ἢ παρωχημένον.

7 δὲ Leonius: ὡς ἐοῖδ' 11 <δ'> Sandbach ἀρμύη Ἀπομ. ἀρχήν ἐοῖδ' 23 οὐ Leonius,
Basilienis δ' ἐοῖδ' 16 ἀρμύη Ἀπομ. ὁρμῆς ἐοῖδ' 22 τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος del. Klotius τῷ
ὑπάρχοντος (καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος) Sandbach. τὸ θ' ὑπάρχον Bury, Chetivus

Context: criticism of the Stoic conception of time.

1-8 These lines seek to exploit difficulties in the Stoics' claim (see **B 3, E 3**) that no time is exactly present. We omit a section (10811-ε) which develops this further. With 16-21, cf. **B 4, E 3**

11-16 Sandbach [304], 50-1, does not mention Archedemus in his attempt to undermine the dependence on Aristotle of Stoic views of time. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* iv.13, 222a10-12: τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστὶν συνέχεια χρόνου . . . συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ πέρας χρόνου ἐστίν.

16-21 Sorabji [22], 22, noting that Chrysippus wrote about time in different books, suggests that 'perhaps he first declared that only the present existed, but then, when he came to write on parts, realized that some revision was called for'. We do not think that Chrysippus' theories, as we interpret them in vol. 1, suggest he was much concerned with the ontological status of time – the issue that Sorabji thinks underlies his remarks on the relation of past, present and future.

22 τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος These words have frequently been judged corrupt or lacunose, but they seem defensible. For Plutarch's argument τὸ ὑπάρχον τοῦ χρόνου, 21, is 'the present'. If this consists of two parts, future and past, which 'do not belong', then these are 'non-belonging parts of what belongs' (τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος), and it is quite reasonable of Plutarch to say that 'the belonging part' of time is divided into these: cf. 10810, τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ μὲν μέλλον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ παρωχημένον.

D Stobaeus 1.105.8-16 (S.F. 3 Apollodorus 8)

Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ τέχνῃ οὕτως ὀρίζει τὸν χρόνον· χρόνος δ' ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως διάστημα· οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν ἄπειρος ὡς ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἄπειρος λέγεται εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ παρεληλυθός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεσθηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλλον. ἐνεστάναι δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐνεσθηκέναι· λέγομεν κατὰ μείζονα περιγραφὴν· καὶ ὑπάρχειν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος λέγεται, οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως.

ὁ ἀπαρτιζόντως Heeren ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐοῖδ'

Context: shortly before **B**.

E Stobaeus 1.105.17-106.4 (Posidonius fr. 98)

(1) Ποσειδωνίου. τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ πᾶν ἄπειρα, ὡς ὁ σύμπας χρόνος· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τι, ὡς ὁ παρεληλυθὺς χρόνος καὶ ὁ μέλλων· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν παρόντα μόνον ἐκάτερος πεπερανται. (2) τὸν δὲ χρόνον οὕτως ὀρίζεται· διάστημα κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδυτήτος. (3) καὶ πως ἔχει τὸν ἐπισνούμενον κατὰ τὸ πότε τοῦ χρόνου τὸν μὲν εἶναι παρεληλυθότα, τὸν δὲ

μέλλοντα, τὸν δὲ παρόντα, ὃς ἐκ τινος μέρους τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν αὐτὸν συνέστηκε· τὸν δὲ διορισμὸν σημειώδη εἶναι. (4) τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐν πλάτει [χρόνου] καὶ οὐχὶ κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. (5) λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ νῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἰσθησιν χρόνον περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ παρεληλυθότος συνιστάμενον.

1 ἐκύτερος πεπερίνεται Diels ἐκατέρω, πεπεράσται codd. 4 1 καὶ πῶς ἔχει τὸν codd., ὅπως ἔχει τὸ Usener qui interpretatur post ἐπινοούμενον 5 κατὰ (ἀέ) Usener: (καί) κατὰ Diels, Kidd 8 χρόνου del. Heeren, χρόνον Usener, Kidd 9 κατὰ δέ! Wachsmuth, Kidd 10 (τὸν) περὶ Usener

Context: immediately following D.

With 1-3, cf. B 5-7; with 3-4, cf. A, B 1-3, with 4-8, cf. C 3-8, 16-21, with 8-9, cf. B 10-11.

4-5 We see no obvious way to mend the corruption here. The common expedient of reading τὸ ἐπινοούμενον and connecting the words with διάστημα βραδυήτος does not seem at all plausible. Good sense can be given to the general thrust of the passage by taking τὸν ἐπινοούμενον with what follows: 'the time which is thought of in terms of when', and supposing that πῶς ἔχει conceals some verb meaning 'he supposes'.

9-10 κατὰ-χρόνον This recalls Epicurus, τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει, 9A 7, which refers to the minimum extension of anything perceptible. Goldschmidt [302], 36, takes this to be the interpretation of Chrysippus' 'broad' sense of present time, B 10-11.

F Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* 271D (SVF 2.521)

(1) ἐτι δὲ κακείνο ληπτέον ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων, ὅτι πολλοὺ δεῖ τοιούτων ὑπονοῆσαι τὸν χρόνον ὃ Ἰλάτων οἶον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑπέλαβον ἢ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἱεριπάτου πολλοί, (2) οἱ μὲν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ψιλὴν αὐτὸν συνιστάντες ἀμενηνὸν καὶ ἐγγιστα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (ἐν γὰρ ἦν τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτων ὁ χρόνος, ὃ δὴ καταπεφρόνηται παρ' αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀδρανὴ καὶ οὐκ ὄντα καὶ ἐν ἐπινοαῖς ὑφιστάμενα ψιλᾶς), (3) οἱ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς κινήσεως λέγοντες.

Context: commentary on Plato, *Tim.* 39d-e. Proclus takes Platonic time to be an independently existing number.

5 ὃ ἐν ἐπινοαῖς... ψιλᾶς Nothing in the reported statements of Stoic philosophers justifies Proclus' reduction of time to a mere thought. He may have been influenced by such stronger doxographical formulations as S.E., *M.* 10.277: ἀσωμάτων τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοούμενον ὑπεστήσαντο τὸν χρόνον (= 7C 39).

G Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1084e-v (SVF 2.665)

καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνεται πᾶσι ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἀγόμενοι τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν λόγῳ, Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω

προσάγοντος· "οὐχ ἡ μὲν νῦν σώμ' ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐσπέρη καὶ ὁ ἄρθρος καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματ' οὐκ ἐστίν· οὐδὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σώμ' ἐστίν οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σώμα καὶ ἡ δεκάτη καὶ πεντεκαίδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακάς καὶ ὁ μὴν σώμ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ θέρας καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνωϊατός."

α σώμ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη defecundus

Context: criticism of Stoic materialism.

ἰ κατὰ μικρόν For this argument, cf. 37G and vol. 1, 229

H Sextus Empiricus, M. 8.254-5 (SVF 2.221, part)

(1) ἔτι, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον παρὸν παρόντος εἶναι δεῖ σημεῖον. (2) ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἑξαπατῶμενοι καὶ παρὸν παρωχημένου θέλουσιν εἶναι σημεῖον, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ "εἰ οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος". τὰ μὲν γὰρ "οὐλὴν ἔχει" παρὸν ἐστὶ, φαίνεται γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἔλκος ἔσχηκέναι παρωχημένον, οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστιν ἔλκος, καὶ παρὸν μέλλοντος, ὥς τὸ περιεχόμενον τῷ τοιούτῳ συνημμένῳ "εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται οὗτος, ἀποθανείται οὗτος". τὸ μὲν γὰρ τραῦμα τῆς καρδίας εἶναι φασὶν ἤδη, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μέλλειν. (3) ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ὅτι ἄλλ' ἐστὶ τὰ παρωχημένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, τὸ μὲντοι σημεῖον καὶ σημειωτὸν κἀν τούτοις παρὸν παρόντος ἐστίν. (4) ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ πρῶτέρῳ τῷ "εἰ οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος" τὸ μὲν ἔλκος γέγονεν ἤδη καὶ παρωχηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκος ἔσχηκέναι τούτου, ἀξίωμα καθεστῆκός, ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ γεγονότος τινὸς λεγόμενον· ἐν τε τῷ "εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται οὗτος, ἀποθανείται οὗτος" ὁ μὲν θάνατος μέλλει, τὸ δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τούτου ἀξίωμα ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ μέλλοντος λεγόμενον, παρὰ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.

3 τὸ κινῆσθαι εἰ οὐκ

Context: account of the Stoic theory of signs. Sextus does not refer to the Stoics by name here, but that he is reporting their doctrines can be inferred from M. 8.244, where he begins to discuss the views of those who take τὸ σημεῖον to be νοητόν as distinct from αἰσθητόν. In M. 8.177 he has identified these as Stoics and Epicureans respectively. What occurs between M. 8.244 and our extract is an account of conditional propositions which enlarges upon 35C, where the Stoics are named.

52 Everlasting recurrence

A Philo, Aet. mundi 52, 54

εἰ γὰρ ἀγέννητος ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἀγέννητος. . . (1) ὥστ' εὐθυβόλως ἀποδεδοῦσθαι πρὸς τῶν εἰσιπύτων τὰ πράγματα ὀρίξεσθαι χρόνον διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦθ' ἴσμεν ἔστι, γίνεται ὁ κόσμος ἰσότης τοῦ χρόνου καὶ αἰτίος. . . (2) τάχα τις εὐρεσιλογῶν Στωϊκὸς ἐρεῖ τὸν χρόνον ἀποδεδοῦσθαι διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως

οὐχὶ τοῦ νυνὶ διακεκοσμημένου μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὑπανοουμένου.

Context: proof of the world's eternity. Philo, drawing on Plato, *Tim.* 37c, urges that time (which is without beginning and end) and the world must have the same duration.

1 3 Chrysippus' definition of time, 51A, is invoked here.

4 7 According to Plutarch, *De Expiat. Delphos* 389c, the Delphic priests' rituals could be interpreted, in reference to the seasons of the year, as treating winter as three months or διακόσμησις, and the rest of the year as nine months or ἐκπύρωσις. Stoic allegory is pervasive in the whole passage, which strengthens the likelihood that the conflagration was thought to be in time, though probably not of a duration as precise as three times the length of each world-order.

B Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 7.23 (SIF 2.623)

melius Chrysippus quem Cicero ait fulcire porticum Stoicorum, qui in libris quos de providentia scripsit, cum de innovatione mundi loqueretur haec intulit: τοῦτου δ' οὕτως ἔχοντος, δηλὸν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδῳ τινῶν εἰλημμένων χρόνου εἰς ὃ νῦν ἔσμεν καταστήσασθαι σχῆμα.

5

Context: Lactantius, discussing the resurrection, finds Chrysippus' account of rebirth preferable to the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of souls.

C Nemesius 309.5–311.2 (SIF 2.625)

(1) οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ φασιν ἀποκαθισταμένους τοὺς πλάνητας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον, κατὰ τε μήκος καὶ πλάτος, ἔνθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὁ κόσμος συνέστη, ἐν ῥηταῖς χρόνων περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθοράν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργάζεσθαι. (2) καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθίστασθαι· καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων ὁμοίως πάλιν φερομένων, ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γινόμενον ἀπαρallάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειρίεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι. (3) γίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τοῦ παντός οὐχ ἅπαρ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις· μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἀπειρον καὶ ἀτελευτήτως τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποκαθίστασθαι. (4) τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς τοὺς μὴ ὑποκειμένους τῇ φθορᾷ, ταύτῃ παρακολουθήσαντας μὴ περιόδῳ, γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτης πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξῆς περιόδοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ξένον ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τὰ γενόμενα πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὡσαύτως ἀπαρallάκτως ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων.

5

10

15

Context: Nemesius contrasts Stoic views on fate with the position of Plato and Judaeo-Christian theology.

1-4 The astrology refers to the end of the 'great' or 'greatest' year (cf. D 4), an event already referred to by Plato, *Tim.* 39d, and connected by him with a return of the planets to their original positions relative to one another. Plato himself does not speak, and probably did not know, of the doctrine that the planets will all then be in one sign of the zodiac. The notion was probably first disseminated to the Greeks by the Babylonian Berossus, early in the third century B.C. (cf. Long [485], 166-7), of whom Seneca, *NQ* 3.29.1 writes: *arsura enim terrena contendit, quandoque omnia sidera quae nunc diversos agunt cursus in Cancrum convenerint, sic sub eodem posita vestigia ut recta linea exire per orbem omnium possit; inundationem futuram, cum eadem siderum turba in Capricornum convenerit*. Hence early Stoics will have had precedents for the doctrine that Nemesis reports, though a cosmic flood has no recorded place in their thinking. For further details, cf. Mansfeld [496], 140-7 n. 51; Long [497], 18-19.

6 ἀπαράλλακτος This and related words seem to begin their life in Stoic/Academic debates concerning the possibility of two particulars existing which are indistinguishable from one another by their intrinsic properties; cf. 40E; 70A 8. Since the Stoics denied that the same ἰδίως ποιόν can occur in two distinct particulars (see 28P), for them the occurrence of something ἀπαράλλακτος should imply the recurrence of the same particular. (This implication, however, appears to be abandoned in the revisionary doctrine of G 1.)

12-13 τοὺς-φθορᾷ I.e. Zeus or god the active principle, as distinct from the perishable elements that the Stoics identified with other deities; cf. Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1075A-E, and note on 70B 14-15.

D Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.19.1-2 (*SIF* 2.599, part)

(1) ἐπὶ τοσούτον δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ (ἡ) κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη, τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναλ-
βοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται, (2) ἐπανελθούσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα
λόγον καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιούσαν ἐν αὐτὸν τὸν μέγιστον,
καθ' ὃν ἀπ' αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις. (3) 5
ἐπανελθούσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν, ἀφ' οἷας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο, κατὰ
λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται, τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ
αἰδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. αὐτὴ γὰρ τῆς αἰτίας ἀρχὴν καὶ πᾶσαι οἷον τι
γίνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ διακοσμοῦ αὐτά.

1 (ἡ) Dicks

Context: report of Stoic views on everlasting recurrence, placed shortly after 46K.

1-3 Cf. 46E H. We translate καὶ, i. by 'or' not 'and', to indicate that κοινὸς λόγος and κοινὴ φύσις are two descriptions of the same thing – god the active principle of the universe. For this use of κοινός, cf. 60A 2, 5.

3 ῥηθέντα The term seems to mean 'so-called', but πρῶτος λόγος is not a Stoic expression; perhaps it is Eusebius', or his source's, way of referring to *σπερματικὸς λόγος*.

4 ἀνάστασιν This is the standard term in Christian writers for the resurrection; cf. Long [497], 35 n. 72. ἐν αὐτὸν τὸν μέγιστον Diogenes of Babylon computed its length at 365 × 18,000 solar years (*SIF* 3 Diogenes 28). For the background to such computations, cf. van der Waerden [515].

E Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 886,12–16 (SVF 2.627, part)

λέγοντες γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμὲ πάλιν γίνεσθαι ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ
ζητοῦσιν εἰκότως πότερον εἰς εἴμι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὁ νῦν καὶ τότε, διὰ τὸ τῇ
οὐσίᾳ εἶναι ὁ αὐτός, ἢ τῇ κατατάξει τῇ εἰς ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην κοσμοποιῖαν
διαφοροῦμαι.

Context: commentary on Aristotle, *Physics* v. 4, 228a3–6. Aristotle is raising a question about the identity of the change that Socrates would undergo if he were subject to the specifically (τῷ εἶδει) same change at different times: if a later occurrence can be numerically identical to an earlier one, he argues, the change itself would be *μία*, if not, the change would be ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν, μία δ' οὐ.

F Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 180,33–6 and 181,25–31 (SVF 2.624, part)

(1) ἀρέσκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταῦτά ἐν τῷ
κόσμῳ γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀριθμόν, ὥς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιοῦν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ
πρόσθεν εἶναι τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, ὥς ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ κόσμου*
Χρύσιππος λέγει . . . (2) καὶ λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἰδίως ποιοῖς τοῖς ὕστερον
γινομένοις πρὸς τοὺς πρόσθεν παραλλαγὰς μόνον γίνεσθαι κατὰ τινα τῶν
ἐξωθεν συμβεβηκότων, οἷαι παραλλαγαὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντός τε
καὶ ζώντος Δίωνος οὐκ ἀλλάσσουσιν αὐτόν. (3) οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος γίνεται εἰ
πρότερον ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς ὥφειας φακούς ὕστερον μηκέτ' ἔχει· τοιαύτας δὲ
φασὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἰδίως ποιοῖς τοῖς ἐν ἄλλῳ κόσμῳ παρὰ τοὺς ἐν ἄλλῳ
γίνεσθαι.

Context: about 3 pages after 38F. Alexander is continuing his refutation of Chrysippus' claim that 'nothing prevents something impossible following even from something possible'. According to Chrysippus, the proposition 'this one is dead' is impossible with reference to Dion, when Dion is dead, but it follows from the proposition 'Dion is dead'. Alexander replies that 'this one is dead' will not be impossible for Chrysippus, if it means 'this man's soul and body have been separated' (Chrysippus' definition of death, cf. 45D), for in the Stoic doctrine of recurrence, the recurrence of Dion just is the recombination of the soul and body of 'this man'.

5–6 **παραλλαγαί** See note on C 16, where no discernibility however slight is admitted, in agreement with Origen, *Cels.* 4.12 (SVF 2.628): ταυτότητας καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτους τοῖς ἰδίως ποιοῖς καὶ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν αὐτοῖς (κόσμοις).

G Origen, *Cels.* 4.68 and 5.20 (SVF 2.626, part)

(1) πειρώμενοι μέντοι θεραπεύειν πῶς τὰς ἀπεμφάσεις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἀπαραλλάκτους φασὶν ἔσσεσθαι κατὰ περίοδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
προτέρων περιόδων πάντας, ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης πάλιν γένηται, ἀλλ'
ἀπαραλλάκτος τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων ἀπαραλλάκτων τῇ Ξανθίππῃ,
καὶ κατηγορηθησόμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαραλλάκτων Ἀντίῳ καὶ Μελήτῳ. οὐκ
οἶδα δὲ πῶς ὁ μὲν κόσμος αἰεὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀπαραλλάκτος ἕτερος

ἐτέρῳ· τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ οὐ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλ' ἀπαράλλακτα . . . (2) ὅσῃ δ' αὐτῶν
ᾗδέσθησαν τὸ δόγμα, ὀλίγην εἰρήκασι παραλλαγὴν καὶ σφόδρα βραχεῖαν
γίνεσθαι κατὰ περίοδον τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς περιόδου.

4 τῇ Σαυθίππῃ Delarue τῇ Σαυθίππῃ codd.: τῇ Σαυθίππῃ Gundermann, Aitman

Context: Origen contrasts Celsus' doctrine of a fixed and everlasting cycle of mortals with the Stoic theory which also includes immortals.

3-5 Barnes [513], 10, assimilates this account of what recurs to that of F 2, but we take G to deny numerical identity, which is postulated in F 1.

H Marcus Aurelius 2.14

(1) κἂν τριαχίλια ἔτη βιώσεσθαι μέλλῃς καὶ τοσαυτάκις μύρια, ὁμῶς
μέμνησο ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄλλον ἀποβάλλει βίον ἢ τοῦτον ὃν ζῇ, οὐδὲ ἄλλον ζῇ ἢ
ὃν ἀποβάλλει. εἰς ταῦτόν οὖν καθίσταται τὸ μήκιστον τῶ βραχυτάτῳ. τὸ
γὰρ παρὸν πᾶσιν ἴσον, καὶ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον οὖν ἴσον· καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλλόμενον
οὕτως ἀκαριαῖον ἀναφαίνεται. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ παρωχηκὸς οὔτε τὸ μέλλον
ἀποβάλλει ἂν τις. ὁ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἂν τις τοῦτο αὐτοῦ ἀφέλοιτο; (2)
τούτων οὖν τῶν δύο αἰεὶ μεμνήσθαι· ἐνὸς μὲν, ὅτι πάντα ἐξ αἰδίου ὁμοειδῆ
καὶ ἀνακυκλούμενα καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει πότερον ἐν ἑκατὸν ἔτεσιν ἢ ἐν
διακοσίοις ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ τὰ αὐτά τις ὀψεται· ἑτέρου δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὁ
πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ ὁ τάχιστα τεθυηξόμενος τὸ ἴσον ἀποβάλλει. τὸ γὰρ
παρὸν ἐστὶ μόνον οὐ στερίσκεσθαι μέλλει, εἴπερ γε ἔχει καὶ τοῦτο μόνον,
καὶ ὁ μὲ ἔχει τις οὐκ ἀποβάλλει.

7 αἰεὶ Faquharson: αἰεὶ P: ἀν AD

On this passage, and on Marcus Aurelius 1.11-12, with which it should be compared, cf. Long [497], 30-1.

i Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 732.26-733.1

ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς χρόνος πότερον γίνεται ὡς περ εἶναι φασιν ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις. πλεοναχῶς δὲ
λεγομένου τοῦ ταυτοῦ τῷ μὲν εἶδει φαίνεται γίνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν θέρος καὶ χειμῶν καὶ αἰ
λοιπαὶ ὥραι τε καὶ περίοδοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται τῷ εἶδει, τροπᾶς
γὰρ καὶ ἰσημερίας καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς πορείας ὃ ἥλιος ἀποτελεῖ, εἰ δὲ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς
Πυθαγορείοις, ὥστα πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῶ, κἄγῳ μυθολογήσω τὰ ραβδίων ἔχων ὑμῖν
καθημένους οὕτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἔξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὐλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν
εἶναι, μίᾳς γὰρ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κινήσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ πρότερον καὶ
ὕστερον ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν, καὶ ὁ τούτων δὲ ἀριθμὸς· πάντα ἄρα τὰ αὐτά, ὥστε καὶ ὁ χρόνος.

Context: quotation from the Aristotelian Eudemus.

6 Sorabji [22], 183-4, is probably right to take Eudemus to be drawing his own inference that the time will be the same, and using that inference as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Pythagorean theory. Our suggestion is that the inference suited Chrysippus very well.

53 Soul

A Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.2–3 (SVF 2.988, part)

(1) τῶν κινουμένων τὰ μὲν τινα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὴν τῆς κινήσεως αἰτίαν, ἕτερα δὲ ἔξωθεν μόνον κινεῖται. (2) ἔξωθεν μὲν οὖν μόνον κινεῖται τὰ φορητά, ὅσον ξύλα καὶ λίθοι καὶ πάντα ἢ ὑπὸ ἑξέως μόνῃς συνεχομένη ὕλη . . . (3) ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ζῶα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἀπαεσπλῶς ὅσα ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ ψυχῆς συνέχεται, ἐξ ὧν φασιν εἶναι καὶ τὰ μέταλλα. πρὸς δὲ ταῦτοις καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι, τὰχα δὲ καὶ αἱ πηγαί. (4) τῶν δὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἔχόντων τὰ μὲν φασιν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὰ αἴψυχα, ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δὲ τὰ ἑμψυχα. καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν κινεῖται τὰ ἑμψυχα φαντασίας ἐγγινομένης ὁρμῆν προκαλουμένης . . . (5) τὸ μέντοι λογικὸν ζῶον καὶ λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φανταστικὴν φύσιν τὸν κρίνοντα τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ τινὰς μὲν ἀποδοκιμάζοντα, τινὰς δὲ παραδεχόμενον, ἵνα ἀγῆται τὸ ζῶον κατ' αὐτάς.

2 μιν οὐκ. Armin silenter γ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν cold: ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν γάρ Armin silenter

Context: the freedom of the will. For similar uses of Stoicism by Origen, cf. SVF 2.989–90, and 470–Q for the threefold system of classification by means of ἔξωθεν φύσις, ψυχῇ. For detailed discussion, see Inwood [547], 21–6.

7–9 ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν In Simplicius' report of these peculiarly Stoic terms, SVF 2.499, the second is related, as in Origen, to ἀφ' ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, but the former is illustrated by a knife's power to cut, ἐκ τῆς οὐκείας κατασκευῆς (κατὰ γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἢ ποιήσιν ἐπιτελεῖται). Simplicius applies a third term δι' ἑαυτοῦ to the movement of plants; but Origen, in another report, says that δι' αὐτῶν (SVF 2, p. 289, 4) is the term that he thinks describes the movement of rational animals. Inwood [547], 23–4, gives good reason for thinking that Simplicius' account, in its divergences from Origen, is contaminated with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic adaptations. But some uncertainty persists concerning Stoic application of the terms δι' (ἐ)αυτῶν; the preposition διὰ, at this date, does not seem as strong a word for conveying personal agency as ἀπό.

10 13 λόγον . . . παραδεχόμενον Origen may be taken to subsume the faculty of assent under his account of λόγος; cf. S.

B Hierocles, 1.5–33, 4.38–53

(1) τὸ τοῖνον σπέρμα[α] καταπεσὼν εἰς ὑστέρα[ν] ἐ[ν] τε καιρῶι τῶι προσήκοντι καὶ ἄμ[α] ὅπ' ἐ[ρ]ρωμένῳ τοῦ ἀγγεῖου σ[υ]λλ[η]φθ[έ]ν[αι] | οὐκ ἐτι ἡρεμεῖ, καθά[περ] τέων, ἀλλ' ἀνακινήθ[εν] ἀρ[χ]ε[ι]ται τῶν ἰδίων ἐ[ρ]ργων, περὶ τε [τοῦ] κυφορουῦντος σ[ώ]μα[τος] ἐπ[ι]σπώμενον τὴν ὕλην δια[π]λατ[έ]ται τὸ ἑμβρυον κατὰ [τι]νας ἀ[παραβ]άτους τάξεις, ἔωι[περ] οὐ πρὸς τ[έ]λος ἀφίκη[ι]ται καὶ πρὸς ἀπό[τεξιν] εὐτρεπ[έ]ς ἀπεργάσσηται τὸ δημιούργημα. | (2) τοῦτον μέντοι πάντα τὸν χρόνον (λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ συλλή[ψ]εως [μέχρι] ἀπὸ [τέξε]ω[ς]) διαμένει φύσι[ς], τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πη[φ]ε[ύ]μα,

μεταβε[βλη]κός[s] ἐκ [σπ]έρματ[ο]ς καὶ ὁδῶι κ[ε]ιν[ο]ύ[μενον] ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς
 [τέ]λος· [ἡ] δὲ κατὰ [μὲν] τὰ πρῶτ[α] τοῦ χρόνου | παχύτεραν πῶς ἐστι 10
 πνεῦμα ἢ φύσις καὶ μακ[ρὰ]ν ἀφαστηκυνία ψυχῆς, κα[τ']όπιν δὲ τούτων
 κα[π]εῖδ[ε]ν | σχεδὸν ἤκηι τῆς ἀποτ[έ]ξεως, ἀπο[λ]επτύνε[ται] . . | διὸ δὴ
 καὶ θύραζε χω[ρ]ήσ[α]σ[α] ἰκανοῦνται τῶι | περι[έ]χοντι, | ὥστε αἶον στομι-
 θε[ί]σα | πρὸς αὐτοῦ μεταβαλεῖν . . | εἰς ψυχὴν, (3) καθάπερ | γὰρ τὸ ἐν
 τοῖς λίθοις πνεῦμα ταχέως ὑπὸ πλ[η]γῆς ἐκπυροῦνται διὰ τὴν πρὸς 15
 ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐτοιμότητα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον | καὶ φύσις ἐμβρύου
 πέποντος | ᾗδ' γεγερό[τος] οὐ | βραδύνει | τὸ μεταβά[λλ]ειν εἰς ψυχὴν
 ἐμ[πε]σοῦσα τῶι | περιέ[χ]οντι. ταύτῃ | δὲ | π[ᾶ]ν τὸ ἐκπεσ[όν] ὑστέρας
 εὐθέως ἐστὶ ζῶιον . . | (4) [τοῦ]ντεῦθεν ἐνθ[υ]μητέον | [ἐστίν] ὅτι πᾶν
 ζῶιον | τοῦ | μὴ ζώ[ο]υ δυο[ῖν] | ἔχει διαφοράν, αἰσθ[η]σεῖ | τε καὶ 20
 ὁρμή . . | (5) ἐπεὶ | τοῖσιν ἐξ ἀμφ[ο]τέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶιον . . αὐθεναν,
 ἐκ φύ[σ]ματος | καὶ ψυχῆς, ἀμφω δ' ἐστὶ θ[ι]κ[τ]ὰ καὶ πρόσβλητα καὶ
 τ.ρ | ἐρεῖσει δ' ἡ ὑπόπτωτα, ἔτι δέ | δι' ὧν κέκρται, καὶ [θά]τερ[ον]
 μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν δύναμις αἰσθητική, τὸ δ' αὐτ[ό] | τοῦτο καὶ τρόπον, ὅν
 [ὑ]πεδείξ[α]μεν, κ[ε]κινείται, δῆλον ὅτι δι[α] | ανεκῶς αἰσθάνοιτ' ἂν [τὸ ζῶιον] 25
 ἑαυτοῦ. (6) τεινωμένη γὰρ ἔξω ἡ ψυχ[ὴ] μετ' | ἀφύσεως [προσβάλλ]λει πᾶσι
 τοῦ σώματος τοῖς | μέρεσιν, ἐπε[ὶ]δὴ καὶ κέκρται πᾶσι, προσβάλλουσα
 δὲ ἀν[τι]προσ[βάλλ]εται. (7) ἀντιβατικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, | [κα]θάπερ
 καὶ [ἡ] ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πάθος συνερεστικ[όν] | ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀντερεστικόν
 ἀποτελεῖται. (8) καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκροτά[των] μερῶν εἶσω νε[ύ]ον ἐπὶ τὴν 30
 ἡγεμονίαν τ. . . | [β]οῦς σ. . ἀναφέρ[ε]ται, ὡς ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι (τῶν)
 | μερῶν [ἀ]πά[ν]των τῶν | τε τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. (9) τοῦτ[ο]
 δὲ ἐστὶν [ἔ]σον τῶι | τὸ ζῶιον αἰσθάν[ε]σθαι ἑαυτοῦ.

For the text and its supplementation, cf. A. 1110 [572] ad loc.

Context. the beginning of Hierocles' treatise, *Ἠθικὴ στοιχειώσις*. In the previous sentence, the first of the whole work, he announces his intention of beginning with an account of the genesis of ensouled creatures, and their primary attributes. For extracts from the passage that follows B, cf. 57C. For further details and bibliography, see Long [520], 46–7; Inwood [575].

5 **κατὰ-τάξεις** The terminology refers to the inviolable laws of nature, cf. 52D 6, and the descriptions of *εἰσαρμένη*, 55J K.

8 **φύσις** Cf. Chrysippus, cited by Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1052i τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι νομίζει καθάπερ φυτὸν, and see Long [520], 43–4.

9–10 Cf. the similar description of god's activity in cosmogony, 46A.

10–12 This too has Chrysippus' authority; cf. Plutarch (note on 8 above) τὴν ψυχὴν ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον. After ἀπολεπτύνεται we omit a line which is too defective to be intelligible.

13–14 Cf. Chrysippus in C 1–2 and 4p. Plutarch (n. 5 above), ψυχόμενον [sc. τὸ βρέφος] ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ ατομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ γίνεσθαι ζῶον. Hence he claimed justification for ψύξεις as the etymology of ψυχή. Plutarch loc. cit.

21ff. The context of these lines, which occur after an interval of several pages, is the soul's corporeal nature and its through-and-through blending (see 48) with the body.

24 **δύναμις αἰσθητική** A way of referring to the soul, which suggests that *δύναμις* (not *Αἰνῆς φύσις*) should fill the lacuna in D.L. 7.156, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αἰσθητικὴν ζ...).

26 **τεινομένη** Cf. 47]. Q. R.

30-1 **ἐπὶ ἀναφέρεται** Aἰνῆς did not offer any supplement for the missing letters. Since Hierocles appears to have used *ἡγεμονίαν* in place of the standard *ἡγεμονικόν*, he may have thought it needed some expansion. We suggest, if the traces are compatible, *ἡγεμονίαν τ[ὸ στή]θος* 'the rulership of the chest' (cf. [φάσκειν] *Χρῆσιππον δ' ἐν τῷ στή]θ]ει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν* [εἶ]ναι, SVF 3, p. 217, 20-1), and more tentatively [συν]ανυφέρεται].

C Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1053C-D (SVF 2.806)

γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῇ καθάπερ στυμῶσει τῇ περιψύξει τοῦ πνεύματος μεταβαλόντος, ἀπαδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι μάλιστα τῷ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσι.

Context: alleged inconsistencies in Chrysippus' statements about the soul's origin.

1-2 Cf. B 13 14.

2-4 The 'proof' of the soul's posteriority to the body is at best implicit, and absent from other Stoic accounts of hereditary resemblances, SVF 1.518 and Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.79. Chrysippus' point is perhaps that the temperamental and character resemblances between parents and children cannot be referred to a pre-natal state, when the body already existed, since they presuppose a parental environment for the child. But if this is his point, it patently fails to show that *all* the soul's properties are subsequent to the generation of the body.

D Galen, *Fori.* 4.698,2-9 (SVF 2.761, part)

(1) οὐ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως ὑπόθεσιν ἀγνοῦσιν μὲν αἰσθήσει, λόγῳ δ' ἀνεύρετον ὑποτίθενται τὴν καρδίαν ἀπάντων πρώτην γίνεσθαι λέγοντες· (2) δευτέραν δ' ἐπὶ τῇδε τὰλλα μύρια διαπλάττειν ἐκείτην, ὡς ἀπολλυμένου τοῦ διαπλάσαντος αὐτὴν, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ μηκέτ' ὄντος· (3) εἴτ' ἐφεξῆς ὡς ἀκόλουθον ἐπιφέροντες ὅτι καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ἡμῶν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ταύτῃ καθέστηκεν.

Galen's reference to the Stoics is secured by his attributing the first two points to Chrysippus 'and many other Stoics and Peripatetics' at *Fori.* 4.674, and by his constant criticism of the third point; cf. 65H. Here he refers to them obliquely as 'people totally unversed in anatomical research, who go in for rash assertions'.

E Galen, *In Hipp. Ep.* VI 270,26-8 (SVF 2.782)

ὅσοι γὰρ οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι πνεῦμα διασφύζεσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ

τε τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἐλκομένου διὰ τῆς τραχείας ἡττηρίας εἶσω τοῦ σώματος (ἀέρος).

3 (ἀέρος) Attini

Context: interpretation of Hippocrates' views on the soul.

2 **ἀναθυμιάσεως** This term (together with *πνεῦμα*, 1) establishes the Stoic provenance of Galen's generalized statement; cf. *SVF* 1.341. 519–20. In their use of it the Stoics claimed to have the authority of Heraclitus; cf. Long [353], 150–2.

F Sextus Empiricus, *M* 7.234

ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι διυμῶς γλαφυρώτερον ἀπὸ λογήσαντο. φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τὸ τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην αἰγκρῖον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἰπωμεν συνεστάναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἰδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

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Context: critical survey of Stoic differences of opinion concerning *φαντασία*.

2 **διχῶς** For the significance of the two senses of soul, in relation to the Stoic distinction between soul and body, cf. Long [520], 44–5.

4 For the account of death, cf. **45D** 1.

5 **ἡγεμονικόν** This term for the soul's 'commanding-faculty' may be Zeno's invention, though it may also have been coined or used independently by the Peripatetic Strato; he differed from the Stoics in locating the *ἡγεμονικόν* in the head, but his insistence that all *αἰσθησις* takes place there, including harshly pains and pleasures, and not in the affected regions (30–Plutarch fragment, pp. 43–7 Sandbach) corresponds to the Stoic position (cf. **M**).

G Caelidius 220 (*SVF* 2 879, part)

(1) item Chrysippus "una et eadem" inquit "certe te spiramus et vivimus. (2) spiramus autem naturali spiritu. (3) ergo etiam vivimus eodem spiritu. (4) vivimus autem anima. (5) naturalis igitur spiritus anima esse invenitur." "haec igitur" inquit "totae in partes divisa invenitur. constat enim e principia et quaque sensibus, etiam vocali substantia et serendi praevidendique potentia. (6) porro partes animae velut ex capite fons cordis sede manantes per universum corpus porriguntur, omniaque membra usque quaque vitali spiritu complent reguntque et moderantur innumerabilibus diversisque virtutibus, nutriendo, adolendo, movendo motibus localibus, instruendo sensibus, compellendo ad operandum, (7) totaque anima sensus, qui sunt eius officia, velut ramos ex principali parte illa tamquam trabe pandit futuros eorum quae sentiunt nuntios, ipsa de his quae nuntiaverint iudicat ut rex. (8) ea porro quae sentimur composita sunt utpote corpora unguisque item sensus unum quiddam sentiunt, hic colores, sonos alius, aut ille sacorum saporis discerne, hic vapores odoremque, ille asperum levigamentumque tactu, atque haec omnia ad praesens; neque tamen

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praeteritorum meminit sensus ullus nec suspicatur futura. (9) intimae vero deliberationis et considerationis proprium cuiusque sensus intelligere passionem et ex his quae nuntiant colligere quid sit illud, et praesens quidem accipere, absentis autem meminisse, futurum item providere." defines idem intimam mentis deliberationem sic: "intimus est motus animae vis rationalis."

20

1. *ignot* vel *ign* *cudil* 10. *aliquis* vel *absent* *cudil*.

Context: doxography of soul. Immediately following this extract, Calcidius describes the commanding-faculty of non-rational animals, and then cites Chrysippus' comparison of a rational commanding-faculty to a spider, located at the centre of its web, the threads of which, gripped by the spider's feet, correspond to the starting-points of the senses. (The image is also anachronistically attributed to Heraclitus, 22 B 67a DK.)

3 **naturalis spiritus** Cf. the much fuller account Chrysippus gave in his *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, SVF 2.885: ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σίμφυτον ἡμῶν συνεχές παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον, ἐστ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὐπνοία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. A medical origin for the term *σίμφυτον πνεῦμα* has been suspected, but Aristotle is its only known user before Stoicism, cf. Sandbach [304], 46–8.

12–15 These lines recall the Aristotelian doctrine of the 'special sensibles' of each sense, cf. also for Epicureanism, 16C, with note. According to Aetius (SVF 2.852), a Stoic account of κοινὴ αἴσθησις (to cater for the Aristotelian concept?) was ἐντός ἀφῆ, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, cf. Lloyd [524], 194–5.

15 **ad praesens** Absence of a developed sense of time is something that differentiates animals from humans, Cicero, *Off.* 1.11; cf. also T 2.

16–17 **intimae deliberationis** Cf. Epicurus' account of δόξα as a secondary internal process, 15A 12. For Stoic accounts of the mind's organization of empirical data, cf. 39C E.

H Aetius 4.21.1–4 (SVF 2.836, part)

(1) οἱ Στωικοί φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν. (2) ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναι. (3) τῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μὲν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὁρασις ὁσφρησις ἀκοή γεῦσις καὶ ἀφή. ὣν ἡ μὲν ὁρασις ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὠτων . . . (4) τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν. (5) τὸ δὲ "φωνᾶν" ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνὴν καλοῦσιν, ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλῶττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ὡς περ ἐν κόρην κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδί κεφαλῇ

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2. καὶ A καὶ τὰν BC 1. κόρην (ῥῆμον) Diels

Context: doxography of Stoic psychology.

2 αἰσθήσεις Nor normally listed as a specific faculty of the ἡγεμονικόν, cf. **K 2**.
P, Placed here between συγκαταθέσεις and ὁρμῆς, αἰσθήσεις should be interpreted in the strong cognitive sense explained in **40Q**.

4 ἐκπεφυκότα The term is used by Alexander, *De an.* 94,30, for the veins' 'outgrowth' from the heart. His discussion throughout *De an.* 94–100 illustrates the dissemination of Stoic psychology.

13 κεφαλῇ Not Chrysippus' doctrine (cf. **65H**) but that of some unnamed Stoics; cf. *SVF* 3 Diogenes 33.

I Nemesius 212,6–9 (*Panaetius* fr. 86)

Παναίτιος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸ μὲν φωνητικὸν τῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως μέρος εἶναι βούλεται, λέγων ὀρθότατα· τὸ δὲ σπερματικὸν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως.

Nemesius says this after reporting Zeno's doctrines of an eight-part soul. Panaetius probably subsumed the vocal faculty under ὁρμή in order to avoid any suggestion that it is only an instrumental part of the soul; cf. Rist [303], 180–1, Long [520], 48. His allocation of reproduction to φύσις looks like an Aristotelian move in the opposite direction, downgrading this faculty to the level of involuntary nutrition; cf. Nemesius 249–50 – Panaetius fr. 86a.

J Cicero, *Off.* 1.132 (*Panaetius* fr. 88)

motus autem animorum duplices sunt: alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus. cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. curandum est igitur ut cognitione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi obediētem praebeamus.

Context: discussion of *decorum*

Together with Cicero, *Off.* 1.101 (*Panaetius* fr. 87), this passage is regularly treated as evidence for Panaetius' psychology: it is also frequently interpreted (cf. Rist [303], 182–4) as a deviation from Chrysippus' rational monism in favour of Aristotelian bipartition of the soul (e.g. *EN* 1.13, 1102b16–1103a13) into rationality and the irrational appetitive faculty which can obey or disobey reason. What recalls Aristotle, however, is not so much the notion of 'making impulse obedient to reason'. Chrysippus himself explains ἀλογος or 'excessive impulse' as 'disobedient to reason', **65J** – as the implied division between theoretical and practical activity; and thus too is standard Stoicism; cf. *DL* 7.130, γεγονέναι . . . ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιτήδεις τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον πρὸς θεωρίαν καὶ πράξιν; also **61D 2**.

K Iamblichus, *De anima* (Stobaeus 1.368,12–20; *SVF* 2.826, part)

(1) πῶς οὖν διακρίνονται, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Στωικοὺς εἶναι μὲν διαφορότητι (τῶν) ὑποκειμένων σαιμάτων· πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὗτοι διατείνειν ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμούς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὠτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια. (2) εἶναι δὲ ἰδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ

ὑποκείμενον' ὡς περ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα ἔχει
καὶ τὴν εἰωδιάν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῃ φαντασίαν, συγκατά-
θεσιν, ὁρμήν, λόγον συνείληφε.

2 (τῶν) Heeren. 3 καὶ codd., κατ' Meineke, Wachsmuth

Context: doxography of soul; cf. 28F for an earlier extract, which discusses the ontology of lines 4–7. For detailed discussion, cf. Inwood [547], 30–41, who amply vindicates the reliability of Iamblichus' evidence.

1 **διακρίνονται** Supply αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς.

6–7 On the puzzling inclusion of λόγος in the list of faculties, cf. Long [520], 49–50, and contrast λογισμός (H 3) as the name of the entire ἡγεμονικόν.

L. Seneca, *Ep.* 113.23 (SVF 2.836, part)

inter Cleanthes et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit
ambulatio. Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum,
Chrysippus ipsum principale.

Context: exposition of the doctrine that the virtues are 'living beings' (cf. 61E). Seneca has been elucidating 'assent': 'I walk', he says, 'immediately following my saying that I should walk and approving this judgement of mine' (*Ep.* 53.18). But Seneca is out of line with Chrysippean psychology in treating the 'impulse to walk' as prior, in the causal sequence, to assent, and thus as something to be approved or disapproved; cf. Inwood [547], 176, 282 n., 193. In Chrysippus' doctrine, the impulse is a component of the assent, a decision issuing in action; see 331. His disagreement with Cleanthes is difficult to elucidate, but probably relates to a wish to avoid any suggestion that purposive bodily movements are even locally separable from the mind's activity. In Cleanthes' account, walking is a mind-directed pneumatic movement in the legs; Chrysippus' claim – walking simply is the mind at work – implies that the legs' movements are not the outcome of an anterior decision, but are actually identical with the mind's assent and impulse to walk. For further discussion, cf. Rist [303], 33–4; Inwood [547], 50–1.

M. Actius 4.23.1 (SVF 2.854)

οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν ταῖς πεπονθόσαι τόποις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ
ἡγεμονικῷ.

Context: doxography περὶ παθῶν σωματικῶν εἰ συναλγεῖ τοιούτοις ἡ ψυχῇ.

The terms πάθη and αἰσθήσεις are not used here in any technical Stoic sense. As the context explains, πάθος refers to bodily states or changes (e.g. damage to a finger) and αἰσθήσεις to the corresponding sensations. The Stoic doctrine agrees with that of Strato, whose view, as described by ps.-Plutarch (cf. note on F 5), uses αἰσθήσεις in the same sense as here, a usage which fits the otherwise misleading attribution to the Stoics of the proposition that all αἰσθήσεις are true, SVF 2.78 (cf. 40Q). For a full account of the Stoic concept of διέδοσις – the transmission of a bodily affection to the ἡγεμονικόν which feels the affection – see Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.7.7; and for συμπάθεια of body and soul, cf. B 4–8; 45C.

N Diogenes Laertius 7.157 (SVF 2.867)

ὁρᾶν δὲ τοῦ μεταξύ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φωτὸς ἐντεινομένου κωνοειδῶς, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἰππολύδιμος γίνεσθαι μὲν τὸ κωνοειδὲς τοῦ αἵρος πρὸς τῇ ὅψει, τὴν δὲ βάσιν πρὸς τῷ ὀριωμένῳ. ὥς διὰ βακτηρίας οὖν τοῦ ταθέντος αἵρος τὸ βλεπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεσθαι.

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3 μὲν BP: μέντοι H(Plouc.)

Context: doxography of Stoic psychology.

1 **ὁράσεως** The soul's visual faculty is *meant*, consisting of πνεῦμα stretching from the ἡγεμονικόν to the eye; cf. H 6–7. By its contact with the illuminated air outside, it makes this into a cone-shaped visual medium, the technical name for which is συνέντασις; cf. SVF 2.863–6.

4 **βακτηρίας** Explained by Alexander, SVF 2.864, as a way of signifying the 'contact' the imprinted air establishes between the visual object and the perceiver.

5 **ἀναγγέλλεσθαι** For the senses as reporters to the mind; cf. G 7: 70A 7

O Nemesis 291.1–8 (SVF 2.991, part)

ἐκάστω γὰρ τῶν γενομένων δεδοσθαι τι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ὥς τῷ ὕδατι τὸ φύχειν, καὶ ἐκάστω τῶν φυτῶν τὸ τοιοῦδε καρπὸν φέρειν, καὶ τῷ λίθῳ τὸ καταφερὲς, καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ἀνωφερὲς, οὕτω καὶ τῷ ζῳῷ τὸ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ ὀρμᾶν· ὅταν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ ὀρμῇ μηδὲν ἀντιπέσῃ τῶν ἐξωθεν καὶ καθ' εἰμορμένην, τότε τὸ περιπατεῖν τέλει· ἐφ' ἧμιν εἶναι, καὶ πάντως περπατήσομεν.

5

Context: Stoic reconciliation of human autonomy and fate (cf. 4–5), attributed to Chrysippus, Philopator, and 'many other distinguished men'.

Animals in general are similarly credited with assent by Alexander, *Fat* 182, 16–183.24 (including 62G 6), and by the Antiochian Stoic Lucullus at 400 3. Texts which seem to restrict assent to rational animals include A 5, P 1, 62K. For discussion, cf. Long [520], 50; Sharples [333], 144–5; and especially Inwood [547], 70–91, who argues that Nemesis and Alexander misrepresent Stoicism by amalgamating what the Stoics called *εἶκεν*, 'an automatic response' to impressions (cf. S and 39A 5), with assent; the Stoics, Inwood maintains, may have attributed the former, but not the latter, to animals and young children. This is a promising suggestion. But however the evidence is interpreted, it seems best to hold on to the notion that rational assent has a rudimentary non-rational counterpart in animal behaviour.

P Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 1.30 (SVF 2.844)

(1) τὰ γὰρ ζῶων τοῦ μὴ ζῶου δυαὶ προὔχει, φαντασία καὶ ὀρμή. (2) ἡ μὲν οὖν φαντασία συνίσταται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐκτὸς πρόσδοον τυποῦντος νοῦν δι' αἰσθήσεως. (3) ἡ δὲ ὀρμή, τὸ ἀδελφὸν τῆς φαντασίας, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ τοικὴν δύναμιν, ἣν τεύσας δι' αἰσθήσεως ἀπτεται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ χωρεῖ γλιχόμενος ἐφικέσθαι καὶ συλλαβεῖν αὐτό.

5

Context: how mental faculties are related to each other. Philo's terminology, though

always eclectic, is so distinctively Stoic here (cf. *τοιούτην*, 4) that the passage can be treated as good evidence for orthodox Stoicism; cf. Inwood [547], 31.

4 *αἰσθησεως* The term refers here to the activity of the senses (cf. the last usage cited in 40Q) and not to cognition of perceptible objects.

Q Stobaeus 2.86,17-87,6 (SVF 3.169, part)

(1) τὸ δὲ κινεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν. (2) τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος. (3) ταύτης δ' ἐν εἶδει θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· οὐ κατωνομασμένα δ' εἶσιν. ἡ γὰρ ὁρεξις οὐκ ἔστι λογικὴ ὁρμή, ἀλλὰ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς εἶδος. (4) τὴν δὲ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν δεόντως ἂν τις ἀφορίζοιτο λέγων εἶναι φορὰν διανοίας ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν· ταύτη δ' ἀντιτιθεσθαι ἀφορμήν.

ἀλλ' ἡ Μενεῖν. ἀλλὰ codd. 3 ἐν εἶδει θεωρεῖσθαι codd. 4 ὁρμὴν εἶναι φαντασίαν τοῦ καθήκοντος P 4 κατωνομασμένα codd. 5 οὐκ ἔστι Μενεῖν 6 ἂν τις ἀφορίζοιτο Galenus ἀποφορίζοιτο codd. 7 ἀντιτιθεσθαι codd. can Meyer

Context: doxography of Stoic ὁρμή. The passage and its sequel are discussed in illuminating detail by Inwood [547], 55-6, 224-42.

1-2 See note on 59E. Inwood [547], 224, takes αὐτόθεν with καθήκοντος, but it seems better to regard it as modifying ὁρμητικὴν; the impression 'then and there' has the power to activate a proper function, i.e. its mere appearance is sufficient to warrant assent and impulse.

4-5 The ὁρμή of rational animals differs from that of the non-rational, but the same term ὁρμή applies to them both. ὁρεξις is not the generic name for 'rational impulse', but a specific type of such impulse; cf. note on 56C, and Inwood [547], 327ff.

R Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1037r (SVF 3.175, part)

καὶ μὴν ἡ ὁρμή κατὰ γ' αὐτὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστὶ προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν, ὥς ἐν τῷ Περὶ νόμου γέγραπεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀφορμὴ λόγος ἀπαγορευτικὸς.

Context: supposed inconsistencies in Chrysippus' accounts of law

As an imperative (προστακτικὸς, cf. D.L., 7.67), ὁρμή manifests itself in a type of *lekton*; cf. note on 331, and see the very full treatment by Inwood [547], 46-7, 61-6, 92-5, 160.

S Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1057A (SVF 3.177, part)

καὶ μὴν ἐν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαίκοις ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήθ' ὁρμῶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς

ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιούοντας οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἵξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους.

5

1 λόγος X'lg' npi leit 2 περί τίνος X'lg' τίνος vel τίνος leit 3 πόνησ Stephenus ὁ πλείστος [λόγος] 4 πόνησ περί τίνος Pohlenz

Context: alleged inconsistencies in the Stoic doctrine of fate. This extract is immediately followed by 41F.

For the Stoics' arguments with the Academics on this issue, cf. vol. 1, 455-7. The Stoic challenge here is a direct rejoinder to Arcesilaus in 69A 5.

T Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 8.275-6 (*SF* 2.223, part)

(1) φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (καὶ γὰρ κόρακες καὶ ψιττακοὶ καὶ κίτται ἐνάρθρους προφέρνται φωνάς), ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ. (2) οὐδὲ τῇ ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ (ἐφαντασιούτο γὰρ κάκεινα), ἀλλὰ τῇ μεταβατικῇ καὶ συνθετικῇ. (3) διόπερ ἀκολουθίας ἔνοιαν ἔχων εὐθὺς καὶ σημείον νόησιν λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ σημεῖον ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον "εἰ τόδε, τόδε". (4) ἔπεται ἄρα τῇ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ τάνθρωπον τὸ καὶ σημεῖον ὑπάρχειν.

5

Context: arguments for and against the existence of signs. Sextus' δογματικοί, i. are primarily, if not exclusively, Stoics. This identification is established by the immediately preceding context, which discusses the Stoic doctrine of signs; cf. note on 51H.

Burnyeat [484], 206-8, shows that the argument crucially depends on the claim that human nature, 7, is providentially structured (*S.E.*, *M.* 8.245-6), a point which assures its Stoic provenance; cf. 63E. However, we do not share his view ([206], n. 33) that ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ, 3, means φαντασίᾳ *simpliciter*. Followed as it is by συνθετικῇ, 4, ἀπλῇ must mean 'simple' as distinct from 'complex'; cf. *S.E.*, *M.* 7.135, 228-9. For further discussion, cf. Long [426], 47ff.; and 45-6, on ἀκολουθία, lines 5-6.

U Galen, *Plac.* 2.5.9-13 (*SF* 3 Digenes 29, part)

(1) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ ταύτην λόγον Διογένης οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτᾷ λέξιν, ἀλλ' ὥδε: "ὅθεν ἐκπέμπεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἡ ἐνάρθρος, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σημαίνουσα ἐνάρθρος φωνὴ ἐκείθεν. (2) τοῦτο δὲ λόγος. (3) καὶ λόγος ἄρα ἐκείθεν ἐκπέμπεται ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. (4) ἡ δὲ φωνὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπων ἐκπέμπεται ἀλλὰ φανερώς ἐκ τῶν κάτωθεν μᾶλλον. ἐφανῆς γοῦν ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς ἀρτηρίας διεξιούσα. (5) καὶ ὁ λόγος ἄρα οὐκ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν μᾶλλον. (6) ἀλλὰ μὴν γε κάκεινο ἀληθές, τὸ τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς διανοίας ἐκπέμπεσθαι. ἔνιοι γοῦν καὶ ὀριζόμενοι αὐτὸν φασιν εἶναι φωνὴν σημαίνουσαν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένην. (7) καὶ ἄλλως δὲ πιθανὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνοιῶν ἐνσενσημασμένον τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ οἷον ἐκτετυπωμένον ἐκπέμπεσθαι τὸν λόγον, καὶ παρεκτείνεσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τε τὸ διανεοῦσθαι καὶ τὴν κατὰ τὸ λέγειν ἐνέργειαν. (8) καὶ ἡ διάνοια

5

10

ἀρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς κατωτέρω τόποις, μάλιστα πῶς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν."

5 ἡφανὲς could = ἑμφανὲς A16

Context: various Stoic arguments for locating the mind in the heart; cf. 65H.

For the linguistic concepts invoked here, cf. 33A, C.

V Galen, *Plac.* 5.2.49 and 5.3.1 (SVF 2.841, part)

"ἔστι δέ (γε) τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι' ἃν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκε καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσις. καὶ ἔστι καλὴ ἢ αἰσχροὶ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μόνιον ἔχον (οὕτως) ἢ οὕτως κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους μερισμούς." . . ἀναμνησκῶν ἴσως ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ λόγου γεγραμμένων ὧν σὺ διήλθες, ὡς ἔστιν ἐννοιῶν τέ τινων καὶ προλήψεων ἁρμοισμα.

1 (γε) Muller, cf. 5.3.1 5 (οὕτως) Ricci, Cornazius

Context: Galen is objecting to Chrysippus' explanation of mental health/ill-health by reference to proportion/disproportion of the 'parts' of the ἡγεμονικόν; cf. 47H. Since the latter, says Galen, is supposed to be a single part of the soul, Chrysippus is compelled to treat its 'activities' as if they were parts, and fails anywhere to specify the nature of its οἰκείοι μερισμοί, 3. The answer Galen offers Chrysippus from his own writings in 4–5 is polemical. Chrysippus would probably have said that the μερισμοί of the ἡγεμονικόν are the four faculties specified in K 2; i.e. the soul's health depends upon a concordant relationship between these faculties, such that a person makes correct use of impressions, avoids excessive impulses, knows when to give or withhold assent, and, in general, acts in rational agreement with nature; cf. 31B; 62K; 63C, E; 65J.

5 Cf. 39E, F.

W Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15 20.6 (SVF 2.809)

(1) τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενετὴν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν. οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτήν, τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς πυσὺν τινὰς χρόνους. (2) τὸ δὲ διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτως λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γενόμενοι τοῦ σώματος χωρισθέντες καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες αὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ τῶν [ἀφρόνων καὶ] ἀλόγων ζώων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι.

6 χωρισθέντες could = ante Diels 6 εἰς DE, οὐκ CFC μεταβαλόντες could = ante Diels 7 ἀφρόνων καὶ del. A.A. Long

Context: doxography of Stoic psychology.

For further evidence and discussion, cf. Hoven [525]; Rist [302], 256–61.

7 ἀφρόνων The repetition of this word, cf. 4, not only risks ambiguity (so Hoven [525], 49 n. 3), but is utterly out of place: ἀφρων is not an attribute of non-

rational animals. The words ἀφρόνων καί, even if Eusebius wrote them, should be deleted from the text when it is treated as testimony for Stoicism.

X Diogenes Laertius 7.143 (SVF 2.633, part)

ἔμφυχον [sc. τὸν κόσμον] δέ, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκείθεν οὐσης ἀποσπάσματος.

Context: doxography of Stoic cosmology

2 ἀποσπάσματος The biological resonance of the term is influenced by its usage in early Stoicism, where σπέρμα is described as ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα, SVF 1.128; cf. Rist [302], 264–5.

Y Cicero, ND 2.58 (SVF 1.172, part)

atque ut ceterae naturae suis seminibus quaeque gignuntur augescunt continentur, sic natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios, conatusque et adpetitiones, quas ὁρμᾶς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut possint ipsi qui animis moventur et sensibus.

Context: defence of Stoic theology; cf. 54B, G–H

54 Theology

A Diogenes Laertius 7.147 (SVF 2.1021)

θεὸν δ' εἶναι ζῶντα ἀθάνατον, λογικὸν ἢ νοερόν, τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντός ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμον τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσωνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Δία μὲν γὰρ φασι δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα, Ζήνα δὲ καλοῦναι παρ' ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἡ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν, Ἀθηναίαν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἶρα, καὶ Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ, καὶ Προσιδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἰσχυρὸν, καὶ Δήμητρην κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοι τινας αἰκεσιότητι ἀπέθεσαν.

1 ἢ νοερόν, τέλειον Sedley: τέλειον ἢ νοερόν BP: τέλειον υπὲρ F

Context: outline of Stoic cosmology.

1 For god's immortality, cf. note on 70C 14–15

5–10 For Stoic allegorical interpretations of divine names, cf. SVF 2.1063–1100;

B 11ff.; Philodemus, *Pier. cols.* 1–10 in Henrichs [529].

B Cicero, ND 1.39–41 (SVF 2.1077)

iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum summorum valerrimus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ea ignotorum ut eos ne conjectura quidem

informare posimus, cum mens nostra quodvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsiisque mundum deum dici esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universam atque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum quem ante dixi aethera, tum ea quae natura fluere atque manare, ut et aquam et terram et aera, solem lunam sidera universitatemque rerum qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homines eos qui immortalitatem essent consecuti. idemque disputat aethera esse eum quem homines Iovem appellarent, quique aeri per maria manaret eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, simulque ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse, eandemque fatalem necessitatem appellat sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale est ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur. et haec quidem in primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem vole Orphei Musaei Homeri Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea quae ipse primo libro de deis immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterum poetae, qui hanc ne suspicari quidem vult, Stoeni fuisse videantur.

7 vim Davies. *umbra* Lodd. *venitum* Creuzer

Context: hostile historical sketch of the theological doctrines of other Greek philosophers, by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius. Cf. the preceding accounts of Zeno, Aristo, Cleanthes and Persaeus, *ibid.* 1.36–8. The entire passage 1.23–45 seems to share much of its material with Philodemus, *Pret.* 3–17 (for a direct comparison, see Diels, *Dox.* 529–50; for a more up-to-date text, see Henrichs [529]).

8–9 The deification of aether was explained at ND 5.37 as central to Cleanthes' theology

8–14 This deification of elemental masses provides the material for some of Carneades' anti-Stoic Sorites arguments: cf. 70E, and Coussin [625].

C Cicero, ND 2.12–15

(1) itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos. quales sint varium est, esse nemo negat. (2) Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. (3) primam posuit eam de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum; (4) alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur cuncta temperatione fecunditate terrarum aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia; (5) tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus nubibus nivibus grandinibus vastitate pestilentia terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus lapidesque imbribus et guttibus umbrarum quasi crientis. tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum huiusmodi cum praeter naturam hominum periculumque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus tum nelliis et quas Graeci *νομήτραι* nostri clementer vocant, quae nuper bello Octaviano magnarum fuerunt calamitatum praenuntiae, tum sole geminatus, quod ut e parte audivi Tulliano et Aquilio

consulibus exnerat, qui quidem anno P. Africanus sol alter extinctus est, quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt; (6) quartam causam esse eamque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus, conversionem caeli, solis lunae siderumque omnium distinctionem utilitatem pulchritudinem ordinem, quatum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita: ut, si quis in domum aliquam aut in gymnasium aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem modum disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri iudicare, sed esse aliquem intellegat qui praesit et cui pareatur, multo magis in tantis motionibus tantisque vicissitudinibus, tam multarum rerum atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil unquam immensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit, statuatur necesse est ab aliqua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari.

Context: Balbus' defence of Stoic theology, here resuming his earlier appeal (ND 2.4-5) to mankind's unanimity as to the existence of god.

For a condensed, and somewhat different, version, see ND 3.16. Cleanthes' first and fourth explanations seem to be modelled closely on Aristotle, *De philosophia* fr. 12 Ross. His third has aroused some puzzlement, since it appears to appeal to a false conception of god as angry or malevolent. Note, however, that the standard Stoic response to the inadequacy of primitive theological notions is not rejection but allegorical reinterpretation. Hence the thunderbolt, a prime example of these divine terrors, is retained by Cleanthes (II 2), but as a symbol of the creativity of fire. Likewise he may well have argued that fear of the supernatural is a primitive forerunner of a very proper wonder at the divine.

1-2 Cf. S.E., *M.* 9.60-5. If the existence of god is uncontroversial, why do the Stoics expend so much effort on proving it (cf. ND 3.8-9)? Partly because even the obvious may need defence if attacked by sceptics (cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.17). Partly because the existence of the specifically Stoic god, who is identical with the world, is not uncontroversial. Cf. Schofield [471].

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9.133-6

(1) Ζήνων δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἡρώτα λόγον: "τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶν· (τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶν)· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί." (2) ὃ λόγος τινὲς παραβάλλοντές φησι: "τοὺς σοφούς ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶν· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶν· εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί." ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος τοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς [τοῦ] νομοῦ. (3) ἀπαντῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν παραβολὴν Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλωνίος τὸ δεύτερόν φησι λῆμμα τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τοιοῦτον εἶναι τῇ δυνάμει: "τοὺς δὲ μὴ πεφυκότας εἶναι οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶν" τοιοῦτου γὰρ λαμβανομένου δηλονότι πεφυκάσιν εἶναι θεοί· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰπὴν ἤδη· εἰ γὰρ ἅπαξ ποτὲ ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ εἰ ἄταμοι ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν· ἀόφθαρτα γὰρ καὶ ἀγένεστα τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν σωμάτων. διὸ καὶ κατὰ ἀκόλουθον ἐπιφορὰν συνάξει ὁ λόγος. οἱ δὲ γε σοφοί οὐκ ἐπεὶ πεφυκάσιν εἶναι, ἤδη καὶ εἰσὶν. (4) ἄλλοι δὲ φασὶ τὸ πρῶτον λῆμμα τοῦ Ζήνωνος, τὸ "τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶν," ἀμφίβολου

εἶναι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει "τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῇ", ἕτερον δὲ 15
 "τιμητικῶς ἔχοι". λαμβάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅπερ ψεῦδος ἐστὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 συμφῶν.

2 suppl. Fabricius

Context: review of doctrinaire, especially Stoic, theological arguments.

See Schofield [345] on this argument and the anonymous παραβολή.

12 Why this comment? Diogenes interprets 'existent' as 'such as to exist' in the additional premise. This compels him to reinterpret the conclusion along the same lines, as he does at 8–12, in order to give 'exist' a consistent sense throughout. The point of the addition is to remark that validity is thus restored.

E Cicero, ND 2.16 (SVF 2.1012, part)

Chrysippus quidem, quamquam est acceptus ingenio, tamen ea dicit ut ab ipsa natura didicisse, non ut ipse repperisse videatur. (1) "si enim" inquit "est aliquid in rerum natura quod hominis mens quod ratio quod vis quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est certe id quod illud efficit homine melius; atqui res caelestes omnesque eae quarum est ordo sempiternus ab homine confici non possunt; 5
 est igitur id quo illa conficiuntur homine melius. id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? (2) etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius, esse autem hominem qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius. est igitur profecto deus." 10

Context: immediately following C.

Cf. ND 3.18, 25; Lactantius, *De ira dei* 10.36–7.

F Sextus Empiricus, M. 9.104, 108–10

(1) καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν· "[εἰ] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρείττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρείττον ἐστίν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ ἐμφυχίας μετέχοντος. τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ (τὸ) ἐμφυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμφύχου κρείττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε 5
 κόσμου κρείττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἐμφυχός ἐστίν ὁ κόσμος." . . (2) ἀλλ' ὁ γε Ἀλεξίνος τῷ Ζήνωνι παρέβαλε τρόπον τῷδε· "τὸ παιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ παιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας θεωρούμενον κρείττον ἐστίν τοῦ μὴ τοιοῦτου· οὐδέ 10
 ἐν δὲ κόσμου κρείττον ἐστίν· παιητικὸν ἄρα καὶ γραμματικὸν ἐστίν ὁ κόσμος." (3) πρὸς τὴν ἀπαντῶντες παραβολὴν οἱ Στωικαὶ φασιν, ὅτι Ζήνων τὸ καθάπαξ κρείττον εἰληφεν, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἐμφυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμφύχου, ὁ δὲ Ἀλεξίνος οὐκέτι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ καθάπαξ τὸ παιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ παιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον. ὥστε μεγάλῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 15
 θεωρεῖσθαι διαφορὰν· ἰδοὺ γὰρ Ἀρχίλοχος παιητικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐστίν

Σωκράτους τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ κρείττων, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος γραμματικὸς ὧν οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτωνος τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττων.

1 del. Bekker 4 add. Bekker

Context: as **D**

On Alexius' παραβολή, and the Stone response, see Schofield [345].

5 The omitted passage compares Zeno's argument to Plato, *Tim.* 29d–30b.

G Cicero, *ND* 2.22

(1) idemque hoc modo: "nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens; mundi autem partes sentientes sunt; non igitur caret sensu mundus." (2) pergit idem et arguet angustius: "nihil" inquit "quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis; mundus autem generat animantis compotesque rationis; animans est igitur mundus composque rationis." (3) idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: "si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin misset in oliva tibicini quaedam scientia? quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeret in platanis inesse musicam. cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque iudicaretur, cum ex se procreet animantis atque sapientis?"

Context: part of Balbus' defence of Stoic theology, following a version of Zeno's argument in **F 1**.

Zeno argues from the capacities of individual animals to those of the world by appeal to the qualitative similarity alleged to exist, first between part and whole, and second between product and cause. **53X**, and the treatment of a similar Zenonian argument at Sextus, *M* 9.101–3, suggest that these two principles were not kept entirely distinct. Cf. Schofield [345], 44–8.

H Cicero, *ND* 2.37–9

(1) neque enim est quicquam aliud praeter mundum cui nihil absit quodque undique aptum atque perfectum expletumque sit omnibus suis numeris et partibus, scite enim Chrysippus, ut elipei causa involutum, vagram autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum velendi causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem; ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum – nullo modo perfectus sed est quaedam particula perfecti, sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est neque est quicquam quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est. (2) qui igitur potest ei deesse id quod est optimum? nihil autem est mente et ratione melius, ergo haec mundo deesse non possunt. (3) bene igitur idem Chrysippus, qui similitudines adiungens omnia in perfectis et maturis docet esse meliora, ut in equo quam in eculeo, in cane

quam in catulo, in viro quam in puero. item quod in omni mundo optimum sit id in perfecto aliquo atque absoluto esse debere, est autem nihil mundo perfectius, nihil virtute melius; igitur mundi est propria virtus. (4) nec vero hominis natura perfecta est, et efficitur tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in mundo facilius; est ergo in eo virtus. sapiens est igitur et propterea deus.

15

Context: Balbus' defence of Stoic theology.

1 omnibus suis numeris See on 59K.

7-8 Cf. 63E.

17 efficitur tamen in homine virtus Contrast D 2, and cf. 61K, N 2.

I Cleanthes, *Hymn*. (Stobaeus 1.25.3-27.4 = SVF 1.537)

(1) κύνιστ' ἄθανάτων, πολυνύκτε παγκρατές αἰεῖ,
Ζεὺ φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
χαῖρε· σέ γάρ καὶ πάσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαιδάν.

ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γενόμεσθα θεοῦ μῖσημα λαχόντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαίαν·
τῷ νε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰεῖσω.

5

(2) σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὁδε κόσμος ἐλισσόμενος περὶ γαίαν
πεύθεται ᾗ κεν ἄγης, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ νεο κρατεῖται·
τοῖον ἔχεις ὑπεργγόν ἀνικήτοις ἐνὶ χερσίν
ἀμφήκη πυρόντ' αἰεζώοντα κεραυνόν·
τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς φύσεως πάντ' ἔργα βέβηκεν,
ᾧ σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
φοιτᾷ μινύμενος μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε φάεσσι
[ὥς τύπος γεγάως ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός.]

10

(3) οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμων,
οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῶν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὅπως βέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέραισιν ἀνοῖαις.

15

ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ὅρτια θεῖναι,
καὶ κοσμεῖν τάκρημα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
ὥδε γὰρ εἰς ἐν πάντα συνήρμακα ἐσθλά κακοῖσιν,
ᾧσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ὄντα·

20

ὃν φεύγοντες ἑώσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοὶ εἰσιν,
δύσμοροι, οἳ τ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες
οὔτ' ἐσοῦσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον οὔτε κλύουσιν,
ᾧ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλόν· ἔχουσιν·

25

αὐτοὶ δ' αὖθ' ὀρμῶσιν ἄνοι κακὸν ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα,
οἳ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδῇ δουέριστον ἔχοντες,
οἳ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα
< > ἐπ' ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλα φέρονται,

30

σπεύδοντες μάλα πᾶμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι.

(4) ἀλλὰ Ζεὺ πάνδωρε κελαινεφέες ἀργικέραυνε,
 ἀνθρώπους ῥύου (μὲν) ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λιγυρῆς,
 ἦν σύ, πάτερ, σκέδασαν ψυχῆς ἅπυ, διὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
 γνώμης, ἣ πίνυος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷς,
 ὄφρ' αὖ τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθ' αὖ σε τιμῇ,
 ὕμνουντες τὰ σά ἔργα διηγεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε
 θνητὸν ἔοντ', ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον
 οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν αἰὲ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὕμνεῖν.

35

4 γεύομεσθα θεοὶ Pearson [322], [324]; γεῖος ἐσμέν ἤσαν τοῖς γεύομεσθα λόγῳ Meinke
 γεύομεσθα οἶδεν Zuntz [354], 24 ἀνοὶ κακὸν Wachsmuth, ἀνεὶ κακῶ τοῖς, ἀνεὶ νόμῳ Wilamowitz
 τοῖς νομοῖς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς ἐπέκρινον Armin Dindorf, ἀνὴρ ἔρδονον Pearson 32
 ἀργικέραυνε Meinke, ἀργικέραυνε τοῖς

For textual issues, see especially Pearson [322], Powell [354], and Zuntz [355].

Readers familiar with Heraclitus will recognize numerous echoes of Cleanthes' famous Presocratic. For the significance of these, cf. Long [353].

4 Pearson's solution to this well-known crux, adopted above, has strong support from Musonius, fr. 17 Elseve, ἀνθρώπος μέμνηται μὲν θεοῦ μόνον· τῶν ἐπιγινώσκοντων ἐστὶ. If the reference to 'god' is thought less likely in a context where Zeus is addressed in the second person, Zuntz's σέθεν is available as an alternative. But note θεοῦ in 24. Man resembles god in his rationality and capacity for virtue: cf. 61].

J Cicero, ND 2.75–6

(1) dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari, eamque disputationem tris in partes nostri fore dividunt. (2) quarum prima pars est quae ducitur ab ea ratione quae docet esse deos; quo concesso confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari. (3) secunda est autem quae docet omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti ab eaque omnia pulcherrime geri; quo constituto sequitur ab animantibus principis eam esse generatam. (4) tertius est locus qui ducitur ex admiratione rerum caelestium atque terrestrium. (5) primum igitur aut negandum est esse deos, quod et Democritus simulacra et Epicurus imagines inducens quodam pacto negat, aut qui deus esse concedant is fatendum est eos aliquid agere idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur.

5

10

Context Balbus' defence of Stoic theology, here introducing the proofs of providence.

Cicero's sources for this section are disputed. In favour of a largely Chrysippean origin, see Dragona-Monachou [528], 133–4.

2–8 The three parts listed correspond to, respectively, *ibid.* 2.76–80, 81–90 (including **L**), and 90–153 (including **M** and **N**)

9 **Epicurus** See 23.

K Plutarch, *Comm. nos.* 1075f (SVF 2.1126)

καὶ μὴν αὐτὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουναι τῶν πραγμάτων

“τοῦ τοῦ, φεῦ φεῦ” βοῶντες, ὥς συγχέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶν πρόληψιν ἀναιρουμένης τῆς προνοίας· οὐ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ μακάριον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλόανθρωπον καὶ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον προλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν.

5

Context: opening of new anti-Stoic argument, criticizing the inconsistency of claiming that god is provident yet making the benefits he confers not ‘goods’ but ‘indifferents’.

Cf. *id.*, *St. rep.* 1051D 1, where this Stoic thesis is associated specifically with Chrysippus and Antipater.

L Cicero, *ND* 2.88

quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa barbaria dubitet quum ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione? hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casumne ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua an ratione ac mente divina; et Archimedeum arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphaerae conversionibus quam naturam in efficiendis; praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata sollertius.

5

Context: see J and note.

Astronomical mechanisms like those of Archimedes were possibly the most advanced creations of antiquity. See Price [50] on one such relic, the Antikythera mechanism, which is contemporary with that of Posidonius.

§ hi Those who deny providence, especially the Epicureans (cf. M).

M Cicero, *ND* 2.93

sic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri mundumque effici ornatisimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? hoc qui existimiat fieri potuisse non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciantur, posse ex is in terram excussis annales Enni ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna.

5

Context: see J and note.

1-3 The reference is to the Epicurean account of cosmogony. Cf. 13C, D. H 2

N Cicero, *ND* 2.133

sini quaeret quispiam cuiusnam causa tantarum rerum molitio facta sit, arborumne et herbarum, quae quamquam sine sensu sunt tamen a natura sustentuntur? at id quidem absurdum est, an bestiarum? nihilo probabilius deos

mutarum et nihil intelligentium causa tantum laborasse, quorum igitur causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? eorum scilicet animantium quae ratione utuntur; hi sunt di et homines; quibus profecto nihil est melius, ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus. ita fit credibile deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum quaecque in eo mundo sint omnia.

Context: see J and note.

O Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1044D (SVF 2.1163)

ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ φύσεως, εἰπὼν ὅτι οἱ κόρεις εὐχρήστως ἐξυπνίζουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ οἱ μύες ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἡμῶς μὴ ἀμελῶς ἕκαστα τιθέναι, φιλοκαλεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκὸς ἐστί, ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· “γένετο δ’ αὖν μάλιστα τοῦτον ἐμφασίς ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταῷ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιφαίνει τὸ ζῶον γεγενῆσθαι ἐνεκα τῆς κέρκου καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν, τῷ <δ> ἄρρени γενομένῳ οὕτως ἡ θῆλυς συνηκολούθηκεν.”

δ ἡ θῆλυς συνηκολούθηκεν Pohlenz. ἡ θηλυδοῦς [vcl. θηλυγούη] ἡκολούθηκεν [vcl. ἠσαν; uodā.

Context: criticism of Chrysippus for censuring those who keep ornamental peacocks, yet holding the bird's beauty to be the gift of providence.

δ συνηκολούθηκεν. Even if the prefix is correctly restored, the term is probably equivalent to Chrysippus' technical term παρακολούθησις (Q 28). The peacock exists for his beauty, the peahen as a necessary concomitant, not intrinsically valuable, but indispensable to his reproduction.

P Porphyry, *Abs.* 3.20.1–3 (including SVF 2.1152)

(1) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο νῆ Δία τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν [ῆ] ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποίησαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῶα· συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεῖν κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας. ἡ δὲ ὅς – ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐστί τῶν χαρίτων τὸ ἥδιον – οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι πλὴν θύεσθαι ἐγγέγονε, καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς οἶον ἀφῆκεν ἐνέμιξεν, εὐσφίαν ἡμῖν μηχανώμενος. ὅπως δὲ ζωμοῦ καὶ παραδεισίων ἀφθονίαν ἔχωμεν, διττὰ τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ πορφύρας καὶ ἀκαλῆφας καὶ γένη πτηνῶν ποικίλα παρεσκεύασεν, οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτοῦ μέγα μέρος ἐνταῦθα τρέψας, εἰς γλυκυθυμίας τὰς τετθῆς ὑπεμβυλλόμενοι, καὶ κατωπυκνῶσαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀπολαύσεσι τὸν περίγειον τόπον. (2) ὅτω δὴ ταῦτα δοκεῖ τι τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ θεῷ πρόποντος μετέχειν, ἀσκοπεῖτω τί πρὸς ἐκείνον ἐρεῖ τὸν λόγον ὃν Κερνεάδης ἔλεγεν· ἕκαστον τῶν φύσει γεγονότων, ὅταν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε καὶ γέγονε τυγχάνῃ τέλους, ὠφελείται. (κοινώτερον δὲ τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν εὐχρηστίαν αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀκουατέον.) ἡ δὲ ὅς φύσει γέγονε πρὸς τὸ σφαγῆναι καὶ καταβριωθῆναι· καὶ τοῦτο πάσχειν τυγχάνει τοῦ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε, καὶ ὠφελείται.

1 ῆ del. Bernardakis. ῆν Dübner.

Context: response to Peripatetic and Stoic positions which conflict with Porphyry's vegetarianism.

Cf. the very similar Cicero, *ND* 2.160–1.

12–14 Carneades makes it clear that he is borrowing a Stoic premise – his regular method. But we have not found any close Stoic parallel for the premise in question.

13 εὐχρηστία For this Stoic term for non-moral 'advantage', as contrasted with ἀφέλεια in its narrow moral sense, cf. *SVF* 3.123, 674

Q Gellius 7.1.1–13 (*SVF* 2.1169–70)

(1) (quibus non videtur mundus dei et hominum causa institutus neque res humanae providentia gubernari, gravi se argumento uti putant cum ita dicunt: "si esset providentia, nulla essent mala" nihil enim minus aiunt providentiae congruere, quam in eo mundo, quem propter homines fecisse dicatur, tantam vim esse acriminarum et malorum, adversus ea Chrysippus cum in libro *Περὶ προνοίας* quarto dissereret: "nihil est prorsus istis" inquit "insubidiis, qui opinantur bona esse potuisse si non essent ibidem mala. nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter sese et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque fulta visu consistere; nullum aden contrarium est sine contrario altero. quo enim pacto iustitiae sensus esse posset, nisi essent iniuriae? aut quid aliud iustitia est quam iniustitiae privatio? quid item fortitudo intellegi posset nisi ex ignaviae adpositione? quid continentia nisi ex intemperantiae? quo item modo prudentia esset, nisi foret contra imprudentia? proinde" inquit "homines stulti cur non hoc etiam desiderant, ut veritas sit et non sit mendacium? namque idem sunt bona et mala, felicitas et infortunitas, dolor et voluptas; alterum enim ex altero, sicuti Plato ait, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est; si tuleris unum, abstuleris utrumque." (2) idem Chrysippus in eodem libro tractat consideratque dignumque esse id quaeri putat, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, id est, (3) natura ipsa rerum vel providentia, quae compagem hanc mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios; numquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum, "sed cum multa" inquit "atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda his ipsis quae faciebat cohaerentia"; eaque per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. "sicut" inquit "cum corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis postulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret, sed hanc utilitatem rei maioris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est ut fieret caput tenenter munitum et ictibus offensioribusque parvis fragile, proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt dum salus paritur. (3) sicut hercle" inquit "dum virtus hominibus

per consilium naturae gignitur, vitra ibidem per adfinitatem contrariam nata sunt.¹²

35

1-4 c Lactantius, *epit. Div. inst.* 2.4.5 supplenda 20 post *eaque* <nun> vel <inque> vulgo

1-5 These opponents are likely to be Academics (cf. **R**) and Epicureans (cf. **13F** 6-7).

R Lactantius, *De ira dei* 13.9-10 (*SVF* 2.1172)

sed Academici contra Stoicos dissonantes solent quaerere cur, si omnia deus hominum causa fecerit, etiam multa contraria et inimica et pestifera nobis reperiantur tam in mari quam in terra, quod Stoici veritatem non perspicientes ineptissime repulerunt. aiunt enim multa esse in gignentibus et in numero animalium quorum adhuc lateat utilitas, sed eam processu temporum inveniri, sicut iam multa prioribus saeculis incognita necessitas et usus invenerit.

5

6 *inveniri* <2> (cf. id. *Div. inst.* 1.6.13) Brandt: *invenitur* uodol *inveniri* edd. ceteri

Context: defence of the Stoic theory of providence, with Lactantius' modification that evils were created along with goods in order to confront human wisdom with choices, rather than for the reason quoted here.

S Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1051B c (*SVF* 2.1178, part)

(1) ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἀπάντων περαινομένων, πολλάκις γεγραφώς, (2) ἔστιν ὅπου πάλιν ἐγκλητὰς τινὰς ἀμελείας οὐ περὶ μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα καταλείπει. ἐν γοῦν τῷ τρίτῳ *Ἡερὶ οὐσίας* μνησθεῖς ὅτι συμβαίνει τινὰ τοῖς καλοῖς καγαθοῖς τοιαῦτα, "πότερον" φησὶν "ἀμελονημένων τινῶν, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζονσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροὶ τινες τῶν ὅλων εὐ οἰκονομουμένων, ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίσταθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν αἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμελείαι;" (3) φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῆχθαι.

5

It may be doubted whether any real contradiction is involved. The suggestions at 5-8 are in interrogative form, and Chrysippus may not have entertained them seriously (although some Stoics did accept the first, to judge from Cicero, *ND* 1.86, 90). There may possibly have been evil spirits in Chrysippus' world (cf. *SVF* 2.1101, 1104), but if so they were surely part of its providential structure. The assertion about necessity at 8-9 certainly is meant seriously, but if good men's sufferings are necessary they are indispensable 'concomitants' of nature's interproachable plan (cf. **Q** 2), and therefore not 'blameworthy cases of negligence' (3).

T Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1050B D (*SVF* 2.937, part)

καίτοι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἁμωσγέντως στρέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ, τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως

μηχανούμενος ἐλευθερώσαι καὶ ἀπολύσει τὴν ἐκούσιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλείπειν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν κακίαν· (ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος) ἀναπεπταμένην παρρησίαν αὐτῇ δίδωσιν ὥς οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ καθ' εἰμαρμένην ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πεποιημένη τὴν ἀρίστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῦθ' ὁράται κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχοντα· 'τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης δεήσει πάν τὰ ὁπωσούν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὅτεα οὖν κατ' ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς ἀκωλύτως διὰ τὸ μὴτ' ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνοστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινήθῃσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως (ἢ) κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν.' τίνες οὖν αἱ τῶν μερῶν σχέσεις εἰσὶ καὶ κινήσεις; δῆλον μὲν ὅτι σχέσεις αἱ κακίαι καὶ τὰ νοσήματα, φιλαργυρίαι φιληδονίαι φιλοδοξίαι δειλίαι ἀδικίαι, κινήσεις δὲ μοιχεύει κλοπαὶ προδοσίαι ἀνδροφονίαι πατροκτονίαι. τούτων οἷεται Χρύσιππος οὔτε μικρόν οὔτε μέγα παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον εἶναι καὶ νόμον καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν.

ἡ ὅλη Wyttienbach: λόγου could.

Context: criticism of Chrysippus for his alleged self-contradiction in holding the view quoted yet stating elsewhere that god is responsible for nothing shameful.

1-3 The Epicurean 'swerve' doctrine: see 20

10-11 For this standard division of qualities into states and processes, cf. 28N 2-

3

U Calcidius 144 (SVF 2.933)

(1) itaque non nulli putant praesumi differentiam providentiae fatique, cum reapse una sit, quippe providentiam dei fore voluntatem, voluntatem porro eius seriem esse causarum, et ex eo quidem, quia voluntas, providentia est, porro quia eadem series causarum est, fatum cognominatum, ex quo fieri ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. (2) alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes.

Context: discussion of the view, attributed to Plato on the strength of *Tim.* 41d8-e3, that providence preceded fate.

3 **providentia est** The interjection of direct speech is harsh. Emending to *providentiam* or *providentiam esse* would restore the grammar, but we are not convinced that it would be justified.

55 Causation and fate

A Stobaeus 1.138.14 139.4 (SVF 1.89 and 2.336)

(1) Ζήνωνος· αἴτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὃ, οὐδ' αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὐδ' αἴτιον κατηγορήμα. (2) ἀδύνατον δ' εἶναι τὸ

μὲν αἴτιον παρεῖναι, οὐδὲ ἔστιν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. (3) τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον
 τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἰτίον ἔστι δι' ὃ γίνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν
 γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν
 σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἰδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περὶ
 5 τινα οὕσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονησεως μὴ φρονεῖν. (4)
 Χρυσίππου. Χρυσίππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ
 σῶμα, (οὐδὲ αἴτιον μήτε ὄν μήτε σῶμα·) καὶ αἴτιον μὲν ὅτι, οὐδὲ αἴτιον
 διὰ τί. (5) αἰτίαν δ' εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου, ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς
 αἰτίου.

9 add. Wachsmuth coll. 119, 7 8 μὲν L. om. PP 10 διὰ τί codd. διατί codd. διὰ τί Heeren

Context: doxography of cause.

1 συμβεβηκός An actualized κατηγορημα. cf. 51B 4

B Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9.211 (SVF 2.341)

εἶγε Στωικοὶ μὲν πᾶν αἴτιον σῶμά φασι σῶματι ἀσωμάτου τινὸς αἴτιον
 γίνεσθαι, οἷον σῶμα μὲν τὸ αμιλίον, σῶματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ
 τέμνεσθαι κατηγορηματος· καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σῶματι δὲ τῷ
 ζύλῳ, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καίεσθαι κατηγορηματος.

Context: classification of views on the nature of cause.

C Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.26.3-4

τὸ γίνεσθαι οὖν καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, τὸ οὐ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἐνέργειαί οὖσαι
 ἀσωμάτοι εἰσιν. εἰς ὃν λόγον κατηγορημάτων ἢ, ὥς τινες, λεκτῶν (λεκτὰ
 γὰρ τὰ κατηγορήματα καλοῦσιν Κλεάνθης καὶ Ἀρχέδημος) τὰ αἴτια ἢ,
 ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον, τὰ μὲν κατηγορημάτων αἴτια λεχθήσεται, οἷον τοῦ
 τέμνεται, οὐ πῶσις τὸ τέμνεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀξιωματῶν, ὡς τοῦ ναῦς γίνεται,
 5 οὐ πάλιν ἢ πῶσις ἔστι τὸ ναῦν γίνεσθαι.

1 οὐ codd. ὡς Strähln αἴτια Wofel αἴτια codd 2 αἴτια codd. καθ' Ἀριστ. δι' Strähln 3 τοῦ
 Ἀριστ. τὸ codd. 5 γίνεσθαι Hervet τέμνεσθαι codd γίνεται Hervet. γίνεσθαι codd 6 ἢ
 del. Armin. Wilamowitz

Context: exposition of causal theory. Here Clement is reporting the view that effects are incorporeal. He is not speaking as a Stoic, but there seems every indication that he is using Stoic causal theory.

Clement contrasts the view that effects are predicates with the view that they are προσηγοραί (cf. S.F., *PH* 3.14 for the same opposition). The latter, which he attributes to Aristotle, is not of course the thesis that effects are linguistic items. The debate is as to whether effects are properly things, expressible with common nouns and adjectives, or predicates which come to be true of things.

3 Κλεάνθης As Frede has observed ([534], 233), this is the earliest attribution of the doctrine of incorporeal λεκτά, and it is not unlikely that it was in the context of causation that the doctrine was first developed.

§ 6 **πῶσις** 'Substantial form' See vol. 1, 201. We see no reason to share Frede's doubts ([418], 67–8) that this is a Stoic usage, although we do recognize a departure from Stoic orthodoxy in 330, which follows almost directly after this text (see vol. 1, 201, vol. 2 ad loc.).

D Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.30.1–3 (SVF 2.349)

(1) ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ αἷτια, ἀλλήλοις δὲ αἷτια. ἡ γὰρ σπληνικὴ διάθεσις προϋποκειμένη οὐ πυρετοῦ αἷτιος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸν πυρετόν· καὶ ὁ πυρετὸς προϋποκειμένος οὐ σπληνός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐξεσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν. (2) οὕτως καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἀλλήλαις αἷτιαι τοῦ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντακολουθίαν, καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ψαλίδος λίθοι ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἷτιοι τοῦ μένειν κατηγορήματος, ἀλλήλων δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἷτιοι· καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος δὲ καὶ ὁ μαθητὴς ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἷτιοι τοῦ προκόπτειν κατηγορήματος. (3) λέγεται δὲ ἀλλήλοις αἷτια ποτὲ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὥς ὁ ἔμπορος καὶ ὁ κάπηλος ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἷτιοι τοῦ κερδαίνειν, ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου, καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα καὶ ἡ σάβρη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι, ἡ σάβρη δὲ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ τοῦ τέμνειν.

4 τοῦ Sylburg τὰς ἐκδ.

Context: as C.

§ **ἀντακολουθίαν** See vol. 1, 383–4.

E Seneca, *Ep.* 65.2

dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet inert, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit, esse ergo debet unde fiat aliquid, deinde a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia.

Context: a discourse on the primary cause, comparing the Stoic account favourably with those of Plato and Aristotle

3 **ratio** Identified with god at ibid. 23; cf. 44

F Galen, *Caus. cont.* 1.1–2.4

(1) Stoycos philosophos novi primos contentivam causam que et coniuncta dicitur nominare, volunt enim ex quatuor quidem elementis facta esse vocata ab Aristotele quidem omniomera corpora, primogenita autem a Platone, ex his autem alia corpora componi, elementorum autem quedam quidem materialia nuncupant, quedam autem activa et virtuosa, et contineri dicunt a virtuosis materialia, et esse ignem quidem et aeternam activam, terram vero et aquam materialia, et pertransire tota per tota in concrectionibus, scilicet virtuosa per materialia, ut aerem et ignem per aquam et terram, et esse aeternam quidem frigidum, ignem vero calidum, et congregari et implari substantiam ab aerea

natura, extendi vero et effundi et multum accipere locum ab ignea et esse
 leptomerea quidem elementa activa, grossiparcia vero reliqua. spiritum autem
 vocant leptomeream substantiam omnem, et eius opus esse continere alia
 corpora physica et ea que animalium, nomen autem physica, quorum
 generatio non ab hominibus sed a natura fit. talia autem sunt es et ferrum et
 aurum et ligna et particularum que in animalibus prime et omiomere vocatæ,
 scilicet nervus et vena et arteria et cartillago et os et quecumque alie tales. sicut
 autem homines ligna per collam et colligationem et clavos et lutum et gipsum
 et calcem coniunt ad invicem, sic videmus et naturam per colligationem
 <et> cartillaginem et carnem unientem et applicantem ad invicem omnes
 particulas animalis et vocare licet ei quicumque voluerit coniunctas causas
 compositarum particularum eas que naturam operantur simplicium que sunt
 in eis, sicut in exterioribus quecumque non natura sed ars humana compaginat
 scilicet lutum et gipsum et calcem et quecumque alia talia his utilitatibus
 famulantur, vocantur autem a Stoicis non hec coniuncte cause entium, sed
 subtilipartis substantia materialis. (2) Athineum igitur Attaleum, qui spiritua-
 lem nominatam heresim in medicativa primo cepit, coniunctam vocare
 causam egritudinum decens est ceu a Stoicorum heresi deductum (conservatus
 enim fuit cum Posidonio), alios vero medicos, quicumque dogmata colunt
 alia, coniunctam causam singule egritudinum non congruit querere, sicut
 neque omiomeroz corporum que secundum naturam habent: ergo neque
 differentias causarum sicut Athineus dicebat tres esse primas et generalissimas
 contingit dicere eos. (3) differentie vero, quas dicebat Athineus esse tres, sunt
 hec: prima quidem coniunctarum, secunda vero antecedentium, tertia autem
 in procatarticarum materia continetur, vocant autem ita omnia quecumque
 extra corpus existentia nocent ei operantia egritudinem; de genere autem
 operantium intus existentia antecedentes cause vocantur; alterationes autem
 innati spiritus que fiunt ab his et etiam ab extrinsecis humectato et seccato et
 infrigidato et calefacto corpore coniunctas egritudinum ait esse causas,
 pertransit enim spiritus iste per omiomera corpora sibi ipsi coalterans ea.
 multociens igitur confutem a procatarticiis causis fieri dicunt coniunctas.

This work survives only in Arabic and Latin translations, of which the latter, by Niccolo di Deoprepio da Reggio di Calabria (fourteenth century), is given above. Our translation, however, is an adaptation of that from the Arabic by M.C. Lyons, whose advice on some points of detail we also gratefully acknowledge.

12 We take 'all the substance with fine parts' perhaps τὴν λεπτομερῆ οὐσίαν πᾶσαν to refer back to the combination of the two active elements. The Arabic does mean 'any substance with fine parts', but that would give a quite unparalleled usage of πνεῦμα, and we suspect the translator of missing the precise sense intended by Galen. Possibly the definite article had fallen out of his copy.

32ff. For this technical medical use of αἷτα προηγούμενα, cf. also Galen, *Met. med.* 10.65-7, *Proes. puls.* 9.386, *Syn. puls.* 438, *Caus. puls.* 9.2-3, and the attribution of it to Athenæus at *Def. med.* 19.392. However, the more general application to any

temporally antecedent cause, which we ascribe to the Stoics in vol. 1, is also frequent in Galen, even in these very same works, eg. *Praes. puls.* 9.267, *Caus. puls.* 9.156.

G Actius 1.11.5 (SVF 2.340)

οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἰτία σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ.

Context: doxography of cause. This sentence occupies the same position in the ps-Plutarch version as A does in the Stobaeus version

H Galen, *Syn. puls.* 9.458,8–14 (SVF 2.356)

μεμνησθαι μέντοι χρή πρὸ πάντων ὅπως ἔφαμεν ὀνομάζειν ἐνίοτε συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον, ὅτι μὴ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ καταχρώμενοι τῇ προσηγορίᾳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κυρίως λεγόμενον αἴτιον συνεκτικὸν οὐτ' ὠνόμασέ τις ἄλλος πρὸ τῶν Στωικῶν οὐτ' εἶναι συνεχώρησε· τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸ ἡμῶν οἶον συνεκτικὰ λεγόμενα γενέσεώς τινος, οὐχ ὑπάρξεως αἰτία.

Context: the three basic kinds of cause (as listed in F 3) of pulses

I Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.33.1–9 (SVF 2.351)

(1) τῶν μὲν οὖν προκαταρκτικῶν αἰρομένων μένει τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, (2) συνεκτικὸν δὲ ἔστιν αἴτιον, οὐ παρόντος μένει τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἰρομένου αἴρεται. τὸ δὲ συνεκτικὸν συνωνύμως καὶ αὐτοτελὲς καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτάρκως δι' αὐτοῦ ποιητικὸν ἔστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος. (3) εἰ δὲ <τούτο> τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοτελοῦς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ δηλατικόν, τὸ συνεργὸν ὑπηρεσίαν σημαίνει καὶ τὴν σὺν ἑτέρῳ λειτουργίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν παρέχεται, οὐδὲ συνεργὸν λεχθήσεται, εἰ δὲ παρέχεται, τούτου πάντως γίνεται αἴτιον οὐ καὶ παρέχεται, τουτέστιν τοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ γινομένου. ἔστιν οὖν συνεργὸν οὐ παρόντος ἐγίνετο τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, προδήλως μὲν οὖν παρόντος <προδύλου>, ἀδήλως δὲ ἀδύλου. (4) καὶ τὸ συναίτιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καθάπερ ὁ συστρατιώτης στρατιώτης καὶ ὁ συνέφηβος ἔφηβος. τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεργὸν αἴτιον τῶ συνεκτικῷ πρὸς τὴν ἐπίτασιν βοηθεῖ τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γινομένου, τὸ δὲ συναίτιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἐννοίας· δύναται γὰρ συναίτιον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον ἢ τι. νοεῖται γὰρ σὺν ἑτέρῳ τὸ συναίτιον οὐδ' αὐτῷ δυναμένῳ κατ' ἰδίαν ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, αἴτιον ὃν σὺν αἰτίῳ, (5) διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ συναίτιου τὸ συνεργὸν ἐν τῷ τὸ συναίτιον <μεθ' ἑτέρου> κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ ποιούντος τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα παρέχειν, τὸ δὲ συνεργὸν, ἐν τῷ κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ ποιεῖν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ προσερχόμενον, τῷ κατ' ἰδίαν ποιοῦντι συνεργεῖν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ σφαιδρότατον γίνεσθαι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἐκ προκαταρκτικοῦ συνεργὸν γεγονέναι τὴν τοῦ αἰτίου διατείνειν δύναμιν παρίστησιν.

5 <τούτο> τὸ κατέλεξε καὶ ἀποτελέσει > Stahlh. 9 10 προδύλως ἀδύλως P. Hübner. Attnm. προδύλως . ἀδύλως could 10 <προδύλου> P. Hübner 17 <μεθ' ἑτέρου> Stahlh. 18 ἐν τῷ δι' Stahlh. 19 συνεργεῖν <ε> Stahlh. 20 σφαιδρότατον could ἀδύλως Attnm.

Context: classification of causes. Cf. C.

1 προκαταρκτικῶν Defined earlier (ibid. 8.9.25.2) as τὰ πρῶτως ἀφορμὴν παρέχόμενα εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τι.

J Aetius 1.28.4 (SVF 2.917)

οἱ Στωικοὶ εἰρμόν αἰτιῶν, τουτέστι τάξιν καὶ ἐπισύνδεσιν ἀπαράβατον.

εἰ ἐπισυνῶναι vel ἐπιδέσιν codd.

Context: doxography of views on fate.

K Gellius 7.2.3 (SVF 2.1000, part)

in libro enim *Περὶ προνοίας* quarto εἰμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικὴν τινὰ σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ αἰδίου τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μεταπαλουμένων ἀπαραβάτου οὐσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς.

3 μεταπαλουμένων Kumamides: ΜΕΤΑΠΛΟΥΜΕΝΩΝ codd.: μὴ ἀπολωμένων Usener

Context: how Chrysippus reconciled fate with human responsibility (cf. 62D).

L Cicero, *Div.* 1.125-6 (SVF 2.921)

(1) fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. (2) ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna, quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. (3) ex quo intellegitur ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose, sed id quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint, et quae iustant fieri, et quae sequuntur futura sint.

Context: appeal to fate as providing the theoretical basis for divination. Cf. 42.

2 5 Cf. 13H 26 8.

M Stobaeus 1.79.1-12 (SVF 2.913, part)

(1) Χρῆσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικὴν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ *Περὶ κόσμου*, (2) ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ *Περὶ ὥρων* καὶ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης* καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων· εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διακυμμένων, ἢ λόγος καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. (3) μεταλαμβάνει δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην, προστιθεὶς καὶ ἐτέρας ὀνομασίας, ὥς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τασσομένας καθ' ἐτέρας καὶ ἐτέρας ἐπιβολάς.

3 ὥρων F. ὥρων Heeren 4 ἐπιβολάς Wachsmuth ἐπιβολῶν codd.

Context: doxography of views on fate (sharing its source with that from which J is excerpted)

N Alexander, *Fat.* 191.30–192.28 (SVF 2.945)

(1) φυσὴν δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ἓνα ὄντα καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχοντα καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς, ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν αἰδίου κατὰ εἰρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προοῦσαν, τῶν πρώτων τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα γινομένοις αἰτίων γινομένων, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συνδεομένων ἀλλήλοις ἀπάντων, καὶ μήτε οὕτως 5 τινὸς ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένου ὥς μὴ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ συνήφθαι ὡς αἰτίῳ ἑτερόν τι, μήτ' αὐ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τινὸς ἀπολεῖσθαι δυναμένου τῶν προγεγονότων ὥς μὴ τινὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν ὥσπερ συνδεόμενον ἀλλὰ παντὶ τε τῷ γενομένῳ ἑτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἡρτημένον (ἐξ) αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι 10 πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται. (2) μὴδὲν γὰρ ἀναίτιός τις μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μὴδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένου τε καὶ κεχωρισμένου τῶν προγεγονότων ἀπάντων, διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἓνα μένειν, αἰεὶ κατὰ μὴν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις· ἣν εἰσάγεσθαι, 15 εἰ μὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ γινόμενα ἔχοι τινὰ αἰτία προγεγονότα οἷς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπεται ὁμοίον τε εἶναι φανερὸν καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναίτιός τῳ γίνεσθαι τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. τοιαύτην δὲ οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησιν ἐξ ἀπείρου εἰς ἀπείρου ἐναργῶς τε καὶ ἀκαταστρόφως γίνεσθαι. (3) οὕσης δὲ τινος διανοίας ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἣν ἐκτιθέντες σημήνος [γὰρ] αἰτίων καταλέγουσιν, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικά, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἐκτικά, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τι (οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν λόγον μηκύνειν, πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα παρατιθέμενον, ἀλλ') τὸ βούλημα αὐτῶν δεῖξαι τοῦ περὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης δόγματος· ὧν τῶν δὴ πλείονων αἰτίων, ἐπ' ἴσης ἐπὶ πάντων αὐτῶν ἀληθές φασιν εἶναι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπάντων 25 περιεστηκότων περὶ τε τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ᾧ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ὅτε μὲν δὴ μὴ οὕτωςί πως συμβαίνειν, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως. ἔσεσθαι γάρ, εἰ οὕτως γίνοντο, ἀναίτιόν τινα κίνησιν. (4) τὴν δὲ εἰμαρμένην αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν λόγον καθ' ὃν διοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναι φασιν, οὖσαν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς τε καὶ γινομένοις ἅπασιν καὶ οὕτως χρωμένῃ ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει πρὸς τὴν 30 τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν.

10 add. Orrells 19 ἀναργῶς codd., ἀναργῶς Usener, Arntzen 20 del. Arntzen 21 ἐκτικὰ καὶ συνεκτικὰ vel ἀρκετικὰ vel ἐκτικὰ codd. 23 suppl. Arntzen 24 δὴ καὶ δ' ἴση codd.

Context: critique of the Stoic defence of determinism.

11 ἀναίτιός Cf. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1045c. in defending strict determinism, Chrysippus found himself rebusing certain philosophers who had posited an ἐπικτατική τις κίνησις in the commanding-faculty to solve the 'Buridan's ass' problem of how a person, faced with having to take one of two 'indiscernibles' (e.g.

two identical-looking coms, see note on 58B), succeeds in deciding between them. These philosophers had introduced a 'supervenient mental motion' because, as they claimed, 'no cause directs us to one rather than the other'. Chrysippus, in his rejoinder, insisted that the person's impulse, in such circumstances, is caused, even though the cause eludes the person's consciousness. What might be mistakenly regarded as genuinely spontaneous events, e.g. the fall of a dice, are, he argued, entirely determined by causal factors, which are features either of the dice itself or of its external conditions. Chrysippus' opponents in this passage are often regarded as Epicureans, and their 'supervenient mental motion' identified with the swerve of atoms (cf. 20). But both suppositions are dubious. Plutarch's language does not recall Epicureanism, nor is the problem these philosophers address one which is known to have interested the Epicureans. The Academics are more promising candidates. Criticism of Stoic determinism, and facing the Stoics with problems over apparent 'indiscernibles', were well-known Academic preoccupations. If this is so, the position Chrysippus opposes will not have been an official school doctrine, but a problem and solution canvassed by Academics in order to discomfit the Stoics.

21 **ἐκτικὰ** A unique occurrence of this term in lists of causes, if the reading is sound. For the problem, see Raeth [351], 67 ff., Sharples [333], 153–4.

28–31 For these equivalences, cf. 54B.

O Cicero, *Div.* 1.127 (*SVF* 2.944)

praeterea, cum fato omnia fiant (id quod alio loco ostendetur), si quis mortalis possit esse qui conligationem causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat quae futura sint. quod cum nemo facere nisi deus possit, relinquendum est homini ut signis quibusdam consequentia declarantibus futura praesentiat. non enim illa quae futura sunt, subito existunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis.

Context: shortly after L.

P Diogenianus (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 4.3.1 – *SVF* 2.939, part)

φέρεי δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν ἐν τῷ προειρημένῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς αὐτῆς τινά· μὴ γὰρ ἂν τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρήσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης περιέχοντο.

Context: attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of fate. Chrysippus is accused of circularity. fate is here proved from divination, but belief in divination already presupposes the fate doctrine (cf. O).

Q Cicero, *Fat.* 7–8

(1) ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur, cui quidem primum de ipsa contagione rerum respondeamus, reliqua postea persequemur. inter locorum naturas

quantum interis̄t videmus; alios esse salubris, alios pestilentis; in alijs esse pituitosos et quasi redundantis, in alijs exsiccatos atque aridos; multaue sunt alia quae inter locum et locum plurimum differant. Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici; crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes. (2) tamen neque illud tenue caelum efficiet, ut aut Zenonem quis aut Arcesilam aut Theophrastum audiat; neque crassum, ut Nemea potius quam Isthmo victoriam petat. diiunge longius: quid enim loci natura adferre potest, ut in porticu Pompei potius quam in Campo ambulemus? tecum quam cum alio? Idibus potius quam Kalendis? ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loca pertinet aliquid, ad quasdam autem nihil, sic astrorum adfectio valeat, si vis, ad quasdam res, ad omnis certe non valebit (3) at enim, quoniam in naturis hominum dissimilitudines sunt, ut alios dulcia, alios subamara delectent, alii libidinosi, alii iracundi aut crudeles aut superbi sint, alii <a> talibus vitiis abhorreant; quoniam igitur, inquit, tantum natura a natura distat, quid mirum est has dissimilitudines ex differentibus causis esse factas?

Context: attack on the doctrine of fate, here replying to arguments of Chrysippus recorded in the lost part of the work. What school is represented by the speaker is a matter of controversy (see the introduction to Von's edition).

R Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1056B C (SVF 2.997, part)

(1) ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι Χρύσιππος οὐκ αὐτοτελῇ τούτων αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἰμαρμένην, ἐκεῖ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἀποδείξει μαχόμενον πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅπου τὸν μὲν "Ὁμηρον ὑπερφυνῶς ἐπαινεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντα "τῷ ἔχεθ' ὅτι κεν ὕμμι κικλὸν πέμπῃσιν ἑκάστω", . . . αὐτὸς δὲ πολλὰ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενα γράφει, τέλος δὲ φησι μὴδὲν ἰσχεσθαι μὴδὲ κενεῖσθαι μὴδὲ ταυλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον, ὅν τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. (2) ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προκαταρκτικὸν αἴτιον ἀσθενέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς, καὶ οὐκ ἐξικνεῖται κρατούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐνισταμένων· τὴν δ' εἰμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἀτρεπτον ἀποφαίνων.

ὑ ἐνισταμένων vel ἐξανισταμένων cecidit

Context: critique of Chrysippus' thesis that φαντασίαι do not themselves compel assent. If this is so, argues Plutarch, fate will not compel assent either.

For this Chrysippean idea that fate operates on us by means of φαντασίαι only, which constitute preliminary, not complete, causes, cf. 62C.

S Cicero, *Fat.* 28–30

(1) nec nos impedit illa "ignava ratio" quae dicitur (appellatur enim quidam a philosophis ἀργὸς λόγος); cui si pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita: sic enim interrogant. "si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, convalesces; nem. si fatum tibi est ex

hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, non convalesces, et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihili attinet." . . . (2) haec ratio a Chrysippo reprehenditur. quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata. simplex est "morietur illo die Socrates"; huic, sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. at si ita fatum sit "nascetur Oedipus Laio", non poterit dici "sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit"; copulata enim res est et confatalis. sic enim appellat quia ita fatum sit et concubiturum cum uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum. ut, si esset dictum "luctabitur Olympis Milon", et referret aliquis "ergo sive habuerit adversarium sive non habuerit, luctabitur", erraret. est enim copulatum "luctabitur", quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est. (3) omnes igitur istius generis captiones eodem modo refelluntur. "sive tu adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces" captiosum; tam enim est fatale medicum adhibere quam convalescere. haec, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat.

Context: see 70G.

2 ἀργὸς λόγος For the form of the title, cf. vol. 1, 229. The argument's origin is unknown, but there is an obvious temptation to guess that it is from the same stable as the κυριεῖων λόγος and the θερίζων λόγος (31M; 38A–B, I), namely the Dialectical school.

11 confatalis = συνευαρμένος. See the parallel passage at 62F.

ETHICS

56 The division of ethical topics

A Diogenes Laertius 7.84 (S1F 11)

τὸ δ' ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περὶ τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. οὕτω δ' ὑποδιαίρουσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Πασειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης, ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι, ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. οὗτοι δὲ διεῖλον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικόν.

Context: the beginning of Diogenes' doxography of Stoic ethics.

B Seneca, Ep. 89.14

ergo cum triperita sit philosophia, moralem eius partem primum incipiamus disponere. quam in tria rursus dividi placuit . . . primum enim est ut quanti quidque sit iudices, secundum ut impetum ad illa caritas ordinatum

temperatunisque, tertium ut inter impetum tuum actionemque conveniat, ut in omnibus istis tibi ipse consentias.

2 *quanti Muret. quattuor codd*

Context: the divisions of philosophy

Panaetius may well be responsible for the tripartite division of ethics. His name is absent from **A**, which includes Posidonius; and Cicero, *Off.* 2.18, probably based on Panaetius, specifies three spheres of action for every virtue, which closely correspond to the arrangement laid out in **B–C**.

C Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.2.1–5

(1) *τρεις εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν·* (2) *ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μὴτ' ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνῃ μὴτ' ἐκκλίνων περιπίπτῃ·* (3) *ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμῶν καὶ ἀφορμῶν καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθήκον, ἵνα τάξῃ, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς·* (4) *τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις.* (5) *τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξειως ἀποτυγχανούσης ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης. αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ τιραχῆς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἰμωγᾶς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονοῦς, ὁ ζηλοτύπους ποιῶν, δι' ὧν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι λόγου δυνάμεθα.* (6) *δεύτερος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὸ καθήκον· οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τῆς φυσικᾶς καὶ ἐπιθέτου ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς πῖόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην.* (7) *τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἥδη τοῖς προκόπτουσιν ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μὴδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθούσα φαντασία μὴδ' ἐν οἰνῶσει μὴδὲ μελαγχολώοντος.*

Context: the opening of a discourse on the subjects that must be studied for moral progress.

For detailed discussion, cf. Bouhöffer [311], 19–28. Epictetus refers to one or more of these topics in 1.17.22; 2.17.15–16, 32–3; 4.1.69; 4.4.13; 4.10.13.

2 *ὀρέξεις* Epictetus treats *ὀρεxis* as a distinct psychological faculty whereas in Cynic/Stoic Stoicism it refers to a species of *ὁρμή*, cf. 53Q 4–5. In Epictetus, as his first two 'topics' indicate, the object of *ὀρεxis* is the good or the apparent good (cf. 60F), that of *ὁρμή* the performance of *καθήκοντα*; cf. Inwood [347], 115–26.

3 *ἀνεικαιότητα* Cf. 31B 3, 41D 1. The presence of this 'dialectical' virtue shows that Epictetus' topics, though all ethical in their orientation, draw upon some material which earlier Stoics (cf. 26) would have assigned to another 'part' of philosophy.

7 *ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη* i.e. the first topic.

11–13 Cf. 59Q; 66F 2.

15–16 Intoxication and depression are singled out because they are the standard conditions which could destroy virtue, cf. 61I 2. Zeno (*Sto.* 1.234) claimed that everyone could assess their progress from the moral purity or impurity of their dreams, a tougher index of a sound character than even Plato required, cf. *Rep.* 9. 572b.

57 Impulse and appropriateness

A Diogenes Laertius 7.85–6 (SVF 3.178)

(1) τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμὴν φασὶ τὸ ζῶον ἰσχεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρυσίππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελείων, (2) πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγειν εἶναι παντὶ ζῳῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνειδήσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτὸ μήτ' ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ' [οὐκ] οἰκειῶσαι. 5 ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστημαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ· οὕτω γὰρ τὰ τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προαίεται. (3) ὁ δὲ λέγουσίν τινας, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῴοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγένημα γὰρ φαίνεται, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἢ φύσιν ἐπιζητήσῃς τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει 10 ἀπολάβῃ, ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῶα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά. (4) οὐδὲν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, ὅτε χωρὶς ὁρμῆς καὶ αἰσθησεως καὶ κείνα οἰκονομεῖ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τινα φυτυειδῶς γίνεται. ἐκ περιττοῦ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπιγενομένης, ἥ συγχρώμενα πορεύεται 15 πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα, ταῦτοις μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διωικεῖσθαι (5) τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν πρῆστασιάν δεδομένου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι (τού)τοις κατὰ φύσιν τεχνίτης γὰρ οὗτος ἐπιγίνεται τῆς ὁρμῆς.

2 αὐτὸ B¹ αὐτὸ F 4 συνειδήσιν | συστημαμένην Peckelitz 5 εἰ ὁ (ἐκείν) Diogenes 6 ποιήσασαν Reiske 7 συστήναι ἢ αὐτὸ 8 οὐδ' ἐκ Zeller 9 οἰκονομεῖ Stobaeus 10 οἰκονομῶν 11 τοῦ δ' F αὐτὴν BF 12 ὅτι B¹F¹ 13 καὶ 14 15 το B¹ τὸ F 16 καὶ τὴν Reiske

Context: immediately following 56A. With 1–9, cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 3.16.

3 **πρῶτον οἰκεῖον** For the interpretation of the term, cf. Penhroke (1964), 141 n. 8.

5 Zeller's deletion of οὐκ needs to be reassessed, in view of recent support for the MSS reading; cf. Kerferd [567], 185 n. 1. If οὐκ is retained, οὐκ οἰκειῶσαι becomes virtually synonymous with ἀλλοτριῶσαι, and this destroys the argument since οἰκειῶσαι must be established as the only reasonable alternative to ἀλλοτριῶσαι, which has been eliminated.

9 **ἐπιγένημα** This account of pleasure (cf. 43A 7) is often thought to betray the influence of Aristotle, *EN* x.3, 1174b31ff., τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν . . . ὡς ἐπιγενομένων τι τέλος, οἷον ταῖς ἀκμαίσις ἡ ὥρα, cf. Long (1991), 80, and Sandbach [304], 27 n. 8, who is unconvinced. With ἐπιγένημα, cf. ἐπακολουθήμα in *SVF* 3.405, and see note on 65A 8–9.

11–12 For a detailed analysis of this argument, cf. Long (1991), 96–101.

13 **ὅτε** This, though much the better attested reading, is regularly rejected in favour of ὅτι; it also makes much better sense. Before birth animal life is plantlike (cf. 53B 2 with notes), and the focus of this sentence is on the continuity between all forms of life. Also καὶ κείνα, 13, should refer to ζῴων and not to φυτῶν, as it would if ὅτε is adopted.

16 **προστροφόν**. In translating this by 'management' we follow Striker [570], 155 n. 12, retracting 'prescription' in Long [555].

17 **ὁρθῶς**. We take the adverb with τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν, treating it as a variant of the familiar ὁρθὸς λόγος (58M 6; 61G 5). Striker, loc. cit., thinks it modifies γίνεσθαι and thus states the correctness of the inference. This does not seem convincing as Greek, nor suitable to the context as continued at 63C. As the craftsman of impulse, reason shapes a way of living correctly. (Note the description of the virtues – dispositions of reason – as τέχναι, 61D 1.)

B Seneca, Ep. 121.6–15

(1) nemo aegre molitur artus suos, nemo in usu sui haesitat, hoc edita protinus faciunt, cum hac scientia prodeunt . . . (2) adeo autem non adigit illa ad hoc doloris timor ut in naturalem motum etiam dolore prohibente nitantur, sic infans qui stare meditatur et ferre se adsuescit, simul temptare vires suas coepit, cadit et cum fletu totiens resurgit donec se per dolorem ad id quod natura poscit exercuit . . . nullum tormentum sentit supina testudo, inquieta est tamen desiderio naturalis status nec ante desinit niti, quaterere se, quam in pedes constitit, ergo omnibus constitutionis suae sensus est et inde membrorum tam expedita tractatio . . . (3) unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, (alia adulescenti), alia seni: omnes ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt, infans sine dentibus est, huic constitutioni saae conciliatur, enari sunt dentes: huic constitutioni conciliatur.

1 haesitat Midvig; haesit ad codd. 10 suppl. Certe

Context: animals' awareness of their own constitution

2–9 A rejoinder to the objection that animals move their bodily parts *apie*, under the constraint of fear of pain if they move otherwise. Cf. the rejection of pleasure as the object of the primary impulse in A 3. In the next sections, omitted here, Seneca explains that a baby's recognition that it has a constitution does not imply any knowledge of what its constitution is.

C Hierocles, 1.34–9, 51–7; 2.1–9

(1) βραχεία δὲ δοκεῖ γέ περί [τῆς] αἰσ[θ]ήσ[ω]ς ἐλ[πί]ν· φέρει γὰρ εἰς γνῶσιν τοῦ πρώτου ο[ικ]είου, ὅν δὲ λόγον ἀρχὴν ἀρίστην ἔφαμεν εἰς[ε]λ[σθαι] τῆς ἡθικῆς στοιχειώ[σεως]. (2) οὐκ ἀγνοητέον [δ]τι τὸ ζῶον εὐθὺς ἅμα [τῷ] γενέσθαι [αἰσθάν]εται [ἐα]υτοῦ . . . τὰ ζῶα πρῶτον μὲν μερῶν τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθάνεται . . . καὶ [ὅ]τι ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ἡν ἔχει | χρεῖαν, ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοῖς ὁφθαλμῶν καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ τῶν ἑλ[λων]. τῇδε γοῦν κάπειδαν μὲν ἰδεῖν [ἐ]θέλωμέν τι, τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς ἐντείνωμεν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν ρύχει δὲ τὰ [ὦ]τα . . . διὸ πρώτη πίστις τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῶον ἅπαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ τῶν μερῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἰδύθη τὰ μέρη, συναίσθησις. (3) δευτέρα δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν πρὸς ἄμυναν παρασκευασθέντων αὐτοῖς ἀναισθητίαις δύναιται. καὶ γὰρ ταῦροι μὲν εἰς

μαχὴν καθιστάμενοι ταύροις | ἐτέροις ἢ καὶ τισιν ἑτερογενέσι ζώοις τὰ
κέρατα πρ[ο]ίσχυν|ται καθάπερ ὅπλα συμφυᾶ πρὸς τὴν ἀντίταξιν. οὕτω δ'
ἔχει | καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ αἰκείον καί, ἔν' οὕτως εἶπω,
συμ|φυῆς ὅπλον.

15

For the text, cf. Arnim [572] ad loc.

Context: one line after 53B 4. Having specified αἰσθησις and ὁρμή as the distinguishing features of animals, Hierocles says he has no need of the latter for his present purpose, but will deal briefly with the former.

4 We omit 12 lines after ἐαυτοῦ in which Hierocles satirizes unnamed people who claim that the only function of αἰσθησις is for perceiving external things. For a very full discussion, cf. Inwood [575], 167–78. He identifies Hierocles' opponents with Academic and Peripatetic philosophers like Antiochus who took over Stoic οἰκείωσις but treated it as an automatic process not involving any cognitive faculty.

8 After ὥτα the point is developed with further examples which we omit.

D Hierocles 9.3 10, 11 14 18

(1) ὅτι [δὲ] ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐνωητ|ική, στερ|κτ|ι|κ|ή δὲ ἡ συγγεν-
|ι|κ|ή· . . . καθάπερ [οὖν] στε|ρ|κτικῶς μὲν κ|ατὰ τοῦτο οἰ||κε|ι|οῦμεθα
τοῖς τέκνοις, αἰρετικ|ῶς) δὲ [τοῖς ἐκ|τὸ]ς χρήμασιν, οὐ|τ|ω καὶ [τὸ ζῶον]
ἑαυτῷ[ι]ι, ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τ|ὴν χ|ρήσιν τὴν συστη|ματικὴν
φέ||ρουσι|ν [ἐκ|λεκτικ|ῶς . . . (2) |ἐο|μεν ζῶον, ἀλλὰ |συμφ|ελαστικόν
καὶ . [δε]όμενον ἑ|τέρο|ῦ· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ π|όλει|ς οἰκοῦμεν· οὐ||δε|ί|ς
γὰρ ἄνθρωπος [ὁ]ς οὐχὶ πάλειος ἐστὶ μέρην· ἐπειτα | [καὶ ρ|αι|δίως
συντιθ|έ|μεθα φιλίαν· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ συνστια||θῆ|και ἡ τ|αυ| συγκαθί|σαι ἐν
θεάτρῳ . . .

5

For the text, cf. Arnim [572] ad loc.

Context: this part of the papyrus is extremely fragmentary. Column 9 has τέλος as the last word of its heading.

1 The feminine noun to be supplied with the adjectives must be οἰκείωσις.

3 τοῖς ἐκ τό]ς That these words preceded χρήμασιν is confirmed by τὰ ἐκτὸς χ| . . . in 9.5.

4 The gap might be filled by μὲν τηρητικῶς πρὸς καθεμονικῶς, cf. Arnim *In Plat Theat.*, 7.41–81.

5–9 Section 2 comes more than 160 lines later than section 1; no legible context survives. Following the break after θεάτρῳ, 9, Hierocles used the word θαυμασιώτα-
των, perhaps in reference to the fraternizing of soldiers in opposing armies; so Arnim [572] ad loc.

E Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1038b (S&F 3.179, 2.724)

(1) πῶς οὖν ἀποκκαίει πάλιν ἐν παντί βιβλίῳ φυσικῶ νή Δία καὶ ἠθικῶ
γράφειν ὡς οἰκειοῦμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ

ἐκγόνα τὰ ἐαυτῶν; (2) ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ θηρία φησὶ
 συμμέτρως τῇ χρειᾷ τῶν ἐκγόνων ὑπείκωνται πρὸς αὐτά, πλὴν τῶν
 ἰχθύων· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ κηήματα τρέφεται δι' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐτ' αἰσθητοὶ ἐστὶν οἷς
 5 μηδὲν αἰσθητὸν οὐτ' οἰκείῳσις οἷς μηδὲν ὑκείον· ἡ γὰρ ὑκείωσις αἰσθητοῖς τοῖς
 οἰκείῳ καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.

1. ἢ δὴν Reiske: ἰδίῳ vel ἰδίῳ eudd.

Context: Plutarch finds a contradiction between Chrysippus' claim that nothing is
 οἰκείον to the φαῦλος and his doctrine reported here.

3-5 For animals' love of their offspring, and fish abandoning their eggs, cf.
 Cicero, *ND* 2.129.

6-7 The likelihood that this is orthodox Stoicism is supported by Porphyry, *Abst*
 3.19.2, οἰκείωσις πάσης καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; cf. Inwood
 [575], 172-3.

F Cicero, *Fin.* 3.62-8

(1) pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a
 parentibus amentur, a quo initio profectam communem humani generis
 societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque
 corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem.
 neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, ut natura et procreari vellet et
 5 diligi procreatos non curaret, atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspicui potest;
 quatum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem
 videmur audire. quare <ut> perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorrere, sic
 apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, impelli. (2) ex hoc
 nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commenda-
 tio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non
 alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut
 aures, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus,
 sic immanes quaedam bestiae sibi solum natae sunt, at . . . formicae, apes,
 10 viciniae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius
 homines, itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates. (3) mundum
 autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et
 civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse
 partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae
 anteponamus . . . ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem appetat pro re
 20 publica, quod deceat cariotem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos . . . (4)
 impellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque
 docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. itaque non facile est invenire qui
 quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus,
 verum etiam ad docendum . . . (5) et quo modo hominum inter homines iuris
 25 esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestis, praeclare enim
 Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem

communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria. (6) quoniamque ea natura esset hominis, ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, cum iustum, qui migraret, iniustum fore. (7) sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse cum locum, quem quisque occupavit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuiusque sit. (8) cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos.

8 (μτ) Μαρτύριος 13 αλφ Μαρτύς: αλφια ARN αλφιαque BE, reliqua V 13 16 κοινωνικός homines Madvig *communis est hominis* codd. 29 et Lambinus et ABEN: ont. RV

Context: transition from the treatment of 'proper functions' concerning oneself to those concerning other people. Cf. Stobaeus 2.94.7–20, and for a comparable passage in the account of Antiochean ethics, see Cicero, *Fin.* 5.65–8.

The *naturalness* of community life is a fundamental step in the grounding of Stoic ethics. For supporting material, cf. 59Q; 63K; 66E, F; Marcus Aurelius 4.4 (deriving the civic character of the world from the community of rational beings, cf. 46G 3); 7.55 (τὸ κοινωνικόν as the 'leading' element in the human constitution). These passages support and illuminate Cicero's claims in 19–20 concerning the preferability of the common advantage to our own, though strictly, as he points out in Off. 3, these should coincide; cf. Epictetus in 59Q 3 and Marcus Aurelius 5.22. For the crucial concept of being *a part mundi*, 18–19, cf. 63C 3. Cicero does not develop its theological implications in *Fin.* 3, though at the end of the book he refers to the Chrysippean doctrine (60A) that ethics should be founded on the government of the world.

G Hierocles (Stobaeus 4.671.7–673.11)

(1) ὅλως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν οἷον κύκλῳ πολλοῖς περιέγγραπται, τοῖς μὲν σμικροτέροις, τοῖς δὲ μείζουσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν περιέχουσι, τοῖς δὲ περιεχομένοις, κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους καὶ ἀνίσους πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσεις. (2) πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κύκλος καὶ προσεχέστατος, ὃν αὐτός τις καθάπερ περὶ κέντρον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γέγραπται διάνοιαν· ἐν ᾧ κύκλῳ τὸ τε σῶμα περιέχεται καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐνεκα παρειλημμένα. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ βραχυτάτος καὶ μικροῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ προσαπτόμενος τοῦ κέντρον κύκλος οὗτος. (3) δεύτερος δ' ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ πλέον μὲν ἀφεστὼς τοῦ κέντρον, περιέχων δὲ τὸν πρῶτον, ἐν ᾧ τετάχεται γονεῖς ἀδελφοὶ γυνὴ παῖδες. ὁ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων τρίτος, ἐν ᾧ θεῖοι καὶ τηθίδες, πάπποι τε καὶ τῆθαι, ἀδελφῶν παῖδες, ἐτι δ' ἀνεψιοί, μεθ' ἃν ὁ τοὺς ἄλλους περιέχων σιγγενεῖς, τούτῳ δ' ἐφεξῆς ὁ τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν ὁ τῶν φυλετῶν, εἰθ' ὁ πολιτῶν, καὶ λοιπὸν οὕτως ὁ μὲν ἀστυγείτων, ὁ δὲ ὁμοεθνῶν (4) ὁ δ' ἐξωτάτῳ καὶ μέγιστος περιέχων τε πάντας τοὺς κύκλους ὁ τοῦ παντός ἀνθρώπων γένους. (5) τούτων οὖν θεωρημένων, κατὰ τὸν ἐντεταμένον

ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν δέουσιν ἐκάστων χρῆσιν τὸ ἐπισυνάγειν πῶς τοὺς κύκλους
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ μεταφέρειν αἰετὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν περιεχόντων
εἰς τοὺς περιεχομένους . . . (6) πρόσκειται δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῦτοις μὲν ὁμοίως
τιμητέον τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου κύκλου, ταῦτοις δ' αὖ πάλιν τοὺς συγγενεῖς.
ἀφαιρησεται μὲν γάρ τι τῆς εὐνοίας τὸ καθ' αἶμα διάστημα πλεόν ὄν' ἡμῖν
δ' ὁμοῦ σπουδαστέα περὶ τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν ἔστιν. ἦκοι μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἰς τὸ
μέτριον, εἰ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν ἐνστάσεως ἐπιτεμνόμεθα τὸ μήκος τῆς
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὸ πρόσωπον σχέσεως. τὸ μὲν οὖν συνέχον καὶ πραγματικώ-
τερον εἰρηται· (7) χρῆ δ' ἐπιμετρεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν προσηγοριῶν
χρῆσιν, τοὺς μὲν ἀνεψιούς καὶ θεῖους καὶ τηθίδας ἀδελφούς ἀποκαλοῦντας
πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας, τῶν δὲ συγγενῶν τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἀδελφίδους, τοὺς
δὲ ἀνεψιούς, ὡς ἂν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἡλικίας παρὶκῇ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐν ταῖς ἀνάμασιν ἐκτενείας. οὗτος
γάρ τῆς προσήψεως ὁ τρόπος ἅμα μὲν ἂν σημείων οὐκ ἄμαυρόν εἴη τῆς
οὐσης ἡμῖν σπουδῆς περὶ ἐκάστους, ἅμα δ' ἂν ἐποτρύνει καὶ προσεντείνει
πρὸς τὴν ὑποδεδειγμένην οἶον συνολκὴν τῶν κύκλων.

1 δλατε MA. ὁλος S 8 τούτου Trincavelli τούτων codd 15 τὸν ἐντεταμένον S τὸ ἐντεταμένον
MA 24 ἐπιμετρεῖν Bentley: ἐπὶ μετρίαν SM. ἐπὶ μετρίαν A

Context: one of seven chapters on ethical subjects excerpted from Hierocles. Entitled 'how to treat one's relatives', it probably formed part of a book which included similarly titled chapters on the gods, native land, and parents. For Hierocles as the Stoic philosopher named by Aulus Gellius 9.5.8, cf. Praechter [573], 106–7, and for his identity with the Hierocles of C–D, see Arnau [572], vii–xi.

1 The image of concentric circles is used by Seneca, *Ep.* 12.6, to represent the temporal stages of a person's life

15–16 κατὰ τὸν ἐντεταμένον ἐστὶ A similar expression, κατὰ τὸν φιλοκίεον
ἐστὶ, begins the sentence which follows περιεχομένους, c8. Inwood [575], 181,
renders 'serious man'; but this translation fails to capture the probably technical sense
of ἐντείνεσθαι. We prefer 'a well-tempered man', a sense which the verb can denote
even without the addition of the adverb εὖ; cf. the Stoic use of εὐτονία, 65T 3.

22 ἐνστάσεως Cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* 3.14.7, 3.22.19.

H Anon., *In Plat. Theaet.*, 5.18–6.31

(1) ὡκειώμεθα γὰρ τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι· (2) μᾶλλον μέντοι ὡκειώται τῷ
ἐαυτοῦ πολίταις ἐπιτείνεται γὰρ καὶ ἀνιέται· (3) ὅσοι
τοῖς ἐαυτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἐκείνου· εἰσάγουσι τὴν δι' αἰσθητικὴν, εἰ μὲν
λέγουσιν ἴσην αὐτοῦ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ ἡμετέραν Μυσίων,
τεθένιτος μὲν τούτου σὺ ἐπεται ἡ δικαιοσύνη, οὐδὲ συγχωρεῖται [δὲ] εἰς
ἴσην παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐστὶν [κ]αὶ τὴν συναίσθησιν. (4) ἡ μὲν
γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν οἰκείωσις φυσικὴ ἐστὶν καὶ ἄλογος, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
πλησίον φυσικὴ μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ, οὐ μέντοι ἀνευ λόγου. (5) ἐὰν γοῦν κα-
ταγνώμεν πονηρίαν τινῶν, οὐ μόνον ψέγομεν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο-
τριούμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἁμαρτάνοντες οὐκ ἀποδέχονται
μὲν τὰ . . . ὅμενα, οὐ δύνανται δὲ μεισῆσαι αὐτούς. (6) οὐκ ἔστιν

τοῖν ἴση | ἢ οἱ|ξε|ί|ωσις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν | καὶ πρὸς ὄντιν|οῦν, ὅπου μὴδὲ
 πρὸς | τῶ |έ|αυτῶν μέρῃ ἐπ' ἴση|ς| ὥκε|ί|ώμεθα. οὐ γὰρ | ὁμοίως ἔχομεν
 πρὸς | ὀφ|θα|λμ|ὸν κα|ί| δάκτυλον, ἵνα μὴ λέγω πρὸς | θυναχας |κ|αί
 15 τρίχας, ἐπεὶ | οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως | ἡλλοτριώμ|εθ|α,
 ἀλλὰ μάλλον κ|αί ἡ|των. | (7) εἰ δὲ καὶ α|ὕτ|οί φήσουσι|ς| ἐπιτεί|ν|εσθα|ί|
 τῇν | οἰκείω|σιν, ἐσ|ται μὲν | φιλανθρ|ωπ|ία, ἐλέγξουσι δὲ τ|ούτους α|ί
 περιστάσεις | ναυαγῶν, ὅ|που ἀνάν|κη μό|νον | σώζεσθαι τὸν ἐτεῖρον
 αὐτῶν. (8) κἂν μὴ γένοιωται δὲ περιστά|σεις, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖ γε οὐ|τως
 20 διάκ|εινται| ὥς ἐλεγχθ|σόμενοι. ὅθεν | καὶ ἐρω|τ|ῶσιν οἱ ἐξ Ἀ|καδη-
 με|ίας ο|ὕ|τ|ω|ς|.

11 τὰ μ|αχόμενα Diels

Context: commentary on Plato, *Thet.* 143d

2 Variation of intensification is the mark of a ἕξις as distinct from a διάθεσις: cf. 475.

3 εἰ μὲν As interpreted in vol. 1, 353, these words introduce the first horn of a dilemma, the second horn of which begins at εἰ δὲ καί, 16.

4 τὸν ἐ||σ|χατον Μουσῶν An allusion to Plato, *Thet.* 209b.

11 If φερόμενα is compatible with the traces of missing letters, it would suit the context better than Diels' μαχόμενα

18 ναυαγῶν Diels' virtually certain supplement has important implications for the origin of this controversy, as Pembroke §564, 127–9, observes. Reference to the Academics, 20–1, points to Carneades' arguments, adducing shipwreck, against justice (Cicero, *Rep.* 3.30), which were subsequently answered by Panaetius' pupil Hecato (Cicero, *Off.* 3.90). For further discussion, cf. Inwood §573, 182–3.

58 Value and indifference

A Diogenes Laertius 7.101–3

(1) τῶν δ' ὄντων φασι τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δ' οὐδέτερα. (2) ἀ-
 γαθὰ μὲν οὖν τὰς τ' ἀρετάς, φρόνησιν, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην
 καὶ τὰ λοιπά. (3) κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀφροσύνην, ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. (4)
 οὐδέτερα δὲ ὅσα μὴ τ' ὠφελεῖ μῆτε βλάπτει, ὅσον ζωὴ, ὑγίεια, ἡδονή,
 κάλλος, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος, δόξα, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐναντία, θάνατος, 5
 νόσος, πόνος, εἰσχυς, ἀσθένεια, πενία, ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια καὶ τὰ παραπλή-
 σια . . . μὴ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτ' ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορα κατ' εἶδος προηγμένα.
 (5) ὥς γὰρ ἰδίου θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν, οὐ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ
 ὠφελεῖν, οὐ τὸ βλάπτειν· οὐ μάλλον δ' ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ
 ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ' ὑγίεια. (6) ἐτι τέ φασιν, ὥς ἐστιν 10
 εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν· πλοῦτι γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειά ἐστιν
 εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος καὶ ὑγίεια.

3 δόξα BEP: εὐδοξία fr

Context: doxography of Stoic ethics, concluding the treatment of ἀγαθὰ and

beginning that of ἀδιάφορα. Editions of Diogenes regularly but incorrectly print the first sentence as the last of the preceding section. Stobaeus' doxography of Stoic ethics, 2.57. 19–20, begins with this 'division' of existing things; cf. Long [561], 55–6.

The doctrine is largely a Stoicized version of Plato; cf. *Meno* 87c–88a, *Euthyd.* 280c for health, strength, beauty and wealth as things that benefit us when used correctly (ὀρθῇ χρήσει) and harm us when used incorrectly, and *Gorg.* 467c for the division of ὄντα into ἀγαθόν, κακόν and μετὰ τούτων, where the 'intermediates' (e.g. sitting, walking) are items 'which sometimes participate in the good, sometimes in the bad, and sometimes in neither'. At *Meno* 88c Socrates argues that virtue, in order to be necessarily ὠφέλιμος, must be a kind of φρόνησις. Aristotle, *Top.* vi.9, 147a34, shows that it was a commonplace to describe τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθὸν as ὠφέλιμον.

οὐ μᾶλλον See note on 1A 7–10.

B Diogenes Laertius 7.104–5 (SVF 3.119)

(1) διχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι ἀδιάφορα· ἅπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὥς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, υἰγία, ἰσχύς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν, τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὐσης ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς. (2) ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ἀδιάφορα τὰ μήθ' ὁρμῆς μήτ' ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, ὥς ἔχει τὸ ἀρτίως ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττὰς, ἢ ἐκτείνει τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ συστείνει, (3) τῶν προτέρων ἀδιαφόρων οὐκέθ' οὕτω λεγομένων· ὁρμῆς γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά. διὸ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκλέγεται, (τὰ δὲ ἀπεκλέγεται), τῶν [δ'] ἐτέρων ἐπίσης ἐχόντων πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγῇ.

δ 9 suppl. Armin ο δ' del. Ménage

Context: a few lines after A.

For essentially the same account, cf. Stobaeus 2.79.4–17. A third sense of 'indifference' is mentioned by Sextius, *M.* 11.59–61: πρὸς ὃ ὁρμὴ μὲν καὶ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, e.g. selecting one of two coins which are indistinguishable in their properties. See further, note on 55N 11.

C Stobaeus 2.79.18–80.13; 82.20–1

(1) καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν. (2) κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα· υἰγίαν, ἰσχύ, αἰσθητηρίων ἀριότητα, καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, πῆρσιν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν· ψυχῆς κατὰστασιν καὶ σώματος, καθ' ὅς ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ φαντασιῶν ψευδῶν δεκτικὴ, τὸ δὲ τραυμάτων καὶ πηρύσεων δεκτικόν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. (3) ποιεῖσθαι δὲ λέγουσι τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον (ἀπὸ) τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. τὸ γὰρ διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων εἶναι. διότι κἂν, φασί, λέγωμεν ἀδιάφορα τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως ζῆν (ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὸ εὐδαιμόνως) ἀδιάφορά φαμεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐ μὰ Δία

πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει· οὐδὲ πρὸς ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμὴν . . . (4) πάντα δὲ
 <τὰ> κατὰ φύσιν ληπτὰ εἶναι καὶ παντὰ τὰ <παρὰ> φύσιν ἀληπτὰ.

5 καθ' ὅς codd. καθ' ὅ schol. Tur. καθ' ὅ Herten. ὁ τραυμάτων Wachsmuth. τραυμάτων codd.
 τραυτῶν schol. Luk. Meineke. ; (ἀπὸ) Wachsmuth. ἐν ᾧπερ ἐστὶ Meineke. ἢ πᾶσι
 codd. 12 <το> Meineke. <παρὰ> whol. Luk. one codd.

Context: doxography of τὰ ἀδιάφορα.

5–6 These examples are strikingly different from those in B 6–7. What the present ones seem to illustrate are mental and bodily conditions which are neither part of nature's providential plan nor contrary to it since they are unavoidable properties of the way soul and body are structured; cf. 54Q 2.

7 **πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν** Cf. 59D 1 2. They are exemplified at Stobaeus 2.82.12–15, by κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους γινόμενη, οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ αἰσθησις . . . καὶ ἰσχύς; cf. his much fuller list outside the Stoic doxography at 2.47.20–48.3.

12 **ληπτὰ** Cf. *sumenda*, 59D 11. Stobaeus 2.83.1 ὁ distinguishes between καθ' αὐτὰ ληπτὰ, e.g. health, and δι' ἕτερα οἰ ποιητικά, e.g. wealth. ληπτῶν in turn is importantly distinguished from αἰρετόν in virtue of the fact that the latter is τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτατελὲς [αὐτοτελοῦς codd.] κινήτικόν, whereas τὰ κατὰ φύσιν are simply ὁρμῆς κινήτικὰ (S.F. 3.121, 131). For the interpretation of the distinction, cf. Long [434]. B1 6, Inwood [547], 125, 208.

D Stobaeus 2.83.10–84.2 (S.F. 3.124)

(1) πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν.
 (2) τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τὴν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν ἁμοιβὴν τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ὁ Ἀντίπατρος ἐκλεκτικὴν προσαγορεύει, καθ' ἣν διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τάδε τιτὰ μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρούμεθα, οἷον ὑγίειαν ἀντὶ νόσου καὶ ζωὴν ἀντὶ θανάτου καὶ πλοῦτον ἀντὶ πενίας. (3) κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπαξίαν τριχῶς φασὶ λέγεσθαι.

2 κα F. δὲ P. 2 τιμὴν Meineke. τὴν codd. 3 ἣν F. καὶ P.

Context: continuation of the doxography of τὰ ἀδιάφορα.

For other accounts of three senses of ἀξία, cf. Stobaeus, 2.84.4–17 (Diogenes of Babylon) and D.L. 7.105, with discussion by Görler [581], 446–51. The present one does not purport to specify different kinds of valuable items but different senses of the value instantiated in things in accordance with nature. There seems to be no reason why the same thing, e.g. health, should not have value in all three senses. If our commentary in vol. 1, 357 9, is on the right lines, health is something valuable *per se*. To credit it with 'selective value' is to make the additional point that, other things being equal, one always has reason to opt for health rather than sickness; cf. 59D 1.

3 ἐκλεκτικὴν Cf. 64C 13

5 αἰρούμεθα This verb is misleading since in strict Stoic usage its object is restricted to ἀγαθόν; cf. 33J

E Stobaeus, 2.84.18–85.11 (SVF 3.125)

(1) τῶν δ' ἀξίαν ἔχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχείαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἔχόντων ἢ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἢ δὲ βραχείαν. (2) τὰ μὲν πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς πράγμασι. (3) προηγμένον δ' εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον <δὴ> ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον, τὸν δ' ὁμοῖον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ταῦτά. (4) οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συγγίξειν πῶς τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν προηγμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους.

τῶν (αἱ) Heeren ἢ (ἀ) Heeren λόγον Mullach, ἀναλογίαν codd., ὁμοῖον λόγον Heeren ἢ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένῳ Wachsmuth τὸ ἀποπροηγμένῳ (vgl. -ος) codd. ἢ προηγμένῳ προηγούμενον codd. 13 ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν Cantab. ἀνὰ πολλῶν codd. προηγμένον Madvig, προηγόμενον codd.

Context one paragraph after D.

15 Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 3.50–1, and Stobaeus 2.80.14–21, where ἀδιάφορα are divided into those with more value/disvalue and those with less. Diogenes 7.105 incorrectly calls 'all' indifferent things with value' προηγμένα. For subdivisions of προηγμένα, cf. m; Stobaeus 2.80.22–81.6; 81.19–82.4; Cicero, *Fin.* 3.56.

5–11 Similarly Cicero, *Fin.* 3.51–2. 'Preferred' is defined in *Fin.* 3.53 as *quod sit indifferens cum destinatione mediocri*.

F Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 1.1.64–7 (SVF 1.361)

(1) μὴ εἶναι δὲ προηγμένον ἀδιάφορον τὴν ὑγίαν καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν παραπλήσιον ἔφησεν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χίος. (2) ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι μόνον διαφέρειν. (3) καθόλου γὰρ τὰ μετὰ ξυῖ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα μὴ ἔχειν μηδεμίαν παραλλαγὴν, μηδὲ τινὰ μὲν εἶναι φύσει προηγμένα, τινὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις μῆτε τὰ λεγόμενα προηχθαι πάντως γίνεσθαι προηγμένα, μῆτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποπροηχθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὑπάρχειν ἀποπροηγμένα. (4) εἴαν γοῦν δέη τοὺς μὲν ὑγιαίνοντας ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ νοσοῦντας ἀπολυμένους τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπολύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιτ' αὖ μάλλον ὁ σοφὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ [δοτῆ] τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. (5) καὶ ταύτῃ οὔτε ἡ ὑγεία προηγμένον ἐστὶ πάντως οὔτε ἡ νόσος ἀποπροηγμένον. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ταῖς ὀνοματογραφίαις ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα προτάττομεν στοιχεῖα, πρὸς τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀρτιζόμενοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν δέλατα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Δίωκος ὄνομα γράφομεν, τὰ δὲ ἴωτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Τιμοκ., τὸ δὲ ὦ ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ξερίωνος, οὐ τῇ φύσει ἐτέρῳ παρὰ τὰ ἕτερα γράμματα προκρινόμενων, τῶν δὲ καιρῶν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενται, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μετὰ ξυῖ

ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πράγμασιν οὐ φυσικῇ τις γίνεται ἐτέρων παρ' ἕτερα πρόκρισις, κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ μᾶλλον.

11 ὅτι del. Armin

Context: immediately following an account of the orthodox Stoic doctrine of ἀδιάφορον

This was Aristo's most famous doctrine; cf. SVF 1.362–9.

5 παραλλαγῇ Cf. H 3. Aristo's thesis amounts to the claim that things intermediate between virtue and vice are completely indiscernible from one another in terms of value; cf. note on 52C 6.

G Diogenes Laertius 7.160 (SVF 1.351 part)

Ἀρίστων ὁ Χίος . . . τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μεταξύ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδ' ἡντιανοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγῇ ἀπολείποντα, ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα· εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸν σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ, ὅς ἂν τε θεροῖτου ἂν τε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσηκόντως.

1 τὰ fr; 74 codd.

Context: opening of Diogenes' life of Aristo.

1–3 Cf. the account of Pyrrho's position in 1F 3, and 2F.

H Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1048A (SVF 3.137)

ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τάναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· "εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακόν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα φερόμενος τὰ πράγματα καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἀποπλανώμενος, (ἀποδεκτέον ὥς) ἐν μὲν τοῖς σηματομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ τὰ δ' ἄλλα στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας."

4 ἐπὶ ταῦτα codd. ἐπ' αὐτὰ Reiske. ἐπὶ ταῦτα φερόμενος [τὸ] Ruston 5 suppl. Saubach (ἀποδεχόμεθ' ὥς) Armin. (ὡς καταγινώσκοντες) Poliwitz

Context: alleged inconsistency in Chrysippus' doctrine of προηγμένα.

3–7 By παραλλαγὰς are meant the differences between 'indifferents', signified by προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα, which Aristo denied; cf. F 5, G 2. Cherniss [326], ad loc., clarifies the main points of the text well, but introduces an unnecessary complication by taking ταῦτα τὰ πράγματα, 4, to refer to the senses of the terms προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον. The antecedent of ταῦτα must be αὐτῶν, i.e. the actual differences between 'indifferents' designated by προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα.

I Cicero, *Fin.* 3.50 (SVF 1.365)

deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam esse diceremus,

confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret.

Context: transition from exposition of 'goods' to that of 'indifferents'.

This criticism of Aristo is frequently stated in Cicero (cf. 2G H; Leg. 1.38) and attributed to Chrysippus at *Fin* 4.68.

J Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.6.9. (SVF 3.191)

διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρυσίππος λέγει ὅτι "μέχρις ἂν ἀθλά μοι ᾗ τὰ ἐξῆς, αἰ τῶν εὐφραστέρων ἔχουμι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. εἰ δέ γε ᾗδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθεύμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι."

3 τούτων vel τοιαύτων codd

Context: illustration of the maxim, 'You will never be disturbed if you are always mindful of what is yours and what is not'; cf. 62K.

The passage is excellently discussed by Sandbach [296], 36, who observes that the foot stands to the whole man as the individual stands to the world as a whole: 'Man is part of the world [cf. 63C] and should co-operate to serve the world's purposes against his own advantage. But this is not against his own good. His good is achieved by rational decision, and reason demands that he should co-operate.'

3 ἐκλεκτικόν Cf. B 8, D 3, K.

K Stobaeus 2.76.9-15

{1} Διογένης δέ· "εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ" . . . {2} Ἀντίπατρος δέ· "ζῆν ἐκλεγόμενους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγόμενους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηλεκῶς." πολλάκις δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεδίδου· "πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηλεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν."

1 εὐλογιστεῖν Diogenes εὐλογιστίαν codd 2 3 ἐκλεγόμενους ἀπεκλεγόμενους cod Aug. -όμενος . . . -όμενος FP 4 καθ' αὐτὸν Mettucke. κατὰ φύσιν codd.

Context: Stoic philosophers' different formulations of the τέλος

3 προηγουμένων It has been recently argued by Görlke [581], 456-62, that this term is meant to include not only certain kinds of ANthings but even ἀγαθά. As far as we can see, this novel interpretation of Antipater is not justified by the evidence he cites, nor does it seem compatible with Antipater's controversy with Carneades; see 64.

I Diogenes Laertius 7.165 (SVF 1.411, part)

Ἡρίλλος . . . εἶπε . . . διαφέρειν ἂν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελεῖν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνου τῶν σοφῶν. τὰ δὲ μεταξύ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι.

Context: life of Heraclitus

Herillus specified ἐπιτήμη as the τέλος; cf. *SVF* 1.411, 413 117, 419 21. In Cicero, our principal informant, he is regularly associated with Aristo, and is criticized like Aristo for his impracticality in acknowledging no difference between [morally indifferent] things. He is the only Stoic credited with the term ὑποτελής, and may have invented it. In Stobaeus 2.47, 12–48, 5 (where Herillus is not named) ὑποτελής is used as a generic term for the object of a living creature's first impulse. Stobaeus is drawing here upon the *Carnadea divisio* (cf. 64G), but it is implausible that his use of ὑποτελής should be independent of Herillus'. On the evidence of Cicero, *Fin.* 4.40, Herillus was open to the charge of having posited two quite independent ultimate ends. No doubt there is distortion of his true position here. Perhaps Herillus argued that the continuity orthodox Stoics posited between the first impulse, aimed at self-preservation, and the *summum bonum* was quite illusory. For a very full discussion, which interprets the evidence somewhat differently, cf. Ioppolo [349].

m Diogenes Laertius 7.107 (*SVF* 3.135)

ἐτε τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτὰ προήκται, τὰ δὲ δι' ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' ἕτερα. δι' αὐτὰ μὲν εὐφροία, προκοπή καὶ τὰ ὁμοία· δι' ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὁμοία· δι' αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ δι' ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐσαιοθυσία, ἀριότης. δι' αὐτὰ μὲν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ δι' ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίων δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπρηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον.

5

1 προήκται BH προήχθη F

Context: report of the Stoic theory of ἀδιάφορα.

A distinction is drawn here between those valuable indifferents which are preferred because they are κατὰ φύσιν, and those such as wealth which are preferred for their utility. This distinction, though perfectly intelligible, is potentially misleading. It should not be interpreted as marking off wealth from the class of AN items; cf. the citation of Diogenes of Babylon at Stobaeus 2.84.4–6, which shows that utility is referred to φύσις. The 'natural' value of wealth is attested by Stobaeus 2.82.20–83.7 in a context which distinguishes it from health as above (cf. note on C 12, and 59D 7). In summary accounts προηγμένα are treated as a monolithic class (cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 3.53; *Acad.* 1.36–7), but Stobaeus 2.83.1–7 notes that health activates impulse in a different way from wealth.

59 Proper functions

A Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1069F (*SVF* 3.491)

“πόθεν οὖν”, φησὶν, “ἄρξωμαι; καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεὶς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;”

1 ἄρξωμαι Rasmus. ἀρξομαι codd 2 κατὰ Mezinac: παρὰ codd

Context: Chrysippus' alleged inconsistency in making ἀδιάφορα the foundation of ethics; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 4.48.

2 ὕλην Cf. 64C 1; 66G 3; and for discussion, see Tsakourakis [556], 30–7. Plutarch interprets τὸ κατὰ φύσιν as if it referred restrictedly to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. On the evidence of 60A this probably distorts Chrysippus' point.

B *Stobaeus* 2.85.13 86.4 (*SVF* 3.494)

(1) ὀρίζεται δὴ τὸ καθήκον "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθέν εὐλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει"· παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως. (2) τοῦτη διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι κάκεῖνα ἀκολουθῶς τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει. (3) ἐπὶ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων οὕτως ἀποδίδεται: "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ." (4) τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ' εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν. οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια καθήκοντα προσμαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τοῦτοις ὅμοια.

1 δὴ could be Hecetiv πραχθεν Mitanke παραχθην codd. 4 γ τὰ . ἐνεργήματα Nansen
τὸ ἐνέργημα codē

Context: beginning of doxography of ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος, described as ἀκόλουθος τῇ λόγῳ τῇ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων

1-4 Cf. *F* 1 5, *D.L.* 7.107

1 **εὐλογον** See notes on **40F**, **69B**. In a very full discussion, Tsekourakis [556], 24-30, convincingly takes 'with a good reason', not 'probable', to be the sense of the term here.

C *Diogenes Laeticius* 7 107 (*SVF* 3.493, part)

(1) ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα διατείνει: ὁρᾶσθαι γάρ καπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. (2) κατονομαζοῦνται δὲ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθήκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τινος ἦκειν τῆς προσονομασίας εὐλημμένης. (3) ἐνέργημα δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.

Context: in the preceding sentence Diogenes states the gist of **B** 1-3.

2-3 Zeno wrote a book *Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* (*D.L.* 7.4), and was no doubt the first philosopher to use the term technically. (In some Stoic texts ἐπιβάλλεται ἐπιβάλλονται are used very similarly; cf. Chrysippus in Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1064f. f., and Dyroff [545], 137-9.) The etymology advanced here has never been satisfactorily explained (for various attempts, cf. Bonhöffer [312], 208; Dyroff [545], 134). Its key feature is presumably κατὰ, so basic a preposition in Stoic ethics, with τινος (unnecessary to the etymology) implying accordance with 'people's natures'; cf. line

4

D *Cicero, Fin.* 3 17, 20-2

(1) satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa quae prima sunt adiecta natura diligamus, quod est nemo quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem uso, immunitas aut decortas habere. . . (2) progrediamur igitur, quoniam, inquit, ab his principis naturae discimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: aestimabile esse dicunt - sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus - id quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione

dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi ἀξίαν vocant, contraque inaestimabile quod sit superiori contrarium. (3) initis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reiicienda, primum est officium – id enim appello καθήκον – ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria, qua inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaue naturae. (4) in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit quod vere bonum possit dici, prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἐνορίαν illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam plura aestimavit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum; (5) quod cum positum sit in eo quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellamus convenientiam, si placet – cum igitur in eo sit id bonum quo omnia referenda sint, [omnia] honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem quae sunt prima naturae propter se nihil est expetendum. (6) cum vero illa quae officia esse dixi proficiantur ab initis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est et post oritur, ut dixi, est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia.

6 *appellamus*: Bentley *appellamus* collid. 7 *ill.*: *enoria* Pearce *ill.* *enoria* collid. 24 *omni* del Madvig

Context: exposition of *οἰκείωσις* and the objects of the first impulse; cf. 57A, and SFC 3.181. The sections omitted after *habere*, 4, deal first with the intrinsic desirability of *καταλήψεις* and *artes*, and then digress from the main point.

6 *divisio* – i.e. between what has value and what has disvalue; cf. 58D 1, 1. For ἀξία, see also 60C 5.

10–11 *propter se sumenda* – This does not contradict the later thesis, 26–7, that no *PAN* thing is *propter se expetendum*. 'Takeable', not 'desirable', is a property of *AN* things: cf. vol. 1, 358.

14 *cum officio selectio* – This expression has always been found difficult, owing to its apparent redundancy after *primum officium*, 11. It presumably refers to selection (cf. 58D 2, E 3) as a deliberate act – a development in moral awareness quite distinct from the infant's behaviour, and in line with the doctrine of an evolving constitution, 57B 3.

19–27 White [569] argues that the understanding of the good, as described here, should be completely distinguished from any notion of 'self-realization' or 'perfection of human nature'. These conceptions, he argues, which belong to Antiochean ethics

(cf. 64K), have no place in early Stoicism. Though unable to argue the point at length here, we venture to disagree. The Stoics, to be sure, differ from Antiochus in treating the *summum bonum* as quite incommensurable with all other valuables; in his philosophy it consists in the totalization of everything worth having, including the objects of the first impulses; cf. 64K 4. But that radical difference does not serve to make White's point. Notice that in this text *honesta actio* is described as a *consequens* of nature's first affiliations (30–1), as *secundum naturam* and *expetendum* (31–2), both of which attributes applied to the 'earliest objects', and as the highest *humani* good (21). Outside this passage, cf. especially 57B 3, F. 60H 4; 61L (Cleanthes); D.L. 7.94.

25 vi sua Cf. 60D n.

E Diogenes Laertius, 7.108–9 (SVF 3.495, 496)

(1) τῶν γὰρ καθ' ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, <τὰ δ' οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον>. (2) καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν, ὥς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεισθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δέ, ὅσα μὴ αἰρεῖ λόγος, ὥς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα, γονέων ἀμελεῖν, ἀδελφῶν ἀφροντιστεῖν, φίλοις μὴ συνδιατίθεσθαι, πατρίδα ὑπερυρᾶν καὶ τὰ παμπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον ὅσα οὐθ' αἰρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ' ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, γραφεῖον κρατεῖν ἢ σπλεγγίδα καὶ τὴ ὁμοία τούτοις. (3) καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστάτικα· καὶ ἄνευ περιστάσεως τᾶδε, ὕγιεινός ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητικῶν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περιστάσιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαρριπτέιν, ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθήκον. (4) ἔτι τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ καθήκει, τὰ δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ. καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθήκον.

2 suppl. Cleanthes 7 λόγον P. λόγον BT 8 ἀποκρίνεσθαι P. αἰεὶ BT

Context: immediately following C.

Stobaeus (53Q) says that impulse is activated by *φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν*. This is consistent with 1–2 if Stobaeus' statement refers to the causes of action generally, while allowing for moral error in the fact that what is actually *καθήκον* may fail to coincide with the agent's *φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ*; cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.18.2, ἀμύχανον . . . ἄλλο μὲν κρίνειν καθήκον, ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμᾶν, with moral error attributed to ignorance of the good.

F Cicero, *Fin.* 3.58–9

(1) sed cum quod honestum sit id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo in etiam probabiliter actio ratio reddi possit. est autem officium quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit, ex quo intelligitur officium medium quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis, quoniamque in his rebus quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in

virtus, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum ul non est, est autem eius generis actio quoque quantitas, et quidem talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum, quod autem ratione actum est, id officium appellamus: est igitur officium eius generis quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis. (2) atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse, quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. (3) quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit [autem] etiam inchoatum, (4) ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito "iuste" fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. (5) quoniamque non dubium est quin in iis quae media dicimus sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut dicitur omne officio continetur. (6) ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum quae secundum naturam sine reiecturumque contraria. (7) ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis quae media dicamus.

5 quiddam Madvig quoddam codd. 6 ut] in codd. 9 est Madvig in codd. 15 quoniam del Lambinus 16 fit Lambinus, deinde codd. 17 omne Cramer omne codd.

Context: transition from treatment of *praeposita* to account of *officia*. What follows **F** is continued, after the omission of one sentence, at 66G

This is a difficult passage, largely because Cicero fails to make it explicit that the wise man's proper functions are always 'perfect', and are thus 'intermediate' or shared by fools as well only in an equivocal sense, i.e. when the action is considered independently of the agent's moral character. In 2-11 two arguments are advanced to show that the existence of 'morally neutral' *officia* is consistent with the thesis that *honestum* is the only good. The first argument, 2-6, takes part of the definition of *καθήκον* in **B** 1-2, ὁ πρᾶξις ἐλλογον ἀπολογία ἔχει, and maintains that this is satisfied by something in the sphere of 'indifferent' things, and specifically by *officium*. Thus the morally neutral status of *officium* is inferred by establishing coincidence between its definiens and a characteristic of indifferent things. The second argument, 7-10, drawing on the formulation of *καθήκον* in **E** 3, ὅσα λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν, is exactly similar. In 10-12 the morally neutral status of *officia* is inferred from the observation that the wise man performs certain actions in the intermediate domain. Since he judges such an action to be an *officium*, and his judgement is infallible, the intermediate domain contains *officia*. This argument, however, ignores the fact that everything done by the wise man is actually a perfect *officium*.

G Sextus Empiricus, *Mf.* 11.200-1 (*SF* 3.516, part)

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ὑπαντῶντές φασί πάντα μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ πάντων τὰ ἔργα, διαρῖζεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς [διαίρεσεως καὶ] διαθέσεως ἢ ἀπὸ αἰτέχων γίνεσθαι. (1) οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γονέων καὶ ἄλλως τιμᾶν γονεῖς τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαίου τὸ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ποιεῖν. (2) καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ὑγιάζειν

κοινόν ἐστι τοῦ τε ἱατροῦ καὶ ἰδιώτου, τὸ δὲ ἱατρικῶς ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ
 τεχνίτου ἰδίου, ὥδε καὶ τὸ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς κοινόν τοῦ τε σπουδαίου
 καὶ μὴ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς ἰδίου τοῦ σοφοῦ,
 (3) ὥστε καὶ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἔχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἧς ἰδίῳ ἐστιν ἔργον τὸ
 ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἀπὸ ἀρίστης διαθέσεως πράττειν.

1 τοῦθ' ὑπαντάμενος Epictetus: τοῖς ὑπαντάμενος σοφῶ 2 διαφερόμενος καὶ ἀπὸ. Bekker

Context: Stoic reply to the objection that φρόνησις cannot be a τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον [cf. 6IG 2] since its supposed work – e.g. honouring parents or returning a deposit – is common to the wise and the unwise.

H Philo. Chrr. 14–15 (SVF 3.513)

(1) τὸ δέον πολλάκις δεόντως οὐκ ἐνεργεῖται καὶ τὸ μὴ καθήκον ἐστὶν ὅτε
 δρᾶται καθήκοντως· (2) οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς παρακιταθήκης ἀπόδοσις ὅταν μὴ
 ἀπὸ γνώμης ὑγιоῦς γίγνηται ἀλλ' ἡ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος ἢ ἐπ' ἐνέδρῳ
 τῆς περὶ μείζονα πίστιν ἀρνήσεως, καθήκον ἔργον οὐ δεόντως ἐπιτελεῖται· (3) τὸ
 δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι μὴ ἀληθεύσαι τὸν ἱατρὸν κενοῦν ἢ τέμνειν ἢ καίειν
 διεγνωκότα ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τοῦ νοσούντος, ἵνα μὴ προλαβὼν τὰ δεινὰ φύγῃ τὴν
 θεραπείαν ἢ ἐξασθενήσας ἀπειθῇ πρὸς αὐτήν, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τὸν σοφὸν ψεύσασθαι
 ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς πατρίδος σωτηρίᾳ, δείσαντα μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀληθεύσαι ῥωσθῇ τὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων, οὐ
 καθήκον ἔργον δεόντως ἐνεργεῖται.

Context: interpretation of the Book of Numbers 5.18. Philo takes 'the priest's placing the woman ἐναντίον κυρίου and uncovering her head' to refer to God's judgement of a person's unseen motive.

4–8 For the examples, cf. S.E., M. 7.43–5, in discussion of the difference between 'truth' and 'the true' (33P).

I Stobaeus 5.906.18–907.5 (SVF 3.510)

Χρυσίππου· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἄκρον, φησί, προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι
 τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει, τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναι πω φησὶν
 εὐδαιμόνα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις
 αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἐκτικόν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσιν.

Context: collection of statements on happiness by philosophers.

For the progressive's distance from happiness, cf. 6IT U, and for προκοπή in general, see Jäschke [605]. Seneca (Ep. 73.4–14) reports a doctrine which distinguishes three grades of progress: (a) those at the stage described in the present text, whom he describes as adjacent to but not yet in possession of wisdom, free of passions and vices, equipped with moral knowledge in a still untested way, beyond the possibility of lapsing but not yet confident of this; (b) those who are free of the greatest mental troubles and passions, but still capable of lapsing; (c) those who are beyond many great vices but not beyond all.

J Diogenes Laertius 7.88 (SVF 3 Archdemus 20, part)

Ἀρχέδημος δὲ [sc. τέλος φησὶ] τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν.

Context: Stoic formulations of the τέλος.

In view of the technical expression τέλεια καθήκοντα (B 6, K 2) it seems justifiable to interpret ἐπιτελοῦντα accordingly 'perfecting' and not give it the weaker sense, 'performing'.

K Stobaeus 2.93, 14–18 (SVF 3.500)

κατόρθωμα δ' εἶναι λέγουσι καθήκον πάντας ἀπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἢ καθάπερ πρᾶξιπαιον, τέλειον καθήκον· ἀμάρτημά τε τὸ παρὰ τὸν ἡρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ᾧ παραλέλειπται τι καθήκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζῶον.

1 ἀπέχον (cod.) ἐπέχον Cuiet (ed. cl. D.L. 7.100) 2 ἀμάρτημά τι Dietsch ἀμάρτηματα cod.

Context: doxography of unrelated Stoic ethical concepts

1 πάντας ἀπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς A standard Stoic image for the completeness or perfect harmony of virtue and virtuous actions; cf. D.L. 7.100, καλὸν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητούμενους ἀριθμούς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τὸ τέλειος σύμμετρον, and see 61F, 64H 3. For ἀπέχειν = 'have in full', cf. LSJ s.v. IV. Perfect harmony is achieved by the conjunction of all the cardinal virtues; cf. D.L. loc. cit., εἶδη δ' εἶναι τοῦ καλοῦ τέτταρα. For other instances of the expression, cf. 54H 2, Cicero, Off. 3.14; Seneca, Ep. 71.16; Marcus Aurelius 6.26, where the numerical image is applied to 'completing' proper functions (μέμνησο ὅτι πᾶν καθήκον ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τινὸν συμπληροῦται), and see note on O. The origins of the expression, which has never been properly studied, are to be sought in musical harmony; cf. Aristotle's description of the four cardinal vices as 'the whole tetrachord' (SVF 1.370). 'Part' seems to be sometimes used as a variant for 'number' (cf. L 2, Stobaeus 2.63.5).

L Cicero, Fin. 3.32 (SVF 3.504)

(1) quicquid enim a sapientia proficiuntur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis paribus; in eo enim positum est id quod dicimus esse expetendum. (2) nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depoculari, quae sunt in effectis, sic timere, sic mactere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. (3) verum ut haec non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea quae proficiuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recta sunt iudicanda.

Context: the difference between wisdom and other types of expertise. Wisdom is like acting or dancing, not navigation or medicine, in having its own performance as its end; cf. 64H. Yet it is also unique in being complete at any moment and wholly self-contained.

M Stobaeus 2.96.18–97.14 (SVF 3.501.502)

(1) ἐτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ' οὐδέτερα· (2) κατορθώματα μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, δικαιοπραγεῖν, χαίρειν, εὐεργετεῖν, εὐφραίνεσθαι, φρονίμως περιπατεῖν, πάνθ' ὅσα κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττεται· (3) ἁμαρτήματα δ' εἶναι τὸ τὴν ἀφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ κλέπτειν καὶ καθόλου ὅσα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττεται· (4) οὔτε δὲ κατορθώματα οὔτε ἁμαρτήματα τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περιπατεῖν, ἀποδημεῖν καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις παραπλήσια. πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνομήματα καὶ εὐτακτῆματα καὶ εὐεπιτηδεύματα καὶ εὐτυχήματα καὶ εὐδαιμονήματα καὶ εὐκαίρηματα καὶ εὐσχημονήματα· οὐκ ἐτι μέντοιγε φρονιμεύματα, ἀλλὰ μόνα τὰ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὠνόμασται, οἷον σωφρονήματα μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ σωφροσύνης, δικαίωματα δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης· τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντεκείμενων ἀδικοπραγήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτῆματα.

1 εὐνομήματα Dindorf: εὐνοήματα codd. 10 εὐεπιτηδεύματα Herken: ἐπιτηδεύματα vel ἐπιτιμώματα codd. 12 ὁμοίως Hercken: ὁμοιώσεως codd. 12 σωφρονήματα Casaub. σωφρονημεύματα vel σωφρονηκτῆματα codd.

Context: taxonomy of unrelated Stoic ethical concepts.

2 οὐδέτερα Cf Rist [303], 99–101.

4 ὀρθὸν λόγον. Cf. 61C 5; 63C 9.

9–14 Chrysippus, in Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1041A, argues as follows: (1) Every *κατόρθωμα* is both a *εὐνόμημα* and a *δικαιοπραγῆμα*. (2) Anything done in accordance with moderation, prudence or courage is a *κατόρθωμα*. (3) Therefore it is also a *δικαιοπραγῆμα*. In conjunction with the present passage, this shows that predicating *δικαιοπραγῆμα* of *κατόρθωμα* is not the familiar thesis of the unity of the virtues; cf. 61C–F. What all the terms listed in 9–11 share is their utterly general applicability to any *κατόρθωμα*. Given the fact that the Stoics described *κατόρθωμα* as a *νόμου πρόσταγμα*, SVF 3.520, we can infer that *δικαιοπραγήματα*, 9, is not a reference to specifically just acts, but to the ‘rightness’ which informs all *κατορθώματα*; cf. Dyroff [545], 130–1. Lines 11–13 now fall into place. To be properly described as a ‘prudent’ act, a *κατόρθωμα* must be informed by prudence, and to be properly called a *δικαίωμα*, it must issue from the virtue of justice. But these and all other virtuous acts can be properly called *δικαιοπραγήματα*. The whole passage seems to tie in well with our interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the inseparability of the virtues, vol. 1, 384.

N Stobaeus 2.99.3–8

ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὅθεν τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ κατορθοῖν ἐν ᾧ αἴαν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν.

1 ἀπ’ Herken: ἀπ’ codd

Context: characterization of the virtuous and inferior types of men.

This doctrine differentiates Stoics from contemporary Peripatetics, who recognized a μέσος βίος or ἔξις, to which they assigned προκοπή (61I 1). Stoics confined μέσος, in its reference to humans, to children, who are excluded from virtue or vice by their undeveloped rationality; cf. D.L. 7.110, and SVF 3.535, 537-8.

O Stobaeus 2.113,18-23 (SVF 3.529, part)

(1) πάντων τε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τοὺς ἀφρονες ἐπίσης πάντας ἀφρονες εἶναι, τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσῃ ἐχοντας διαθέσιν. (2) ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, καθ' ὅσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρὰς καὶ δυσίατου διαθέσεως γίνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ.

5

Context: characterization of virtuous men.

Cf. SVF 3.524-43, and for the absence of degrees of virtue and vice, see 61I. The differentiation of ἀμαρτήματα, 3-5, is necessary to account for progress and the teachability of virtue. For another Stoic way of expressing difference of type between wrong acts, cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 4.56: *peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterea quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent*, with discussion of 'numbers' in note on K.

P Cicero, *Off.* 1.15,152

quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima descripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium . . . sed ab his partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum officia ducerentur, satis expositum videtur.

5

2 *descripta* Heine. *descripta* codd.

Context: the beginning and the end of Cicero's account of *officia*, which drew heavily on Panaetius' lost work, *Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*; cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.* 16.11.4.

1 For Panaetius' account of the unity of the virtues, cf. 63G; and for the common foundation of virtue and proper functions, see A.

3-4 Panaetius seems to have differed from earlier Stoics in stressing the heuristic function of φρόνησις rather than its practical application; cf. 61H 1.

4-5 Analysis of proper functions by reference to virtues may have been helped by the elaborate classifications of 'subordinate virtues', 61H 6-7. E.g. the characterization of how a courageous man should act, Cicero, *Off.* 1.66, recalls the subordinate virtues of courage set out in 61H 16-17.

Q Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.10.1-12

(1) πῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ καθήκοντα ἔστιν εὐρίσκειν; (2) σκέψαι τίς εἶ, τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπου, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως,

ἀλλὰ ταύτη τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δ' ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον. σκόπει οὖν, τίνας κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον, κεχώρισαι θηρίων, κεχώρισαι προβάτιων.
 (3) ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἓν τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων· παρακολουθητικός γὰρ εἰ τῇ θεῷ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς ἐπιλογιστικής. τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου, μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς βουλευέσθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν, εἴ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ἡ ποὺς λογιζομένη εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδὲν οὐκ ἄλλως ὥρμησαι ἢ ὥρέχθασιν ἢ ἐπανεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἅλον. . . (4) μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υἱὸς εἶ. . . μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι, ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφός εἶ. . . μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτής· πύλεως τινος, ὅτι βουλευτής· <εἰ> νέος, ὅτι νέος· εἰ πρεσβύτερος, ὅτι πρεσβύτερος· εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεία ἔργα.

2 **προαιρέσεις** This common term in Epictetus for 'moral purpose' is not attested with this sense in earlier Stoicism.

4 7 Cf. 63E.

10 **ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον**. In the section omitted after these words, Epictetus expands this point by repeating the gist of 58J.

10 14 Cf. 66F 2.

60 Good and bad

A Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1035c–u (SVF 3.68)

“οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐκτεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομεν τι εὖρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.” (1) **πάνω ἐν ταῖς Φυσικαῖς θέσεσιν** “οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ' ἐπ' εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' (<ἢ>) ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως.” (2) **προελθὼν δ' αὖθις**: “δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτοις συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὕσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνων οὐδ' ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἔνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὕσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.”

1 μέλλομεν τι Baul: μέλλομεν (vel μέλλομεν vel μέλλομεν); εἴρωτε codd. 2 (<ἢ>) Loxianus

Context Chrysippus' alleged inconsistency in making theology the final topic of physics (cf. 26C) while introducing all his ethical inquiries with Zeus, fate and providence. The passage quoted in 1–3 is taken from book 3 of his *On gods*.

For the identity of Zeus, universal nature and fate, cf. 46B, 54A–B. For the thesis that everything is determined by universal nature, cf. 54T. For universal nature in specifications of the τέλος, cf. 63C. For the place of κακά in the divine administration, cf. 54Q T.

B Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1041E (SVF 3 69)

τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναι φησι τῷ βίῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἀπτεσθαι προλήψεων. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Προτρεπτικῶν εἴρηκεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ταύτων τὸν λόγον φησὶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀφέλκειν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ὥς οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ συνεργούντων πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδέν.

5

Context: demonstration of the inconsistency between Chrysippus' statement in 1 3, and that in 4 5. Plutarch cites 66A a few lines later, in confirmation of his claim.

2-3 ἐμφύτων ... προλήψεων For *πρόληψις* in general, cf 39-40. That their content included ordinary evaluations of AN and CN things (see vol. 1, 35?) is confirmed by 4 5, and cf Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1047E, where Chrysippus ascribes madness to those who set no value on wealth, health etc. At *Comm. por.* 1070C Plutarch is probably drawing on Stoic doctrine when he contrasts the 'internal' origin of value concepts (ταῦτα δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν [generally amended to ἀρχῶν] τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν) with the external source of impressions of hot, cold etc. For reasons suggested in vol. 1, 375, *οἰκείωσις* seems the best candidate for the generative power 'in us'.

C Diogenes Laertius 7.53 (-39D 8)

φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν

For the context on concept formation, of which this sentence forms a part, see 39D and discussion by Sandbach [470], 13-4.

D Cicero, *Fin.* 3.33-4 (SVF 3.72)

(1) cuiusque rerum notiones in animis fiunt, si aut usui aliquid cognitum sit aut conjunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto quod extremum posui boni notitia facta est. (2) cum enim ab his rebus quae sunt secundum naturam ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. (3) hoc autem ipsi boni non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. (4) ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. (5) nam cum aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit, alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet.

5

10

1 boni: Lambinus. bonum recte

Context: the nature of the good. This text should be read in conjunction with 59D.

1-3 Cf. 39D, which includes C; and for the exact repetition of the fourfold scheme, see 16F.

4 **ascendit** The image of 'ascent' is probably a deliberate reminiscence of Plato, *Rep.* 7, 515c, on climbing out of the cave to view the sun (the Form of the good).

5-10 Two claims are made concerning the *ipsum bonum*: (a) it is analogous to *AN* things, with which it shares the property of having value, just as honey shares the property of sweetness with other things, thus those *AN* things can be used as steps towards conceptualizing it. (b) Its value is incommensurable with that of anything else, just as honey has to be experienced in order for its particular brand of sweetness to be grasped; thus the value of the good is not arrived at by adding or increasing or comparing the value of other valuable things. Since analogy functions by magnification or diminution (39D), the denials in 5-6 reveal the limits of the process. Analogy puts us in a position to form a concept of something supremely valuable. But the character of the thing which answers to that concept can only be perceived by direct acquaintance.

E Seneca, *Ep.* 120.3-5, 8-11

{1} nunc ergo ad id revertor de quo desideras dici, quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit. {2} hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit. quidam aiunt nos in notitiam incidisse, quod est incredibile, virtutis alicui speciem casu occurrerisse. {3} nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se conlatio; per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum indicant. . . . noveramus corporis sanitatem: ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus vires corporis: ex his collegimus esse et animi robur. {4} aliqua benigna facta, aliqua humana, aliqua fortia nos obstupescerant: haec coepimus tamquam perfecta mirari. suberant illis multa vitia quae species conspicui alicuius facti fulgorque celabat: haec dissimulavimus. natura iubet augere laudanda, nemo non gloriam ultra verum tulit: ex his ergo speciem ingentis boni traximus. . . . {5} mala interdum speciem honesti obtulere et optimum ex contrario enituit. sunt enim, ut scis, virtutibus vitia confinia, et perditis quoque ac turpibus recti similitudo est: sic mentitur prodigus liberalium, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat. . . . {6} haec nos similitudo coegit adtendere et distinguere specie quidem vicina, re autem plurimum inter se dissidentia. dum observamus eos quos insignes egregium opus fecerat, coepimus adnotare quis rem aliquam generoso animo fecisset et magno impetu, sed semel, hunc vidimus in bello fortem, in foro timidum, animose paupertatem ferentem, humiliter infamiam, factum laudavimus, contempsimus virum. {7} alium vidimus adversus amicos benignum, adversus inimicos temperatum, et publica et privata sancte ac religiose administrantem; non deesse enim us quae toleranda erant patientiam, in us quae agenda prudentiam, vidimus ubi esuendum esset plena manu dantem, ubi laborandum, peritacem et obnoxium et lassitudinem corporis animo sublevantem, praeterea idem erat semper et in omnia actus par sibi, tam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset intelleximus in illo perfectam esse virtutem. {8}

hanc in partes divisimus: oportebat cupiditates refrenari, metus comprimi, facienda provideri, reddenda distribui: comprehendimus temperantiam, 30 fortitudinem, prudentiam, iustitiam et suum cuique dedimus officium. ex quo ergo virtutem intelleximus? ostendit illam nobis ordo eius et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens sese. hinc intellecta est illa beata vita secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. 35

2-3 Cf. 61L, and Cicero, *Fin.* 5.59, [*natura*] *virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius.*

13 In the omitted passage Seneca refers to the fortitude of Fabricius and Horatius Coclès as examples of the kind of behaviour that provides an *imago* of virtue.

18-28 Illustrations of the heuristic powers of observation and comparison. 5, which are Seneca's analysis of 'analogy'.

28 **perfectam . . . virtutem** Seneca speaks in the factual mode; cf. D 6. The earliest Stoics, for whom the wise man was as 'rare as the Phoenix', could not have supposed that virtue has to be actually observed in order to be grasped as a concept. But it became commonplace to instance Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic as Stoic sages. The character of such men, we can take Seneca to be saying, has provided us with the means of distinguishing the fundamental features of virtue as a whole. 32-4, from spurious instances of isolated virtues.

32-3 **ordo . . . concordia** Cf. 59D 18-19, *rerum agenda rerum ordinem . . . et concordiam.*

34 **beata . . . cursu** An allusion to Zeno's definition of happiness; 63A 4-5.

F Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.3.2-4

(1) πέφυκεν δὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ὡς περ τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνανεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐπέχειν, οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλητικῶς, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτ' ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως . . . (2) τὸ ἀγαθὸν φινέν εὐθὺς ἐκίνησεν ἐφ' αὐτό, τὸ κακὸν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ. οὐδέποτε δ' ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῆ ἀποδοκιμάσει 5 ψυχὴ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Καίσαρος νόμισμα. ἐνθεν ἐξήρηται πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοῦ.

Context: opening of a discourse on the good.

In Epictetus' psychology, *ὀρεξις* is always motivated by the good or the apparent good; cf. note on 56C 1. In the absence of a 'clear impression' of the good, people are motivated by false judgements of value: mistaking things which fall outside their moral purpose for good, they experience frustration and disappointment.

5-6 Cf. 40O 3.

G Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.22-6 (*SVF* 3.75)

(1) οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ τῶν κοινῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐννοιῶν ἐχόμενοι ὀρίζονται τὰ ἀγαθὰν τρόπον τῷδε "ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας", ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον

δὲ ὠφέλειας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀνθρώπον καὶ τὸν φίλον. (2) ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ
 πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πράξις ἐνέργειά τις
 οὖσα κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἀντικρὺς ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ
 φίλος, πάλιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντες καὶ αὐτοί, οὔτε ὠφέλεια λεχθεῖεν ἂν
 ὑπάρχειν οὐθ' ἕτεροι ὠφελείας δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην. (3) τὰ γὰρ μέρη,
 Στωικῶν φασὶ παῖδες, οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἑτεροῖα τῶν
 ὅλων, οἷον ἡ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ὅλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ γὰρ ὅλος ἀνθρωπὸς
 ἐστὶν ἡ χεὶρ, οὔτε ἕτερα τοῦ ὅλου, σὺν γὰρ τῇ [ὀλῃ] χειρὶ ὅλος ὁ ἀνθρωπος
 νοεῖται ἀνθρώπος. (4) ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ φίλου
 μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, τὰ δὲ μέρη οὔτε ταῦτ' αὖτε τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἕτερα τῶν
 ὅλων, εἴρηται ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας. (5)
 ὥστε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄρῳ ἐμπεριελήφθαι, ἐάν τε ἐξ εὐθείας ὠφέλεια
 τυγχάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ ἢ ἕτερον ὠφελείας. ἐνθεν καὶ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν τριχῶς εἰπόντες
 ἀγαθὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἕκαστον τῶν σημεινομένων κατ' ἴδιον πάλιν ἐπιβολὴν
 ἀπογράφουσιν. λέγεται γὰρ ἀγαθόν, φασί, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ὑφ' οὗ ἐστὶ
 ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατον ἐπ' ἔρχεται καὶ ἀρετῇ ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης ὥσπερ τινὸς πηγῆς
 πᾶσα πέφυκεν ἀνίσχειν ὠφέλεια. καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι· οὕτως οὐ
 μόνον αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεχθήσονται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτάς πράξεις, εἴπερ καὶ κατὰ ταύτας
 συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον λέγεται ἀγαθὸν τὸ οἷον τε
 ὠφελῆν, ἐμπεριλαμβανούσης τῆς ἀποδόσεως ταύτης τὰς τε ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς ἐναρέτους
 πράξεις καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους ἀνθρώπους θεοὺς τε καὶ σπουδαίους
 δαίμονας.

11 ὀλῃ del. Atram 13 ἐστὶν² ὁμοῖος ἐστὶν codd 23 ἐμπεριλαμβανούσης Bekker ἐκ. cond.

Context: doxography of good, bad and indifferent

These elaborate distinctions provide the Stoics with the logical apparatus for accommodating different kinds of good things, while retaining a univocal sense of ἀγαθόν, cf. especially 15–16, 22–5. The whole passage is consistent with the account of ὠφέλειαν as κινεῖν ἢ ἵσχειν κατ' ἀρετὴν, *DL* 7. 104. For parallel evidence, cf. *SVF* 3.74, 76; Sextus, *PH* 3.169–71, with discussion by Tsekourakis [356], 70–1.

9 Στωικῶν . . . παῖδες Probably meaning 'later Stoics'. Since the doctrine in question is explicitly attributed only to them, cf. 28D 9.

20–2 This use of 'good' in reference to the beneficial results of virtuous actions seems to be similar to what is elsewhere called ὠφέλημα and distinguished from ἀγαθόν, cf. 33J.

H Seneca, *Ep.* 124.13–14

"ilicibus" inquit "aliquid bonum esse arboris, aliquid herbar: potest ergo aliquid esse et
 inanimatis." (1) verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus: hoc quod
 in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur "quod est?" inquis. "Hic quod
 secundum cuiusque naturam est, (2) bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal
 nullo modo potest, felicitatis meliorisque naturae est, nisi ubi rationis locus est,
 bonum non est. (3) quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei:

haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt quod alterum immortale, alterum mortale est. ex his ergo unus bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. (4) cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non vere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. hoc enim demum 10 perfectum est quod secundum universam naturam perfectum, universa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta."

7 illu Schweighauser; illa eodd

Context: cognition of the good.

4-6 Cf. section 9 of the letter: *est aliquod irrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale* [i.e. child], *est rationale sed imperfectum* [i.e. ordinary adult human], *in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert*.

I Clement, *Paed.* 1.8.63.1-2 (*SF* 2.1116, part)

(1) ὁ δὲ φιλῶν τι ὠφελεῖν αὐτὸ βούλεται, τὸ δὲ ὠφελούν τοῦ μὴ ὠφελούντος πάντως ἂν πού κρείττον εἴη· τοῦ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ κρείττον οὐδὲ ἓν· ὠφελεῖ ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθόν. (2) ἀγαθὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὡμολογεῖται· ὠφελεῖ ἄρα ὁ θεός. (3) τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἢ ὅτι ὠφελεῖ· πάντα ἄρα ὠφελεῖ ὁ θεός. (4) καὶ οὐ δῆπου ὠφελεῖ μὲν τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐχὶ δὲ κηδεταὶ αὐτοῦ, 5 οὐδὲ κηδεταὶ μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτοῦ· κρείττον μὲν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ γνώμην ὠφελούν τοῦ μὴ ὠφελούντος κατὰ γνώμην· τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ κρείττον οὐδέν· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ γνώμην ὠφελεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· κηδεταὶ ἄρα καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ θεός.

9 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ Ἀσπμ

Context: elaboration of an argument showing god and λόγος to be φιλόανθρωποι. Though not attributed to the Stoics, the syllogistic form of the argument strongly recalls early Stoic proofs of the world's divine nature; cf. 54E-H.

For beneficence as a Stoic attribute of god, cf. 54K.

J Stobaeus 2.73.1-15 (*SF* 3.111)

(1) ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἐν κινήσει, τὰ δὲ ἐν σχέσει. ἐν κινήσει μὲν τὰ τοιούτα, χαράν, εὐφροσύνην, σίφφονα ὁμιλίαν· ἐν σχέσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὐτακτον ἡσυχίαν, μονὴν ἀτάραχον, προσοχήν ἐπαυδρον. (2) τῶν δὲ ἐν σχέσει τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐν ἔξει εἶναι, οἷον τὰς ἀρετάς· τὰ δ' ἐν σχέσει μόνον, ὡς τὰ ῥηθέντα. (3) ἐν ἔξει δὲ οὐ μόνος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 5 τέχνας τὰς ἐν τῷ ὑπουδαίμιν ἀνδρὶ ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους· οἷον γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίνεσθαι. (4) φασὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἔξει ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλούμενα, οἷον φιλομουσίαν, φιλογραμματίαν, φιλογεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· εἶναι

γὰρ ὁδὸν τιπὲ ἐκλεκτικὴν τῶν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς τέχναις οἰκείων πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀναφέρουσιν αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος.

4 τὰ τὰ Rieth τὰς τας codd 5-7 τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας P τὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τέχνας F τὸν τέχνης Wachsmuth 10 ἐκλεκτικὴν Meusier. ἐκλεκτὴν codd.

Context: doxography of goods.

1 For this division, cf. the two aspects of ὠφελεῖν cited in note on G, and Rieth [551], 29-31.

2 For χαρὰ and εὐφροσύνη, see also K 2-3, M 3; 21R 8-9. They are also classified as goods which do not belong to all φρόνημοι, nor to [any of] them all the time, Stobaeus 2.69,3-4.

9-11 Cf. 26H 5-7.

K Stobaeus 2.58,5-15 (SVF 3.95, part)

(1) τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀρετὰς, τὰ δ' οὐ. φρόνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην (καὶ δικαιοσύνην) καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἀρετὰς· χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ θάρρος καὶ βούλησιν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια οὐκ εἶναι ἀρετὰς.

(2) τῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν ἐπιστήμας τινῶν καὶ τέχνας, τὰς δ' οὐ. φρόνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμας εἶναι τινῶν καὶ τέχνας· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ καὶ ῥώμην καὶ ἰσχύϊ ψυχῆς οὐτ' ἐπιστήμας τινῶν εἶναι οὔτε τέχνας. (3) ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ' οὐ.

2 (καὶ δικαιοσύνην) Meusier ἀνδρείαν (καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ ἰσχύϊ ψυχῆς) Wachsmuth

Context: Stobaeus' first division of goods.

2-3 χαρὰ and βούλησις, along with εὐλάβεια, are the three εὐπάθειαι (65F), a term absent from Stobaeus' doxography.

6 μεγαλοψυχίαν In 61H 7 this is classified as subordinate to ἀνδρεία, and at Stobaeus 2.61,15 it is defined by reference to ἐπιστήμη (cf. D.L. 7.93), so it seems a wrong example to illustrate virtues which are neither ἐπιστήμαι ποῖ τέχναι

L Stobaeus 2.70,21-71,6 (SVF 3.104, part)

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι διαθέσεις, τὰ δὲ ἔξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ' οὐ, τὰ δ' οὔτε ἔξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. διαθέσεις μὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας, ἔξεις δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐ διαθέσεις τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ὡς τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ ἔξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις τὰς κατ' ἀρετὰς ἐνεργείας, οἷοι φρονιμῆμα καὶ τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης κτήσιν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

3 ὡς τὴν Heeren. καὶ τὴν codd. 4 ἀρετὰς Meusier; αὐτὰς codd

Context: 2 pages before J.

5 φρονιμῆμα Cf. 59M 11.

M Stobaeus 2.71.15–72.6 (SVF 3.106, part)

τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως
 ἔχοντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν φρόνιμος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος ποιητικὰ μόνον ἔστιν
 ἀγαθὰ· χαρὰ δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ θάρρος καὶ φρονίμη περιπάτησις
 τελικὰ μόνον ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ· αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι καὶ ποιητικὰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ
 καὶ τελικά, καὶ γὰρ ἀπαγεννῶσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ συμπληροῦσι, μέρῃ 5
 αὐτῆς γινόμεναι. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν . . .

ἀ γινόμεναι Usener: γινόμενα codd

Context: a few lines after **L**.

For this division, see also D.L. 7.96 and Cicero, *Fin.* 3.55. It closely recalls the tripartite classification of goods in Plato, *Rep.* 2, 357b–d: (a) desirable not for their consequences but for their own sake; (b) desirable both for their consequences and for their own sake; (c) desirable not for their own sake but for their consequences. Stoaic τελικά correspond to (a) and ποιητικά to (c). Plato's prime example of (b) is *φρονεῖν*, with *χαίρειν* one of his examples of (a) and exercise of (c), all of which are taken over in **M**. Cf. also the bipartite division into δι' αὐτὰ and ποιητικά, Stobaeus 2.72.14–18.

N Cicero, *Fin.* 3.27

sed consecretaria me Stolorum brevia et acuta delectant. concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta
 sic: (1) quod est bonum, omne laudabile est: quod autem laudabile est, omne
 est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est. satisne hoc conclusum
 videtur? certe; quod enim efficiebatur ex iis duobus quae erant sumpta, in eo
 vides esse conclusum. (2) duorum autem e quibus effecta conclusio est, contra 5
 superius dici solet non omne bonum esse laudabile. nam quod laudabile sit
 honestum esse conceditur. (3) illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid
 quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum quod non placens, aut si id, non
 etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem
 honestum, ita fit ut quod bonum sit, id etiam honestum sit. 10

4 *its* Baizer: *hu* endl. 5 *vides* ed. princ.: *videt* codd

Context: proof that *honestum* is the only good. The syllogism is criticized at *Fin.* 4.48.

The whole passage, minus the elementary lesson in logic, is ultimately derived from Chrysippus; cf. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1039c. For discussion of this and similar Stoic arguments, cf. Irwin [594].

O Diogenes Laertius 7.101 (SVF 3.92)

δοκεῖ δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσα εἶναι καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' ἄκρον εἶναι αἰρετὸν
 καὶ μὴτ' ἀνεσιν μὴτ' ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι.

Context: one sentence before **58A**.

2 The defining characteristic of a *διάθεσις*; cf. 47S.

P Stoebaeus 2.101,21–102,3 (SVF 3.626)

τὰ δ' ἀγαθὰ πάντα κοινὰ εἶναι τῶν σπουδαίων, τῶν δὲ φεύλων τὰ κακὰ. δι' ὃ καὶ τὸν ὠφελούντ' αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ βλάπτουτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτειν. πάντας δὲ τοὺς σπουδαίους ὠφελεῖν ἀλλήλους, οὔτε φίλους ἀντας ἀλλήλων πάντως οὔτε εὐνοίᾳ (αὐτῇ) εὐδικίμους οὔτε ἀποδεχόμενους παρὰ τὴ μήτε καταλαμβάνεσθαι μήτ' ἐν ταύτῃ κατοικεῖν τόπῳ, εὐνοητικῶς μέντοι γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διακείσθαι καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ δοκιμαστικῶς καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς· τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων ὑπάρχειν.

4 <οὔτε> Heron

Cicero: see note on 59N

1–2 Similarly Stoebaeus 2.93.19–94.1, where the thesis concerning virtuous men is followed by the definition of *δμόνοια* as *ἐπιστήμη κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν*; this is a feature of all virtuous men διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον

Q Cleanthes (Clement, *Protr.* 6.72.7; SVF 1.557)

τάγαθὸν ἐριτωῆς μ' οἶον ἔστ'; ἄκουε δὴ·
τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὁσιον, εὐσιβές,
κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον,
αἰσθηρόν, αὐθέκαστον, αἰεὶ συμφέρον,
ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον,
ὠφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον,
ἐντιμον <...> ὁμολογούμενον,
εὐκλές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρῶτον, σφοδρόν,
χρονιζόμενον, ἀμεμπτον, αἰεὶ διαμένον.

7 ἐντιμον <εὐχάριστον> Aspin

* Compare: the verses are quoted as Cleanthes' 'revelation' concerning the nature of god.

Most of the attributes are too familiar to require comment. The following are more distinctive: 4 αἰσθηρόν, cf. SVF 1.637–9, Aristotle, *EE* vii.3, 1240a2; 5 ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον – free from two of the cardinal passions, cf. R6; 8 ὁμολογούμενον – recalling the definition of the τέλος, cf. 63A 1; 8 ἄτυφον, cf. notes on 1D; 2B 4

R Plutarch, *Si rep.* 1042E–F (SVF 3.85)

(1) τὰγαθὰ πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τὴν πᾶσιν ἔχειν διαφορὰν ὁμολογεῖ Χρύσιππος. καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν εἰ τὰ μὲν ἐσχάτως ποιεῖ κακοδαίμονας εὐθὺς οἷς ἂν παρῇ τὰ δ' ἐπ' ἄκρον εὐδαίμονας. (2) αἰσθητὰ δ' εἶναι τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ φησιν, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ *Περὶ τέλους* ταῦτα γράφων: "ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὰ εἰσι τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τούτοις ἐκποικίλεται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἰδεσιν, οὐδὲν λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλυτῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθῆσθαι καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν οὐδὲ μόνον χαρὰς καὶ

ἐπεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν."

10

γ καθόλου Renke. γὰρ ὅλον Todd

Context: Plutarch finds these doctrines absurdly inconsistent with the Stoic thesis that a man may change from vice to virtue without perceiving the change; cf. 61U.

δ σὺν τοῖς εἶδεσιν For the translation, 'people's appearance', cf. Burnyeat [484], 228–9, who aptly refers to D.L. 7.173 where Cleanthes is reported to have vindicated a Zenoian doctrine that moral character is καταληπτὸν ἐξ εἶδους; and cf. 45C for Cleanthes' use of the visible signs of shame and fear – blushing and pallor – in his argument for the soul's corporeality

S Seneca, *Ep.* 1 (7.2–3)

(1) placet nostris quod bonum est corpus esse, quia quod bonum est facit, quidquid facit corpus est. quod bonum est prodest; faciat autem aliquid oportet ut prosit, si facit, corpus est. (2) sapientiam bonum esse dicunt; sequitur ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere – at sapere non putant eiusdem condicionis esse. incorporeale est et accidet alteri, id est sapientiae: itaque nec facit quicquam nec prodest. "quid ergo?" inquit "non illiusus, bonum est sapere?" dicimus referentes ad id ex quo pendet, id est ad ipsam sapientiam.

5

Context: exposition of the corporeality of wisdom

1–3 Cf. 45A–B.

4–7 Cf. 33E and note on 33J.

61 Virtue and vice

A Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (SVF 3.39)

(1) τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν διαθέσειν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην· καὶ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτὴν εἶναι αἰρετήν, οὐ διὰ τινος φόβου ἢ ἐλπίδα ἢ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· (2) ἐν αὐτῇ τ' εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἧτ' οὕση ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντός τοῦ βίου.

Context: immediately following 63C.

3 The identification of virtue with a soul of this kind seems to be a purely verbal difference from the more familiar account of it as a διάθεσις of the soul or the soul's commanding-faculty; cf. B 8. In Stobaeus 2.64.18–23 the corporeality of the virtues is inferred from the fact that they are identical to the soul's commanding part καθ' ὑπόστασιν.

B Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D

(1) Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἑρετρίας ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὡς μιᾶς οὐσίας καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ

σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βρυτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον. (2) Ἀρίστων δ' ὁ Χίος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· (3) τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείυνας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὄρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαι καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανοθέαι ἢ τι τοιούτων ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητῶν μὲν ἐπισκοπούσα καὶ μὴ ποιητῶν κέκληται φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὐκαριν ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὀρίζουσα σωφροσύνη, κοινωνίῃσιν δὲ καὶ συμβολαίῃσι ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέροις δικαιοσύνη· (4) καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἐν μὲν ἔστιν ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλο διαιρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μὲν φύσει χρώμενον. (5) εἴκοι δὲ καὶ Ζήνων εἰς τοῦτό πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ὁ Κιτιεῖς, ὀριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπομεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην ἐν δ' αἰρετέας σωφροσύνην ἐν δ' ὑπομεμητέοις ἀνδρείαν· (6) ἀπολογούμενοι δ' ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν ταῦτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνομάσθαι. (7) Χρυσίππος δὲ, κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων, ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν Ἠλάτωνα "σμήνος ἀρετῶν" αὐτὸν σύνθετες αὐτὸς γνώριμον ἐγείρας· ὡς γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἀνδρείον ἀνδρείαν καὶ παρὰ τὸν πρῶτον πρόσητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην παρὰ τὸν δίκαιον, οὕτω παρὰ τὸν χαρίεντα χαριεντότητα καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐσθλότητα καὶ παρὰ τὸν μέγαν μεγαλότητα καὶ παρὰ τὸν καλὸν καλότητα ἑτέρας τε τοιαύτης ἐκιδεξιότητης εὐαπειτησίας εὐραπείας ἀρετὰς τιθένους πολλῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν δεσμένην ἐμπέπληκε φιλοσοφίαν. (8) κοινῶς δ' ἅπαντες οὗτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγεννημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογοῦμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται· (9) καὶ νομίζουσι οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορὰ τι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, δι' ὅλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε ταῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς καθ' ἑξὶν ἡ διαθήσειν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, (10) λέγεσθαι δ' ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῶ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰρῶντι λόγον ἐκφέρηται· (11) καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον ποιητὴν καὶ ἀκόλουστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης.

14 τὸ κοινὸν τὸν Πόλην 20 χαριεντότητα 21 ἐσθλότητα εἰ καὶ -ότητας εἰσδίδ. 22 ψυχῆς δι: Hartman

Context: the unitary conception of virtue held by those philosophers who, mistakenly in Plutarch's opinion, have defended a unitary conception of the soul.

1 Menedemus' position recalls that of the Megarians, D.L. 7.161

5 ὑγίειαν Cf Plato, *Rep.* 4.444d.

12-14 The position attributed to Zeno closely resembles Aristotle's account of Socrates' doctrine on the relationship between virtue, knowledge and φρόνησις. Cf EN VI 13, 1144b17-30

14-15 Evidence that the task of Zeno's successors in this matter was, as so often,

to impose some formal coherence on his pronouncements. The 'defence' (ἀπαλογούμενοι) probably concerns the awkward double role of φρόνησις as both genus and one species of virtue, cf. C 2.

16 τὸ ποιόν The MSS reading should be retained: τὸ ποιόν refers to the genus of 'the qualified' (cf. 28) in contrast with that of 'relative disposition' (cf. 29), as proposed (though perhaps not explicitly, see vol. 1, 179) by Aristo, § 10.

17 The Platonic reference is to *Meno* 72a.

20-3 χαριεντότης and the succeeding virtue terms are Chrysippean innovations. He presumably took his own theory to require names for each virtue which would unambiguously denote the quality corresponding to each virtue adjective. Available nouns such as χάρις, μέγεθος, κάλλος may have seemed too general for this purpose. He could have avoided the 'swarm of virtues' only by either treating some virtue adjectives as synonyms or leaving the corresponding virtues nameless (cf. Aristotle's procedure in *EN* II 7).

25 ὁ βέλαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον The terms connote properties of ἐπιστήμη and the wise man's character; cf. especially 41E, 59E, and see also *NE* I 1342.

27 διαφορά ψυχῆς We take διαφορά τινι καὶ φύσει as a hendiadys: ψυχή, though often deleted, is essential to the argument. The Stoics acknowledge that passion and irrationality are different from rationality, but do not locate their difference in different parts of the soul. Cf. 65G.

31 πλεονάζοντι The technical term for an 'excessive' impulse, cf. 65A, J.

32 αἰρούμενα λόγον Cf. 59E 2, where ὁ αἰρὼν λόγος is a definition of καθήκον and may be taken to stand to it as ὁρθὸς λόγος stands to a κατ'ὁρθώμα. Thus the account of irrationality here should be taken to refer to a mind which is temporarily under the direction of passion, and not to the character of all who lack the wise man's perfect reason.

C Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034C 1.

(1) ἀρετὰς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπολείπει πλείους κατὰ διαφοράς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ὥς ἀχωρίστους μὲν οὖσας ἐτέρας δὲ καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων. (2) πάλιν δὲ ἀριζόμενος αὐτῶν ἐκάστην τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνησιν (ἐν ὑπαμενετείῃ τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν αἰρετέοις τὴν δ' ἰδίως λεγομένην φρόνησιν φρόνησιν) ἐν ἐνεργητέοις τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν ἀπαινεητέοις, ὥς μίαν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσει κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν. (3) οὐ μόνον δὲ ὁ Ζήνων περὶ ταῦτα φαίνεται αὐτῷ μεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χρύσιππος Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν ὅτι μίᾳ ἀρετῇ σχέσει εἶλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι (4) Ζήνωνι δὲ συνηγορῶν οὕτως ἀριζομένῳ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐκάστην. (5) ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν Ὑπομνήμασι φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, καὶ ἰκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἰσχύς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν ἢ δ' ἰσχύς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος, ὅταν μὲν ἐν τοῖς φανέοις ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγίγνηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν, ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς

ὑπομενεύεις, ἀνδρεία: περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη· περὶ δὲ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη.”

1 κατὰ διαφοράς νε. καὶ διαφοράς could 4 ὁ suppl. Pohlenz 13 ἐν vel ἐν τοῖς 15 διαφέρει Flutsch: ἐμφανέως could 15 ἐν could: Am Herwerden

Context: alleged Stoic self-contradictions

12 **τόνος** Cleanthes' physicalist account of virtue (for **τόνος**, cf. 47J–M) has left clear traces in later Stoic terminology. See 65T for ἀτονία as a mark of moral weakness, and for εὐτονία as well as ὁτονία, cf. also SVF 3.270, 473. As a term that evokes the stringing and harmonies of a lyre (cf. vol. 1, 488 n. 1), **τόνος** fits the Stoics' favoured image of the 'concordance' that exists between the specific virtues. Cf. notes on 57G and 59K

D Stobaeus 2.63,6–24 (SVF 3.280, part)

(1) πᾶσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὅσαι ἐπιστημαὶ εἰσι καὶ τέχναι κοινὰ τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ αὐτό· διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πᾶσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πᾶσας πράττειν. διηφέρειν δ' ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. (2) φρονήσεως μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν, ὃ ποιητέον, προηγου- 5 μένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπανέμειν (καὶ ἃ δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν), χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτύτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον. (3) τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς, ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτύτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς 10 ἀναστρέφεσθαι. (4) καὶ ὁμοίως τὴν ἀνδρείαν προηγουμένως μὲν πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας (5) καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προηγουμένως μὲν τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστω σκοπεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ. (6) πᾶσας γὰρ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὰ πασῶν βλέπειν καὶ τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα ἀλλήλαις.

6 ὁ suppl. Usener 10 τὰ Flutsch: τὰς could 15 ἀλλήλαις Usener: ἄλλας could

Context: doxography of the Stoic virtues.

1 ἐπιστημαὶ . . . καὶ τέχναι Cf. 60K 2.

2 **τέλος** The 'end' of the virtues is reported by Stobaeus 2.62,7–8, as τὸ ἀκοιμήτως τῇ φύσει ζῆν; see also 63B, C. G

14–15 τὰ πασῶν βλέπειν What we call (vol. 1, 384) the 'primary' and 'secondary' perspectives of each virtue is illuminated by Cicero, Off. 2.18. There three spheres of action (cf. 'common theorems', 1–2) are specified for every virtue, cf. note on 56B.

E Seneca, Ep. 113. 24

"non sunt" inquit "virtutes multa animalia, et tamen animalia sunt. nam quemadmodum aliquis et poeta est et orator, et tamen unus, sic virtutes istae

animalia sunt sed multa non sunt idem est animus et temperans et iustus et prudens et fortis, ad singulas virtutes quodam modo se habens."

3 *temperans* A A 1 long; *animus* codd.; *animus* <*temperans*> Henric

Context: concluding discussion of the Stoic thesis (cf. Stobaeus 2.65,1-4) that the virtues are living beings. The thesis is grounded in the conception of the *animus* as *animal*, and virtue as *animus quodam modo se habens*. **29B.**

1 **inquit** The subject is Seneca's imaginary Stoic interlocutor, who has been defending the thesis about the virtues' being *animalia* against Seneca's objections. Cf. Ep. 113.9: 'non sunt', inquit, 'multo, quia ex uno reliqua sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt.'

F Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1046E F (SVF 3.299,243)

(1) τὰς ἀρετὰς φασιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις; οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργούντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνδρα φασὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα. τὰς ἀρετὰς οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετὰς. (2) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῇ ἑκτῇ τῶν Ἰθικῶν ζητημάτων ὁ Χρύσιππος οὐκ αἰετ φησιν ἀνδρίζεσθαι τὸν ἀπτεῖον οὐδὲ δειλαίνειν τὸν φαῦλον, ὥς δέον ἐν φαντασίαις ἐπιφερομένων τινῶν τὸν μὲν ἐμμένειν τοῖς κρίμασι τὸν δ' ἀφίστασθαι, πιθανὸν δέ φησι μὴδ' ἀκολασταίνειν αἰετ τὸν φαῦλον. 5

1 φασιν νῦν φησιν codd. 2 τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα g τῇ μίαν ἔχοντι (νῦν ἔχοντα) cets. 3 δέον ἐν codd.; δεῖν ἐν Madvig. alii alii

Context: an alleged Stoic self-contradiction

G Stobaeus 2.66,14-67,4 (SVF 3.360)

(1) λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν. ᾧ ποιεῖ, δηλοῦ(όντι)· ὃν τρόπον γὰρ λέγομεν πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν αὐλητὴν ἢ κιθαριδόν, σινυπακ- 5 ουσόμενον τοῦ ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλησιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κιθαριδίαν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καθ' ὅσα ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μὰ Δία καὶ ᾧ μὴ ποιεῖ. (2) τῷ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἐπιτελεῖν πάντα καὶ ᾗ οἶον κατ' ἀρετὴν, περὶ ὅλων οὖσαν τὴν βίον τέχνην, ἀκόλουθον ἀήθησαν τὸ περὶ τοῦ πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν δόγμα. (3) κατὰ τὸ ἀνέλυστον δὲ καὶ τὸν φαῦλον πάντα ὅσα ποιεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν κατὰ πάσας τὰς κακίας.

1 δηλοῦ(όντι) Mullach' δηλῶν οὐδ' 2 καθ' ὅσα codd. κατ' ὅσα καὶ οὐδ' κατ' ὅσα Henric 3 οἶον curreptely notanipius

Context: characterization of the Stoic sage.

H Stobaeus 2.59.4 60,2; 60,9-24 (SVF 3.262, 264, 261)

(1) φρόνησιν δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέων καὶ οὐ ποιητέων καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἣ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει

πολιτικοῦ ζώου . . . (2) σωφροσύνην δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων' (3) δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἐκάστω' (4) ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων' (5) ἀφροσύνην δὲ <ἀγνοίαν> ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἣ ἀγνοίαν ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων . . . (6) τῶν δ' ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταῖς πρώταις ὑποτεταγμένους· πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην. καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὑπομνάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις τῶν δὲ ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταύταις τὰς μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ὑποτετάχθαι, τὰς δὲ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, τὰς δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ, τὰς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ (7) τῇ μὲν οὖν φρονήσει ὑποτάττεσθαι εὐβουλίαν, εὐλογιστίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, νουνέχειαν, εὐμηχανίαν· (8) τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξίαν, κοσμιότητα, αἰδημοσύνην, ἐγκράτειαν· (9) τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ καρτερίαν, θαρραλεότητα, μεγαλοψυχίαν, εὐψυχίαν, φιλοποनीαν· (10) τῇ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ εὐσέβειαν, χρηστότητα, εὐκοινωνησίαν, εὐσυναλλαξίαν.

1 δ' εἶναι Ἡερεν δὲ καὶ τοῦ δ' <ἀγνοίαν> Ἡερεν

Context: a few lines after 60K.

2-3 **φύσει-ζώου** Cf. 57D 2, F 2; 63K 5-6; 67R. For *man* as so specified, cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.2, 1253a2-3

5-6 For alternative Stoic definitions of courage, cf. 32H.

13-18 In the passage that follows this extract these subordinate virtues are all defined in terms of ἐπιστήμη.

I Diogenes Laertius 7.127

(1) ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μετὰ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μετὰ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπὴν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν φασιν ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλόν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον, οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτ' ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. (2) καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρῦσιππος μὲν ἀποβλήτην, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλήτην διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις· (3) καὶ αὐτὴν δι' <αὐτὴν> αἰρετὴν εἶναι, αἰσχυρόμεθα γοῦν ἐφ' οἷς κακῶς πράττομεν, ὡς ἂν μόνον τὸ καλὸν εἰδότες ἀγαθόν. αὐτάρ κη τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθὼς φησι Ζήνων καὶ Χρῦσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ Ἐνάτωρ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν.

1 δι' ε' δὲ BF <αὐτὴν> Arist

Context: doxography of the Stoic virtues

7 **βεβαίους καταλήψεις** This expression alludes to Stoic accounts of ἐπιστήμη (cf. 41H). Cleanthes, then, is arguing that *quia* ἐπιστήμη (cf. 60K 2) the cardinal virtues are necessarily secure.

8-9 This appears to offer empirical support for the sole goodness of τὸ καλόν

But shame at behaving badly provides no ground for so strong a claim. The sentence has the look of being garbled or heavily condensed. Cf. 60N.

10 After a quotation from Hecato the passage continues at 64o.

J Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1076A (SVF 3.246)

τὸ τρίτον τοίνυν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας ἐστὶ μηδενὶ τοσαῦτον τοῖς θεοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν ὅσον εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρονται. ἀλλὰ κατὰ Χρύσιππον οὐδὲ τοῦτο περίεστιν αὐτοῖς ἀρετῇ τε γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερέχειν τὸν Δία τοῦ Δίωνος ὠφελείσθαι θ' ὁμοίως ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Δίωνα, σοφοὺς ὄντας, ὅταν ἄτερος θατέρου τυγχάνῃ κινουμένου.

5

4 ἄτερος Hecataeum 4τερος τοῦδ

Context: polemic against Stoic theology

This doctrine, though shocking to conventional Greek piety (cf. 1-2), is entirely consistent with the Stoics' thinking on goods (cf. 60P), and their psychology (cf. 53X; 62K 3).

K Diogenes Laertius 7.91 (SVF 3.223)

διδασκτὴν τ' εἶναι . . . τὴν ἀρετὴν . . . ὅτι δὲ διδασκτὴ ἐστὶ, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθοῦς ἐκ φαύλων.

Context: doxography of Stoic virtue. The first sentence is ascribed to Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Pseudoxy and Hecato.

L Stoicæus 2.65.8 (SVF 1.566, part)

πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν . . . κατὰ τὸν Κλέανθην.

Context: the absence of anything in between virtue and vice (cf. 11). Cleanthes is quoted in support of that thesis, which, as amplified, takes the vicious to be φαῦλοι to be imperfect (ἀτελεῖς) and the virtuous to be perfected (τελειωθέντες).

1 ἀφορμὰς Cf. 63C 2 3.

M Alexander, *Fat.* 196.24 (197.3 (SVF 2.984, part)

(1) "εἴ", φασίν, "ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δυνάμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οἱ τε ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ὀδοί, προτροπαὶ τε καὶ ἀποτροπαί, κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμαί, οὐκ ἐστὶν τὸ φρονίμως εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ὅτι μηκέτ' εἰσὶν τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς δεκτικαί, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ αἱ κακαὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς κακοῖς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις τὸ μηκέτ' εἶναι κακοῖς. (2) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ λέγειν τὰς

5

ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴδὲ τοὺς ἐπαινοὺς καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ἐπὶ ταύταιν γίνεσθαι. (3) οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον."

Context: a problem raised by the unnamed determinists who are Alexander's target, and who, with qualifications (cf. Long [541]), can be identified with Stoics.

The passage has the appearance of being an authentic (Stoic) argument, but some think it may be distorted, or even formulated, by Alexander; cf. Sharples [333] ad loc. For further discussion, see Long [535], 183–5, Stough [539], 208–13.

4. ὁ μὴκέτι We have reverted to 'no longer' as our translation, instead of 'not now', as proposed by Long loc. cit.

N Alexander, *Fat.* 109,14–22 (SVF 3.658, part)

(1) εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ κακία μόναι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων οὐδετέρου τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικόν, (2) τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν εἰς ἡ δεύτερος ὑπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῶον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν σπανιώτερον τοῦ φοίνικος τοῦ παρ' Αἰθιοπίαν, (3) οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὥς μὴδὲν διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, 5 μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας ὅσοι μὴ σοφοί, (4) πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀθλιώτατον ζῶον ἀπάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἔχων τήν τε κακίαν καὶ τὸ μαίνεσθαι σύμφυτα πύτῳ καὶ συγκεκληρωμένα;

Context: the inconsistency of these doctrines with the thesis that man's welfare is nature's goal.

4–5 For this paradox, cf. Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1076b, where the wise man is alleged to have never existed, and *St. rep.* 1048e, where Chrysippus is said to disclaim virtue for himself and all his acquaintances and teachers.

O Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.29, 34–5

(1) vitiositas autem est habitus aut affectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens . . . (2) ex qua concitantur perturbationes, quae sunt, ut paulo ante diximus, turbidi animorum concitatusque motus, aversi a ratione et inimicissimi mentis vitaeque tranquillae. (3) important enim aegritudines anxias atque acerbis animosque adfligunt et debilitant metu: idem inflammant adpetitione nitima, quam tum cupiditatem, tum libidinem dicimus, impotentiam quandam animi a temperantia et moderatione plurimum dissidentem . . . (4) eorum igitur malorum in una virtute posita sanatio est. 5

2 concitantur Mamurum cogitantur cod.3

Context: an account, based on Stoicism, of the diseases of the soul; cf. 65R.

Cicero at *Tusc.* 4.30 distinguishes *vitia*, as persistent *affectiones* (i.e. διαθέσεις), from intermittent *perturbationes*. *vitiositas* is his translation of κακία, cf. 4.34.

P Marcus Aurelius 8.14

ὦ ἂν ἐντυγχάνης, εὐθύς σουτῶ πρόλεγε· αὐτός τίνα δόγματα ἔχει περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; εἰ γὰρ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνου καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἐκατέρου καὶ περὶ δόξης, ἀδοξίας, θανάτου, ζωῆς, τοιάδε τινὰ δόγματα ἔχει, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἢ ξένον μοι δόξει, εἰάν τάδε τινὰ ποιῇ, καὶ μεμνήσομαι ὅτι ἀναγκάζεται οὕτως ποιεῖν

Cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.18.3-4, especially *πεπλάνηται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν*; and for ἀναγκάζεται, s, see 62D 3

Q Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1039E (SVF 3.761, part)

καὶ προελθὼν δέ φησιν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις καθήκει μένειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν· εἴτα κατὰ λέξιν· "πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψιλὰς οὐδὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῶς, οὕτως δ' οὐδὲ ἡ κακία οὐδὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμῶς ἀπιέναι."

Context: Chrysippus' alleged self-contradiction in also approving Antisthenes' saying, 'one should get intelligence or a hangman's rope'. Prior to this extract, Chrysippus is reported to have criticized Plato, *Charmus* 408a: life is no advantage to someone who has not learned how to live.

For the irrelevance of virtue or vice, on their own, to reasons for living or dying, cf 66G.

R Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1050E-F, 1051A-B (SVF 2.1181, part; 1182)

ἐπιτείνει δὲ τὴν ὑπερκειμένην (1) ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ φύσεως γράφων τάδε· "ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δευρὶ συμπτώματα ἰδίον τιν' ἔχει λόγον" (2) γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὕτη πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνα οὕτως εἰπω, οὐκ ἀχρηστάτος γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· (3) οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τὰγαθὸν ἦν." . . . (4) πάλιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐνισταμένων ἐνίοις ἀδικήμασι, (5) "κακίαν δέ", φησι, "καθόλου ἄραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὐτ' ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι."

1 λόγον codd. 2 οὐκ ἄχρηστα, cf. Comm. not. 1051A, 4 γὰρ δὲ ἡ κακία καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐτὲ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἦν codd. 5 ἐνισταμένων ἐνίοις vel ἐνισταμένοις ἐνίοις codd.

Context: Chrysippus' statements on κακία; cf. Comm. not. 1051A, where the same passage is quoted with slight verbal differences.

For Chrysippus' general position, cf. 60A, and for the accommodation of vice to divine providence, see 54T. For the necessary coexistence of opposites, cf. 54Q 1.

S Plutarch, *Prof.* 75C (SVF 3.539, part)

(1) οὕτως ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὔτε τινὰ προκοπὴν οὔτε προκοπῆς αἰσθησὶν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ μὴ μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ μεθίστοι μὴδ' ἀπακαθαίρεται τῆς ἀβελτερίας, ἀλλ' ἄχρι τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἀκράτει τῷ κακῷ χρῆται. (2) καὶ γὰρ ἀκαρεὶ χρόνον καὶ ὥρας ἐκ τῆς ὥς ἐνὶ μάλιστα

φαιλότῃτος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διαθέσιν μεταβαλὼν ὁ
σφόδρως, ἥς οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ μέρους ἀφείλε κακίας, ἅμα πάσαν ἐξαίφνης
ἀποπέφευγε.

1 ὑποληπτέον vel ἀποληπτέον codd 5 μεταβαλὼν vel μεταβῆλος ἂν codd

Context: Plutarch's rejection of this Stoic thesis.

1 οὕτως By analogy with technical and medical treatment.

4 ἀκαρεῖ χρόνου Cf. 631 2.

T Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1063A–H (SVF 3.539, part)

“καί”, φασίν, “ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας
οὐδὲν ἦττιν πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυιᾶς πεντακοσίας, οὕτως
οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἦττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ· καί
καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοὶ εἰσιν κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν,
οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρι οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ
μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν.”

Context: attack on the Stoic doctrine of progress.

U Plutarch, *Comm. mor.* 1062H

τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα θαυμάσιος αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς
εἰδαιμονίας παραγιννομένης πολλάκις οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον
οἰοῦνται διαλεληθέναι δὲ αὐτὸν ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ
ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν.

1 αὐτὸν Wyttenebach: αὐτόν codd

Context: shortly after 631, to which τοῦτο, 1, refers.

1 διαλεληθέναι A famous paradox; cf. Plutarch, *Prof.* 750; SVF 3.540–1; and
Sedley 111f, 94–5.

62 Moral responsibility

A Hippolytus, *Haer.* 1.21 (SVF 2.975)

καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαιώσωσιν παραδείγ-
ματι χρῆσάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ἡ ἐξηρητημένος κύων,
ἐὰν μὲν βουλήται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπεται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ
αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς εἰμαρμένης]· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βουλήται
ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ δῆπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων·
καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκαλοποιεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντας εἰς τὸ
πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

4 vel. Roper

Context: summary of Stoic cosmology

B Cleanthes (Fpictetus, *Ench.* 53; *SVF* 1.527)

ἄγον δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ αἰ γ' ἡ Περικυμένῃ,
 ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος·
 ὥς ἔφομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
 κακὸς γενόμενος, αἰδέν ἤττον ἔφομαι.

Context: the close of the *Enchiridion*. The lines are cited along with others from Euripides and Plato, the dominant theme being the merits of complying with fate and the divine will.

C Cicero, *Fat.* 39-43 (*SVF* 2.974)

(1) ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, (2) altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, (3) Chrysippus tanquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt, dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabatur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus. (4) atque hoc, si placet, facile sit, videamus in adsensionibus, quas prima oratione tractavi. eas enim veteres illi quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur, vi effici et necessitate dicebant. qui autem ab his dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque fato adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri, sique ita diserebant: "si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente; et, si adpetitus, illa etiam quae adpetitum secuntur. ergo etiam adsensiones; ac, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem quae adpetitu efficiuntur sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. ex quo efficiunt ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia." quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri quaecumque fiant. (5) Chrysippus autem, cum et necessitatem improbaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum. "causarum enim" inquit "aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adjuvantes et proximae. quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus, causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus [antecedentibus] et proximis." (6) itaque illi rationi quam paulo ante conclusi sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adjuvantibus et proximis. quae si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. ac hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne ille quidem

esset in nostra potestate. (7) quam ob rem, qui ita fatum introducunt ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio: qui autem causas antecedentis non dicent perfectas neque principales, in eos nihil valebit. (8) quod enim dicantur adensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. nam quamquam adensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus; non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat. (9) "ut igitur" inquit "qui protulit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed adensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, suapte vi et natura movebitur. (10) quod si aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus quaecumque fiunt veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit cur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit? modo intellegatur quae sit causarum distinctio ac dissimilitudo."

7 *enimvero* Davies: *enim* could 25 del. Davies

Context: qualified defence of Chrysippus' position.

4 Aristoteles A puzzling characterization of Aristotle, perhaps by inference from his approval of divination, noted by Cicero at *Div.* 1.53, 81. Aristotle's celebrated Sea Battle discussion at *De int.* 9 was evidently not cited in the Hellenistic debate (despite Epicurus' similar treatment of the issue at 20H 1), or he could hardly have failed to find his way into the libertarian group, mentioned next.

13–20 This is a general, rather than a specifically anti-Stoic, argument, since it does not reflect the Stoics' own account of the relation of impulse to assent: cf. note on 33I.

23 adiuvantes et proximae See vol. 1, 342, where we argue, in agreement with Frede ([334], 240–1), that this represents *συνεργὰ καὶ προκαταρκτικά*

D Gellius 7.2.6–13 (*SLF* 2.1000, part)

(1) contra ea Chrysippus tenuiter multa et argute dissent; sed omnium fere, quae super ea re scripsit, huiusmodi sententia est. "quamquam ita sit" inquit "ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque conexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. (2) nam si sunt per naturam primum salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit inoffensus tractabilisque transmittunt. sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etiamsi parvo sive nullo fatals incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen scaevitate et voluntario impetu in

assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt. (3) idque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, quae fatum vocatur. est enim genere ipso quasi fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non vacent." (4) huius demum fere res exemplo non hercle nimis alieno neque inlepidio utitur. "sicut" inquit "lapidem cylindrum si per spatia terrae prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei et initium praecipitaniae feceris, mox tamen ille praecipit volvitur, non quia tu id iam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et formae volubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera ipsa et principia causarum movet, impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque prostratarum actionesque ipsas voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur." (5) infert deinde verba haec his quae dixi congruentia: διὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἴρηται "γινώσκει δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πῆματ' ἔχοντας" ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἐκάστοις παρ' αὐτοῦς γινυμένων καὶ καθ' ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἀμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ <διά>θεσιν. (6) propterea negat oportere ferri audiriue homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et in maleficio reuicti sunt, perfugium ad fati necessitatem tamquam in aliquod fami asyllum et, quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritati, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt.

13 fere rei Hitz: fere VP. rei recepitores

22 πῶτος V. πῶτος recepitores

24 <διά>θεσιν Sedley

Context: as 55K.

5 **proprietas . . et qualitas** Perhaps an attempt to render ἰδία ποιότης (see 28).

E Diogenes Laertius 7.23

δούλον ἐπὶ κλοπῇ, φασὶν, ἐμαρτίγουν· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος, "εἴμαρτό μοι κλέψαι", ἔφη, "καὶ διαρῆναι."

Context: life of Zeno

F Diogenianus (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 6.8.25–9; S1F 2.998)

(1) ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* βιβλίῳ τοιαύταις τισὶν ἀποδείξεισι κέχρηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ λύειν πεινῶνται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκούντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ τῶ πάντα κινηναγκάσθαι λέγοντι, ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐτίθεμεν· ὅλον τὸ ἀναρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν περὶ φόρους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπὰς καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γινόμενα φαίνεται. (2) φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἦτον συγκαθεμαρῆθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὄλων διοικήσει. (3) κέχρηταί τε παραδείγμασι τοιούτοις τισί· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησί, θυμιάτιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς καθεμαρτα, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων σωθῆσεσθαι τόνδε τινὰ μετὰ τοῦ φεύγειν αὐτὸν τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τὸ

γενέσθαι παίδας μετὰ τοῦ βούλεσθαι κοινωνεῖν γυναικί. (4) ὥσπερ γάρ, φησὶν, εἰ λέγοντός τινος Ἑγήσαρχον τὸν πύκτην ἐξελεύσεσθαι τοῦ ἀγῶνος πάντως ἀπληκτον ἀτόπως ἂν τις ἡξίου καθιέντι τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἑγήσαρχον μάχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἀπληκτον αὐτὸν καθεῖμαρτο ἀπελθεῖν, τοῦ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιησαμένου διὰ τὴν περιττοτέραν τὰνθρώπου πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλῆττεσθαι φυλακὴν τοῦτο εἰπόντος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. (5) πολλὰ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι χωρὶς τοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐκτενεσάτην γε περὶ αὐτὰ προθυμίαν τε καὶ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεισθαι, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τούτου, φησὶν, αὐτὰ γενέσθαι καθεῖμαρτο.

Context: attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of fate (cf. 55P).

τοιαύταις The reference is to Chrysippus' allegorical etymologies of εἰμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, etc., which Diogenianus has somewhat implausibly (ibid 6.8.8–24) interpreted as attempted proofs of determinism.

G Alexander, *Fat.* 181,13–182,20 (SVF 2.979)

(1) ἀναιρούντες γὰρ τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἰρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγουσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον [καὶ] δι' ἡμῶν. (2) ἐπεὶ γάρ, φασὶν, τῶν ὄντων τε καὶ γινομένων αἱ φύσεις ἑτεραί τε καὶ διάφοροι (οὐ γὰρ αἱ αὐταὶ τῶν ἐμφύχων τε καὶ τῶν ἀφύχων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἐμφύχων ἀπάντων αἱ αὐταὶ πάλιν· αἱ γὰρ κατ' εἶδος τῶν ὄντων διαφοραὶ τὰς τῶν φύσεων αὐτῶν διαφορὰς δεκνύουσιν), γίνεται δὲ τὰ ὑφ' ἐκάστου γινόμενα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ λίθου κατὰ τὴν λίθου, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ πυρὸς κατὰ τὴν πυρὸς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ζῶου κατὰ τὴν [ὑπὸ] ζῶου, οὐδὲν μὲν τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ὑφ' ἐκάστου γινομένων δύνασθαι φασιν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τῶν γινομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι κατηναγκασμένως, (3) κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐ τὴν ἐκ βίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ δὴ πεφυκὸς οὕτως (ὄντων τῶν περισσώτων τοιούτων <ᾧ> ἀδύνατον αὐτῷ μὴ περιεστάναι τότε) ἄλλως πως καὶ μὴ οὕτως κινήθῃναι. (4) μήτε γὰρ τὸν λίθον, εἰ ἀπὸ ὕψους ἀφεθείη τινός, δύνασθαι μὴ φέρεσθαι κάτω μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος· τῷ <γάρ> βαρὺτητα μὲν ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως κατὰ φύσιν <αἰτίαν>, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν αἰτία τὰ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν τῷ λίθῳ συντελοῦντα παρῇ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸν λίθον ὡς πέφυκεν φέρεσθαι πάντως δ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρῆναι ταῦτα τὰ αἰτία δι' ἃ κινεῖται τότε, οὐ μόνον μὴ δυναμένῳ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τούτων [μὴ] παρόντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινεῖσθαι τότε, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης διὰ τοῦ λίθου· (5) ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων λόγος. ὡς δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφύχων ἔχει, οὕτως δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν φασὶν. εἶναι γὰρ τινα καὶ τοῖς ζώοις κίνησιν κατὰ φύσιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν· πᾶν γὰρ ζῶον ὡς ζῶον κινούμενον κινεῖσθαι <τὴν> καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης διὰ ζῶου γινομένην. (6) οὕτως δὲ πούτων ἐχόντων, καὶ γινομένων ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης κινήσεών τε καὶ ἐνεργειῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῶν μὲν διὰ γῆς, ἂν οὕτω τύχη, τῶν δὲ δι' ἀέρος,

τῶν δὲ διὰ πυρός, τῶν δὲ δι' ἄλλων τινός, γινομένων δὲ τινων καὶ διὰ ζώων (τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ καθ' ἑρμῆν κινήσεις), τὰς διὰ τῶν ζώων ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης γινομένης ἐπὶ τοῖς ζώοις εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ἄλλοις γινομένης ἅπασιν, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τούτοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ἐξωθεν αἰτία παρεῖναι τότε, ὥστε αὐτὰ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ καθ' ὁρμῆν κίνησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως πως ἐνεργεῖν, ὅτι δὲ αὐταὶ μὲν δι' ὁρμῆς τε καὶ σιγκαταθέσεως, ἐκείνων δὲ αἱ μὲν διὰ βαρύτητα γίνονται, αἱ δὲ διὰ θερμότητα, αἱ δὲ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ (αἰτίαν), ταύτην μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζώοις λέγοντες, οὐκέτι δὲ ἐκείνων ἐκάστην, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ λίθῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ πυρί. (7) καὶ τοιαύτη μὲν αὐτῶν ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὁδὸς ὡς δι' ὀλίγων εἰπεῖν.

12 δὴ Cicero. μὴ codd. (Δ) Aetniti <ὡς> Lend. 15 add Aetniti. 16 add B². 20 δυναμένης Fl ut vul., Cicero. -μένον 2¹². -μένης V. -μένης B². μὴ² om 2¹ fund., uel Ciceli. 31 τοῖσιν Dindorf. τοῖς codd. τὰ Aetniti. 35 <αἰτίαν> Boetius.

Context: critique of Stoic determinism. Cf. 530, and SVF 2.991

H Alexander, *Fat.* 185.7-11 (SVF 2.982)

τὸ δ' ἐποχουμένους τῷ "εἰ δὴ τῶν αὐτῶν περιεστώτων ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὅτε δὲ ἄλλως ἐνεργήσει τις, ἀναίτιον κίνησιν εἰσάγεσθαι" διὰ τοῦτο λέγειν μὴ δύνασθαι οὐ πράξει τις πράξει τὸ ἀντικείμενον, μήποτε καὶ πύττο τῶν ὁμοίως τοῖς προειρημένοις παρρωμένων.

1 ἐποχουμένους Bruns. -μένων codd

Context: 25 G.

2 ἀναίτιον κίνησιν εἰσάγεσθαι. Cf. 55N 2.

4 τοῖς προειρημένοις. The reference is to Alexander's criticism of the Stoic argument in G, which, he has alleged, fails to take account of the special causal character of human agency as a capacity for either of a pair of opposed actions.

I Alexander, *Fat.* 205.24-206.2 (SVF 2.1002)

(1) λαβόντες γὰρ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν συνεστώτων φύσει καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὁποῖόν ἐστι, ὡς ταυτοῦ ὄντος τινὶ τε φύσει καὶ τοῦ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, (2) προστιθέσιν τὸ "οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ αἰσθησεται τὰ ζῶα καὶ ὁρμήσει, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐνεργήσει μόνον τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικά, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀμαρτήσεται τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν. (3) μερόντων δὲ καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεων καὶ ποιότητων μὴ ἀναιρουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μένου(σι) καὶ ψόγοι καὶ κολάσεις καὶ τιμαί. ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει ἀκολουθίας τε καὶ τάξεως."

7-8 ἀναιρουμένων Aetniti. ἀναρρομένων codd. 4 ἔπαινοι μένου(σι) Aetniti. ἔπαινοι codd. sed ex ἔπαινουμένου codd. V¹

Context: as G. This argument in effect extends to moral concepts themselves the point defended in G with respect to movement in accordance with impulse.

J. Alexander, *Fat.* 207,5–21 (SVF 2.1003)

(1) λέγουσιν γὰρ "οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη, (οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν πεπρωμένη) οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἴσα, οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἴσα, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις, οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος, οὐδ' ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐδ' ἔστιν δὲ λόγος ὁρθὸς προαιτακτικός μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικός δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον. (2) ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ 3
ἀμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα. (3) ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἀμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ 10
ἐπαινετόν καὶ ψεκτόν. (4) ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τιμῆς ἀξία, τὰ δὲ ψεκτὰ κολάσεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τιμὴ καὶ κόλασις, (5) ἀλλ' ἔστιν μὲν τιμὴ γέρας ἀξίωσις, ἡ δὲ κόλασις ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι (δὲ) γέρας ἀξίωσις καὶ 15
ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις. (6) εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἅπερ εἴρηται μένει πάντα, πάντων γινόμενων καθ' εἰμαρμένην κατορθώματά τε καὶ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις καὶ γέρας ἀξιώσεις καὶ ἐπαινοὶ καὶ φάτοι."

2 *vapet* Otelli 15 *ἀπερ πάντα* Hackforth. ἀπείργεται μὲν εἶναι Todd.

Context: as G. Cf. the similar argument at *Ind.* 210,15–28.

The negated conjunctions, standardly preferred to conditionals in Stoic formulations of Sorites arguments, probably indicate that the implications are not strict *συνάρτησις* entailments (see 35) but appeals to similarity (vol. 1, 229–30; Sedley [440]): there is little significant difference between *εἰμαρμένη* and *πεπρωμένη*, or between *πεπρωμένη* and *αἴσα*, or between . . . etc. The conditionals, on the other hand (8–9), can be held to supply strict entailments.

K. Epictetus, *Disc.* 1.1.7–12

(1) ὥσπερ οὖν ἦν ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἀπάντων καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, (2) τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἄρα γε ὅτι οὐκ ἠθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν. ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς γὰρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιοῦτω καὶ κοινωνοῖς τοιοῦτοις πῶς οἷόν τ' ἦν 5
εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐμποδιζεσθαι; (3) ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ὁ Ζεὺς; "Ἐπικτήτε, εἰ οἶόν τε ἦν, καὶ τὸ σωματίον ἂν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον ἐποίησαι ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ, μὴ σε λανθανέτω, ταῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ πηλὸς κομφῶς πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδυνάμην, ἔδωκα μὲν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν 10
ὀρμητικὴν τε καὶ ἀφωρμητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικὴν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ ἀπλῶς

τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἥς ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ ἐν ἡ τὰ σαυτοῦ
τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε καλυθῆσθαι, οὐδέποτε ἐμποδισθῆσθαι, οὐ στενάζεις, οὐ
μέμψῃ, οὐ κατακεῖσθαι οὐδένα."

Context: on what is, and what is not, ἐφ' ἡμῖν

63 The end and happiness

A Stobaeus 2.77.16-27 (SVF 3.16)

(1) τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ
πράττεται μὲν οὐδενός δέ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν,
ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, ἔτι, ταύτου ὄντος, ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. (2) τὴν
δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ Ζήνων ὠρίσατο τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εὐδαιμονία δ' ἐστὶν
εὐροια βίου. κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὄρμ τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ
συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντες, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
εἶναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἑτέραν τοῦ εὐδαιμόναος βίου, (3) καίτοι γε λέγοντες τὴν
μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι, τέλος δ' εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμο-
νίας, ὅπερ ταῦτόν ἐστιν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν

3 τοῦτο Hecetiv τοῦ eodd. 4 τὴν P καὶ F

Context: doxography of the Stoic τέλος

1-2 For further Stoic formulations, cf. SVF 3.2-3

5 εὐροια βίου Probably Zeno's metaphor for happiness, though he will have
had such precedents as Aeschylus, *Per. hoc. ὅταρ δ' ὁ δαίμων εὐροῇ*, a condition
sanctioning confidence in stability of fortune. For Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' use of
this formula, cf. S.E., *MF* 11.36.

8 σκοπὸν . . . τέλος This distinction seems to originate with the Stoics: for the
synonymous use of the terms, cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* viii 13, 1331b28-31. Its point is
clarified by Stobaeus 2.77.1-5 (cf. 2.47.7-11), according to which the σκοπός is the
bodily objective at which one aims, while the τέλος is the corresponding incorporeal
predicate, see vol. 1, 400, and cf. Stobaeus 2.76.19-21, λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν
τέλος, οἷον τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον ἀναφορικῶς λέγοντας ἐπὶ τὸ παρακείμενον
κατηγορήμα, which should be compared with 33J 2-3.

B Stobaeus 2.75.11-76.8

(1) τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· "τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν."
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένων
ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων. (2) αἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον προσδιαρθροῦντες
οὕτως ἐξέφερον "ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν" ὑπολαβόντες ἑλαττων
εἶναι <ῆ> κατηγορήμα τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ῥηθέν. (3) Κλεάνθης γάρ
πρῶτος διαδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν αἴρεσιν προσέθηκε "τῇ φύσει" καὶ οὕτως
ἀπέδωκε· "τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν." (4) ὅπερ ὁ

Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιήσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·
 "ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων."

2 3 *μοχομένους ζώων* schol. Luc. *μοχομένους ζώων* codd. 5 (ζ) Sedley, cf. 339 14

Context: diachrony of the Stoic τέλος, see 58K for what follows. B.

2 This explanation of ὁμολογουμένως has the ring of Zeno's etymologies (cf. 59C 2): ὁμο- (= σήμεριον), -λογονμ- (= λόγον), -εν- (= ἐνα), -ως (= καθ'). The concept of the best life as one of internal 'harmony' cannot fail to recall Plato, e.g. *Rep.* 4. 443d; and cf. note on 59K.

ὁ προσέθηκε This conflicts with C 1, which attributes the full formulation to Zeno. Rust [342], 167–72, resolves the inconsistency with the suggestion that Zeno used both formulations, adopting the full one 'when he came across an account of nature' [probably Polemo's, cf. Cicero, *Tul.* 4.43] 'which enabled him to develop his own particular version of the consistent life'.

9 Regularly attributed to Chrysippus: cf. C 2; 64I 4–5

C Diogenes Laertius 7.87–9

(1) διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ *Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως* τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ *Περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ Πονεிடῶν* καὶ *Ἐκάτων* ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ τελῶν*. (2) πάλιν δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ τελῶν*· μέρη γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὄλου. (3) διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὄλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργούντας ὦν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴσθην ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Διί, καθηγγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· (4) εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττῃται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὄλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν. . . (5) φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακοῖει, ἢ ἀκολουθῆσαι δεῖ ζῆν, τὴν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους.

4 κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτῆς FP. κατ' ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ B. 5 ὅπερ Ἡράκλει. ὅπερ codd. 10 τῶν Μένεα *ἐν* codd. ἄστων BP. πάντων F. 15 τῶν ὄλων ἢ ὄλων BFP.

Context: immediately following 57A.

2–3 ἄγει φύσιν Cf. 61I.

4 τελῶν The plural suggests that such books considered and rejected other possible ends by way of establishing the Stoic doctrine, cf. note on 64G.

6 μέρη For this fundamental notion, cf. Marcus Aurelius 1.24: μέμνησο τῆς συμπάσης αὑτοῦ, ἥς ὀλίγιστον μετέχεις . . . καὶ τῆς εἰμαρμένης, ἥς πᾶσιν εἰ μέρους; and for discussion, see Long [331], 179–80.

8–9 οὐδὲν . κοινός There are strong reasons to interpret this phrase by reference to καθήκοντα, cf. 59A, C 3 4, E 2. 67S 1, and see Long [357], 192–3.

13 **δαίμονος** Is this a reference to the individual's *ἡγεμονικόν*? That suits the context, and such a use of *δαίμων* is common in later Stoicism. We are doubtful that (as Rist [303], 262–6, argues) it need imply the Platonizing psychology of Posidonius, and so be excluded for Chrysippus; he too regarded persons as composites of soul and body. Rist interprets the present passage by reference to D.L. 7.131, which refers to daemons who have *συμπάθεια* with men and oversee their affairs. But they do not seem appropriate to the present context.

The lines omitted after *βούληται* report formulations of the *τέλος* by Diogenes of Babylon (see 58K) and Archdemius (see 59J).

D Seneca, *Ep.* 76.9–10 (SVF 3.200a)

(1) in homine quid est optimum? ratio: hac antecedit animalia, deos sequitur, ratio ergo perfecta proprium bonum est, cetera illi cum animalibus satisque communia sunt. . . (2) quid est in homine proprium? ratio: haec recta et consummata felicitatem hominis implevit, ergo si omnis res, cum bonum suum perfectit, laudabilis est et ad finem naturae suae pervenit, hominum autem suum bonum ratio est, si hanc perfectit laudabilis est et finem naturae suae tetigit. (3) haec ratio perfecta virtus vocatur eademque honestum est.

Context: a proof that *honestum* is the only good; cf. 60H.

The argument depends on the assumption that the *proprium bonum* of any creature is the fulfilment of its peculiar function; cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1.6, 1097b34, *ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον* [sc. *ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*].

E Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.6.12–22

(1) πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἑξαίρετως χρεῖαν εἶχε τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὐρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. (2) ὅρ' οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γὰρ ἐστὶ χρήσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολουθήσις. ἐκεῖνων χρεῖαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθοῦντων τῇ χρήσει. (3) διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπνεύσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τὰλλ' ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, ἡμῖν δ', οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν, οὐκέτι ταύτ' ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ ἐκάστου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν. (4) ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη. . . (5) τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσάγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. (6) διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνθεν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δ' ἐφ' ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. κατέληξεν δ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολουθήσθαι καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει. ὁράτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέαται τούτων ἀποθάνητε.

7 αὐτῶν ε. τῶν αὐτῶν. 8 τῶν αὐτῶν. 9 κρονεῖσθαι.

Context: divine providence as revealed in each creature's constitution.

2 παρακολουθεῖ The term signifies both 'following intellectually' (understanding) and 'following willingly' (conforming). Much of Epictetus' thought in the extract is summed up in his favourite expression, *χρήσις ὁρθή τῆς φαντασίας* (62K 1).

F Seneca, *Ep.* 92.3

(1) quid est beata vita? securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene iudicati tenax. (2) ad haec quomodo pervenitur? si veritas tota perspecta est; si servatus est in rebus agendis ordo, modus, decor, innoxia voluntas ac benigna, iuvienta rationi nec unquam ab illa recedens, amabilis simul mirabilisque. (3) denique ut breviter tibi formulam scribam, talis animus esse sapientis viri debet qualis deum deceat.

Context: the dependence of happiness on the perfection of reason.

G Stobaeus 2.63,25–64,12 (Panactius fr. 109, part)

(1) ὁμοιον γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι ὁ Παναίτιος τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὡς εἰ πολλοῖς τοξόταις εἰς σκοπὸς εἴη κείμενος, ἔχοι δ' οὗτος ἐν αὐτῷ γραμμὰς διαφόρους τοῖς χρώμασιν· (2) εἴθ' ἕκαστος μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἥδη δ' ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ πατάξαι εἰς τὴν λευκὴν εἰ τύχει γραμμὴν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν, ἄλλος (δὲ) διὰ τοῦ εἰς ἄλλο τι χρῶμα γραμμῆς. (3) καθάπερ γὰρ τούτους ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτω τέλος ποιέσθαι τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἥδη δ' ἄλλον κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον προτίθεσθαι τὴν τεύξιν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας ποιέσθαι μὲν τέλος τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὃ ἐστὶ κείμενον ἐν τῷ ζῆν ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει, τούτου δ' ἄλλην κατ' ἄλλον τυγχάνειν.

1: αὐτῷ Meineke: αὐτῷ codd. 4: τοῦ πατάξαι Usener: τὸ (πατάξαι) codd. 5: (δὲ) Heeren: τοῦ? Usener: τῇ codd. 10: ἄλλος: Heine: ἄλλος codd. ἄλλος Usener: ἄλλος P: ἄλλος F

Context: immediately following 61D. In company with that passage (see note ad loc.), Panactius' image illustrates the different perspectives and common end of the specific virtues.

4 7 τέλος . . . σκοποῦ Cf. A 3, and for the virtues' τέλος, see note on 61D 2

H Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1042A (SVF 3.55)

οὐσίαν κακοδαιμονίᾳ ἀποφαίνει τὴν κακίαν, ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῶ καὶ ἠθικῶ γράφων καὶ διατεινόμενος ὅτι τὸ κατὰ κακίαν ζῆν τῷ κακοδαιμονίᾳ ζῆν ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

Context: a series of alleged self-contradictions by Chrysippus in his ethical writings.

I Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1061E (SIF 3.54, part)

οὐ μόνον οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τοῦτοις, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὖξει προσγιγνόμενος ἀλλὰ, καὶν ἀκαρὲς τις ὥρας γένηται φρόνιμος, οὐδὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπολειφθήσεται τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα χρωμένου τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μακαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ καταβιούντος.

3 οὐδὲν Bannius: οὐδενὶ Lodd

Context: the alleged inconsistency of this statement with the further doctrine that to get happiness or virtue only for a moment is useless.

Plutarch's criticism here, and at *St. rep.* 1046C–E, confronts two Stoic theses which are mutually consistent in fact. (1) [1] The duration of happiness makes no difference to the amount of happiness someone enjoys at any moment; (2) it is not worthwhile to be happy only for a moment. The point of stating (2) was perhaps to meet objections to (1). If happiness, as an all-or-nothing affair, is complete at any moment, why should momentary happiness not be worth striving for? Answer: happiness is constituted solely by virtue, and it is not worthwhile to acquire virtue of only momentary duration. In *St. rep.* 1046C–E and *Comm. not.* 1062A, it is the utility of momentary virtue which the Stoics explicitly reject.

J Clement, *Strom.* 2.21.129.4–5 (Panaetius fr. 96; Posidonius fr. 186, part)

(1) πρὸς τοῦτοις ἐτι Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος ἀπεφῆναι· (2) ἐπὶ πάνι τε ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς. (3) τινὲς δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων Στωικῶν οὕτως ἀπέδοσαν, τέλος εἶναι τὸ ζῆν ἀκολουθῶς τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ.

4 οὕτω Lodd: αὐτὸν Sylburg

Context: doxography of the Stoic τέλος.

2 ἀφορμὰς Used here just as in 61L.

2–5 The first part of Posidonius' formulation emphasizes the cosmic dimension, absent from Panaetius'. The second part recalls Aristotle's connexion between a moral life that promotes *θεωρία* of god, and *ἡκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς*, *EE* vii 3, 1249b17–23.

3 δ Cf E 3.4

K Marcus Aurelius 5.16

οἷα αἱ πολλάκις φανταστῆς, τοιαύτη σοι ἴσται ἡ διάνοια. βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ. βάπτε οὖν αὐτὴν τῇ συνεχείᾳ τῶν τοιούτων φαντασιῶν· οἷον . . . ὅτι (1) ὑπὲρ ἑνεκεν ἑκάστων κατεσκευάσται, (πρὸς τοῦτα κατεσκευάσται)· (2) πρὸς ὃ δὲ κατεσκευάσται, πρὸς τοῦτο φέρεται· (3) πρὸς ὃ φέρεται δέ, ἐν τούτῳ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ· (4) ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· (5) ἐκάστων· (6) τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κοινωνία· (6) ὅτι γὰρ πρὸς

κοινωνίαν γεγόναιμεν, πάλοι δέδεικται: (7) ἡ οὐκ ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι τὰ χεῖρω
τῶν κρείττονων ἐνεκεν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; (8) κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν
ἀφύχων τὰ ἑμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἑμψύχων τὰ λογικά.

The conclusion, stated at 5, depends on 1–4: 'the good of something is that for the sake of which it is made', and 6–8, 'community is that for the sake of which rational beings are made'. For the latter in earlier Stoicism, cf. 57D, F.

7–9 Cf. 54P R.

L Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.40–1

(1) sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi. quid enim deest ad beate vivendum ei qui confidit suis bonis? aut, qui diffidit, beatus esse qui potest? at diffidat necesse est, qui bona dividit tripartito. qui enim poterit aut corporis firmitate aut fortunae stabilitate confidere? atqui nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono beatus esse nemo potest. . . . (2) nam qui timebit ne quid ex is deperdat, beatus esse non poterit. volumus enim eum, qui beatus sit, tutum esse, inexpugnabilem, saeptum atque munitum, non ut parvo metu praeditus sit, sed ut nullo.

Context: the speaker defends the sufficiency of virtue for supreme happiness (the Stoic position) against the Academic–Peripatetic view of Antiochus (cf. 64K) that bodily and external goods (cf. *tripartito*, 3) are also necessary for this.

M Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.81–2

(1) sapientis est enim proprium nihil quod paenitere possit facere, nihil invicem, splendide, constantem, graviter, honeste omnia, nihil ita expectare quasi certo futurum, nihil, cum acciderit, admirari, ut inopinatum ac novum accidisse videatur, omnia ad suum arbitrium referte, suis stare iudiciis. (2) quo quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest. (3) Stoicorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui cum finem bonorum esse senserint congruere naturae cumque ea convenienter vivere, cum id sit in sapientis situm non officio solum verum etiam potestate, (4) sequatur necesse est ut, ceteris in potestate summum bonum, in eiusdem vita beata sit. (5) ita fit semper vita beata sapientis.

7 sapientis Lambinus sapiente codd.

Context: wisdom and happiness will not be affected by fear of pain.

8–9 in potestate This is what makes the Stoics' conclusion 'easy', 6.

64 The end: Academic criticism and Stoic defence

A Cicero, *Fin.* 3.31 (SVF 3.15)

relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum

quae natura eveniant, intelligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere.

3 *cim* Madvig: *sum* endd.

Context: Cato's conclusion concerning the *summum bonum*, which he reaches by elimination of all opinions which locate it in anything other than virtue, or which maintain the wise man's complete indifference to everything he encounters. For the criticism this invited, cf. L.

B Alexander, *Mantissa* 164,3–9

(1) οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἐκλέγεται τι αὐτοῦ χάρις τοῦ ἐκλέεσθαι μόνου, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἡ ἐκλογὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ χρήσει τῶν ἐκλεγομένων, οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὸ τέλος, (2) καὶ καθόλου πῶς οὐκ ἀτοπον τὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτο λέγειν εἶναι μόνον, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐκλέεσθαι; εἰ γὰρ ἀδιάφορος ἡ κτήσις τῶν ἐκλεγομένων καὶ μὴ 5 συντείνουσα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, κενὴ ἂν εἴη καὶ ματαία ἡ ἐκλογὴ.

Context: part of a lengthy refutation of the Stoic thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Alexander has used a Sorites, in order to argue that the necessity of selecting AN things, which the Stoics admit, requires them for consistency to accept that such selection is πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Section 2 is his justification for this claim; cf. C 5, E.

C Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1070F–1071E

(1) παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐστὶ δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκείσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν ἐφ' ἧν τι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν, (2) ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἑαυτὸν ἀναφέρεσθαι. (3) τούτων δ' αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη θάτερον. (4) εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν <τὰ> πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν <ἀγ>αθὰ μὴ ἐστὶν ἡ δ' 5 εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λήψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρὰ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δεῖ πάντα ἔχειν τὰ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφοράν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν. (5) εἴπερ δ' ἄρ' οἴονται μὴ στοχαζομένους μηδ' ἐπιφεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, <ἐπ' > ἄλλο οὐ ἕνεκα δεῖ ἀναφέρεσθαι τὴν 10 τούτων ἐκλογὴν καὶ μὴ τοῦτο. (6) τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως, ἐκεῖνα δ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα . . . σκόπει δὲ ὅτι ταῦτά πάσχεισι τοὺς τὴν κτάν ὑπεράλλεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιφεμένους· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἀλλὰ συμμεταφέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῇ λύγῃ, πορρωτάτω τῶν ἐννοίων ἀφισταμένην. (7) ὥς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρὰ αὐτὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ' αὐτόν, αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαινέειν. (8) οὕτως οἱ τριπέμπελοι βιαζόμενοι μὴ τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τέλος ἀλλὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν καὶ ἐκλέεσθαι μηδὲ τὴν 20

ἔφασιν τῆς ὑγίαιας καὶ δίδωσιν εἰς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐκάστω τελευτῶν ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔφασιν αὐτοῦ καὶ δίδωσιν ἀναφέρεσ-
 θαι . . . (9) τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος γεγονέναι τὴν ὑγίαιαν τῶν
 φαρμάκων ἔνεκα, μὴ τὰ φάρμακα τῆς ὑγίαιας, ὃ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τὴν περὶ τὰ
 φάρμακα καὶ σύνθεσιν καὶ χρῆσιν αὐτῶν αἰρετωτέραν ποιῶν τῆς ὑγίαιας, 25
 μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως αἰρετὸν ἡγούμενος, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκείνῃ
 πραγματείᾳ τὸ τέλος τιθέμενος καὶ τὴν ἔφασιν ἀποφαίνων (τέλος) τῆς
 τεύξεως, οὐ τῆς ἐφέσεως τὴν τεύξιν; (10) "τῇ γὰρ ἐφέσει νῆ Δία τὸ
 εὐλογίστως καὶ τὸ φρονίμως πρόσεστι." (11) πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φήσομεν, ἂν ὥς
 πρὸς τέλος ὁρᾷ τὴν τεύξιν ὧν διώκει καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ 30
 εὐλόγιτον αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεῖται, πάντα ποιούσης ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν, οὐ τυχεῖν
 οὐ σεμνόν οὐδὲ μακάριόν ἐστιν.

1 (τα) Wyttenbach (ἀγ)υθό Wyttenbach 7 δαί E δέ H 9 δ' ἄρ' Wyttenbach γάρ
 codd. 10 (ἐπ') Rastmus οὐ ἔνεκα δαί Chernys: ἔνεκα οὐ δαί E αὐ δαί ἔνεκα H 11 τοῦτο
 scriptum est πῶτα codd., ταῦτά Chernys 16 17 παρὰ αὐτῶν Reisk' περὶ αὐτῶν codd. 20 καὶ
 Pohlenz τὸ codd. 27 (τέλος) Mezianar 30 ὁρᾷ Mezianar ἄρ'αν codd.

Context: attack on Stoic formulations of the τέλος.

1 **τέλη καὶ σκοπούς** The terms are used synonymously here, and not as at 63A 3.

4 **θύτερον** I.e. either of the alternatives mentioned in 1 2. Since Antipater's second formula (58K 2) is explicitly cited as evidence that the Stoics do not set up two ends (cf. F), Plutarch probably intended to attack Diogenes' 'selection' formula in the first horn of his dilemma, and Antipater's 'goal-directed' formula in the second horn. Thus 4 might be taken as the development of 2, and 5 of 1. But by conflating the two formulae, as in 6-7, Plutarch has obscured the proper development of his dilemma: cf. Long [591], 69, 81 2; Soreth [592], 58 63; Striker [593], 190-1.

5 (τα) **πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν** If this expression has its normal Stoic sense (cf. vol 1, 357), Plutarch seriously distorts the formulae of Diogenes and Antipater reported in 58K (cf. also Posidonius in I 2). Diogenes does not restrict the AN things which are to be selected to the objects of the primary impulse, and Antipater uses the word *προηγούμενα*, which means 'leading' or 'predominating' in worth. Sandbach [296], 56, rightly suspects Carneades (cf. G 2-4) of introducing the term *πρῶτα* for polemical purposes, with Posidonius and Plutarch following suit.

9-11 Sense can be made of this very difficult sentence along the lines proposed by Chernys [326] ad loc. and by reading *τοῦτο* in 11, taking 'this' to refer to τὸ τυχεῖν καὶ τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν, 8-9 I.e., if 'this' is not the point of selecting AN things, the selection of them must be for the sake of something else, a second τέλος, cf. lines 29 30, and Cicero, *Fin.* 4.46.

11-13 Purporting to state the Stoics' own position; cf. A. For ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία, Antipater's expression, see 58D 2.

16 For the archer analogy, cf. F.

28-9 Purporting to state the Stoics' defence of Diogenes' 'selection' formula; cf. J.

D Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1072E-F (S1F 3 Antipater 59, part)

(1) ἤδη τοίνυν ἀποκαλύψας ὅρα το συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ

εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἔχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν τὰγαθαῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὗτ' ἔχειν φασὶν οὔτε νοεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἢ τὴν πολυτίμητον εὐλογιστίαν ταύτην περὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν ἀξίαν ἔχόντων. (2) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἶπεν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον υἱόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν· ἐκείνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὐρησιλογίας.

γ καταδύεσθαι Wycisłowski: καταλίεσθαι codic

Context: resuming the criticism of C 11: cf. 1072c, ἐκλογὴ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἢ μὴ πρὸς τι γενομένη τέλος, and B.

5-7 This is puzzling since εὐρησιλογίας should refer to 1-2, a tendentious statement of the 'selection' formula (58K) expressed in Diogenes' language, not Antipater's. According to the view taken in vol. 1, 407-9, the 'selection' formula was not advanced as a Stoic rejoinder to Carneades; rather, it was this formulation of the τέλος that provoked his attack, prompting Antipater to offer the 'goal-directed' formula in its place, which is the better candidate for εὐρησιλογίας, cf. I 2-3. But, as noted on C, Plutarch fails to distinguish clearly between the two formulae.

E Cicero, *Fin.* 5.16

(1) quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensus est, Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. ille igitur vidit, non modo quot fuissent adhibe philosophorum de summo bono, sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. (2) negabat igitur ullam esse artem quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est quod arte comprehenditur. nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti. (3) quoniam igitur, ut medicina valetudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam.

Context: the beginning of Piso's exposition of Antiochean ethics

1 quo i.e. quid sit ei bonorum extremum et malorum.

2 divisio See G

8 Stock examples of a τέχνη and its τέλος; cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1.1, 1094a8-9.

F Cicero, *Fin.* 3.22 (SVF 3.18)

(1) sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. (2) etenim, si cui propositum sit conlinare hastam aliquo aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet. (3) hunc in eius modi similitudine omnia sunt facienda, ut conliniet. (4) et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum adsequatur, sit hoc

quasi ultimum quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.

2 enim Schiche: ut enim codd 3 4 ut continet uel Madvig, Schiche 5 ut finem sed codd

Context: immediately following 59D.

The Latin is obscure, but less corrupt than has often been supposed (cf. Soreth [592], 52-4). *sic*, 3, must answer the previous *sic*, and *etenim*, 2, is preferable to the otiose *ut enim*. With *sic illi* understand *ultimum sic* from *sic* dicimus. In 4-5, *hinc continet*, the point of the analogy is stated: the archer must indeed try his best to aim straight (i.e. hit the target), since that is his *propositum*, 2-3. But his *ultimum*, as distinct from his *propositum*, is *ut omnia faciat, quae propositum adsequatur*. 5, reading *ut* for *sed*, and taking *hinc* as a reference to *ut omnia faciat quae propositum adsequatur*. The actual attainment of his *propositum*, 'hitting the target' (illud . . . *ut feriat*, 6-7), is *seligendum* (ἀληπτόν), not *expetendum* (αἰρετόν); cf. 58C 4; 59D 5.

The archer analogy illustrates Antipater's second formulation of the τέλος (58K 2). It employs the notion that virtue, the expertise of life, is a στοχαστική τέχνη, the τέλος of which is reported by Alexander (SVF 3.19) as τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τευχάνειν. Alexander also shows, loc. cit., that upholders of this notion distinguished such τέχναι from other crafts by the fact that the former require certain external conditions to be met, in addition to the display of expertise, if the objective is to be attained. There were earlier precedents for this notion, cf. Aristotle, *Top.* 1.3, 101b7, where the orator and doctor exemptify τέχναι which do not require consistent success from their practitioners, but ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ὁ προαιρούμεθα. Antipater thus opts for a formulation of the τέλος as an art of life which, though it specifies an objective outside its own performance (cf. Carneades in F), treats the τέλος itself not as the attainment of this objective (the getting of AN things) but τὸ ἀποπληρώσαι τὰ τῆς τέχνης (Alexander, loc. cit.). For an illuminating discussion of what can be said for and against his strategy, cf. Striker [593].

G Cicero, *Fin.* 3.17 21

(1) consistit autem fere inter omnes id in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem ὁρμήν Graeci vocant, quod autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, illoque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquirunt. omnis dissensio, totius enim quaestionis eius quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur in his quid sit extremum et ultimum, fons rependiendus est in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae, quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur. (2) voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris, vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam et primum declinatum dolorem, ab eis alii, quae prima secundum naturam nominant, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, validitatem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, viris, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. (3) ex

his tribus cum unum aliquid sit, quo primum natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad repellendum, nec quicquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in eorum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. (4) ex eo autem quod statuerit esse quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum uno aliquo ex tribus illis congruere possit, ut aut id honestum sit facere omnia [aut] voluptatis causa, etiam si eam non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiam si id assequi nequeas, aut eorum quae secundum naturam sunt adipiscendi, etiam si nihil consequare. ita fit ut, quanta differentia est in principis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. alii rursum isdem a principis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam optinenda. (5) expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. (6) superiores tres erant quae esse possent, quarum est una sola defensa, eaque vehementer. nam voluptatis causa facere omnia cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. ne vitacionem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi etiam evitare posset. at vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quae secundum naturam sint etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt. sex igitur hae sunt simplices de summo bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patronis, quattuor defensae. iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si primum rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Callipho et Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodorus, aut prima naturae, ut antiqui, quos eisdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus.

in *assum* Madvig: *antichum* vel *asserum* codi.

15 Lamberus: *ho* codd.

15 aliquid Weissenberg.

aliquid codd. primum *directa* prima vel *primo* cec.

22 aut scil. Madvig.

36 *non* Ursinus: *ne* *si* codd.

37 *non* vel *non* codd.

Context: immediately following E.

On Carneades' division, and its interest for Antiochus, cf. Gucker [42], 52–62. The origin of such a classification of ends goes back as far as Chrysippus (cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.138), perhaps expounded in his *Περὶ τελείων* (63C 4–6).

30–1 For other opinions defended by Carneades for dialectical purposes, cf. 68M; 69H. L.

38–9 The addition of *iunctae* to *simplices* accords with Chrysippus' classification (Cicero, loc. cit.), which posits *honestas*, *voluptas*, *utrumque*.

40 *nec . . . plures* Indicating that these composite ends could not, practically speaking, include the mere pursuit of 'rectitude plus pleasure' etc. irrespective of their attainment.

42–3 *antiquis Peripateticos* The trademark of Antiochus.

H Cicero, *Fin.* 3.24–5 (*SVF* 3.11, part)

(1) nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non fortis petatur extremum, id est artis effectus. (2) et tamen est etiam aliqua cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes e quibus constant; (3) quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant *κατορθώματα*, omnes numeros virtutis continent, sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit.

Context: shortly after 59D.

1 For the rejected analogies, see E 3.

2 *quam modo dixi* Cato has just used acting and dancing, to make the point that these *artes*, like the *ars vivendi*, require determinate activities (as opposed to *quibus*) of their practitioners.

3 *omnes numeros* See note on 59K.

I Galen, *Plac.* 5 6.10–14 (Posidonius fr. 187, part)

(1) οὐκ ἀρκεσθεῖς δὲ τούτοις ὁ Ηοσειδώνιος ἐναργέστερόν τε καὶ σφοδρότερον καθάπτεται τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐξηγουμένων τὸ τέλος. (2) ἔχει δὲ ἡ ῥήσις ὧδε: ἡ δὴ παρέντες ἐνιοὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν συστέλλουσιν εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, ὅμοιον αὐτῷ ποιοῦντες τῷ σκοπῶν ἐκτίθεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ἀσχησίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἐστὶ δὲ μάχην ἐμφαῶν κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκφοράν, καλὸν δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονικὸν οὐδέν· παρέπετα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ τέλει, τέλος δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν. (3) ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτου διαληφθέντος ὀρθῶς, ἔξεστι μὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ διακόπτειν τὰς ἀπορίας αἷς οἱ σοφισταὶ πρυτεύουσι, (4) μὴ μέντοι γε τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὅπερ ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ ὁμολογουμένως εἰπεῖν ζῆν ἥνικα μὴ τοῦτο μικροπρεπῶς συντείνειν εἰς τὸ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τυγχάνειν. (5) ἥρκει μὲν οὖν ἰσως καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἐνδειξιν τῆς ἀτοπίας ὣν ὁ Χρύσιππος εἴρηκε περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐξηγουμένος ὅπως ἂν τις τυγχάνοι τοῦ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἀμεικον μὴν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ηοσειδωνίου γεγραμμένα παραθέσθαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα: (6) "ταύτην τε δὴ τὴν ἀτοπίαν διέλυσε καὶ αἰτία τῶν παθῶν ὁραθεῖσα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰδείξε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀρεκτοῖς καὶ φευκτοῖς διαστροφῆς καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἀσκήσεως διεῖλε καὶ τὰ διαπορούμενα περὶ τῆς ἐκ πάθους ὁρμῆς ἐξέφηνεν."

5 αὐτῷ HL. αὐτὸ M. 7 καλὸν H (scilicet) μάλλον L. 10 τῷ Bake τὸ codd. 11 ἰσοδυναμεῖν. 12 εἰπε Hirtzel. 13 ζῆν ἥνικα H. ζῆν ἥνικα καὶ L. ζῆν ἥνικα δ' (scilicet) A A Long. συντείνειν codd. συντείνει Cornarius. 14 ἀδιαφόρων Wittenbach. διαφορῶν codd. διαφόρων Bake. 15 τε H. δὲ L. αἰτία H. ἀτοπία L. 16 ὀρεκτοῖς AL. οὐρετοῖς codd.

Context: Galen is using Posidonius, to attack Chrysippus' monistic psychology, which

excludes the Platonic distinction between rational and irrational parts of the soul. The Posidonian position, approved by Galen, is that correct doctrines on the τέλος and the virtues depend upon understanding the πάθος, which arise when the irrational part of the soul is in command (*Plac.* 5.6.1–5). As Galen understands him, Posidonius interpreted ἀμολογούμενους τῇ φύσει ζῆν to mean, 'as Plato has taught us, following the lead of the better part' (*Plac.* 5.6.6–9); i.e., living κατὰ λόγον and not κατὰ πάθος. It is this interpretation of the τέλος which οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσαιππον, 2, have neglected.

4 5 A version of Antipater's second formulation of the τέλος (58K 2). Posidonius' direct allusion to this is confirmed by his comparisons with ἡδονή and ἀσχημία, 6, which, along with τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, comprise Carneades' division of the possible σκοποί (G 2; cf. note on C 5).

7 παρέπεται. The subject must be the τέλος, as formulated by Antipater.

8 τούτου. Some take this to refer to Posidonius' own account of the end (63J 2; cf. Edelstein [373], 314. This might seem appropriate in view of the general context and the attack on Chrysippeans in 6–13, who must include Antipater. But better sense is produced by reading it as 'Antipater's formulation', understood in the light of lines 7–8. ἀλλὰ καί, 8, is a concession, and contrasts with μὴ μέντοι γε, 10, which introduces an unequivocal rejection of Chrysippus' formula (cf. 63D 4) as a means of combating the difficulties raised by the 'sophists' (i.e. Carneades). This reading gives point to Posidonius' qualified acceptance of Antipater's formula as a 'necessary adjunct' of the τέλος, and Antipater best fits 3.

10–13. An interpretation of these very difficult lines is needed which will show why Chrysippus' formula, κατ' ἐμπερίαν ζῆν, is incapable of meeting the problems raised by 'the sophists' and why it is 'absurd', 14. The point, we suggest, is this: Antipater's formula has at least the dialectical merit of incorporating Carneades' requirement that action should be consistently aimed at getting AN things (see F, G 6). But Chrysippus is evasive in his attitude towards them, holding that they are not to be pursued in all circumstances; cf. 58J, 'I should pursue sickness if I know I am fated to fall ill'. For Chrysippus, the overriding requirement is acting in agreement with universal nature (cf. 63C 3–4), a point Posidonius emphasizes by adding ὅλην in 11 to Chrysippus' formula. So it is impossible to act consistently with human nature, since there will be times when aiming at getting AN things (what human nature dictates) would be acting out of tune with universal nature. Posidonius, then, argues that all problems disappear once the τέλος is perceived as reason's consistent control of the passions, 17–20. Reason will decide what should be pursued and avoided, in such a way that no emotional conflict will arise (no clash between human and universal nature) in the attitude towards AN things. So construed, the clause beginning ὅπερ, 11, is Posidonius' own gloss, and so ἰσοδυναμεῖ should not be changed to ἰσοδυναμεῖν. συντείνειν, infinitive, can stand as dependent on εἰπεῖν, a usage of the infinitive in temporal and adverbial clauses for which Kühner/Gerth 2.551 give many examples from classical Attic prose. ἡνίκα μὴ seems to have quasi-conditional force, 'when' = 'in all cases if'. Sense and grammar would be improved by reading ἡνίκα <ἀν> (so 65M 43); for εἰπεῖ with infinitive and ἀν, cf. Thucydides 2.93.3. συντείνειν is equivalent in sense to πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα, 4; cf. Rieth [590], 38 n. 1. This adds further support to the view that 8–13 contrast the dialectical effectiveness of Chrysippus' and Antipater's formulae.

J Seneca, *Ep.* 92.11–13

(1) "quid ergo?" inquit "si virtutem nihil impeditura sit bona valetudo et quies et dolorum vacatio, non petes illas?" (2) quidem petam? non quia bona sunt, sed quia secundum naturam sunt, et quia bono a me iudicio sumentur. (3) quid erit tunc in illis bonum? hoc unum, bene eligi. nam cum vestem qualem decet sumo, cum ambulo ut oportet, cum ceno quemadmodum debeo, non cena aut ambulatio aut vestis bona sunt, sed meum in his propositum servantis in quaque re rationi convenientem modum. . . . (4) itaque non est bonum per se munda vestis sed mundae vestis electio, quia non in re bonum est sed in electione quali; actiones nostrae honestae sunt, non ipsa quae aguntur. . . . (5) sumpturum quidem me, si detur electio, et sanitatem et vires, bonum autem futurum iudicium de illis meum, non ipsa.

¶ *eligi vel elegi* codd.

Context: developing the thesis that virtue is the only good; cf. **m** and 63F.

¶ *bene eligi*. Cf. **D** 3 5

K Cicero, *Fin.* 4.26–7, 29–30, 32, 39

(1) quaero igitur, quo modo hae tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint. quodsi non hominis summum bonum quaereremus, sed cuiusdam animantis, is autem esset nihil nisi animus. . . . tamen illi animo non esset hic vester finis. (2) desideraret enim validitudinem, vacuitatem doloris, appeteret etiam conservationem sui earumque rerum custodiam finemque sibi constitueret secundum naturam vivere, quod est, ut dixi, habere ea quae secundum naturam sunt, vel omnia vel plurima et maxima. . . . (3) sin dicit obscurari quaedam nec apparere, quia valde parva sint, nos quoque concedimus; quod dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptate, quae minimae sint voluptates, eas obscurari saepe et obui, sed non sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis tanque productae temporibus tanque multae. . . habent enim accessionem dignam, in qua elaboretur, ut mihi in hoc Stoici rocati videantur interdum, cum ita dicant, si ad illam vitam quae cum virtute degatur ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius quo haec adiecta sint, nec beatiorum tamen ob eam causam fore. . . . (4) atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, est quaedam appetitio naturalis ea quae secundum naturam sunt appetens, eorum omnium est aliquae summa facienda. . . . (5) itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare, ut mirari satis istorum inconstantiam non possim naturalem enim appetitionem. . . . itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt esse earum rerum quae secundum naturam sunt. cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera

pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.

19 istum Weissenberg. eorum codd. 20 possum Madvig. possum vel possumus codd. 21 post virtutem addunt deti. Iacium 22 expetamus Barthe. ea petamus codd.

Context: representative excerpts from the Antiochean criticism of Stoic ethics.

1–8 Antiochus accepts the Stoics' account of self-preservation as the object of the primary impulse (57A), but claims that in this allegedly 'ancient doctrine' (cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 4.24), the end must, for consistency, require preservation of the whole person (body as well as soul). Hence these lines are advanced as a *reductio ad absurdum*.

8–9 Taking up the Stoic point at *Fin.* 3.45, which was advanced against the Peripatetic postulation of multiple 'goods', defended by Antiochus; see also m.

22 **duo** . . . **opera** For the Stoics' answer to this charge, cf. F.

L Cicero, *Fin.* 4.78

quid enim est tam repugnans quam eundem dicere, quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum (<a>) natura profectam? ita cum ea volunt retinere quae superiori sententiae conveniunt in Aristonem incidunt: cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus.

5

1 (<a>) Marullus

Context: concluding the Antiochean criticism of Stoic ethics.

For Aristo, see 2F–H; 58F, G, I. Antiochus constantly accuses the Stoics of being Peripatetics (and Platonists) in everything but terminology, cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 1.37; *Fin.* 4.19–23.

m Seneca, *Ep.* 92.5 (*SVF* 3 Antipater 53)

quidam tamen augeri summum bonum iudicant, quia parum sit fortuitis repugnantibus Antipater quoque inter magnos scitae huius auctores aliquid se tribuere dicunt externis, sed exiguum admodum. vides autem quale sit die non esse contentum nisi aliquis igniculus adluxerit: quod potest in hac claritate solis habere scintilla momentum?

1 die non Erasmus. senon BQψ. et te non D. te non B. sole te non Astina

Context: virtue is the only good.

The 'light' image is used by Cato in Cicero, *Fin.* 3.45, to show how the value of bodily advantages is completely eclipsed by that of virtue. Piso, speaking for Antiochus at *Fin.* 5.72, accepts this too, while also insisting against the Stoics that they are *parva ad beate vivendum momenta*. What is here attributed to Antipater looks like the latter thesis, and his arguments with Carneades certainly gained him the dubious reputation of having made concessions to the Academics: cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 1.57. Antipater devoted three books to defending the thesis that 'according to Plato virtue is the only good', which was taken to show that he too regarded virtue as sufficient for happiness (*SVF* 3 Antipater 56). Yet Antiochus also accepted the latter, while denying

the former; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 3.81. Given the state of the evidence, it is impossible to know whether Antipater's apparent concessions were substantial or only dialectical and verbal. We incline to the second alternative.

n Diogenes Laertius 7.103 (Posidonius fr. 171, part)

Ποσειδώνιος μέντοι καὶ ταῦτά φησι [sc. πλούτος καὶ υἰεία] τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι

Context: immediately following 58A.

This bald statement (absurdly exaggerated in Posidonius fr. 172) is completely contradicted by Seneca, *Ep.* 87 31, 35, where Posidonius is credited with arguments to prove that wealth and health are not goods. Cf. Kidd [578], 162 3.

o Diogenes Laertius 7.128 (Posidonius fr. 173, part, Panaetius fr. 110)

ὁ μέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ χρειαὶ εἶναι φασι καὶ υἰείας καὶ χρημίας καὶ ἰσχύος.

Context: shortly after 61I. For the likelihood that this is misrepresentation, cf. Kidd [578], 159–60.

65 The passions

A Stobaeus 2.88,8–90,6 (*SVF* 3.378,389, part)

(1) πάθος δ' εἶναι φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἰρούντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς), (2) διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι, <καὶ> πάλιν <πάν> πάθος πτοίαν. (3) τοῦ δὲ πάθους τοιοῦτου ὄντος ὑποληπτέον, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἶναι καὶ ἀρχηγὰ, τὰ δ' εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν. πρῶτα δ' εἶναι τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. (4) ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγείσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν. ἐπιγίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἡδονὴν μὲν ὅταν τυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ ἐκφυγῶμεν ἃ ἐφοβούμεθα· λύπην δέ, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ περιπέσωμεν οἷς ἐφοβούμεθα. (5) [= 65C] (6) τὸ δὲ "ἄλογον" καὶ τὸ "παρὰ φύσιν" οὐ κοινῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν "ἄλογον" ἴσον τῷ ἀπειθέει τῷ λόγῳ. πάν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστι, ὡς πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό . . . (7) καὶ τὸ "παρὰ φύσιν" δ' εἰληπταί ἐν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ὑπογραφῇ, ὡς συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθόν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. πάντες δ' οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀπιστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὄψῳ, ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως. (8) οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡπατημένοι, λόγον χάριν περὶ <τοῦ> τὰς ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς εἶναι, διδαχθέντες ὅτι οὐκ εἰσιν, ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι,

καὶν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων, ἀλλ' ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος.

1 ἀπειθῇ P. ὁ παθῇ P. 2 <ἄλογον> Wachsmuth. 3 τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ Wachsmuth: τῆς γένει ἡ coad. 4 <καὶ> Heeren. 4 <πάν> Meiske. 9, 10 ἐπιθυμοῦμεν Meurer. ἐπιθ- coad. 12 ἴσον Cramer: ὅσον coad. ἀπειθῇ Cramer: ἀπειθῆς coad. 13 ὡν Meiske. καὶ coad. 14 τῶν οὐ Cramer: τῶν, οὐ Salmasius. τὸ δὲ εἶδ' coad. 20 <τοῦ> Wachsmuth.

Context: following 331.

(-2) The same two accounts of πάθος are attributed to Zeno at D.L. 7.110; cf. also Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.11. For αἰροῦντε λόγῳ, cf. 59E 2, from which it is inferable that πάθη are παρὰ τὸ καθήκον.

3 ἡγεμονικοῦ Wachsmuth's emendation seems certain; cf. G 7 8 πτοῖαν Zeno's metaphor, cf. SVF 1.206.

5-6 πρῶτα . . . τέσσαρα For the Platonic/Aristotelian background of this distinctively Stoic classification, cf. Pohlenz [298] 2, 80 2, Forschner [544], 123 34.

8-9 ἥδονην It is widely agreed that this πάθος pleasure is not identical to the ἥδονή called ἐπιγένημα in 57A 3 and which must be the pleasure referred to in 58A 4 as a 'preferred indifferent', or as simply 'indifferent' (SVF 3.70), or as 'neither natural nor valuable' (SVF 3.155). We are not persuaded by Gosling/Taylor [19], 426 7, who assimilate all ἥδονή to the former type and make it depend in all cases upon the mind's assent.

11 ἄλογον More fully explained in J 4.

15 ἵππου An allusion to Plato, *Phdr.* 248a6ff., which may suggest the influence of Posidonius on this sentence; cf. Kidd [183].

B Andronicus, *De passionibus* 1 (SVF 3.391, part)

(1) λύπη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄλογος συστολή· ἢ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν συστέλλεσθαι. (2) φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἐκκλισίς· ἢ φυγὴ ἀπὸ προσδοκωμένου δεινῶν. (3) ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἄλογος ὄρεξις· ἢ δίωξις προσδοκωμένου ἀγαθοῦ. (4) ἥδονή δὲ ἄλογος ἐπαιρσις· ἢ δόξα πρόσφατος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν ἐπαίρεσθαι.

5

Context: definitions of the πάθη.

For further evidence to the same effect, cf. Stobaeus 2.90.7-18; Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.24 5; SVF 3 386 8, 392 3 Stobaeus, loc. cit., expresses Andronicus' ἐφ' ᾧ οἴονται δεῖν, 2, by ἐφ' ᾧ καθήκει, cf. note on A 1 2.

3 δεινῶν A literary variant for the standard κακοῦ; cf. Plato, *Prot.* 358d6; Aristotle, *EN* in.6, 1115a9.

C Stobaeus 2.88,22-89,3 (SVF 3.378, part; = 65A 5)

ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν, ἐπεὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι, παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως, τὸ δὲ πρόσφατον ἀντὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου (<ῆ> ἐπάρσεως.

3 (<ῆ> Salmasius

Context: see A 3.

2 ἀσθενούς ὑπολήψεως Cf. 41G with note. 'Weakness' contrasts with the βεβαιότης of the wise man's judgements, and focuses upon the 'changeability' (cf. G 3) of the passions

3 πρόσφατον Applied only to pleasure and distress (cf. B, except at Stobaeus 2.90, 11). See also Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.73, and, for discussion of the term, Inwood [547], 146–55.

D Galen, *Plac.* 4.2.1 6 (SVF 3.463, part)

ὥσπερ δ' ἐν ταύταις ἐπελάβεται τε ἅμα τῶν ἐαυτοῦ γεγραμμένων οὐκ ἤξιωσά τε πρὶν τὸ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀντεπεῖν δόγμα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (1) ἐν τοῖς ὁρίσμοις τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν οὓς πρῶτους ἐξέθετο, τελέως ἀποχωρεῖ τῆς γνώμης αὐτῶν, τὴν λύπην ὀριζόμενος δόξαν πρόσφατον κακοῦ παρηνυσίας, τὸν δὲ φόβον προσδοκίαν κακοῦ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν δόξαν πρόσφατον ἀγαθοῦ παρηνυσίας. (2) ἀντικρὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνου μέμνηται παραλείπων τὸ τ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές· καὶ γὰρ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἐν τῇ λογιστικῇ μόνῃ συνίστασθαι νομίζει . . . ἐν μέντοι δὴ τοῦτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρμὰς καὶ δόξας καὶ κρίσεις ὑπάρχειν οἶεται, τὰ πάθη, (3) κατὰ δέ τινας τῶν ἐφεξῆς 'Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δόγμασιν ἀκόλουθα γράφει (4) τὴν τε γὰρ λύπην ὀριζόμενος, "μειώσιν εἰς αἰ", φησιν, "ἐπὶ φεικτικῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν τὴν θ' ἡδονὴν ἔπαρσιν ἐφ' αἰρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν." (5) καὶ γὰρ αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις καὶ γὰρ ταύτων ἐνίστη μέμνηται – τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεως ἐστὶ παθήματα ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιγινόμενα.

1: 9^o Muller: δ' H

Context: Chrysippus' doctrine that the πάθη are κρίσεις (8–9) is set against statements in his 'writings' (1, i.e. *Περὶ ψυχῆς*) that love belongs to the ἐπιθυμητικὴ δύναμις and anger to the θυμοειδής. Galen's quotations (4.1.5–17) seem to show that Chrysippus used this Platonic terminology; but his purpose in doing so was probably to argue that Plato should have located these faculties together with τὸ λογιστικόν in the heart (4.1.6); cf. H. No surviving quotation from Chrysippus proves him to have ever supported Plato's psychology in the manner alleged by Galen.

2 γενικῶν Cf. A 3.

3 In the omitted lines Galen cites the definition of ἐπιθυμία as ἀλογος ὁρξις (cf. B 3) as a 'verbal' acknowledgement of the soul's ἀλογος δύναμις

9–13 For Epicurean use of the term διαχύσις, cf. Usener [133] s.v., and for Zeno, cf. K 1

11 μειώσιν The more familiar term is ἐκκλίσις, B 2.

E Stobaeus 2.90.19–91.9 (SVF 3.394, part)

(1) ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὀργή καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτῆς· θυμὸς καὶ χόλος καὶ μῆνις καὶ κῆτος καὶ περὶ αἵας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ καὶ

πόθοι καὶ ἱμεροὶ καὶ φιληδοναίαι καὶ φιλοπλουτίαὶ καὶ φιλοδοξίαι καὶ τὰ
 ὅμοια: (2) ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαὶ καὶ ἄσμενισμοὶ καὶ γοητείαὶ
 καὶ τὰ ὅμοια: (3) ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν φόβον ὄκνοι καὶ ἀγωνίαι καὶ ἐκπλήξεις καὶ
 αἰσχύναι καὶ θόρυβοι καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαὶ καὶ δέος καὶ δειμάτα: (4) ὑπὸ δὲ
 τὴν λύπην φθόνος, ζήλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἔλεος, πένθος, ἄχθος, ἄχος, ἀνία,
 ὀδύνη, αἰτή.

2 καὶ τοὺς L. antea: ἀπότος P. om. F

Context: a few lines after A.

For similar classifications, cf. D.L. 7.111–14; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.16.

7 ἔλεος Included as a blameworthy passion on the dubious ground that susceptibility to pity (distress at another's misfortunes) implies susceptibility to envy (distress at another's prosperity), cf. Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1046a; Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.21.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.116 (SVF 3.431)

(1) εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπάθειας φασὶν τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. (2) καὶ
 τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὐλογον ἔπαρσιν: τὴν
 δ' εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὐλογον ἐκκλισιν. φαβηθῆσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν
 σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθῆσθαι δέ. (3) τῇ δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν
 εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὐλογον ὀρεξιν. (4) καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τῇ πρώτῃ
 πάθῃ πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρώτας εὐπάθειας: καὶ
 ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὐνοίαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν: ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν
 εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἀγνεύαν: ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμία.

2, 4 φασὶν om. F εὐλαβηθῆσθαι F. εὐλαβησισθαὶ BF 5 πίπτει FF. -ει B

Context: doxography of πάθη

The term *εὐπάθεια* is not attributed to Chrysippus by name, and it is absent from the accounts of Stoic ethics in Stobaeus and Cicero. *Em.* 3. Plutarch, however, says the Stoics are correct to give this name, and not *ἀπάθειαι*, to *χαρά*, *βουλήσεις*, and *εὐλάβειαι*. *Γιστ. μοι.* 449b. Cicero too, at *Tusc.* 4.12–14, gives a full account of the doctrine. If Chrysippus did not authorize it in its transmitted form, he certainly foreshadowed its account of *εὐλάβεια* (SVF 3.175). See further SVF 3.432–42. Since *ὁρμή* is a necessary condition of any action, and the wise man's *ὁρμή* is always *φρονιμή* (Stobaeus 2.69.1), one of the *εὐπάθειαι* should always characterize his impulse. If, however, we can interpret the concept from Stobaeus' statements about *χαρά* and *εὐφροσύνη* (2.69.3–4), *εὐπάθειαι* are not universal or permanent attributes of all wise men. In D.L. 7.94 *χαρά* and *εὐφροσύνη* are described as *ἐπιγινεήματα* of virtue. The absence of a *εὐπάθεια* corresponding to *λύπη* is due to the wise man's never being affected by the 'presence' of *κακόν*; cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.14. For further discussion, see Inwood [547]: 173–5.

5 εὐλογον ὀρεξιν Is this the same as what Chrysippus calls *ὁρμή λογικὴ ἐπὶ τι ὅσον χρή ἡδονῇ* (SVF 3.463)? The use of *ἡδοναί* here implies that the technical distinction between *χαρά* and *ἡδονή* is compatible with regarding the former as a species of pleasure in ordinary language use.

G Plutarch, *Vite. mor.* 446e–447a (S¹ F¹ 3.459, part)

(1) ἔνιοι δὲ φασι οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λύγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυεῖν διαφορὰν καὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἐνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὁξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς, (2) οὐ συνυπαρχούσας ὅτι ταυτὸν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ φερομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς ἐπιλιμνᾶνεσθαι· (3) καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς, οὐ περὶ ἐν τι γινομένης τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅλου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ῥοπᾶς καὶ εἴσεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὀρμᾶς καὶ ὅλως ἐνεργείας τινὰς οὕσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ μεταπτωτάς, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν παιδῶν ἐπιδρομαὶ τὸ ῥιγδαῖον καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπισφυλὲς ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἔχουσι.

4 φ. vel ὁ could. 5 φερομένης codell. φερομένης A1111111. οὐτῆς Pohlenz; ταυτῆς G. κατῆς ceti

Context. a few pages after 61B and continuing the same subject.

2 τροπὴν Cf 61B 29

6–11 Cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 1.39, reporting Zeno, especially *perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat*.

H Galen, *Plac.* 3.1.25 (S¹ F¹ 2.886, part)

“κοιτῇ δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν αἱ πολλοὶ φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὥσανεὶ συναισθανόμενοι περὶ τὸν θώρακα αὐτοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν παθῶν γινομένων καὶ μάλιστα καθ' ἣν ἡ καρδία τέτακται τύπον, οἷον μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν φόβων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θυμοῦ.”

1 κοιτῇ vel κοινοῖ could. πολλοὶ Ricci; ἀποτοῖ could. 2 οὕτως E1111111; κατῶς could.

Context. quotation from book 1 of Chrysippus, *On soul*.

I Galen, *Plac.* 5.6.34–7 (Posidonius frg. 33. 166, part)

(1) καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δείκνυσιν ἐν ταῖς ἐξῆς ὁ Πτολεμαῖος οὐ τοῖς φαινόμενοις μόνις ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει διαφέρεται. (2) τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ Κλεάνθους γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶνδε φαίνεσθαι φησι τῶν ἐπῶν·

τί ποτ' εὐθ' ὁ βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτά μοι φράσον.

ἐγώ, λογισμέ; πάν ἂ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.

⟨ῆ⟩ βασιλικόν γε· πλὴν ὅμως εἶπον πάλιν.

ὥς ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ, ταῦθ' ὅπως γενήσεται.

(3) ταυτὶ τὰ ἁμμιβαῖα Κλεάνθους φησὶν εἶναι Πτολεμαῖος ἐναργῶς ἐκδεικνύμενα τὴν περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς γνώμην αὐτοῦ, εἰ γε δὴ πεποιήκε τὸν λογισμὸν τῷ θυμῷ διαλεγόμενον ὥς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. (4) ὁ δὲ Χρυσίππος οὐθ' ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ

λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη φανερώς ἐπιθυμία
τε καὶ θυμῷ διοικουμένων, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἡοσειδώνιος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλεόν
διεξέρχεται.

15

3 αὐτὸν om H τὰν om L 5 δ' H (corr j. ὡτε H. ὡτε Alé 6 ἔγωγ codd λεγὼν Powell 7 <ῥ>
Powell 8 ὡς codd 11ν Cōrnatius 13σ' Wittenbach 19 ἐνδεκνόμενα Bake. -ος codd 24 δ
om. H

Context: Posidonius' account of the abatement of passions.

2 φαῖνομένοις The 'facts' as explained in P.

J Galen, *Plac.* 4.2.10-18 (SVF 3.462, part)

(1) "δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ἐντεθιμῆσθαι ὅτι τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει
ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν. (2) παλλάκειν
μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπὶ τινα καὶ ὑπὸ τινων ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ
ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεόν, (3) καθ' ἣν φοράν ἀμφοτέρω ἐχουσιν οἱ ὄροι, τῆς
παρὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ἀλόγως οὕτως γνωμένης καὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς
πλεονασμοῦ. (4) τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον τοῦτ' ἐπιπλέον ὑπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ
ἀπεστριμμένον τὸν λόγον, καθ' ἣν φοράν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔθει τινὰς φαμεν
ὠθεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι ἄνευ λόγου (καὶ) κρίσεως· (οὐ γάρ) ὡς εἰ
διημαρτημένως φέρεται καὶ παριδύνει κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ταῦτ' ἐπισημαι-
νόμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα καθ' ἣν ὑπογράφει φορμίν, αὐτοῦ πεφυκέντος τοῦ
λογικοῦ ζώου κινεῖσθαι οὕτως κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον." ἡ
μὲν οὖν ἐτέρα τῶν τοῦ Χρυσίππου ῥήσεων ἐξηγουμένη τὸν πρότερον τῶν ὁρῶν τὰς πάθους
ἐνταυθαῖ τελεσιτὰ, τὴν δ' ὑπόλοιπον ἐν ἧ τῶν ἐτέρων ὁρῶν ἐξηγεῖται γνωμμαιμένη ἐφέτης
τῆδε κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σύγγραμμι Περὶ παθῶν ἥδη σοι παραθήσομαι (5) "κατὰ τοῦτο
δὲ καὶ ὁ πλεονασμὸς τῆς ὁρμῆς εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ
φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν. (6) γένοιτο δ' ἂν τὸ
λεγόμενον διὰ τούτων γνωμμαιώτερον, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρενεῖσθαι καθ' ὁρμὴν
οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε
καὶ στήναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. (7) ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ'
ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἡ τῶν
σκελῶν κινήσις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως
εὐθὺς ἐναρξάμενων. (8) αἱς οἰμαί τι παρμπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρμῶν
γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὑπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ὥσθ' ὅταν ὁρμῇ
μὴ εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτόν, (9) ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δρόμου τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ
λεγομένου παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον, συμμετρία
γάρ ἐστι φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσούτου (οὐδ') [καὶ ἕως]
αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ. ἡ δὲ καὶ τῆς ὑπερβύσεως κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτως γνωμμένης πλεονάζουσα
τε ὁρμὴ λέγεται εἶναι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄλογος κίνησις ψυχῆς."

25

8 <καὶ> Pteisen <οὐ γάρ> 12ν Lact 13ν ὑπογράφει codd ὑπογράφεται Muller 18 τῇ ὁρμῇ
Müller, τῆς ὁρμῆς codd 20 οὐ κοινῇ, καὶ ἕως del A.A. Long et C. Mureau καὶ del Muller

Context: a few lines after D. Galen takes Chrysippus to be implying that the soul

contains an irrational faculty analogous to a runner's weight (cf. *Plac.* 4.2.32). With 1-4, cf. A 1, 6-7.

3 **φέρεται-τινων** Referring to the standard account of action caused by impulse or repulsion; cf. 53P-Q.

10 **ὑπογράφει** If the text is sound, it is best to take the subject as 'the expressions' *ὁθεῖσθαι-κρίσεως*, 8.

16 **συμμετρίαν** Cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.1.84 on having an *ὄρεξις* which is *σύμμετρος*.

K. Galen, *Plac.* 4.3.2-3 (Posidonius fr. 34, part)

(1) καὶ γὰρ Ζήνωνι κατὰ γε τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις μάχεται τῶν Στωικῶν, οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολάς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δῆξεις ἐπάροσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσι εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. (2) Ποσειδωνίου μὲν γε τελέως ἀπεχώρησεν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν δοξῶν· οὔτε γὰρ κρίσεις οὔτε ἐπιγιγνώμενα κρίσεις, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς θυμοειδοῦς τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγείται γίνεσθαι τὰ πάθη κατὰ πᾶν ἀκολουθήσας τῷ παλαιῷ λόγῳ. (3) καὶ πυνθάνεται γε τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἐν τῇ *Περὶ παθῶν* ἑαυτοῦ πραγματείᾳ, "τίς ἢ τῆς πλεονάζουσας ὁρμῆς ἐστιν αἰτία, ὃ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό γε πλεονάζειν παρὰ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράγματα τε καὶ μέτρα. πρόδηλον οὖν ὡς ἑτέρα τις ἀλογός ἐστι δύναμις αἰτία τοῦ πλεονάζεσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τοῦ λόγου, καθάπερ τοῦ πλεονάζεσθαι τὸν δρόμον ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀλογος ἡ αἰτία, τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος." 5 10

8 τῶν Kidd τοῖς codā

Context: shortly after J.

1 **Ζήνωνι** Pohlenz [335], 188-93, found support here for his view that Zeno and Cleanthes (cf. I) regarded the πάθη as quite independent of λόγος, i.e. ἀλογος κινήσεις in an unqualified sense of ἀλογος which Chrysippus modified. The recent tendency has been to minimize the differences between the two Stoics. Cf. Rist [303], 28-33; Lloyd [396], 239-41.

9 **L and N** bear on Posidonius' question.

13 **δρόμον** Taking up Chrysippus' analogy in J 6-9

L. Galen, *Plac.* 4.5.21-6 (*SVF* 3.480, part)

(1) "οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἀγαθὰ ἕκαστα τούτων λέγεται ἀρρωστήματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπτικῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν." . . . (2) ὡς εἰ καὶ οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ἀρρωστήματι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἁπλῶς τῷ ψευδῶς ὑπεληφέναι περὶ τινος ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μέγιστον μοιζειν αὐτὸ· μηδέπω γὰρ ἀρρώστημα τὴν περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἶναι δόξαν ὡς ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτὰ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μηδὲ ζῆν ἀξίον ὑπολαμβάνει τῷ στέρηθέντι χρημάτων· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ συνίστασ- 5

θαι τὴν τε φιλοχρηματίαν καὶ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἄρρωσθήματα οὖσας. ἀλλὰ τῷ ταῦτα φάσκοντι Ἡσοειδώνιος ἀντιλέγων ὡδέ πως φησι: "τοιοῦτων δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου λεγομένων . . ."

10

7 ἀπολαμβάνει Κίθη: -oi codē

Context: the alleged inconsistency of Chrysippus' statement in 1-3 with his thesis that the πάθη are κρίσεις.

3-8 These lines seem to report a Chrysippean proposition (cf. p. 10) though expressed as only a possible interpretation of his words (cf. ἴσως ἂν τις φήσῃ, two lines before ὡς εἰ . . .).

8 ἄρρωσθήματα Cf. S 2-3, and Seneca, *Ep.* 75.11-12, distinguishing *affectus* from *passus*.

M Galen, *Plac.* 5.5.8-26 (Posidonius fr. 160, part)

(1) τριῶν οὖν τούτων ἡμῖν οἰκειώσεων ὑπαρχουσῶν φύσει καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν νίκην διὰ τὸ θυμολογικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ λογιστικόν. (2) Ἐπίκουρος μὲν τὴν τοῦ χειρίστου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκειώσιν ἐθεάσατο μόνην, ὁ δὲ Χρυσίππος τὴν τοῦ βελτίστου, φάμενος ἡμῖς οἰκειοῦσθαι πρὸς 5 μόνον τὸ καλόν, ὅπερ εἶναι δηλονότι καὶ ἀγαθόν. (3) ἔσας οὖν τὰς δύο ὁ Χρυσίππος εἰκότως ἀπαρεῖ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν κακίαν γενέσεως οὐτ' αἰτίαν ἔχων εἰπεῖν αὐτῇ, οὕτι τρόποις τῆς συστάσεως οὗθ' ὅπως ἀμαρτάνει τὰ παιδιὰ δυνάμενος ἐξευρεῖν, ὅπερ εὐλόγως οἶμαι πάντα καὶ ὁ Ἡσοειδώνιος αὐτοῦ καταμέμφεται καὶ ἐλέγχει. (4) εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς 10 ὥκειώσθαι τὰ παιδιὰ, τὴν κακίαν οὐκ ἐνδοθεῖν οὐδ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀλλ' ἐξωθεν μόνον ἐχρὴν αὐτοὺς ἐγγίγνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρίται γε, κἂν χρηστοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐντρέφῃται καὶ προσκόντως παιδεύηται, πάντως ἐξαμαρτάνοντά τι, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ Χρυσίππος ὁμολογεῖ. (5) καίτοι γ' ἐνῆν αὐτῷ ὑπεριδόντι τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον ὁμολογήσαι τὸ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσε- 15 σιν ἀκόλουθον, εἰ καλῶς ἀχθεῖται τὰ παιδιὰ, πάντως αὐτὰ φάσκοντι σοφοὺς ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τοῦ χρόνου προϊόντος. (6) ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐτόλμησε τοῦτό γε καταβεῦσασθαι τῶν φαινομένων, ἀλλὰ κἂν ὑπὸ φιλοσόφῳ τρέφῃται μοῖον καὶ μηδὲν μῆτε θεάσθαι μῆτ' ἀκούσῃ πύποτε παράδειγμα κακίας, ὅμως οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὰ φιλοσοφῆσιν. . . (7) ἐπειδὴν γὰρ λέγῃ τὰς περὶ 20 ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῖς φαύλοις διατροφὰς διὰ τε τὴν πιθανότητα τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ τὴν κατῆχῃσιν, ἐρωτητέον αὐτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἀληθῶν δ' ὡς κακὸν πιθανὴν προβάλλουσι φαντασίαν οὕτως δὲ καὶ διὰ τί τὴν μὲν νίκην τὴν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνδριάντων ἀνάθεσιν ἐπαινούμενά τε καὶ 25 μακαριζόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀκούοντες ὡς ἀγαθὰ, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡττῆς τε καὶ τῆς ἀτιμίας ὡς κακὰν, ἐτοιμῶς πειθόμεθα; (8) καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ Ἡσοειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύει περὶ τοῦ πασῶν τῶν ψυχῶν ὑπολήψεαι τὰς αἰτίας εἰ μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὁλκῆς, προηγεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῇ τῇ ψευδεῖς

δόξας ἀσθενήσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζῳῷ τὴν 30
 ὁρμὴν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει, πολλάκις δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει
 τοῦ παθητικοῦ. (9) συνάπτει δ' εἰκότως αἰὲς λόγοις ταῦτοις ὁ Ποσειδώνιος
 τὰ κατὰ τὸν φυσιογνώμονα φαινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων ὅσα μὲν εὐρύτερὰ τε καὶ θερμότερα θυμικώτερα πάνθ'
 ὑπάρχει(ν) φύσει, ὅσα δὲ πλατυσίχιά τε καὶ ψυχρότερα δειλότερα. (10) 35
 καὶ κατὰ τὰς χώρας δὲ οὐ σμικρῷ τι διεννηοχέαι τοῖς ἡθεσι τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις εἰς δειλίαν καὶ τόλμαν ἢ τὴν φιλήδονόν τε καὶ φιλόπονον, ὥς τῶν
 παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπομένον ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος,
 ἦν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ περιέχον κράσεως οὐ κατ' ὀλίγον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. καὶ γὰρ
 δὴ καὶ τὸ αἷμα διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις φησὶ θερμότητι καὶ ψυχρότητι καὶ 40
 πάχει καὶ λεπτότητι καὶ ἄλλαις [φήσι] διαφοραῖς οὐκ ὀλίγαις, ὑπὲρ ὧν
 Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ πλείστον διηγήθην ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸν οἰκίον καιρὸν ἐπὶ
 προήκοντι τῷ λόγῳ μνημονεύομεν αὐτῶν, ἥνικα ἂν καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς Ἱπποκράτους τε καὶ
 Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις περὶ τούτων παραγράψωμεν. (11) ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τοὺς
 περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκέ μοι μῆτ' ἄλλο τι γινώσκοντας τῶν 45
 κατὰ τὰ πάθη μῆθ' ὥς αἱ τοῦ σώματος κράσεις οἰκείας ἑαυταῖς ἐργάζονται
 τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις· οὕτως γὰρ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν.

ἐ οἰκείωσθαι Bas. οἰκείωσθαι H. οἰκείωσθαι E. 7 ἀπορεῖ περὶ Dels. ἀπορεῖ ἐπεὶ codd. καὶ
 διέχχει H. τε καὶ λέγει L. 12 γὰρ L. 13 καὶ om. L. 14 καὶ H. γέγονε L. 15 ἀκούσῃ
 Κύπρῃ. ἀκούσει H. ἀκούσῃ μῆτε L. ὅμως H. ὅπως L. 20 τὰ H. τίς L. 21 ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν
 H. ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν L. 27 κακῶς Müller. κακῶ codd. 29 θεωρηματικῶν L. θεωρητικῶν
 <σκέμματα γινόμενων διὰ τῆς ἀμθίας. ἐν δὲ τῷ πραγματικῷ> Edelstein/Kidd θεωρητικῶν <γίνεσθαι δ'
 ἀμθίας. ἐν δὲ τῷ πραγματικῷ> Dc Lac. αὐτῆς H. αὐταῖς L. 30 ἀσθενήσαντος L. τὰς H. 35
 τῶν φυσιογνώμονα H. τὴν φυσιογνωμοσίαν L. 35 ὑπάρχει(ν) Κύπρῃ -cc codd. 41 φησι D.
 Müller. 42 αὐτὰς Κύπρῃ αὐταῖς codd. 44 παραγράφωμεν Ald. περιγράφωμεν codd. 46
 κράσεις H. κράσεις L.

Context. exposition of the soul's tripartite nature, and criticism of Chrysippus' denial of this.

1-3 For Galen's dependence on Posidonius here, cf. *Plac.* 4.7.35 and *N*.

20-2 τὰς... διαστροφὰς... κατήχησιν The standard Chrysippean doctrine, cf. *SVF* 3.228-36, especially 229, which answers Posidonius' question in 22. 4. and Long [§31], 336-7.

28-30 The text of these important lines is so obscure that we omit them from vol. 1. Posidonius wishes to show why Chrysippus' account of the external source of false value judgements is inadequate. His own answer, as sketched in *K* 3 (cf. *N*, *P* 1), is to invoke the 'pull' of the irrational faculties of soul – hence παθητικὴ ὁλκή. 29-30 recall his formulation of the τέλος. Cf. *63J*, *64E*; and Galen, *Plac.* 5.6.4-5, especially τὴν δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἰτίαν... κατὰ μὲν ἀγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου... τῆς ψυχῆς. Since Posidonius wants completely to reject the view that the passions have any rational foundation, or result from false judgements (cf. *K* 2), it is hard to make any sense of 29-30, 'false opinions precede the pull of passion', even with the lacuna and supplements (see ap. crit.) suggested after θεωρητικῶν. Nor can we conjecture what that term signifies here.

42 Posidonius had the reputation of 'Aticizing' (Strabo 2.3.8): cf. Kidd [379]. 210-11

N Galen, *Plac.* 5.6.18–19 (Posidonius fr. 161, part)

"καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δὲ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰρετοῖς τε καὶ φευκτοῖς διαστροφῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἡ αἰτία τῶν παθῶν αἰσθηθείσα." τὰ γὰρ οἰκεία ταῖς ἀλόγοις δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξαπατώμενοί τινες ὡς ἀπλῶς οἰκεία δοξάζουσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς τὸ μὲν ᾗδεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν πέλας τοῦ ζωώδους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ὀρεκτά, σοφία δὲ καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλὸν ἅμα τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ θείου.

3

Context: a few lines after 641.

O Galen, *Plac.* 4.7.12–17 (SFF 3.466, part)

ὅτι δ' ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ μαλ' ὀττεται τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ δόξαι μένουσι τοῦ κακὸν τε αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι, καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ παθῶν μαρτυρεῖ γράφειν οὕτως: (1) "ζητήσαι δ' αὖ τις καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀνέσεως τῆς λύπης, πῶς γίνεται, πότερον δόξης τινὸς μετακινουμένης ἢ πασῶν διαμενουσῶν, καὶ διὰ τί τοῦτ' ἔσται." εἰ ἐπιφέρω φησί, (2) "δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν, ὅτι κακὸν αὐτὸ ὃ δὴ πάρεστιν, ἐγχεινόμενης δ' ἀνίστασθαι ἢ συστολῇ καὶ ὡς οἶμαι ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὁρμή." (3) τυχόν δὲ καὶ ταύτης διαμενουμένης οὐχ ὑπακούσεται τὰ ἐξῆς, διὰ ποῖαν ἄλλην ἐπιγινόμενὴν διάθεσιν ἀσυλλόγιστον τοῦτων γινομένων. (4) οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίωντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίαν τὰς φαντασίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα ποιῇ καὶ ἐπιστῇται τι ἢ μὴθέν. ὅν τρόπον γὰρ ἡ θρήνων παύσις γίνεται καὶ κλαυθμοί, τοιαῦτα εὐλογον καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων συντυγχάνειν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μᾶλλον τῶν πρηνιμάτων κινούντων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν γέλωτα κινούντων γίνεσθαι ἔφη, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις."

5

10

8–9 ἀσυλλόγιστον Müller: διασυλλόγιστον vel s.m. could: δυσσυλλόγιστον Pohlenz 10 μὴ vel Rict

Context: Posidonius' refutations of Chrysippus.

5–11. Obscure text and train of thought. In 5–7 Chrysippus appears to take up his first alternative in 3–4, δόξης τινὸς μετακινουμένης, identifying the 'impulse to the contraction' with an opinion that alters. In 7–9, where ταύτης should refer to ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὁρμή, he takes up the second alternative in 4, πασῶν [δόξων] διαμενουσῶν. τὰ ἐξῆς, 8, then, should refer to the contraction itself, which 'will not correspond' (οὐχ ὑπακούσεται) with the impulse (cf. *Plac.* 4.7.36, where Posidonius denies this possibility). Thus, if the passionate mental state were represented as 'here is something very bad, therefore I should contract (feel depressed)', the depression fails to occur owing to a different διάθεσις which does not draw the inference necessary to produce the passion. Some such thought seems required by 8–9, where Müller's ἀσυλλόγιστον (cf. P 7, and 36A 21 for its technical sense) fits the change of emotional state exemplified in 9–11. Galen (4.7.19) claims that Chrysippus confessed to finding the cause of the abatement of passion δυσλόγιστον, but this, we suggest, is a polemical misrepresentation of whatever -λογιστος word Chrysippus used in 8.

10 μὴ. Omitted in the repetition of these lines at 4.7.37; but what explains the change of emotional state must be the occurrence of impressions *not* similar to those which prompted the passion.

P Galen, *Plac.* 4.7.24–41 (Posidonius fr. 165, part)

(1) αὐτὸς τε δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας γίνεται τὰ πάθη καὶ διὰ τίνα τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ καθίσταται, κἂν αἱ δόξαι τε καὶ αἱ κρίσεις ἐτι μένωσι τοῦ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἢ γεγονέναι. . . (2) ὡς γὰρ ἐφίεται τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκειῶν τινῶν ὀρεκτῶν, οὕτως καὶ τυγχάνον αὐτῶν ἐμπίπλονται κἂν τούτῳ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κίνησιν καθίστησιν, ἥτις ἐκράτει τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῦ ζώου καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἦγεν ἐφ' ᾧ τι παρήγετο. (3) οὐκ οὖν ἀσυλλύγιστοι τῆς παύλης τῶν παθῶν εἰσιν αἱ αἰτίαι, καθάπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἔλεγεν. . . (4) διὰ τοῦτο τοῖσιν καὶ τὰ ἔθη φαίνεται πλείστον δυνάμενα καὶ ὅλως ὁ χρόνος εἰς τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔθεσιν οἰκειοῦνται κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον οἷς ἂν ἐντρέφηται. 5 10

4 ὀρεκτῶν M: ὀρεκτικῶν H τυγχάνον De Lacyn: τυγχανόντων καὶ τυγχανούντων Ladd 5 ἑαυτοῖς Müller. ἐν τῶν Ladd. 9 ὅλως Potholici: ὅλος Ladd

Context: Posidonius' response to Chrysippus in O.

Q Galen, *Plac.* 5.6.22–6 (including Posidonius fr. 162)

(1) τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγῳ διὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἢ τε ὠφέλεια καὶ ἡ βλάβη, τῷ λογικῷ δὲ δι' ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀμαθίας. (2) καὶ ταῦτ' οὖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν παθῶν αἰτίας γνωσθείσης ὠφελείσθαι φησὶν ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἡσσειδώνιος καὶ προσέτι "τὰ διαπορούμενα", φησί, "περὶ τῆς ἐκ πάθους ὁρμῆς ἐξέφηγεν." εἴτ' αὐτὸς ἅτα ποτ' αὐτὰ ἔστιν ἐπιφέρειν ἐξηγεῖται τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. {3} "οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι πάλοι βλέπετε πῶς διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες κακὸν ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεισθαι οὔτε φοβοῦνται οὔτε λυποῦνται, φαντασίας δ' ἐκείνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες. (4) πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις λόγῳ κινήσει τὸ ἄλογον, εἰ μὴ τίνα ἀναζωγράψῃσιν πρὸςβάλλῃται αἰσθητῇ παραπλησίαν; οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διηγήσεώς τινας εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσιν καὶ ἐναργίως ἐγκελευσασμένον 10 φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λένοντα οὐκ ἰδύντες φοβούμενται."

4 ἐκ πάθους H: ἐμφανούς L 5 αὐτὰ uti. L H λαμβάνοντες L. -ονται H λόγῳ H: λόγῳ :

Context: a few lines after N.

For discussion, cf. Kidd [379], 205–6

R Galen, *Plac.* 5.2.3–7 (Posidonius fr. 163, part)

(1) Χρύσιππος μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν αὐτὴν φησὶ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν σώμασιν εἰς πυρετοὺς ἐμπίπτειν ἢ διαρροίας ἢ τι ταιούτων ἕτερον ἐπὶ μικρὰ καὶ τυχοῦση προφάσει. (2) καὶ μέμφεται γε ὁ Ἡσσειδώνιος αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα· χρῆναι γὰρ φησὶν οὐ τούτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀπλῶς ὑγιαίνουσιν σώμασιν εἰκάσαι τὴν τῶν φαύλων ψυχὴν. (3) εἴτε γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγάλοις αἰτίοις εἴτ' ἐπὶ μικροῖς πυρέττοιεν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ὡς πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς πάθος ἀγεσθαι καθ' ὅτιον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν εὐέμπτωτα εἶναι τὰ δὲ δύσπρωτα διεφέρειν ἀλλήλων. (4) οὐκ οὖν ὁρθῶς εἰκάζεσθαι φησὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ 5

Χρυσίππου τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγείᾳ, τὴν δὲ νόσον
τῇ ραδίᾳ εἰς νόσημα ἐμπίπτουσα καταστάσει τοῦ σώματος· ἀπαθὴ μὲν 10
γὰρ γίνεσθαι ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ δηλονότι, σῶμα δ' οὐδὲν ὑπάρχειν
ἀπαθές· (5) ἀλλὰ δικαιότερον εἶναι προσεικάζειν τὰς τῶν φιύλων ψυχὰς
"ἥτοι τῇ σωματικῇ ὑγείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπωτον εἰς νόσον" οὕτω γὰρ
ὠνόμασεν ὁ Πρσιδώνιος - "ἡ αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ", εἶναι γὰρ ἥτοι νοσῶδη τινὶ 15
ῥοσιν ἡ ἡδὴ νοσοῦσαν. (6) συμφέρεται μέντοι τῷ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς
νοσεῖν τε λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἅπαντας τῶν φαύλους εἰκέναι τε τὴν νόσον
αὐτῶν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τοῦ σώματος καταυτᾶσαι. (7) λέγει γοῦν ὧδε κατὰ
λέξιν· "διὰ καὶ ἡ νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰκεν οὐχ ὡς ὁ Χρυσίππος ὑπέληφε τῇ
νοσῶδει καχεξία τοῦ σώματος, καθ' ἣν ὑποφέρεται ρεμβῶδεσιν· οὐχὶ 20
περιοδικοῖς οἷά τ' ἐμπίπτειν πυρετοῖς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκεν ἡ ψυχικὴ νόσος
ἥτοι σωματικῇ ὑγείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπωτον εἰς τὴν νόσον ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ
νόσῳ. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν σωματικὴ νόσος ἕξις ἡδὴ νοσοῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ
Χρυσίππου λεγομένη νόσος εὐεμπωσίᾳ μᾶλλον εἰκεν εἰς πυρετοῖς."

19 ρεμβῶδεσιν Cornutus: ρομβῶδεσιν codd.

Context: the difference between Chrysippus' and Posidonius' accounts of the souls of the φαῦλοι

For the ethical application of such medical analogies, cf. 610, and for the details of R, see Kidd [383].

S Stobaeus 2.93.1-13 (SVF 3.421)

(1) εὐεμπωσίαν δ' εἶναι εὐκαταφύριαν εἰς πάθος, εἰς τι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν
ἔργων, οἷον ἐπιλυσίαν, ὀργιλότητα, φθονερίαν, ἀκροχολίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.
γίνεσθαι δὲ εὐεμπωσίας καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον εἰς
κλοπὰς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ὕβρεις, καθ' ἃς κλέπται τε καὶ ὕβρισταὶ καὶ 5
μοιχοὶ λέγονται. (2) νόσημα δ' εἶναι δόξαν ἐπιθυμίας ἐρρηγκυῖαν εἰς ἕξιν
καὶ ἐνεσκιωμένην, καθ' ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἰρετὰ σφόδρα αἰρετὰ
εἶναι, οἷον φιλογυνίαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαν· εἶναι δὲ τινα καὶ ἐναντία
<τούτοις> ταῖς νοσήμασι κατὰ προσκυπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν,
μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν. (3) τὰ δὲ νοσήματα μετ' ἀσθενείας συμβαίνοντα 10
ἀρρωστήματα καλεῖσθαι.

R <τούτοις> Heeren προσκυπὴς F: προσκυπὴν P

Context: conclusion of doxography of πάθη

1 εὐεμπωσίαν Cf. R 7, 21-3, and Kidd [383]

5-11 Cf. L, and for the terminology and examples, Cicero, *Tusc.* 4 23-9.

T Galen, *Plac.* 4.6.2 3 (SVF 3.423, part)

ὅσα γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ μὲν εἰς μοχθηρὰν κρίσιν
ἀναφέρει, τὰ δ' εἰς ἀτονίαν καὶ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ οἷον

κατορθοῦσιν ἢ ὀρθή κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας
 . . . ἀφίστασθαι τέ φησιν ἔστιν ὅτε τῶν ὀρθῶς ἐγνωσμένων ἡμῖν ἐνδόντων
 τοῦ τόνου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ παραμείναντος ἕως παντὸς μηδ' ἐξυπηρετή- 5
 σαντος τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προσατάγμασιν.

5 μηδ' ἄλλοι μὴτ' ἐοῦσι

Context: Galen takes Chrysippus' uses of the terms ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς to indicate his admitting a faculty other than the rational as the cause of the πάθη.

3 **εὐτονίας** This defines the soul's excellence (εὐψυχία) at fulfilling its own functions (SVF 3.270). Changes in πνεῦμα (i.e. psychic tension) are specified as the causes of the πάθη in D.L. 7.136, cf. Lloyd [596], 242–4, and note on 61C.

6 **προσατάγματα** The term recalls the accounts of ὁρμή (53R) and κατορθώματα [62] 6, SVF 3.320).

U Epictetus, *Ench.* 5

ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
 δόγματα· οἷον ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ Σωκράτει αἶν' ἐφαίνετο,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου, διότι δεινόν, ἐκείνου τὸ δεινόν ἐστιν.
 ὅταν οὖν ἐμποδιζώμεθα ἢ ταρυσσώμεθα ἢ λυπώμεθα, μηδέποτε ἄλλον
 αἰτιώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐαυτούς, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ἐαυτῶν δόγματα. 5

A favourite theme in Epictetus; cf. Lloyd [596], 244–5; Long [385], 991–2

V Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.12.20–1

(1) οὐδ' ἀταλαίπωρος εἰ καὶ δυσάρεστος κἂν μὲν μόνος ᾔης, ἐρημίαν καλεῖς
 τοῦτο, ἂν δὲ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιβούλους λέγεις καὶ ληστας, μέμψη δὲ καὶ
 γονεῖς τοὺς πατρὸς καὶ τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ γείτονας (2) ὅδε δὲ μόνος
 μένοντα ἡσυχίαν καλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ὅμοιον τοῖς θεοῖς
 ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, μετὰ πολλῶν δ' ὅντα μὴ ὄχλον καλεῖν μηδὲ θόρυβον μηδ' 5
 ἀηδίαν, ἀλλ' ἑορτὴν καὶ πανηγυρίαν καὶ οὕτως πάντα εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι.

Context: a discourse on contentment.

For discussion of 'redescription', as therapy for the passions, cf. the references cited in U.

W Stobaeus 2.115.5–17 (SVF 3.564.632)

(1) λέγουσι δὲ μήτε παρὰ τὴν ἄρεξιν μήτε παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν μήτε παρὰ τὴν
 ἐπιβολὴν γίνεσθαι τι περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον, διὰ τὸ μεθ' ὑπεξαίρεσως πάντα
 ποιεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀπρόληπτον
 προσπίπτειν. (2) εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρῶτον, τῆς πραότητος οὕσης ἕξως καθ' ἣν
 πρῶτος ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιβállαντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι 5
 εἰς ὀργὴν ἐν μηδενί. (3) καὶ ἡσυχίον δὲ καὶ κόσμιον εἶναι, τῆς κοσμιότητος
 οὐκ ἐπιστήμης κινήσεων πρεπουσιῶν, ἡσυχιότητος δὲ εὐταξίας περὶ τὰς

κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεις καὶ μόνὰς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, (4) τῶν ἐναντίων
τούτοις ἐπὶ πάντων φαύλων γιγνόμεναν.

ε μήτε Wicksmith. ἀπὸ codd. 2 ἐπιβολῇ Meurer. ἐπιβολῇ codd. 8 μόνας C. inter. μόνως
codd. 9 ἐπὶ Meincke. περὶ codd. πάντων F. πάντα P.

Context: doxography of the wise man.

2 **ὑπεξαίρεσως** For the importance of this concept, cf. Inwood [547], 119–26, 165–75, who interprets ‘excessive impulse’ (see **A I, J**) in terms of its lack of ‘reservation’. This is strongly supported by other instances of the word. Cf. Epictetus fr. 27, *Ench.* 2; Marcus Aurelius 4.1, 5.20, 6.50.

X Seneca, *De ira* 2.3.1–2.4

(1) nihil ex his quae animium fortuito impellunt adfectus vocari debet: ista, ut
ita dicam, patitur magis animus quam facit. ergo adfectus est non ad oblatas
rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum
prosequi. nam si quis pallorem et lacrimas procurrentis et iritationem umoris
obsceni altunive suspirium et oculos subito actiores aut quid his simile
indiciū adfectus animique signum putat. fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos
esse pulsus. . . (2) ira non moveri tantum debet sed excurrere; est enim
impetus; numquam autem impetus sine adsensu mentis est, neque enim fieri
potest ut de ultione et poena agatur animo nesciente.

Context: the voluntariness of anger.

Seneca (and Epictetus in **Y**) are sharply distinguishing between involuntary
emotional reactions and passions, properly so called, which are subsequent to the
former and depend on the mind's assent. The first, in modern scholarship, are
sometimes called *προπάθειαι*, a rare word of seemingly medical origin; cf. Plutarch,
San. praec. 127c., 128D. There is no evidence that the early Stoics themselves used this
term; but the likelihood that they acknowledged the concept, in the manner of **X** and
Y, is well argued by Abel [602]. Two particularly relevant texts are Seneca, *De ira*
3.16.7, *ut dicit Zenon in sapientis quoque animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est cicatrix manet
sentire itaque suspitiones quasdam et umbras adfectuum, ipsi quidem carebit*; and *SNT* 3.574,
ἔλεγεν [sc. Χρύσιππος] ἀλεγείν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δὲ μὴ γὰρ
ἐπιδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὲν, μὴ προσδέχεσθαι δέ.

8 Cf. 331; 535.

Y Gellius 10.1.17–18 (Epictetus fr. 9)

(1) propterea cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caeli aut ex tinnia aut repentinus
necio cuius periculi mortis, vel quid aliud est eiusmodi factum, sapientis quoque
animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et palescere necessum est non opinione
alicuius mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium
mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. (2) mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τὰς
τοιούτας φαντασίας, id est visa istaec animi sui terribia, non approbat. hoc est οὐ

συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει, sed abicit respuitque, nec ei metuentium esse in his quicquam videtur.

4 *procepta* Fy. *percepta* F(cons.)δ 5 *rationis* γ. *rationis* Γδ

Context: a Latin version of an extract from book 5 (now lost) of Epictetus' *Discourses*, supposedly reported to Gellius by a Stoic philosopher, to explain the Stoics' position on 'necessary and natural fear'. In the preceding lines Epictetus explains the difference between the involuntary nature of *φαντασίαι* and the voluntary nature of assent to them.

7 **προσεπιδοξάζει** Explained a few lines later by *sua adensione adprobatai*, which is the response of the fool in contrast with the wise man's lack of assent. The word is not found elsewhere. For the doctrine, see note on X.

66 Ethics in action

A Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1041F (*SVF* 3.545)

ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης* ταύτ' εἶρηκε· "διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ τε μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ κάλλους πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν."

Context: the alleged inconsistency between this statement and 60B.

The context does not show what Chrysippus had previously said, to explain his διὸ. It was perhaps along the lines of Cicero, *Leg.* 1.28: *nihil est . . . praestabilius quam plane intellegi nos ad iustitiam esse natos*. On justice, see also 57F 5–6, H; 60A 1–2, C, 61C 2, D 5, H 3.

B Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034B (*SVF* 3.698)

Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* γράφων οὕτως ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνεξέδους εἶναι καὶ ἀπολιτεύτους.

Context: the internal contradictions of Stoic political theory.

This passage is explained by Luschkat [605], 187, as an acknowledgement of what he calls man's 'empirical' as distinct from his Logos-nature. Such a supposed bifurcation in the Stoic concept of human nature is one that we resist strongly. Chrysippus is making the point that a wise man, i.e. someone who *knows* the indifference of wealth etc., will utter conventional value judgements in his efforts to influence public affairs. The passage is about the psychology of effective persuasion, and should be related to the notion that the wise man will resort to fiction where necessary; cf. 41F.

C Seneca, *Ep.* 116.5 (Panaetius fr. 114, part)

elegantè mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adolescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset "de sapiente" inquit "videbimus, mihi et tibi, qui

adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incedamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi."

Context: is it better to indulge emotions to a moderate degree (as the Peripatetics claim) or to follow the Stoics in extirpating them?

Sexual love is defined as 'an impulse to form friendships because of the manifest beauty of handsome young people'; as such it is attributed to the wise man by reliable sources (cf. *SVF* 3 630-3). Though the latter is denied by D.L. 7.113, *ἔρως* is included by him at 7.130 in the context of virtue. See also 67D.

For the concept of 'progress', which is implied here in the notion of distance from wisdom, see note on 59f.

D Cicero, *Off.* 1.46

quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus pleneque sapientibus, sed cum iis in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat.

¹ *pleneque vel planeque* codd.

Context: discussion of generosity (*beneficentia*).

² *simulacra virtutis* Cf. *Off.* 3.13, and *Fin.* 5.43 (Antiochian ethics).

E Cicero, *Off.* 1.107, 110-11, 114-17 (including Panaetius fr. 97)

(1) intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est, ex eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius qua antecellimus bestis; a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiruntur. (2) altera autem quae proprie singulis est tribuitur. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis alius dignitatem inesse, alius venustatem, sic in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates . . . (3) admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud quod quaerimus retineatur. sic enim est faciendum ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus. ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut etiam si sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur, neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi quod assequi non queas . . . (4) omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas (cum) universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans ornatas tuam . . . (5) suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat . . . (6) ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus. sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut

ea, si non decore, ut quam minime indecore facere possumus . . . (7) ac duabus
 his personis quas supra dixi tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus
 imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus,
 nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes eaque quae sunt his
 contraria, in casu sita, temporibus gubernantur. ipsi autem gerere quam
 personam velimus a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. itaque se alii ad philosophiam,
 alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in
 alia alius mavult excellere . . . (8) in primis autem constituendum est quos nos
 et quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium
 difficillima.

25

30

13 <cum> Lambinus

Context: the great superiority of human nature to that of other creatures.

4 decorumque This notion (Greek *πρέπον*), cardinal to the present extract, has
 already been under discussion since *Off.* 1.93, where Cicero began his treatment of the
 virtue moderation. It appears to have been a particular feature of Panaetius' ethics.
 Cicero insists both on its factual inseparability from *honestum* and on its theoretical
 independence. *decorum* is to virtue what charm and beauty are to health. We may
 think of it as the aesthetic aspect of morality, or as that feature of morality which
 displays itself outwardly and engages admiration (cf. *Off.* 1.95, 98). In much of
 Cicero's later discussion of moderation it means good manners, gentlemanly
 etiquette, good taste – matters which the ancients found it natural to regard as part of
 the ethical domain. Panaetius' theoretical grounds for doing so are his claim that
decorum is 'what accords with man's superiority in the area where his nature differs
 from that of other creatures' (*Off.* 1.96). For further discussion, see Philippson [367];
 Brunt [604].

8 What we omit here and elsewhere in this extract are mainly Cicero's historical
 examples. 8–13 Cf. Panaetius' formulation of the τέλος (63] 1), and vol. 1, 401.

28–30 Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 1, 352d, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου χρὴ ζῆν. Bernard Williams (*Ethics and the limits of philosophy*,
 Cambridge, Mass., 1986) argues that Socrates' question is the best place for moral
 philosophy to start.

F Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.12.15–19

(1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἔχειν [sc. δεῖ] πρόχειρα καὶ μηδὲν δίχα τούτων
 ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τετάσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ ταῦτον τὸν σκοπὸν, μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω
 διώκειν, μηδὲν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλ' ὡς διέταξεν ὁ δυνάμενος, τὰ
 προαιρετικὰ ἐξ ἁπαντος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὡς αὖ δίδωται. (2) ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ
 μεμνησθαι τίνες ἐσμέν καὶ τί ἡμῖν ὄνημα, καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν
 σχέσεων πειρᾶσθαι τὰ καθήκοντα ἀπευθύνειν· τίς καιρὸς ᾧδης, τίς καιρὸς
 παιδιῶς, τίκων παρόντων· τί ἔσται ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος . . . πότε σκῶφαι
 καὶ τίνας ποτὲ καταγελάσαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ποτὲ συμπερινεχθῆναι καὶ τῶν,
 καὶ λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ συμπεριφορᾷ πῶς τηρῆσαι τὸ αὐτοῦ. (3) τί οὖν
 δυνατόν ἀναμάρτητον ἤδη εἶναι; ἀμήχανον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο δυνατόν πρὸς τὸ μὴ

5

10

ἀμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶς. ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ εἰ μὴδέποτε ἀνιέντες ταύτην τὴν προσοχὴν ὀλίγων γε ἀμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα.

1 δι' ἧδ' ε. sed cf. Diu. 4.12.7. τίπτε οὐκ ὀρίμε προσιέναι.

Context: a discourse on moral vigilance (προσοχή)

1 τετάσθαι Cf. ἀτονία/εὐτονία, 65T.

2-4 μὴδὲν-δίδωται Cf. 58J, 62K.

4 9 Cf. 59Q

G Cicero, *Fin.* 3.60-1 (*SVF* 3.763)

(1) in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. (2) ex quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. (3) nam bonum illud et malum (quod saepe iam dictum est) postea
consequitur: prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium
sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae. (4)
itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis rebus quas supra dixi
metiendi, nam neque virtute retinetur <ille> in vita, nec iis qui sine virtute
sunt mors est oppetenda, (5) et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita
cum sit beatissimus, si id opportune facere possit . . . (6) quam ob rem cum
victorum ista vis non sit ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est
etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in
maiore parte rerum earum quas secundum naturam esse dicimus.

9 <ille> Schiche

Context: immediately following 59F.

For further material on justified suicide, cf. *SVF* 3.758-68.

7 **materia sapientiae** Cf. 59A.

H Diogenes Laertius 7.130 (*SVF* 3.757)

εὐλόγως τέφρασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδας καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων, κὰν ἐν σκληροτέρῃ γένηται ἀλγηδὼν ἢ πηρώσειν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.

Context: features of the wise man.

I Seneca, *Ep.* 94.2, 31, 50-1

(1) Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat et quae non descendat in pectus usque, nulla habentem praeccepta; plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta philosophiae constitutionemque summam boni: "quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit quid in quaque re faciendum sit sibi ipse praecipit" . . . "si quis"

inquit "non habet recta decreta, quid illum admonitiones iuvabunt vitiosos obligatum?" (2) hoc scilicet, ut illis liberetur; non enim extincta in illo indoles naturalis est, sed obscurata et oppressa, sic quoque temptat resurgere et contra prava nititur, nacta vero praesidium et adiuta praeceptis evalescit, si tamen illam diuturna pestis non infectu nec enecuit; hanc enim ne disciplina quidem philosophiae toto impetu suo comisa restituit. quid enim interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta nisi quod illa generalia praecepta sunt, haec specialia? utraque res praecepit, sed altera in totum, particulatim altera. . . (3) inbecillioribus quidem ingens necessarium est aliquem praecere: "huc vitabis, hoc facies." praeterea si expectat tempus quo per se sciat quid optimum factu sit, interitum errabit et errando impiedietur quominus ad illud perveniat quo possit se esse contentum; regit ergo debet dum incipit posse se regere.

2. Antja Buchner: *Antia sei et diem* road

Context. discussion of the educational value of specific precepts. In *Ep.* 94 Seneca marshals arguments for and against the thesis that *praecepta* are educationally useless, and that only *decreta* are necessary. In *Ep.* 95 (cf. J) he opposes the thesis that *praecepta* are sufficient to produce right actions and happiness.

1. For Aristo's position, cf. Ioppolo [346], 123-33; and for the distinction between *praecepta* and *decreta*, see Kidd [582].

J Seneca, *Ep.* 95 10-12, 61, 63-4

(1) philosophia autem et contemplativa est et activa: spectat simul atque . . . sequitur ergo ut, cum contemplativa sit, habeat decreta sua, quid quod facienda quoque nemo rite exhibet nisi is cui ratio erit tradita qua in quaque re omnis officiorum numeros exsequi possit? quos non servabit qui in tem praecepta acceperit, non in omne inbecilla sunt per se et, ut nathicam, sine radice quae patibascuntur, decreta sunt quae munant, quae securitatem nostram tranquillitatemque tuantur, quae totam vitam totamque verum materiam simul contineant, hoc interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta quod inter elementa et membra: haec ex illis dependent, illa et horum causae sunt et omnium . . . (2) quaedam admonitionem in philosophia desiderant, quaedam probationem . . . si probationes (necessariae sunt), necessaria sunt et decreta quae veritatem argumentis colligunt . . . denique cum monemus aliquem ut amicum eodem habeat loco quo se, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum, in illo amorem incitet, in hoc odium moderetur, adiciamus "iustum est, honestum." iustum autem honestumque decretorum nostrorum continet ratio; ergo haec necessaria est, sine qua nec illa sunt, sed utrumque negamus, namque et sine radice inutiles tam sunt et ipsae radices is quae genere adjuvantur.

11. *Conversantur* Antja Schweighauser

Context: see on I.

4 *officiorum numeros* Cf. note on 59K.

67 Political theory

A Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 329A B (SFF 1.262, part)

(1) καὶ μὲν ἡ πολὺ θαυμάζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἐν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πάλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δῆμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίους ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίους, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγούμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἰς δὲ βίος ἡ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ συντρεφόμενης. (2) τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὥσπερ ἦναρ ἡ εἰδωλὸν εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχευεν.

Context: why Alexander the Great should be regarded as a philosopher. The subsequent lines were a principal source of the now discredited idea of Alexander's cosmopolitan mission

B Diogenes Laertius 7.32-3

(1) ἔνοιαι μέντοι, ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ Κᾶσιον τὸν σκεπτικόν, ἐν πολλοῖς κατηγοροῦντες τοῦ Ζήνωνος, (2) πρώτον μὲν τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἀχρηστον ἀποφαίνειν λέγουσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς Πολιτείας, (3) δεύτερον ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους καὶ δούλους καὶ ἄλλοτρίους λέγειν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων εἶναι πάντας τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους, καὶ γοεῖς τέκνων καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν, (καὶ) οἰκείους οἰκείων. (4) πάλιν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ περιεσπᾶντα πολίτας καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον . . . κοινὰς τε τὰς γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους (στίχους) μὴτ' ἱερὰ μὴτε δικαστήρια μὴτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. (5) περὶ τε νομίσματος οὕτως γράφειν, "νόμισμα δ' οὗτ' ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν οἰεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὗτ' ἀποδημίας ἔνεκεν." καὶ ἐσθλήτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι ἀνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μῦρον ἀποκεκρύφθαι.

1 λέγουσιν Bockh λέγουσιν Lidd 4 πολεμίους Heibner οἰκείους Lidd 6 (καὶ) Huxford 9 (στίχους) Minage 10 ἡ ἐν τῇ BP

Context: report of Zeno's critics.

2 ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν See note on 26H. Zeno's extreme attitude, rejected by Chrysippus (cf. SFF 3.378). Was probably, like much else in his *Republic*, inspired by the Cynic Diogenes; cf. D.L. 6.72-3. The authenticity of the *Republic* attributed to Diogenes is made virtually certain by the fragments of Philodemus, *Περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, in which references to the work by Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Anaximenes are cited; cf. Dorandi [334]: Diogenes fr. 126 Giannantonio [36].

8 κοινὰς . . . γυναῖκας So too Chrysippus in his *Περὶ πολιτείας*, D.L. 7.141.

9-10 Even the much more conventional Panaetius disapproved of theatres, colonnades and new temples: cf. fr. 122 van Straaten [123]

11-12 A probably direct contradiction of Plato, *Rep.* 7, 371b, ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα.

C Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034B (S1F 1.264, part)

ἐτι δόγμα Ζήνωνος ἔστιν ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἰκοδομεῖν· ἱερὸν γάρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἄγιον οὐκ ἔστιν, οἰκοδόμων δ' ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων οὐδέν ἐστι πολλοῦ ἄξιον.

Context: immediately following 66B.

D Athenaeus 561C (S1F 1.263, part)

Ποντιανὸς δὲ Ζήωνα ἔφη τὸν Κιτιέα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ἐρωτα θεὸν εἶναι φιλίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁμονοίας παρασκευαστικόν, ἄλλον δὲ οὐδενός. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ *Πυλῑτεΐᾳ* ἔφη τὸν Ἐρωτα θεὸν εἶναι συνεργόν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν.

2 φιλίαν ὁμονοίας A· φιλίαν καὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας C.

Context: miscellaneous remarks on ἔρως and κάλλος.

1 Ποντιανὸς He figures in Athenaeus as a philosopher, possibly fictional, from Nicomedia. Ἐρωτα The proper object of sexual desire, according to Zeno, is friendship, not intercourse; cf. D.L. 7.130, and note on 66C.

2 ὁμονοίας Cf. note on 60P.

E Clement, *Strom.* 5.9.58.2 (S1F 1.43)

οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ γεγράφθαι τινὰ, ὃ μὴ ραδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγινώσκειν μὴ οὐχὶ πείραν δεδωκόσι πρότερον, εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖεν.

Context: esoteric doctrines and writings of Greek philosophers.

For later Stoic embarrassment over Zeno's *Republic*, cf. Philodemus, *Περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, edited by Dorandi [334]. Philodemus reports a whole spectrum of reactions to the work, ranging from those who regarded it as approachable to Stoics who even disclaimed Zeno's foundation of the school. It is commonly supposed, on the basis of his concern with bourgeois respectability plus the evidence of Cicero, *Off.* 1.128, that Panaetius principally authorized the hostile reaction. Athenodorus, the Stoic in charge of the Pergamene library in the first century B.C., is said to have been caught expurgating certain of the disapproved passages. D.L. 7.34.

1 πρώτῳ To distinguish the founder from Zeno of Tarsus (see Index of philosophers, vol. 1).

3 Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 5, 473d φιλοσοφῆσαι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς.

F Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1044F–1045A (S1F 3.753, part)

καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ <...> τῶν *Προτρεπτικῶν*, εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μητράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς συγγενέσθαι καὶ τὸ φαγεῖν τι καὶ πρὸς λαβῆναι ἀπὸ λεχοῦς ἢ θανάτου πρὸς ἱερὸν ἀλόγως διαβέβληται, καὶ πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν

ἀποβλέπειν, καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων γινομένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ μὴδὲν ἄτοπον μὴδὲ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων.

5

1 lacunam ind. Nylander 2 λέχους Empiricus, λέχους indc.
Context: inconsistencies in Chrysippus' political theory.

G Sextus Empiricus, PH 3 247-8

(1) "καὶ ἂν τῶν ζώντων ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται." (2) ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησιν "ὑπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος, καθάπερ ὀνύχων ἢ ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν ἄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρῆσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος, ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀρκείων δὲ ἥτων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάπυσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ρίψαντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφήν ποιήσουσι καθάπερ ἄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν."

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10

γ ἐπέβαλλε Bekker, ἐπέβαλε Lodd.

Context: demonstration by quotation that philosophers' theories are too impractical to warrant their claims to propound an art of life.

H Plutarch, De exilio 600c (SEF 1.371, part)

φύσει γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι πατρίς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἶκος οὐδ' ἀγρὸς οὐδὲ χαλκείον, ὡς Ἀρίστων ἔλεγεν, οὐδ' ἰατρείον· ἀλλὰ γίνεται μᾶλλον δ' ὀνομάζεται καὶ καλεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον.

Context: quotations to illustrate the thesis that exile is not an evil

I Stobaeus 2.103.14-17 (SEF 1.587, part)

ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἡρώτης τοιοῦτον· πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκευάσμα, εἰς ᾧ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὲ πόλις ἔστιν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιούτων ἔστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον· ἀστεῖον ἂρ' ἔστιν ἡ πόλις

1 <εἰ> Heeren

Context: doxography of Stoic political theory.

3 ἀστεῖον A pun which seeks to make a conceptual link between city and moral refinement. Cf. D.L. 6.72 (the Cynic Diogenes)

J Dio Chrysostom 36.20 (SEF 3.320)

τὴν πόλιν φαίνει εἶναι πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐν ταύτῳ κατοικούντων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον.

Context: elucidation of the meaning of ἀνθρωπος.

That Dio's *φασίν* refers to Stoics is proved by section 29 of his oration, where he gives this definition in an abbreviated form, and precedes it with the words *τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸν κόσμον ἀποφαινομένων πόλιν*.

K Seneca, *De otio* 4.1

duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscriptis condicio nascendi.

Context: the contemplative life, practised at leisure, is a service to the world community.

L Arius Didymus (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.15.3–5; *SVF* 2.528, part)

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πάσης οὐσίας ποιὸν κόσμον αἰδίων εἶναι καὶ θεόν· λέγεσθαι δὲ κόσμον σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσεων (1) λέγεσθαι δὲ κόσμον καὶ τὸ οἰκητήριον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων <καὶ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων> καὶ τῶν ἔνεκα τούτων γενομένων σύστημα· (2) ὃν γὰρ τρόπον πόλις λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε οἰκητήριον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνοικούντων 5
σύν τοις πολίταις σύστημα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ κόσμος οἰοῖναι πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντων, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων. (3) κοινωνίαν δ' ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα γεγονέναι τούτων ἔνεκα.

3 4 <καὶ ἀνθρώπων> Acnien 4 σύστημα Acnien. συνεστῶσα codd

Context: doxography of Stoic cosmology.

1–2 See notes on 44F

ὁ οἰοῖναι πόλις Cf. 46G 3.

8 10 Cf. 54N; 63K 5–8.

M Diogenes Laetius 7.121–2

(1) μόνον τ' ἐλευθέρον [sc. τὸν σοφόν], τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει 5
τε καὶ ὑποτάξει, ἣ ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαῦλη οὖσα καὶ αὕτη. (2) οὐ μόνον δ' ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας, τῆς βασιλείας οὐσης ἀρχῆς ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἀν τοὺς σοφοὺς ἀνσταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ *Περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεκρησθαι Ζήνωνα* τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐγνωκέναι γὰρ φησι δεῖν τὸν ἀρχοντα περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα. (3) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀρχικοὺς δικαστικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μόνους εἶναι, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδένα.

4 ἀντιτίθεται BP ἀντιτίθεται καὶ F 6 ἀνσταίη Ménage c Suda σταίη codd

Context: characteristics of the wise man.

1 Cf. B 4

2 **ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας** Said to be got by the wise man 'from the divine law' (SVF 3.344), which shows that 'self-mastery' or 'moral freedom' is the intended sense. The thought here and in 4-6 is Platonic; cf. especially *Rep.* 9, 577d-580c.

2-4 The second sense of slavery seems to signify a 'subordinate' position in society, as distinct from being 'owned' as well as subordinate – the third sense. Cf. Q. and Chrysippus' further account of 'slave' as *perpetuus mercenarius* (Seneca, *Ben.* 3.22.1). For a convincing argument that the early Stoics rejected any natural basis to slavery, see Griffin [384], 459-60.

N Philo, *Quod omnes probus liber sit* 97 (SVF 1.218)

ἐπὶ δὴ τοιαύταις ἀποφάσεσι καὶ γνώμασι ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ Ζηνῶνειον ἐπιφωνῆσαι, ὅτι "θάττον ἂν ἁκὸν βαπτίσει τις πλήρη πνεύματος ἢ βιάσαιτο τῶν σπουδαίων ἀντινοῦν ἄκοντα δρᾶσαι τι τῶν ἀβουλήτων"; ἀνένδοτος γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ἀήττητος, ἣν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος δόγμασι παγίοις ἐνεύρωσε.

1 δὴ M. omi. cett. 2 τις G. omi. cett. βιάσαιτο vel βιάσαι codd. 2 3 τῶν σπουδαίων MG. τὴν τοῦ σπουδαίου A: τὸν σπουδαῖον cett.

Context: Zeno's saying is quoted for its resemblance to a letter sent by the gymnosophist Calanus to Alexander, in which Calanus remarks that no ruler will compel Indian philosophers to act against their will.

3-4 Cf. 59E; 61G 2; 63L 2.

O Plutarch, *De audiendis poetis* 330 (SVF 1.219)

καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους

ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπαρεύεται,
κείνου 'στὶ δούλος, καὶ ἐλεύθερος μόλη

μετέγραψεν

οὐκ ἔστι δούλος, ἦν ἐλεύθερος μόλη,

5

τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ γινὼ συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀθεῖα καὶ μεγαλήφρωνα καὶ ἀταπεινῶτον.

Context: approval of Stoics for rewriting verses in a morally improving way.

The Sophoclean lines (= fr. 873 Pearson) are frequently quoted, with or without the tragedian's name. D.L. 2.82 refers to the 'correction' to Aristippus. Even if he originated the change, Zeno may still have adopted it.

P Diogenes Laertius 7.124 (SVF 3.631)

λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· φασὶ δ' αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τινα εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς. δι' αὐτόν θ' αἰρετὸν τὸν φίλον

ἀποφαίνονται καὶ τὴν πολυφιλίαν ἀγαθόν. ἐν τε τοῖς φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι
φιλίαν μηδενὶ τῶν φαύλων φίλον εἶναι.

5

1 αὐτὴν DP. αὐτοῖς FP(coni.)

Context: characteristics of the wise man.

On friendship, see 60G, M, and, for 'goods being common to the virtuous', 60P

3 δι' αὐτόν θ' αἰρετόν For Epicureanism, cf. 22F 1.

Q Athenaeus 267b (SVF 3.353)

διαφέρειν δὲ φησι Χρύσιππος δούλων οἰκέτου γράφων ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ
ὁμονοίας διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους ἐτι εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς
μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους. "ὁ γὰρ οἰκέτης" φησί "δούλός ἐστι κτήσει
κατατεταγμένος."

Context: discussion of slavery.

For Chrysippus' distinction, see note on M 3. 4

R Marcian 1 (SVF 3.314)

... Chrysippus sic incipit libro quinti fecit Περὶ νόμου: "ὁ νόμος πάντων
ἐστὶ βίαιεὺς θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν
προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα,
καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει
πολιτικῶν ζώων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ
ποιητέον."

5

Note the weight and formality of the language. The opening words recall Pindar's
famous phrase (fr. 152.1 Bowra).

4 5 φύσει πολιτικῶν ζώων Cf. note on 61H 2-3.

S Cicero, Rep. 3.33 (SVF 3.325)

(1) est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis,
constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude
deterreat, (2) quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat, nec improbos
iubendo aut vetando movet. (3) huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari
aliquid ex hac licet, neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut
per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut
interpret Sextus Aelius, (4) nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia
posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et
immutabilis continebit, (5) unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator
omnium deus: ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator; (6) cui qui non
parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas
poenas, etiam si cetera supplicia quae putantur effugerit.

5

10

The original context of this passage (quoted by Lactantius, *Inu. div.* 6.8.6-9) is lost.

1 recta ratio Cf. 63C 9.

3 4 Cf. 54I 3.

T Cicero, *Rep.* 1.34 (Panaetius fr. 119)

... quod memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio, duobus Graecis vel peritissimis rerum civium, multaue colligere ac docere, optimum longe statum civitatis esse cum quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent.

The original context is lost.

For Polybius' admiration for the Roman constitution, cf. his *History* 3.2.6, 6.11-18. Given his general interest in different constitutions (sometimes regarded as dependent on Panaetius), lines 3-4 probably state a position supported by him and Panaetius as well as by Scipio.

U Diogenes Laertius 7.131 (SVF 3.700)

πολιτείαν δ' ἀρίστην τὴν μικτὴν ἐκ τε δημοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας.

Context: doxography of Stoic political theory.

This sentence is inconsequentially added after a passage reporting the views of Zeno and Chrysippus on community of wives. It chimes so little with their known political theory and so well with the position of Polybius (cf. his *History* 6.10.6-7, 6.18.7) that we incline to regard 'the mixed constitution' as the system approved by later Stoics, especially Panaetius.

V Cicero, *Off.* 2.73 (Panaetius fr. 118)

hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.

Context: the statesman's duty to preserve people's property and to prevent the state from interfering with private ownership.

This interesting defence of capitalism is likely to have a philosophical source, for which Panaetius would be the best candidate; cf. Reesor [608], 28-9. Earlier Stoics will hardly have agreed that capitalism is the state's primary function and justification. However, there is no reason to think that Zeno, even in his *Republic*, was hostile to private property, and the compatibility of private ownership with a communal world is stated in an image (SVF 7) probably derived from Chrysippus. Wealth, though indifferent for happiness, is something 'preferred' (58m).

W Stobaeus 2.109.10-110.4 (SVF 3.686, part)

(1) τρεῖς δὲ προηγουμένους εἶναι βίους, τὸν τε βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τρίτον τὸν ἐπιστημονικόν· (2) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χρηματισμούς τρεῖς προηγουμένους, τὸν τε ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλείας, καθ' ἣν ἡ αὐτὸς βασιλεύσει ἢ μοναρχικῶν χρημάτων εὐπορήσει· (3) δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύσεσθαι γάρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον· καὶ γὰρ γαμήσειν καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι, ἀκολουθεῖν (γάρ) ταῦτα τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου καὶ

5

κοινωνικοῦ καὶ φιλαλλήλου <φύσει>. χρηματιεῖσθαι οὖν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς ὄντων. (4) περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστεῦναι καὶ ἀπὸ σοφιστείας εὐπορήσειν χρημάτων διέατησαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως κατὰ τὸ σημαϊνόμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ χρηματιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ μισθούς ποτε λήψεσθαι παρὰ τῶν φιλομαθοῦντων διωμολογήσαντο· περὶ δὲ τὸ σημαϊνόμενον ἐγένετό τις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμφισβήτησις, τῶν μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο λεγόντων σοφιστεῦναι, τὸ ἐπὶ μισθῷ μεταδίδοναι τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας δογμάτων, τῶν δ' ὑποτοπηνάντων ἐν τῷ σοφιστεῦναι περιέχεσθαι τι φαῦλον, οἷονεὶ λόγους καπηλεῦναι.

ε προσηγομένους Hecetm προσηγορευμένους codd 3 ἢ Heine κπὶ codd. α μοναρχικῶν Hecetm· ικοῦς codd 5 πολιτεύεσθαι Meiserke: πολιτεῖσθαι codd α <γὰρ> Hecetm 7 <φύσει> Hecetm 9 σοφιστεῖσθαι Usener: σοφιστεῖναι codd.

Context: characterization of the wise man.

For further material on the three preferable lives, cf. *SVF* 3.690–704.

4 **δεύτερον** In his books *Περὶ βίων* (*SVF* 3.693) Chrysippus specified the second livelihood only as ἀπὸ φίλων (cf. 8), and not also as ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας. Perhaps this reflects his belief that a political career is not possible for a Stoic in some communities (*SVF* 3.695–6), and that it is extremely difficult to combine political popularity and moral integrity (*SVF* 3.694).

5–7 Cf. **SVF** 8. **φιλαλλήλου** Cf. **225** 2

15 **λόγους καπηλεῦναι** A clear reminiscence of Socrates' characterization of the sophists' profession (Plato, *Prot.* 313c–314a).

X Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1033C–D (*SVF* 3.702)

αὐτὸς γοῦν Χρυσίππος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ *Περὶ βίων* οὐδὲν οἶται τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ διαφέρειν· αὐτὰς δὲ ππραθῆσθαι τὰς λέγειν· "ἄσοι δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν, ὑποουσύντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἔνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίον, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διεκλύσαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ λαυθάνειν τὴν ὑπόνοιαν αὐτῶν, πολλῶν μὲν σαφῶς τοῦτο λεγόντων οὐκ ὀλίγων δ' ἀδηλότερον."

Context: Chrysippus' inconsistency in stating this while spending his life as a scholar.

7 πολλῶν is a reference to the Epicureans, and οὐκ ὀλίγων are generally identified with the Peripatetics; cf. Cherniss [326] ad loc.

Y Seneca, *Ep.* 90.5–7 (Posidonius fr. 284, part)

(1) illo ergo saeculo quod aureum perhibent penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius iudicat. hi continebant manus et infirmiore a validioribus tuebantur, suadebant dissuadebantque et utilia atque inutilia monstrabant: horum prudentia ne quid deesset suis providebat, fortitudo pericula arcebat, beneficentia augebat ornabatque subiectos. (2) sed postquam subrepenti-

bus vitis in tyrannidem regna conversa sunt, opus esse legibus coepit, quas et ipsas inter initia tulere sapientes . . . (3) haecenus Posidonio adsentior: artes quidem a philosophia inventas quibus in cotidiano vita utitur non concesserim, nec illi fabricae adseram gloriam. "illa" inquit "sparsos et aut easis tectos aut aliqua rupe suffossa aut exesae arboris trunco docuit tecta moliri." 10

2 *iudicat vel iudicat rudi* *inferiorem B: -iores ceter* *8 in cotidiano vita utitur vel cotidiana vita utitur*
codd. 9 *sparsos et aut utitur* *Summers: sparsos et tectos vel sum codd.*

Context: critique of Posidonius' account of the origin of culture.

1-3 The largely unoriginal nature of Posidonius' account is indicated by its close similarity to Epicurean theories; cf. 22L-N and Cole [273], 18-19, 35-6. He seems to have drawn upon a long-standing 'pattern of prehistory' (Cole's phrase), to which his special contribution was the identification of the *πρώτος εὐεργής* with philosophers. Even this notion, as applied to technology, is an exaggeration, rather than a complete modification, of the pattern, cf. 22L 1107, 1143-4, M 3, N 1-2.

68 Methodology

A Cicero, *Acad.* 1.43–6

(1) tum Varro "tuae sunt nunc partes", inquit, "qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea quae ab Arcesila novata sunt probas, docere quod et qua de causa discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio." (2) tum ego "cum Zenone", inquam, "ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate quae ad confessionem ignorantis adduxerant Socratem, et iam ante Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae, et (ut Democritus) in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt." (3) itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, ut nihil scire se sciret; sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset. (4) quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque affirmare quemquam neque assensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. (5) huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias disserens de sua plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrarius in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte assensio sustineretur. (6) hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur, sed tamen illa quam exposuisti vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit."

7 iam ante Davies: velim amantem add. 13 ut sciret om. Dv 20 disserens de sua F dicit iam D dicit in eam Macéng 26 exposuisti Durand exposuit: codd

Context: a few lines after 41B, Varro's account of Zeno's epistemology

1 antiquorum ratione The position of the Old Academy, as interpreted by Antiochus.

4 cum Zenone Cf. G. 40D. But the elderly Zeno was not Arcesilaus' only Stoic opponent in epistemology. For the neglected importance of Aristotle in this connexion, cf. Long [622], 441–3.

7 The cognitive pessimism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, unlike that of Democritus, is a historical distortion, to say the least. In the case of Empedocles it appears to be founded on 31 B 2 DK. Its attribution to Anaxagoras seems to go back to Aristotle's odd interpretation of his remarks about the primal mixture of everything; cf. *Metaph.* E.4, 1007b25, and 5, 1009a27, where Anaxagoras is mentioned alongside Democritus (as in the doxographical tradition at 59 A 96 DK). For the Academics' interest in collecting illustrious precursors, cf. H 3 and Cicero, *Acad.* 2.14.

9 For Democritus' famous assertion, which is quoted again at R 1, cf. 68 A 117 DK. See also vol. 1. 17.

20 de sua Understand *sententia*. This reading, though commonly rejected in favour of Madvig's *in eam* (for the nonsensical *dies iam*), makes excellent sense. What is *consentaneum* with Arcesilaus' recommendation of suspension of judgement about everything is his 'drawing people away from their own opinion', and he achieves this by 'arguing against everyone's opinion'. Madvig's emendation does not show why this methodology should result in people's 'accepting Arcesilaus' ratio' (the presumed sense of *in eam deducere*), nor how this would be consistent with his scepticism.

B Cicero, *Acad.* 1.13

"relictam a te veterem Academiam", inquit [sc. Varro], "tractari autem novam." "quid ergo", inquam, . . . "Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime; quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir ut tu existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit." "est", inquit, "ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra <ea> Philonis Antiochus scripserit."

1 *Academiam* Bentley *iam* codd. 5 *negat* Davies *negaret* codd. 8 <ea> Reid

Context: Varro's interest in Cicero's recent change of philosophical allegiance, from the 'Old' Academy of Antiochus to the 'New' Academy of Philo.

3 in domum veterem e nova An allusion to Antiochus' secession from Philo, cf. vol. 1, 449.

4 recentissima maxime Well explained by Glucker [42], 105, as an ironical rejoinder to Antiochus (who had represented Stoicism as a *correctio veteris Academiae*, Cicero, *Acad.* 1.43), implying the superiority of the New Academy of Philo.

8 Referring to Antiochus' *Sosus* (Cicero, *Acad.* 2.12).

C Cicero, *Acad.* 2.16

(1) Arcesilas Zenoni ut putatur obtrectans nihil novi repertenti sed emendanti

superiores inmutacione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere. (2) cuius primo non admodum probata ratio (quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni cum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi), proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta a Carneade.

Context: the New Academy's perversion of the history of philosophy.

1 2 What is attributed here to Arcesilaus sounds suspiciously like Antiochus' own account of the relation of Stoicism to the Academic tradition; cf. note on B 4.

3 **clarissimis rebus** A reference to Arcesilaus' rejection of the *φαντασία καταληπτική*; cf. 40D.

D Diogenes Laertius 4.28

οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημείας κατάρξας, πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητάς τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε, καὶ πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε τὸν ὑπὸ Ἠλάτῳ παραδεδομένον καὶ ἐποίησε δι' ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἐριστικώτερον.

Context: the opening of Diogenes' life of Arcesilaus.

For its anachronisms and inaccuracies, cf. Long [622], 444–7.

1 **μέσης** The earliest reference to the Middle Academy is in the Herculaneum papyrus *Academicorum index* (probably composed by Philodemus), 21.37, where it is said to have been 'stabilized' by Lacydes.

1 2 **πρῶτος-λόγων** Cf. note on 1A 6.

2–3 **πρῶτος ἐπεχείρησε** In fact, argument *pro* and *contra* the same thesis has a history which goes back to Protagoras, as D.L. 9.51 acknowledges.

E Diogenes Laertius 4.32–3

(1) Κράτιτος δὲ ἐκλιπόντος κατέειχε τὴν σχολήν, ἐκχωρήσαντας αὐτῷ Σωκρατίδου τινός, διὰ δὲ τὸ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχειν οὐδὲ βιβλίον, φασὶ τινες, συνέγραψεν· αἱ δὲ, ὅτι ἐφωράθη τινὰ κατωρθῶν, ἃ φησιν οἱ μὲν ἐκδούνην, οἱ δὲ κατακαῦσαι. ἐρκεῖ δὴ θαυμάζειν καὶ τὸν Ἠλάτῳ καὶ τὰ βιβλία ἐκέκτητο αὐτοῦ. (2) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Πύρρῳ κατὰ τινὰς ἐξηλώκει, καὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶχετο καὶ τῶν Ἑρετρικῶν ἤπειτο λόγοις, ὅθεν καὶ ἐλέγετο ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπ' Ἀρίστωνος "πρόσθε Ἠλάτῳ, ὅπιθεν Πύρρῳ, μέσσις Διόδιωρος." καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐπ' αὐτοῦ φησιν οὕτως "τῇ γὰρ ἔχων Μενεδήμιον ὑπὸ στέρονοι μὸλυβδον | θεύσεται ἢ Πύρρῳ τὸ πᾶν κρέας ἢ Διόδιωρον." καὶ διαλιπὼν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ λέγοντα "νήξομαι εἰς Πύρρῳ καὶ εἰς σκολιὸν Διόδιωρον."

~ ὅπθεν SE, PH 1 214; ἀπὸ τοῦ δὲ codd. 8 γὰρ codd. μεν Numenius ap. Euseb. (Theop. 14.3.1) Μενεδήμιος BF, -ον P, Numenios. 9 θεύσεται Numenios θεάσεται codd. ἢ ἐξ' Ἠπύρρῳ Meineke κρέας codd. κρέας Lloyd-Jones, cf. Hunt, II 24.21

Context: life of Arcesilaus.

1 2 *Acad. index* col. 18 expands the point about Socrates, and indicates that has

seniority was the reason for his being the first choice to succeed Crates; cf. Glucker [42], 234 n. 25, Long [622], 434–5.

3–4 This puzzling sentence is illuminated by *Acad. index* 18.34–6, according to which Arcesilaus edited and revised some memoirs left by Crantor.

5 ἐκέκτητο This probably means that Arcesilaus was in possession of Plato's own library and manuscripts.

6 διαλεκτικῆς In this context, an allusion to the school of Diodorus. Ἐρετρικῶν refers to that of Menedemus.

7–8 Aristotle's famous verse is a parody of the Homeric description of the Chimera, πρόσθε λέων, ὄπισθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα, *Il.* 6.181. Its significance is well explained by Glucker [42], 35–6: 'What Aristotle must have meant is that the teachings of Arcesilaus [not his philosophical education] presented such a chimaeric spectacle to him. They were officially expounded as Platonic; they appeared to Aristotle to be identical with those of Pyrrho; while their central core consisted of [Diodorus'] dialectical arguments. . .'

8–9 Our interpretation of these very obscure lines is based on Long [69], 80. (For other views, cf. Caizzi [64], 188–90.) μόλυβδον (cf. *fl.* 24.80) should refer to the lead weight of a fishing line, and Arcesilaus himself was probably (cf. 10), as Plato was certainly (Timon *fr.* 804), represented as a large fish. Menedemus' dialectic, we conjecture, is such attractive bait for Arcesilaus that he has devoured it, and is now in pursuit of further philosophical nutriment. For another account of Arcesilaus by Timon, see 3E.

F Numenius (Eusebius, *Pr.* *rv.* 14.6.4–6)

(1) οὕτως μὲν δὴ ἔνθεν καταρτυθεῖς, πλὴν τῆς προσήσεως, ἐνέμενε Πυρρωνεῖος τῇ πάντων ἀναιρέσει. Μνασέας γοῦν καὶ Φιλόμηλος καὶ Τίμων οἱ σκεπτικοὶ σκεπτικὸν αὐτὸν προσονομάζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν, ἀναιροῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ πιθανόν. (2) λεχθεὶς οὖν ἂν αἰτία τῶν Πυρρωνείων Πυρρώνειος, αἰδοῖ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ὑπέμενε λέγεσθαι Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς ἔτι. ἦν μὲν τοίνυν Πυρρώνειος, πλὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος· Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς δ' οὐκ ἦν, πλὴν τοῦ λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πείθουμαι τοῦ Κνιδίου Διζκαίου ἀκλέους φάσκοντος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Διατριβαῖς Ἀρκεσίλαον φόβῳ τῶν Θεοδωρείων τε καὶ Βίωνος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ἐπεξίστοντων τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ οὐδὲν ἀκνούωντων ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐλέγχειν, αὐτὸν ἐξευλαβηθέντα ἵνα μὴ πράγματα ἔχῃ, μηδὲν μὲν δόγμα ὑπειπεῖν φαινόμενον, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ μέλαν τὰς σηπίους προβάλλεσθαι πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐποχὴν. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐ πείθομαι.

1 οὕτως Kienling. οὗτος codd. 2 Πυρρωνεῖος Wilamowitz. Πυρρωνίως codd. 3 ἂν αἰτία Heinichen: ἀκλίτος vel am codd. 4 Διατριβήσις Wilamowitz: Διακλήσις codd. 5 ἐπεξίστοντων Wilamowitz. ἐπεισιπτόντων codd. 6 ὑπειπεῖν ID. ἀπειπεῖν ON

Context: Arcesilaus' educational background, incorporating Theophrastus, Crantor, Diodorus and Pyrrho.

2–3 Philomelus is completely unknown. Mnaseas may be the Methodist doctor of that name, who lived at the time of Nero, and is referred to by Galen (14.684

Kühn). If so, later Pyrrhonists may have counted him as a 'Sceptic' (cf. S.E., *PH* 1 236-41), and he in turn would be regarding Arcesilaus similarly to Sextus in **I** 1.

4 **τὸ πιθανόν** Confirmed by Sextus in **I** 2. Carneades' and later Academics' adoption of the **πιθάνον** (cf. **69D**, **F**, **I**) as a practical criterion will have encouraged subsequent writers to stress Arcesilaus' difference in this respect, a difference which is doubtless genuine, even though Arcesilaus may not have expressed himself exactly as stated here.

5 **ἔραστοῦ** Crantor is meant; cf. Numenius at Eusebius, *Præp. ev.* 14.6.2; D.L. 4.22, 29.

8 **Δι(και)ακλέους** For this emendation of the MSS **Διοκλέους**, cf. Wilamowitz [31], 313 n. 23. Diacocles of Cnidus is referred to by Athenæus (308) as a writer of *Diatribes*. He is a much more likely source for Numenius than the historian of philosophy Diocles of Magnesia, as suggested by Weisheir [616], 21.

9 For Theodorus and Bion, cf. vol. 1, Index of philosophers; and for the extant testimonia, see Giannantoni [36] 1, 301-15 (Theodorus), and Kindstrand [39]. Bion is also described as a 'sophist' at D.L. 4.47, which may help to identify the sophistic critics of Arcesilaus in **H** 16. For his hostility to the Academy, cf. D.L. 4.51, and for his personal connexions with Arcesilaus, see Kindstrand [39], 154.

G Numenius (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.6.12-13)

τὸν δ' οὖν Ζήνωνα ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντίτεχνον καὶ ἀξιόεικον ὑπάρχοντα θεωρῶν τοὺς περ' ἐκείνου ἀποφευγμένους λόγους καθήρει καὶ οὐδὲν ὥκει . . . τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο αὐτοῦ πρώτου εὐρομένου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα βλέπων εὐδοκίμων ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, πάσῃ μηχανῇ ἐχρήτη ἐπ' αὐτήν.

Context: shortly after **F**.

3 5 For Zeno's innovation, cf. **40B**, and for Arcesilaus' opposition to it, **A** 2 and note on **C** 3.

H Plutarch, *Cul.* 1120C, 11211, 1122A

(1) γενόμενος δ' οὖν ὁ Κωιλώτης ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν τρέπεται πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτὸν φιλοσόφους, οὐδεὲς τιθεὶς ὄνομα . . . βούλεται δὲ προτέρους μὲν, ὡς ὑπνωτῶ, τοὺς Κυρηναίους ἐλέγχειν, δευτέρους δὲ τοὺς περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαου Ἀκαδημαίους. οὗτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες . . . (2) τοῦ δὲ Ἀρκεσίλαου τὸν Ἐπικούρειον οὐ μετρίως εἰκεν ἡ δόξα πυραυπεῖν ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαπηθέντος. μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἴδιον λέγοντά φησιν ὑπόληψιν ἐμποικεῖν καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώποις ἀγραμμάτοις . . . (3) ὁ δ' Ἀρκεσίλαος τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τοῦ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαι (τι) τῶν παλαιῶν ὥστε ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς τότε σοφιστὰς ὅτι προστρίβεται Σωκράτει καὶ Πλάτῳ καὶ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας οὐδὲν δεσμένοις, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀναγωγῇ καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐταὶ εἰς ἀνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος. ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτου Κωιλώτης χάρις καὶ

παντὶ τῷ τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν λόγον ἀνῶθεν ἦκεν εἰς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀποφαίνοντι.

15

5 Ἐπικούρειον Crönert. ἐπίκουρον codd. / post ἐμπειρὴν (καυσιοτομίαν) Reiske 9 (<π>) Reiske Context: 1.4, transition from the Epicurean Colotes' attack on Democritus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato and Stilpo to his anonymous critique of contemporary philosophers whom he charges with making life impossible: 5-15, the beginning of Colotes' attack on Academic scepticism, following his refutation of the Cyrenaics.

5 Ἐπικούρειον Crönert's emendation, though by no means certain, seems highly probable. There is no independent evidence of controversy between Epicurus himself and Arcesilaus; and the subject of φησι, 7, must be Colotes.

5-6 For Arcesilaus' contemporary renown, cf. Strabo 1.15, who cites Erastosthenes' judgement of him and the Stoic Aristo as the leading philosophers of his time.

10 σοφιστάς See note on F.9. For Arcesilaus' appeals to philosophical precedent, cf. A.2 with note, and Sedley [59], 15-16.

I Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.232-4

(1) ὁ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγουμεν εἶναι
προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάννυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνείοις κοινωνεῖν
λόγοις, ὥς μὲν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν. (2)
οὐτε γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξείας τινὸς ἀποφανόμενος εὐρίσκεται,
οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων
ἐπέχει. (3) καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἣ συνεισέρχασθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν
ἡμεῖς ἐφάσσομεν. λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐποχάς,
κακὰ δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος συγκαταθέσεις. (4) ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ λέγει τις ὅτι ἡμεῖς
μὲν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς,
ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν
ἐποχὴν, κακὸν δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν. (5) εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ
λεγομένοις πιστεῦειν, φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρωνείος
ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἐταίρων
ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς, εἰ εὐφύως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν
ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς
μὲντοι γε εὐφύει τῶν ἐταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχερεῖν.

5

10

15

8 ἐκτὸς Mutschmann: ἦτοι πλὴν LEAB: ἔξω M. πλὴν Bury 10 αὐτὸν Mutschmann: αὐτὴν codd Context: survey of schools that are thought to resemble Pyrrhonist scepticism.

5 πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν See note on F.4.

6-11 The bald way in which Sextus formulates these 'doctrines' of Arcesilaus should be presumed to ignore qualifications and defences against dogmatizing which the Academic would have made himself. For the position which we conjecture to be the basis of Sextus' remarks see vol. 1, 447, and Sedley [59], 13-15. For what the later Pyrrhonist says about suspension of judgement, and his difference from the Academics, cf. 71A, C.

11-16 This tradition, which Sextus himself views with suspicion, probably underlies Diacoeles' charges in F.11-13. For a similar story told about Carneades, cf.

Numenius in Eusebius, *Praep.* ev. 14.8.12–14. Notice that what is said to be concealed in Q is not Platonic doctrine, but the Academics' own opinion; cf. Glucker [42], 303–4. Sextus continues by relating what he has just said to Aristotle's verse (E 7).

J Cicero, *Fin.* 2.2

is [sc. Socrates] enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum dissererat, ut ad ea quae ei respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret, qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit instituitque ut ei qui se audire vellent non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent quid sentirent, quod cum dixissent, ille contra sed eum qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam.

1 percontando A (corr.): percontando rets

Context: Cicero's approval of the Socratic method of discourse.

5 **quid sentirent** Arcesilaus' instruction should be interpreted as the Socratic requirement that the interlocutor give an honest statement of his own opinion, and be prepared to engage in a serious dialectical examination of that opinion; cf. for instance Plato, *Gorg.* 500b, *Rep.* 1, 346a, and Long [622], 446–8.

6 In what follows our extract, Cicero goes on to observe that in the contemporary Academy the pupil merely puts up a thesis for discussion, and then listens to a formal refutation of it.

K Cicero, *Fin.* 5.10

disserendique ab eodem [sc. Peripateticis] non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratione praecepta sunt tradita, ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus quicquid ex utraque parte dici posset exprimeret.

Context: survey of the Peripatetic school.

This characterization of Aristotle is a Ciceronian commonplace; cf. L and *Tusc.* 2.9. It appears to be based on such passages as *Top.* 1.2, 101a34–6 and *Metaph.* B.1, 995b2–4.

4

L Cicero, *De or.* 3.80

si aliquis extiterit aliquando qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque sententiam possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes praeceptis illius cognititis explicare, aut hoc Arcesilae modo et Carneadi contra omne quod propositum sit disserat quique ad eam rationem exercitationemque adiungat hunc rhetoricum usum moremque [exeritationemque] dicendi, is sit verus, is perfectus, is solus orator.

4 *exercitationemque huc transit*. Kumanzick ex luce 3 *exercitium* del. Schütz *moremque* del. Lambinus

Context: the best orator needs both training in public speaking and expertise in philosophical techniques of argument.

M Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 5.14.3–5 and *Epit.* 50.8

is [sc. Carneades] cum legatus ab Atheniensibus Romam missus esset, disputavit de iustitia copiose audiente Galba et Catone Censorio maximis tunc oratoribus, sed idem disputationem suam postridie contraria disputatione subvertit et iustitiam quam pridie laudaverit sustulit, non quidem philosophi gravitate, cuius firma et stabilis debet esse sententia, sed quasi oratorio exercitii genere in utramque partem disserendi. . . . Carneades autem ut Aristotelem refelleret ac Platonem iustitiae patronos, prima illa disputatione collegit ea omnia quae pro iustitia dicebantur, ut posset illam, sicut fecit, evertere . . . non quia vituperandam esse iustitiam sentiebat, sed ut illos defensores eius ostenderet nihil certi, nihil firmi de iustitia disputari.

Context: excerpt and paraphrase of a now lost section of Cicero's *De republica* (inserted by modern editors as 3.9–11).

The Athenian embassy to Rome took place in 156 B.C. Carneades was accompanied by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus. For further details of his arguments for and against justice, see Long [1], 104–6.

N Cicero, *Acad.* 2.28–9

(1) sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi [consentaneum esse] unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse consentaneum esse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat; nam tantum abesse dicebat ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret, qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, cum nihil excipere, ita necesse esse ne id ipsum quidem quod exceptum non esset comprehendere et percipi ullo modo posse. (2) Antiochus ad istum locum pressus videbatur accedere quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum [sentitis enim iam haec me δόγμα dicere] nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto sicut in ceteris rebus fluctuari, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret, hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi cogniti incogniti quam rationem quoniam suscipere docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse

2. *consentaneum esse del. Marquardt* 12. *ita illam res eodem*

Context: Lucullus' defence of Antiochus' epistemology against the New Academy.

6–7 **ne id ipsum—posse** Cf. Arcesilaus III **A** 3

12–13 **docereque repudiari**. Cf. 70B.

O Cicero, *Acad.* 2.76–7

Arcesilan vero non obstrictandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur, nemo unquam superiorum nisi modo expresserat sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum

posse sed ita necesse esse sapienti. visa est Arcesilae cum vera sententia cum honesta et digna sapienti.

5

Context: rejoinder to the criticism of Arcesilaus stated in C; cf. A 2.

2 **sic intellegitur** From 4-5 combined with Arcesilaus' scrutiny of Zeno's position (40D).

3-5 The necessity and moral worth of the wise man's freedom from opinion, though not explained here, should be seen as a deduction from (a) the impossibility of cognition, and (b) the supreme moral badness of assenting in advance of cognition (A 4). With *honestu* and *neque* . . . *quicquam* . . . *turpius* (A 18), cf. Plato, *Soph.* 230b c on the value of cathartic dialectic which rids the soul of the conceit of untested opinions, especially 230d8-e3, τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐ νομιστόν . . . ἀπαιδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγυμέναι ταῦτα ᾧ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὧτως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

P Augustine, *Acad.* 2.11

nam et Academicis placuit nec homini scientiam posse contingere earum dumtaxat rerum quae ad philosophiam pertinent – nam cetera curare se Carneades negabat – et tamen hominem posse esse sapientem sapientisque totum munus, ut abs te quoque, Licenti, illo sermone disertum est, in conquisitione veri explicari.

5

Context: beginning of Augustine's account of the New Academy.

1-2 Cf. Epiphanius, *Adv. haeres.* 3.29, Ἀρκεσίλαος ἔφασκε τῷ θεῷ ἐφικτόν εἶναι μόνον [Diels: μόνον codd.] τὴ ἀλήθειαν, ἀνθρώποι δὲ αὐ. Καρυβάδης τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἀρκεσίλαῳ ἐδόξασεν.

4 Licentius, in his exposition (*Acad.* 1.11-12), had argued that the quest for truth is sufficient for happiness, even though truth cannot be found.

Q Cicero, *Acad.* 2.60

restat illud quod dicunt veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. volo igitur videre quid invenerint. "non solemus" inquit "ostendere," quae sunt tandem ista mysteria, aut cur celatis quasi turpe aliquid sententiam vestram? "ut qui audient" inquit "ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur."

5

Context: concluding section of Antiochus' criticism of the New Academy, as reported by Lucullus.

1 **veri inveniendi causa** Cf. O 1-2, S 1. Reference to the latter passage strongly suggests Philo as the Academic authority for this heuristic goal. Note the absence of any reference to suspension of judgement.

3-4 **celatis** . . . **sententiam** Cf. note on I 11-16 and Tacitum [629], 35-7

R Cicero, *Acad.* 2.32

(1) nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint.

interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi, "si ea quae disputentur vera sint tam omnia fore incerta," respondent "quid ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit." (2) alii autem elegantius, qui etiam 5 queruntur quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit inter incertum et id quod percipi non possit docere conantur eaque distinguere. (3) cum his igitur agamus qui haec distinguunt, illos qui omnia sic incerta dicunt ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit quasi desperatos aliquos relinquantur, volunt enim . . . probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque 10 se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo

Context: immediately following 40N.

We are inclined to identify the hard-line Academics of 2-5 with philosophers like Aenesidemus (cf. 71C), who refused to risk compromising their scepticism along the lines taken by Philo. As for the *alii*, 5-11, these are best treated as Philo and his followers, who extended Carneades' *probabile* from a purely practical criterion (cf. 69D-E) to a heuristic and dialectical instrument (10-11), note the way these two functions are distinguished by Sextus in his criticism of the Academics (M. 7.435-7). At Cicero, *Acad.* 2.34, Lucullus refers to a group of Academics who want to distinguish between *perspicua* and *percepta*. These are certainly Philonians (cf. Tarrant [629], 53-7), and they are plainly presented in Cicero's text as identical to the *alii* of 5-11.

5 **Democritus** Cf. A. 9.

S Cicero, *Acad.* 2.7-8

(1) neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo et audiendo eliciant et tanquam expriment aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. (2) nec inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur quicquam interest nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea vera sint quae 5 defendunt, nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, adfirmare vis possumus. hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur.

7 a quibusdam Carter, Rieu: a quibus cod.; scilicet ceteri edd.

Context: Cicero's defence of the New Academy

For regarding this passage as the manifesto of Philo's Academy, cf. Tarrant [629], 4, 25-6.

T Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.235

οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τοιούτῃ τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτὰ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στωὴν μετέγγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὥς καὶ εἰρήσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν

Ἀκαδημίῃ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνα
κεῖται τὰ τῶν Στωικῶν δόγματα. 5

Context: shortly after I

1-3 What Philo meant by leaving things 'cognitive', so far as their nature is concerned, is a question on which certainty is unattainable. For Platonic precedents on which he might have drawn, including that of god's superior cognition (as attested for his New Academic predecessors by Epiphanius, note to P 1-2), cf. Sedley [630], 72-3. We are intrigued, but not persuaded, by the novel proposal by Tarrant [629], 53-9, to attribute a non-Stoic sense of cognition to Philo, which would suffice to get at the nature of things.

3-6 Cf. what is said of Antiochus at Cicero, *Acad.* 1.43 (note to B 4).

U Cicero, *Acad.* 2.17-18

(1) iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos dedit; Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. (2) sed quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et i quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant. nec vero esse ullam 5
rationem disputare cum is qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum qui multus in eo fuisset reprehendebant nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio (quam 10
κατάληψιν illi vocant), eosque qui persuadere vellent esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarus ἐναργεῖς . . . nec ea quae tam clara essent definienda cense- 10
bant . . . {3} Philo autem dum nova quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur . . . et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit quod timebat. cum enim ita negaret quicquam esse quod comprehendi posset . . . iudicium tollit 15
incogniti et cogniti, ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi, ita imprudens eo quo minime volt revolvitur.

Context: a little after C.

3-11 Our guess at the identity of these philosophers is the Peripatetic school under Critolaus, contemporary with Antipater. For Peripatetic interest in the criterial role of τὸ ἐναργές, cf. S.E., *M.* 7.218 (Theophrastus), and for their rejection of the absolute certainty invoked by the Stoic criterion of truth, see Cicero, *Acad.* 2.143. The Epicureans (suggested by Schofield [471], 288) seem less likely, since they certainly did argue against scepticism (16).

15 nihil posse comprehendi Contrary to his claim in T 2-3

V Galen, *Opt. doct.* 1

(1) τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχείρησιν ἀρίστην εἶναι διδασκαλίαν ὁ Φαβιανὸς φησιν. ὀνομάζονται δ' οὕτως οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καθ' ἣν τοῖς ἀντικειμένους συναγαγεύουσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν παλαιότεροι τελευτᾶν αὐτὴν εἰς ἐποχὴν

ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐποχὴν καλοῦντες τὴν ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἀοριστίαν, ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ περὶ μηδενὸς πράγματος ὀρίσασθαι μηδ' ἀποφύνασθαι βεβαίως. (2) οἱ
 νεώτεροι δ' - οὐ γὰρ μόνος ὁ Φαβωρίνος - ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰς τοσοῦτον
 προάγουσι τὴν ἐποχὴν ὡς μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι κατιληπτόν,
 ἐνίοτε δ' εἰς τοσοῦτον τὴν κρίσιν ὡς καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτὴν
 ἄνευ τοῦ διδαχθῆναι πρότερον ἐπιστημονικὸν κριτήριον . . . καὶ μέντοι
 κἀν τῇ μετὰ ταῦτα γραφέντῃ βιβλίῳ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τοὺς Ἀκαδημαίκοις
 ἐπαινεῖ συναγορεύοντας μὲν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις λόγων,
 ἐπιτρέποντας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀληθευτέρους. (3) ἀλλ' ἐν
 τούτῳ μὲν εἴρηκε πιθανὸν ἑαυτῷ φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτόν, ἐν δὲ
 τῷ Ἠλουτάρχῳ συγχωρεῖν ἔοικεν εἶναι τι βεβαίως γνωστόν.

Context: the opening of the treatise.

3-4 Cf. 1G for early Pyrrhonian precedent.

9 For Galen's views on the criterion of truth, cf. Long [477]

69 Living without opinions

A Plutarch, Col. 1122A-F

(1) τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ' οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ
 κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματι καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς
 Στωϊκῆς αὐτῇ τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Ἰοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες
 ἀπηγόρευσαν, ὡς πάντα πειρώσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ
 ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάβεις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥῆπης ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἰσθητινὴν.
 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη, μὴ δεομένη τοῦ
 προστίθεσθαι . . . λέγεται δὲ τοῖς συνεπομένοις καὶ ἀκούουσιν, ὅτι (2)
 τριῶν περὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κινήσεων ὄντων, φανταστικῇ καὶ ὁρμητικῇ καὶ
 συγκαταθετικῇ, τῇ μὲν φανταστικῇ οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἀνελεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
 ἀνάγκη προεντυγχάνοντας τοῖς πράγμασι τυποῦσθαι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν, (3) τὸ δ' ὁρμητικὸν ἐγειρόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανταστικῇ πρὸς τὰ
 οἰκεῖα πρακτικῶς κινεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπου, οἷον ῥοπῆς ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ
 νεύσεως γινομένης. οὐδὲ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναιρούσιν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες,
 ἀλλὰ χρώνται τῇ ὁρμῇ φυσικῶς ἀγοῦσῃ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον οἰκεῖον. (4) τί
 οὖν φεύγουσιν μόνον; ὃ μόνον ψεύδους ἐμφύεται καὶ ἀπάτη, τὸ δοξάζειν καὶ
 προπίπτειν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, εἴξιν οὖσαν ὑπ' ἀσθενείας τῷ φαινόμενῳ,
 χρήσιμον δ' οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν. (5) ἡ γὰρ πράξις δυοῖν δέεται, φαντασίας τοῦ
 οἰκεῖου καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὲν οἰκεῖον ὁρμῆς, ὣν οὐδέτερον τῇ ἐποχῇ μάχεται.
 δόξης γάρ, οὐχ ὁρμῆς οὐδὲ φαντασίας ὁ λόγος ἀφίστησιν. ὅταν οὖν φανῇ τὸ
 [ἡδύ] οἰκεῖον, οὐθὲν δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐπ' αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ φορὰν δόξης, ἀλλ'
 ἦλθεν εὐθύς ἡ ὁρμὴ, κίνησιν οὖσι καὶ φορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς . . . (6) ἡ ἀλλὰ πῶς
 οὐκ εἰς ἄρος ἀπεισι τρέχων ὁ ἐπέχων ἀλλ' εἰς βαλανεῖον, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν
 τοῖχον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς θύρας ἀναστὰς βαδίζει, βουλόμενος εἰς ἀγορὰν
 προελθεῖν; τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἀκριβῆ τὰ αἰσθητήρια λέγων εἶναι καὶ τὰς

φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς; ὅτι φαίνεται δῆπουθεν αὐτῷ βαλανεῖον οὐ τὸ ὄρος 25
ἀλλὰ τὸ βαλανεῖον, καὶ θύρα οὐχ ὁ τοῖχος ἀλλ' ἡ θύρα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. (7) ὁ γὰρ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος οὐ παρατρέπει τὴν αἰσθητικὴν,
οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀλόγοις πάθεισιν αὐτοῖς καὶ κινήμασιν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιεῖ
διαταράττουσαν τὸ φανταστικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δόξας μόνον ἀναιρεῖ χρήται δὲ 30
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς πέφυκεν.

3 αὐτῇ Pohlenz. πῶτ' ἐν codd. 5 αἰσθητικῇ codd. πρόσθετον Pohlenz 12 καὶ σὲ Stephanius. κατεῖν
codd. 16 προσπίπτειν Dalmatius. προ- codd. 20 ἡδὲ del. Einarsson/Die Lacy 24 οὐ τοῖς codd.
αὐτῆς Reske

Context: immediately after 68H.

Reasons for regarding Arcesilaus as the author of the argument in 7–21 are briefly noted in vol. 1, 456. (See further Westman [139], 294–5, 302–3.) They are compatible with Plutarch's report, 1–3, that the controversy was protracted, as is equally clear from Antiochus' continuing insistence on assent as a precondition of impulse and action; cf. 400 and Cicero, *Acad.* 2.24–5. It is likely that some of the language of Plutarch's report is derived from this later time. For further study of the argument, cf. Striker [467], 65 n. 29, 67–9.

3 Γοργόνα Cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* 1.3.1–3. ἀπραξία by this date is a technical term for the impossibility of action, imputed to sceptics by their critics.

5 ῥοπῆς Cf. *lancea* 400 7.

7 προστίθεσθαι A synonym for συγκατατίθεσθαι; cf. S.E., *M.* 7.225.

8–9 The three movements refer to the three specific Stoic faculties of soul; cf. 53H 1, K 2, and vol. 1, 321–2.

14 φυσικῶς The crucial role this notion plays in Arcesilaus' argument is recognized by Striker (see above); cf. also ὡς πέφυκεν, 30, and Plutarch's rejoinder to the Epicureans in the section we omit after ψυχῆς, 21. Arcesilaus is best interpreted not as intruding a non-Stoic concept, but as exploiting the *natural* causal connexion Stoics could be taken to posit between an impression of what is appropriate and action in pursuit thereof (cf. 400 3, 60F 2; and note the combination φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκειῶς, 34] 4). He could argue that such passages make assent a superfluous link in a causal chain, rather than the precondition of every impulse, as the Stoics want to maintain.

20 [ἡδύ] The word is clearly out of place, and looks like an Epicurean gloss on οἰκεῖον.

21 In the omitted lines Plutarch argues that suspension of judgement is compatible with the Epicureans' theory of action, given their doctrine concerning the natural attractiveness of pleasure (cf. 21A 1–3). He then quotes an objection to Arcesilaus by Colotes, which is very similar to Aristotle's insistence on the impossibility of acting if one really rejected the principle of non-contradiction (*Metaph.* Γ.4, 1008b12–16; cf. Long [57], 96–7). Plutarch's rejoinder, 24–30, is offered on behalf of Arcesilaus. There seems to be no evidence, here or elsewhere, to show that Arcesilaus himself engaged in argument with the Epicureans.

B Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.158

(1) ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν, ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀπαδιδόσθαι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία,

ταυτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἡρτημένη· ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων καρνοιεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· (2) τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθώμα εἶναι ὅπερ προχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. (3) ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.

4 ὁ Ἡερευατ οὐ codd. 7 κείσθαι N. κινεῖσθαι ceti.

Context: immediately following 41C.

5 **τῷ εὐλόγῳ** For the Stoic definition of a *eulogon dēiōma*, cf. note to 40F; and for further Stoic background to this concept, and to those which follow, see vol. 1, 437. The most interesting attempt to credit Arcesilaus with substantive ethical doctrines (although we ourselves resist it) is that of Iorppolo [42c].

C Diogenes Laertius 7.171

εἰπόντος δὲ τινος Ἀρκεσίλαον μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, "παῦσαι". ἔφη [sc. Κλεάνθης], "καὶ μὴ ψέγε· εἰ γὰρ καὶ λόγῳ τὸ καθήκον ἀναιρεῖ, τοῖς γούν ἔργοις αὐτὸ τιθεῖ." καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, "οὐ κυλακεύομαι", φησί. πρὸς δὲ ὁ Κλεάνθης, "ναί", ἔφη, "σὲ κυλακεύω φάμενος ἄλλα μὲν λέγειν, ἕτερα δὲ ποιεῖν."

ε καὶ FP. καὶ B

Context: life of Cleanthes

4 The imputation of inconsistency is very barbed flattery, cf. 68A 5.

D Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.166-75

(1) ταῦτα μὲν ἀντιπαρεξάγων τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις ὁ Καρνεάδης εἰς τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ κριτηρίου διεξήρχετο· ἀπαιτούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός τε κριτήριον πρὸς τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτισιν, δυνάμει ἐπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τούτου διατάττεσθαι, προυλαμβίνων τὴν τε πιθανὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν πιθανὴν ἄμην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ διεξωδευμένην. (2) τίς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τούτων διαφορὰ, συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον. ἡ τοίνυν φαντασία τινὲς φαντασία ἐστίν, οἷον τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται καὶ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, καὶ (τοῦ) ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γίνεται ὡς τοῦ ἐκτός ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίνεται καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου. τοιαύτη δὲ οὐσα δύο ἂν ἔχοι σχέσεις, μίαν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν, 10 δευτέραν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν σχέσιν ἡ ἀληθὴς γίνεται ἡ ψευδής, καὶ ἀληθὴς μὲν ὅταν σύμφωνος ἢ τῷ φανταστῷ, ψευδὴς δὲ ὅταν διάφωνος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον σχέσιν ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς ἡ δὲ οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς, ὣν ἡ μὲν φαινομένη ἀληθὴς ἐμφασις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς 15 Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία, ἡ δ' οὐ φαινομένη

ἀληθῆς ἀπέμφασίς τε προσαγορεύεται καὶ ἀπειθῆς καὶ ἀπίθανος φαν-
 τασία· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸθεν φαινόμενον ψευδὲς οὔτε τὸ ἀληθές μὲν, μὴ
 φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν. (3) τούτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ
 μὲν φανερῶς ψευδῆς καὶ μὴ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς παραγράφωμός ἐστι καὶ οὐ
 κριτήριον, [ἴαν τε <...> ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, διαφύκων δὲ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὅποια ἦν ἡ ἀπὸ Ἑλέκτρας προσπεσούσῃ τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, μίαν τῶν Ἐρινύων
 αὐτὴν δοξάζοντι καὶ κεκραγόντι· "μέθεσ· μί' οὐσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων."] (4) τῆς δὲ
 φαινομένης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστιν ἄμυδρά, ὥς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικράτητα
 τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἢ παρὰ ἱκανὸν διάστημα ἢ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ὕψεως
 συγκεχυμένως καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύποις τι λαμβανάντων, ἡ δὲ τις ἦν σὺν τῷ
 φαίνεσθαι ἀληθῆς ἐτι καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ. ὣν
 πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἄμυδρά καὶ ἔκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ
 μήτε αὐτὴν μήτε τὸ ποιήσαν αὐτὴν τραῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς
 πείθειν οὐδ' εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπᾶσθαι. ἡ δὲ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς καὶ
 ἱκανῶς ἐμφαινόμενη κριτήριόν ἐστι τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν
 Καρνεάδην. (5) κριτήριον δὲ οὐσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἱκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη
 αὐτῇ ἄλλην ἄλλης ἐν εἶδει πιθανωτέραν τε καὶ πληκτικωτέραν ἴσχει
 φαντασίαν. τὰ δὲ πιθανὸν ὥς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν
 τρόπον τὸ ἀληθές τε ὄν καὶ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ψευδές
 μὲν καθεστὼς φαινόμενον δὲ ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τρίτον τὸ ἀληθές <φαινόμε-
 νον ὅπερ ἐστὶ> κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων. ὅθεν τὸ κριτήριον ἔσται μὲν τῆς
 φαινομένης ἀληθῆς φαντασίᾳ, ἦν καὶ πιθανὴν προσηγορεύουν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 Ἀκαδημίας, ἐμπίπτει δὲ ἑσθ' ὅτε καὶ ψευδῆς, ὥστε ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ τῇ
 κοινῇ ποτὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς φαντασίᾳ χρῆσθαι. οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν
 σπάνιον ταύτης παρέμπτωσιν, λέγω δὲ τῆς μαρτυρούσης τὸ ἀληθές,
 ἀπιστητέον ἐστὶ τῇ ὥς <ἐπὶ> τὸ πολὺ ἀληθεύουσῃ· τῷ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 τὰς τε κρίσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις κανονίζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

4 ἐπαναγκάζεται Bekker: ἀπ- codd.

6 διεξυδουμένην N: διεξυδουμένην cett. 8 <του>

Heinic 12. 13 τὸν LEABR: τὸ NV

21 4 ἴαν τε Ἐρινύων vel Heinic 21 τε <ἀπὸ μὴ

ὑπάρχοντος γίγνεται ὅν τε> Bekker

26 λαμβανούσῃ Bekker λαμβανούσης codd 27 3

ἐπιτεινομένη αὐτῇ ἄλλην A.A Long ἐπιτεινομένη αὐτῆς ἄλλῃ codd 30 7 suppl A.A Long del

ἀληθῆς Bekker. Mutschmann 42 <ἐπὶ> Kayser

Context: immediately following 70A.

For Carneades' use of Stoic concepts here and in E, see vol. 1, 459, where our commentary has benefited from the opportunity to read an unpublished paper by Myles Burnyeat. The gist of Carneades' analysis of 'convincing' impressions is presented more summarily by Cicero at *Acad.* 2.99-101 (cf. 42f), on the basis of book 1 of Chrysostomus' *On suspension of judgement*. Sextus criticizes it at *M.* 7.435-8.

ε καὶ αὐτός In addition to Arcesilaus, B 1.

15 ἐμφασίς This use of the term, with the coinage of ἀπέμφασίς as its opposite, is an Academic initiative. By itself ἐμφασίς simply means 'appearance', and can be used as a synonym for φαντασία; cf. S.E., *M.* 10.300. In Stoicism (cf. 39A 18) it even stands for φαντασίαι which are 'mere appearances' and have no corresponding object.

21-4 The garbled intrusion of Stoicism, with its anticipation of the Orestes

example (see 39G 9; 40E 6), is quite out of place here. It should probably be explained as a marginal note, based on the later passages, which was unthinkingly incorporated into the text under the influence of the Menelaus example in E 2.

32-3 *ἐπιτεινομένη-ἄλλη* Cf. E 24. Our emendation is an attempt to restore grammar and sense. As transmitted, the text presents a genitive absolute which refers to the subject of ἴσχει, and ἄλλη yields the surely impossible thought that 'one [impression which appears true] has a more convincing . . . impression than another'. Note Burg's unacceptably free translation of the unemended text in the Loeb edition: 'and when extended one presentation reveals itself as more probable . . . than another'.

36-7 To make sense, either the word ἀληθές must be deleted, or something must be supplied after it. We prefer the second alternative. Our supplement, τὸ ἀληθές <φαινόμενον ὅπερ ἐστὶ>, fits the language and thought of 33-40, allows the retention of ἀληθές, and exhibits the logic of the passage more clearly than the first alternative. It is easier to explain the accidental omission of the words we supply than to account for the incorrect intrusion of ἀληθές.

E Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.176-84

(1) τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ καινόν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην
ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδὴς ὑφίσταται ἀλλ'
ἀλύσεως τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἡρτηται, δεύτερον προτηγνήσεται
κριτήριον ἢ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου
σπῶν φαντασίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λαμβάνει φαντασίαν καὶ
τῶν ἐκτός, τῶν μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν <ὡς> χροᾶς μεγέθους οἰκίας καὶ
λαλίας ἐσθίτης ὑποδέσεως, τῶν δὲ ἐκτός ὡς ἀέρος φωτὸς ἡμέρας οὐρανοῦ
γῆς φίλων, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ὅταν οὖν μηδεμία τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν
περιέλκη ἡμᾶς τῷ φαίνεσθαι ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πάσαι συμφώνως φαίνονται
ἀληθεῖς, μᾶλλον πιστεύομεν ὅτι γὰρ οὗτός ἐστι Ζωκράτης, πιστεύομεν ἐκ
τοῦ πάντα αὐτῷ προσεῖναι τὰ εἰωθότα, χρώμα μέγεθος σχῆμα διήλεξιν
τρίβωνα, τὸ ἐνθάδε εἶναι ὅπου οὐθεὶς ἐστίν αὐτῷ ἀπαράλλικτος. καὶ ὅν
τρόπον τινὲς τῶν ἱατρῶν τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν περιέπειν οὐκ ἐξ ἐνός λαμβάνουσι
συμπτώματος, καθάπερ σφυγμοῦ σφοδρότητος ἢ θαλασίου θιρμασίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ συνδρομῆς,
οἷον θερμότητος ἅμα καὶ σφυγμοῦ καὶ ἰλκώδους ἀφῆς καὶ ἐρυθρίαιτος καὶ δίσκου καὶ τῶν
ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς τῇ συνδρομῇ τῶν φαντασιῶν ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν τῇ
ἀληθείας, μηδεμίαν τε τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν περιπτώσεως αὐτὸν ὡς ψευδοῦς λέγει
ἀληθές εἶναι τὸν προσηπτόν· καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος ἐστὶ συνδρομὴ τοῦ πιστεῖν ἐμπνεῖν,
φαειρόν ἀπὸ Μενελάου (2) καταλιπὼν γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὸ εἰδῶλον τῆς Ἑλένης,
ὅπερ ἀπὸ Τροίας ἐπήγετο ὡς Ἑλένην, καὶ ἐπιβὰς τῆς Φάρου νήσου ὄρα
τὴν ἀληθὴ Ἑλένην, σπῶν τε ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀληθὴ φαντασίαν ὅμως οὐ πιστεύει
τῇ τοιαύτῃ φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλης περισπᾶσθαι, καθ' ἣν ἤδει
ἀπολελοιπῶς ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὴν Ἑλένην· τοιαύτη γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος
φαντασία· ἥτις καὶ αὕτη πλάτος ἔχειν εἴκει διὰ τὸ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον
ἀπερίσπαστον εὐρίσκεισθαι. (3) τῆς δὲ ἀπερισπᾶστου φαντασίας πιστο-
τέρα μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καὶ τελειοτάτην ποιούσα τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ πῦν τῷ

ἀπερίσπαστος εἶναι ἔτι καὶ διεξωδευμένη καθέστηκεν. τίς δέ ἐστι καὶ ὁ
ταύτης χαρακτήρ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀπερι-
σπάστου ψιλὸν ζητεῖται τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν ὡς
ψευδῇ ἡμᾶς περισπᾶν, πάσας δὲ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς τε [καὶ] φαινομένας καὶ μὴ
ἀπιθάνους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν περιωδευμένην συνδρομῆς ἐκάστην τῶν ἐν
τῇ συνδρομῇ ἐπιστατικῶς δοκιμάζομεν, ὅποῖόν τι γίνεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς
ἐκκλησίαις, ὅταν ὁ δῆμος ἕκαστον τῶν μελλόντων ἄρχειν ἢ δικάζειν
ἐξετάζῃ εἰ ἀξίος ἐστὶ τοῦ πιστευθῆναι τὴν ἀρχὴν (ἢ) τὴν κρίσιν. (4) οἷον
ὄντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς κρίσεως τύπον τῇ τε κρινόντος καὶ τοῦ κρινόμενου καὶ τοῦ δι'
οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἀποστήματός τι καὶ διαστήματος, τόπου χρόνου τρόπου διαθέσεως ἐνεργείας,
ἕκαστον τῶν ταιούτων ὅποῖόν ἐστι φυλοκρινουῦμεν, τὸ μὲν κρίνουν, μὴ ἢ
ὄψις ἡμβλυται (τοιαύτη γὰρ οὐσα ἀθετός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν), τὸ δὲ κρινόμενον,
μὴ μικρὸν ἄγαν καθέστηκεν, τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ἡ κρίσις, μὴ ὁ ἄρξ ζοφερός
ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ ἀπόστημα, μὴ μέγα λίαν ὑπόκειται, τὸ δὲ διάστημα, μὴ
σγέκεται, τὸν δὲ τόπον, μὴ ἀχανὲς ἐστὶ, τὸν δὲ χρόνον, μὴ ταχύς ἐστὶ, τὴν
δὲ διάθεσιν, μὴ μανιώδης θεωρεῖται, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν, μὴ ἀπρόσδεκτός
ἐστιν. (5) ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καθ' ἐν γίνεται κριτήριον, ἢ τε πιθανὴ
φαντασία καὶ ἢ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος, πρὸς δὲ ταύτοις ἢ πιθανὴ
ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ διεξωδευμένη. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν ὃν τρόπον ἐν τῷ
βίῳ, ὅταν μὲν περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος ζητῶμεν, ἕνα μάρτυρα ἀνακρίνομεν,
ὅταν δὲ περὶ μείζονος, πλείονας, ὅταν δ' ἐτι μᾶλλον περὶ ἀναγκαϊοτέρου,
καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μαρτυρούντων ἐξετάζομεν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθομο-
λογήσεως, οὕτως, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην, ἐν μὲν τοῖς τυχοῦσι
πράγμασι τῇ πιθανῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ κριτηρίῳ χρῶμεθα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
διαφέρουσι τῇ ἀπερισπάστῳ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνουσι τῇ
περιωδευμένῃ.

6 (ὡς) Bekker 11 διὰλέξιν Bekker διὰλέξιν codd 18 προσπίπτων N: προσπίπτων ceteri. 20
τελειοτάτην Bekker: τελειοτάτη ἢ codd 30 καὶ del Heintz 31 συνδρομῆς Heintz συνδρομῇ
codd 34 (ἢ) ed. Genevensis

Context: immediately following D.

12-19 We omit this section from our translation because of a doubt about the historicity of the medical analogy so far as Carneades is concerned; it reads like Sextus' own comment. However, the term *συνδρομή* also occurs in lines 29, 31.

19-25 For the Menelaus example, see also 40K 2.

F Cicero, *Acad.* 2.59

(1) illud vero perabsurdum quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi si nulla re impediantur primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veri falsa non distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? (2) ex his illa necessario nata est ἐποχή id est adiensus intentio, in qua melius vbi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. si enim percipi nihil potest, quid utrique visum est, tollendus adsensu est; quid enim est tam futile quam

quisquam adprobare non cogitum? (3) Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse (eo) delabi interdum ut diceret opinaturum id est peccaturum esse sapientem.

B (eo) Ernesto

Context. Lucullus' account of Antiochus' criticism of the New Academy, which is concluded in 68Q and its immediate continuation.

1-2 **nulla re impediamini** A reference to Carneades' ἀνεπίστατος requirement (E); cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.33.

3 **commune** Picking up and attacking Carneades. Cf. D 37-44, Cicero, *Acad.* 2.34.

7 **heri** In Catulus' speech in the lost *Academia priora* 1. See introductory note on K.

9 **peccaturum esse sapientem** Attacking Carneades by citing Arcesilaus' position on the wise man. Cf. G; 68A 4. O.

G Cicero, *Acad.* 2.66-7

(1) non sum sapiens; itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere. sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse maximam Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur. ne fallatur videre . . . (2) haec primum conclusio quam habeat vim considera: "si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur nunquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur; nunquam autem opinabitur; nulli igitur rei adsentietur." hanc conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non nunquam secundum illud dabat, adsentiri aliquando; ita sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis, et recte ut mihi videris.

7-8 *ita sequebatur* Manutius *id adsequebatur* vel sim. codd.

Context. Cicero's defence of the New Academy.

H Cicero, *Acad.* 2.78

haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit. nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse sapientem. nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat: licebat enim "nihil percipere et tamen opinari"; quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto.

Cf. introductory note on K.

I Cicero, *Acad.* 2.102-4

explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret; accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitoma hoc in eo libro quem ad C. Lucillum scripsit portam, cum scripsisset eadem de rebus ad L. Censorium eum qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit scripsit igitur his fere verbis (sunt enim mihi nota propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum de quibus agimus

prima institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur) sed scriptum est ita (1) Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines ut aliae probabiles videantur aliae contra. id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse. itaque ait vehementer errare eos qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut sorem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non messe in iis propriam quae nusquam alibi esset veri et certi notam. (2) quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem, uno modo cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri, altero cum se a respondendo ut aut adprobet quod aut improbet sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. id cum ita sit, alterum placere ut numquam adsentiantur, alterum tenere ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut "etiam" aut "non" respondere possit. (3) etenim cum placeat eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab adsentiendo moveri tamen et agere aliquid, relinquit eius modi visa quibus ad actionem excitemur, item ea quae interrogati in utramque partem respondere possimus sequentes tantum modo quod ita visum sit, dum sine adsensu; neque tamen omnia eius modi visa adprobari sed ea quae nulla re impedirentur.

18 *etenim cum* Rend. *net ut* codd.: nam cum Lambinus

19 *relinquit* Davies: *relinquit* codd.

Context: Cicero's defence of the New Academy.

1 Cicero's cross-reference is to *Acad.* 2.98. *ista* Lucullus' charge, on behalf of Antiochus, that the New Academy, in suspending judgement, undermines ordinary sense experience (400 2-3) Cicero is doubtless correct in maintaining, 9-10, that Clitomachus defended the school against a similar charge; but that charge cannot, for chronological reasons, have been mounted by Antiochus; cf. Glueker [42], 412-13.

3 The date of this consulship is 149 B.C.

12-18 The general sense of the Latin is easier to make out than some of the linguistic details. *alterum placere*, 16, must refer to *uno modo*, 13 assenting to nothing at all. Since *alterum tenere*, 16, is compatible with responding 'yes' or 'no', *tenere* must mean 'retains' the kind of assent which is withheld in the second sense of 'suspending judgement', *altero*, 14. By responding 'yes' or 'no', the Academic does indicate a qualified form of affirmation or negation; contrast *adprobari*, 22, with its withholding in 14-15. Hence his suspension of judgement does not have the unqualified consequence *ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat*, 15. These words should probably be interpreted as a misleadingly strong way of saying *ut neque 'etiam' respondeat neque 'non'*.

J Cicero, *Acad.* 2.108

ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto repugnare visis obstistere opinionibus adsensus lubricos sustinere, credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a Carneade, quod ut feram et inmanem beluam sic ex animis nostris adsensionem id est opinionem et temeritatem

exercasset, tamen, ut ea pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius 5
qui probabilia sequitur nulla re impediente?

Context: Cicero's defence of the New Academy against the charge that suspension of judgement is incompatible with action.

1 **maximam actionem** The behaviour of the wise man, from whom Cicero distances himself in G 1.

5-6 **impediet... impediente** Cicero extends the Carneadean notion of 'undivertedness' from the ἀνεπιμαχτος φαντασία to the action which such impressions can guide.

K Cicero, *Acad.* 2 148

tum Catulus "egone?" inquit: "ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille
Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem non
percepto, id est opinaturum, sapientem existurum: sed ita ut intellegat se
opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendere et percipi possit. hunc epochen illam
omnium rerum comprobans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer 5
adsentior."

4 per codd. quare Manitius: parum ed. anon. ap. Reid: nec Turnebus 5 comprobans: codd. non probans
Madvig: improbus Davies

Context: conclusion of the debate between the New Academy and the supporters of Antiochus.

As Glueck has argued ([42], 417-18), Catulus' speech in the lost *Academica priora* 1 was probably based on a speech by the loyal Philonian Heraclitus in Antiochus' *Sosus*, representing the standard position of the Philonian Academy prior to Philo's idiosyncratic new thesis (68T) of 89 B.C. (vol. 1, 449). Thus Catulus, here and as referred to at F 3, represents the Philonian Academy of the early first century, to which Antiochus himself had previously adhered. Cicero's dismissal of Catulus' position as not the proper Academic one (directly after our passage) indicates not Catulus' heterodoxy (as suggested by Frede [61], 268), but Cicero's own preference for Clitomachus' over Philo's interpretation of Carneades.

2 3 That the wise man will hold opinions is the position of Philo and Metrodorus (H), no doubt based on a simplistic understanding of Carneades' argument at G 2 without adequate attention to its dialectical character (see vol. 1, 436).

3 4 **intellegat... sciatque** Probably not terms for κατὰληψις, but used untechnically, as by Aenesidemus at 71C 8 (on which see vol. 1, 472-3).

4 **per** The favoured emendation *quare* makes Catulus say that he both approves of *suspension of assent* about all things and *vehemently assents* to the view that nothing is cognitive. So blatant a contradiction seems unlikely unless we take Catulus to be exploiting Clitomachus' distinction between two kinds of assent (I 2-3), as suggested by Reid [328], 348. But there is no hint in the text that any such equivocation is intended, and, if it were, it would be incredible that Catulus should use *vehementer adsentior* to express the *weaker* kind of assent, as this interpretation would require. We therefore find *parum* a less implausible emendation. But the corruption may well run deeper.

cuius [sc. Calliphontis] quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat ut eam probare etiam videretur; quamquam Clitomachus affirmabat nunquam se intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur.

Context: Cicero's treatment of ethics, in defence of the New Academy

For Callipho's position (*honestas cum voluptate*), cf. Cicero, *Tim.* 2.19, 3.21.

70 Contributions to philosophical debates

A Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.159–65

(1) ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου (2) καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ' ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος, οὐκ αἰσθησις, οὐ φαντασία, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς. (3) δευτέρου δὲ καθ' ὃ δέικνυσιν ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο, οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθους ὑφίσταται. (4) ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἰσθητικὴ δυνάμει διαφέρει τὸ ζῶον τῶν ἀψύχων, πάντως διὰ ταύτης ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτικὸν γενήσεται. ἡ δὲ γε αἰσθησις ἀκίνητος μὲν οὖσα καὶ ἀπαιθής καὶ ἄτρεπτος οὔτε αἰσθησίς ἐστιν οὔτε ἀντιληπτικὴ τις, τραπέισα δὲ καὶ πῶς παθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ὑπόπτωσιν, τότε ἐνδεικνύει τὰ πράγματα. (5) ἐν ἄρα τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτὸ φαινομένου, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον τῆς φαντασίας. ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος τι περὶ τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παραστατικόν. (6) οἷον προσβλέψαντές τινι, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντίοχος, διατιθέμεθά πως τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὥς πρὶν τοῦ βλέπειν διακειμένην εἶχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοίωσιν διεὶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἐνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήριον. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς ἑαυτὸ τε δέικνυσι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχηγὸς οὖσα τῆς περὶ τὸ ζῶον εἰδήσεως, φαντὸς δίκην ἑαυτῇ τε ἐμφανίζειν ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὴν ἐναργοῦς ἐνδεικτικὴ καθεστάναι. (7) ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀεὶ ποτε ἐνδείκνυται, πολλάκις δὲ διαψεύδεται καὶ διαφανεῖ τοῖς ἀναπέμψασιν αὐτὴν πράγμασιν ὥς οἱ μοχθηροὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἡκολούθησι τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν φαντασίαν δύνασθαι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ μόνην, εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὴν ἀληθῆ. (8) πάλιν οὖν ἐπεὶ οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πάσῃ τῇ δοκῶσῃ ἀληθεῖ καθεστάναι εὐρίσκεται τις ἀπαράλλακτος ψευδῆς, γενήσεται τὸ κριτήριον ἐν κοινῇ φαντασίᾳ, τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψεύδους. ἡ δὲ κοινὴ ταύτων φαντασία οὐκ ἐστὶ

καταληπτική, μὴ οὖσα δὲ καταληπτική οὐδὲ κριτήριον ἔσται. (9) μηδεμίας δὲ οὔσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ οὗτος ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανῆναι δὲ οὐδὲν δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως. (10) οὔτε οὖν ἡ ἀλογος αἰσθησις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἦν κριτήριον.

Context: following 69B in Sextus' history of doctrines on the criterion of truth. This part of the history is probably derived by him from Antiochus' *Causae*.

36 7 Carneades' talk of αἰσθησις ἀλόγος is primarily Epicurean (cf. 16B). As a Stoic criterion, αἰσθησις is sensory cognition, and hence a form of judgement (especially 40Q). The Stoic equivalent of Epicurean αἰσθησις is φαντασία αἰσθητική (39A 4).

B Cicero, *Acad.* 2.40–2

(1) sed prius potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. (2) componunt igitur primum artem quandam de his quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt, in his quale sit id quod percipi et comprehendere possit, totidem verbis quot Stoici. (3) deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem, quae ita videantur ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint nec in is quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi alia non percipi; nihil interesse autem non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint sed etiam si discerni non possint. (4) quibus positus unius argumenti conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur, composita autem ea conclusio sic est: eorum quae videntur alia vera sunt alia falsa; et quod falsum est id percipi non potest; quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est ut eiusdem modi falsum etiam possit videri; et quae visa sint eius modi ut in is nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint alia non possint; nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit. (5) quae autem sumunt ut concludant id quod voluit, ex his duo sibi putant concedi (neque enim quisquam repugnat); ea sunt haec: quae visa falsa sint ea percipi non posse; et alterum: inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex is non posse alia talia esse ut percipi possint alia ut non possint. (6) reliqua veris multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo: unum, quae videantur eorum alia vera esse alia falsa; alterum, omne visum quod sit a vero tale esse quale etiam a falso possit esse haec duo proposita non praetervolvunt sed ita dilatant ut non mediocre curam adhibeant et diligentiam dividunt eam in partes et eas quidem magnas, primum in sensus, deinde in ea quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt, tum perveniunt ad eam partem ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. haec autem universa concludunt etiam minutius ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis utrum faciant de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispartimus, volunt efficere ut omnibus quae visa sunt veris adiuncta esse falsa quae a veris nihil differant, ea cum talia sint non posse comprehendere.

23 διὰ τούτων διακρίνει Α' Β' Γ' Δ'

Context: criticism of the New Academy. Their highly methodical approach, it is argued, is hardly the mark of people in a state of sceptical doubt.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9.139–41

(1) εἴγ' ἄρ' εἰσὶ θεοί, ζῶά εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ ζῶά εἰσιν, αἰσθάνονται· πᾶν γὰρ ζῶον αἰσθήσεως μετοχὴ νοεῖται ζῶον. (2) εἰ δὲ αἰσθάνονται, καὶ πικράζονται καὶ γλυκαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἄλλης μὲν τινος αἰσθήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς γεύσεως. (3) ὅθεν καὶ τὸ περικόπτειν ταύτην ἢ τινα αἰσθησὶν ἄλλην ἀπλῶς τοῦ θεοῦ παντελῶς ἐστιν ἀπίθανον· περὶ τοσούτας γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἔχων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑμείνων αὐτοῦ γενήσεται, δέοι μᾶλλον, ὥς ἔλεγεν ὁ Καρνεάδης, οὐν ταῖς πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσαις πέντε ταύταις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἄλλας αὐτῷ περισσοτέρας προσμαρτυρεῖν, ἢ ἔχει πλείονων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πρηνιμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν πέντε ἀφαιρεῖν. (4) ῥητέοι οὖν γευσῖν τινα ἔχειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ διὰ ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν γευστῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ γεύσεως ἀντιλαμβάνεται, (γλυκαίνεται) καὶ πικράζεται. γλυκαζόμενος δὲ καὶ πικραζόμενος εὐαρεστήσει τι καὶ δυσαρεστήσει. δυσαρεστῶν δὲ τισι καὶ ὀχλήσεως ἔσται δεκτικὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, φθαρτός ἐστιν. (5) ὥστε εἴπερ εἰσὶ θεοί, φθαρτοὶ εἰσιν. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσιν.

1 εἴγ' ἄρ' Sedley. εἰ γὰρ eudé.

2 πᾶσιν Bekker: πάσας eudé

15 (γλυκαίνεται) Fabricius

Context: attempt to produce equipollence between arguments for and against the existence of god

1 ζῶά εἰσιν This expresses the conclusion of an argument at *M.* 9.138, which mimics the Stoic syllogism at 54F: an animal is better than a non-animal; but nothing is better than god; therefore god is an animal. Of course, with or without this formal defence, the Stoics do hold the conclusion to be true (cf. 54A).

14–15 This argument, like many of the other anti-theistic arguments reported by Sextus at *M.* 9.137–81, and those of Carneades at Cicero, *ND* 3.29–34, takes imperishability to be an inalienable feature of god. Yet in Stoic theology, the principal target of these arguments, imperishability receives little emphasis, no doubt because although Zeus does endure through the cosmic conflagration (280 4), lower gods, such as sun, moon, aether etc., are destroyed in it (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1052A). On the other hand, Antipater, Carneades' chief Stoic antagonist in his own day, did contrive to stress the gods' imperishability (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1051E 1). We may perhaps take this as a sign of a new theological emphasis generated in the course of their confrontation. God's imperishability is cardinal to most non-Stoic theologies, including the Epicurean (23). (54A, K, which may at first sight appear also to make the gods imperishable, in fact call them only 'deathless', ἀθάνατος, and since θάνατος is defined as the separation of soul from body, which is not the mode of the gods' destruction, all gods are technically ἀθάνατοι, though only Zeus is also ἀφθαρτος (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1075C, cf. id. *St. rep.* 1052C).)

15 As editors note, a premise has fallen out or been suppressed before the conclusion, e.g. οὐχὶ δὲ γε φθαρτοὶ εἰσιν (Heintz).

D Cicero, *ND* 3.33–4

(1) "Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras, ergo etiam Oceanus frater eorum

deus, et illi qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron Cocytus Pyriphlegethon, tum Charon tum Cerberus di putandi. at id quidem repudiandum; ne Orcus quidem igitur: quid dicitis ergo de fratribus?" (2) haec Carneades airbat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret.

Context: critique of Stoic theology. The present argument is an informal Sorites, cf. E with notes.

§ **non ut deos tolleret** This is strictly speaking correct, since atheism would be as un-acceptable a stance as theism. Cotta is also no doubt right about the anti-Stoic context of the argument. But to judge from his parenthesis he probably means to be understood as making Carneades himself some sort of theist. And that is symptomatic of the Platonian Academy's reading of Carneades' dialectical arguments as doctrinally motivated (see vol. 1, 448–9). Cf. the Philonian interpretation of Carneades' purpose at Cicero, *ND* 1.4.5.

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9.182–4

τοιούτων μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν λόγων τοιαῦτα εἶδος ἔστιν· (1) ἡρώτηται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωριτικῶς τινες, οὓς ὁ γενάρμος αὐτοῦ Κλειτόμαχος ὡς σπουδαιωτάτους καὶ ἀντικωτάτους ἀνέγραψεν, ἔχοντας τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. (2) "εἰ Ζεὺς θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεὸς ἐστίν·

τρεις γὰρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου ἦμεν ἀδελφεαί, οὓς τέκετο Πέα,

Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Αἰδης ἐνέροσσε ἀνάσσειν.

τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δόδασται, ἐκαστος δ' ἐμχορε τιμῆς.

ᾧστε εἰ ὁ Ζεὺς θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀδελφὸς αὐν τοῦτου θεὸς γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ἀχελῷος ἐστὶ θεός· εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἀχελῷος, καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος· εἰ ὁ Νεῖλος, καὶ πᾶς ποταμός· εἰ πᾶς ποταμός, καὶ οἱ ῥύακες αὖ εἰεν θεοί· εἰ οἱ ῥύακες, καὶ αἱ χαράδραι. οὐχὶ δὲ οἱ ῥύακες· οὐδὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄρα θεὸς ἐστίν. εἰ δέ γε ἦσαν θεοί, καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἦν αὖ θεός. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσιν." (3) καὶ μὴν "εἰ ὁ ἥλιος θεὸς ἐστίν, καὶ ἡμέρα αὖ εἴη θεός· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἡμέρα ἢ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς· εἰ δ' ἡμέρα ἐστὶ θεός, καὶ ὁ μὴν ἐστὶ θεός· σύστημα γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ἡμερῶν. εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴν θεός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός αὖ εἴη θεός· σύστημα γάρ ἐστιν ἐκ μηνῶν ὁ ἐνιαυτός. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτον τοῖνον οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς." αὐν τῷ ἀσποιν εἶναι, φασι, τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν θεὸν εἶναι λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἔω καὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν· καὶ τὴν δειλὴν μηκέτι

11 ῥύακες οὐδὲ αἱ χαράδραι οὐδὲ ὁ Ζεὺς Bekker dubitantes

Context: as C. For comment, see especially Burnyeat [451]; also Counsins [623].

13–17 While a Sorites normally has no need to justify its inference from 'a is F' to 'b is F', the obvious similarity of a to b being sufficient ground (see vol. 1, 229–30), the present one is unusual in offering a precise metaphysical ground for each step, namely that a consists of b. The metaphysics is presumably borrowed from Carneades' Stoic opponents. Cf. *SVF* 2.693, and 51G.

F Cicero, *Div.* 2.9–10

{1} etenim me movet illud quod in primis Carneades quaerere solebat, quatumnam rerum divinatio esset. earumne quae sensibus perciperentur? at eas quidem cernimus, audimus, gustamus, olfacimus, tangimus. num quid ergo in his rebus est, quod provisione aut permotione mentis magis quam natura ipsa sentiamus? aut num nescio qui ille divinus, si oculis captus sit, ut Tiresias fuit, possit quae alia sunt, quae nigra dicere aut, si surdus sit, varietates vocum aut modos noscere? ad nullam igitur earum rerum quae sensu accipiuntur divinatio adhibetur. {2} atqui ne in his quidem rebus quae arte tractantur divinatione opus est. etenim ad aegros non vates aut hariolos, sed medicos solemus adducere. nec vero qui fidibus aut tibis uti volunt ab haruspicibus accipiunt earum tractationem, sed a musicis. eadem in litteris ratio est reliquisque rebus quarum est disciplina

Context: the opening of Cicero's critique of divination.

The argument tries to render divination redundant by showing that all its possible objects are already pre-empted by other capacities or skills. It is as Platonic an argument as any recorded for Carneades, being closely modelled on the treatment of justice at *Rep.* I, 332d–333e.

G Cicero, *Fat.* 26–33 (continuing 20E)

{1} quod cum ita sit, quid est cur non omnis pronuntiatio aut vera aut falsa sit, nisi concesserimus fato fieri quaecumque fiant? {2} "quia futura vera" inquit "non possunt esse ea quae causas cur futura sint non habent; habeant igitur causas necesse est ea quae vera sunt; ita, cum evenerint, fato evenerint." {3} confectum negotium, si quidem concedendum tibi est aut fato omnia fieri, aut quicquam fieri posse sine causa. {4} an aliter haec enuntiatio vera esse non potest, "capiet Numantiam Scipio", nisi ex aeternitate causa causam serens hoc erit effectura? an hoc falsum potuisset esse, si esset sescentis saeculis ante dictum? {5} et si tum non esset vera haec enuntiatio, "capiet Numantiam Scipio", ne illa quidem eversa vera est haec enuntiatio, "cepit Numantiam Scipio". potest igitur quicquam factum esse quod non verum fuerit futurum esse? nam ut praeterita ea vera dicimus quorum superiore tempore vera fuerit instantia, sic futura quorum consequenti tempore vera erit instantia, ea vera dicemus. {6} nec, si omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur illico esse causas immutabiles, easque aeternas, quae prohibeant quicquam secus cadere atque casurum sit. fortuitae sunt causae quae efficiant ut vere dicantur quae ita dicuntur, "veniet in senatum Cato", non inclusae in rerum natura atque mundo. {7} et tamen tam est immutabile ventorum, cum est verum, quam venisse, nec ob eam causam fatum aut necessitas extimescenda est. {8} etenim erit confiteri necesse: si haec enuntiatio, "veniet in Tusculanum Hortensius", vera non est, sequitur ut falsa sit. {quorum istud neutrum volunt, quod fieri non potest.} {9} [= 555] {10} Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat itaque

premebat alio modo, nec ullam adhibebat calumniam; cuius erat haec
 conclusio: "si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione
 25 conserte contexteque fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum
 est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at si
 omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt,
 quaecumque fiunt." (11) hoc artius adstringi ratio non potest. nam si quis velit
 idem referre atque ita dicere, "si omne futurum ex aeternitate verum est, ut ita
 30 certe eveniat quem ad modum sit futurum, omnia necesse est conligatione
 naturali conserte contexteque fieri", nihil dicat. multum enim differt utrum
 causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat, an etiam sine aeternitate
 naturali futura quae sint ea vera esse possint intellegi. (12) itaque dicebat
 Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea quorum causas
 35 natura ita contineret ut ea fieri necesse esset. (13) quid enim spectans deus ipse
 diceret Marcellum cum quo ter consul fuit in mari esse periturum? erat hoc
 quidem verum ex aeternitate, sed causas id efficientis non habebat. (14) ita ne
 praeterita quidem ea quorum nulla signa tamquam vestigia exstarent Apollini
 nota esse censebat; quo minus futura? causis enim efficientibus quamque rem
 40 cognitis posse denique sciri quid futurum esset. (15) ergo nec de Oedipode
 potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis cur ab
 eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi.

10 cepit Ramus. capiet codd.

For discussion, cf. Long [3], 101–4. For a possible earlier Academic criticism of Stoic
 determinism, see note on 55N 11.

71 Why to suspend judgement

A Diogenes Laertius 9.106–7

(1) καὶ Αἰνεσιδῆμος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Πυρρωνείων λόγων οὐδέν φησιν ὀρίζειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. ταῦτά δὲ λέγει καὶ τῷ Κατὰ σαφείας καὶ τῷ Περί ζητήσεως. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζεῶδης ὁ Αἰνεσιδήμου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ Ηἰρη διττῶν λόγων καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ Λαοδικεύς καὶ Ἀπελλὰς ἐν τῷ Ἀγρίππᾳ τιθέασι τὰ φαινόμενα μόνα. (2) ἔστιν οὖν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς Σκεπτικούς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς καὶ Αἰνεσιδῆμός φησιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος. Δημόκριτος δὲ μὴδὲν εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι... (3) τέλος δὲ οἱ Σκεπτικοὶ φασὶ τὴν ἐπαχήν, ἥ σκυιάς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὡς φασιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσιδήμον.

Context: summary of Pyrrhonism – from the life of Pyrrho, but principally representing later Pyrrhonist teaching.

5–7 For τὸ φαινόμενον as ‘criterion’ (with appropriate qualifications) see S.E., *PH* 1.21–4.

6 Σκεπτικός This title is unlikely to date back to Aenesidemus, despite its occurrence in non-verbatim quotations here and at S.E., *PH* 1.210. Cf. Janáček [644]; Sedley [59], 27–8, n. 61; and, in partial disagreement, Tarrant [629], 22–9.

7–8 A fairly shallow assimilation of the Pyrrhonist and Epicurean (cf. 17) criteria, possibly reflecting Aenesidemus’ respect for Epicurus (cf. 72M 7–9, with note, and the surprising gesture towards hedonism at 1F 5). The next sentence appears to mean ‘Democritus says that it [the criterion] is none of the things that appear, and that they [the things that appear] do not exist’. Diogenes’ source for this passage perhaps wanted to downgrade Democritus’ credentials as a sceptic (contrast D.L. 9.76) in favour of Epicurus’.

8–9 The shadow simile is also at S.E., *PH* 1.29 (and cf. 72A 1–2), but with the difference that there ἀταραξία is itself the τέλος. For a suggested explanation of this shift of emphasis, cf. Sedley [59], 21–2.

B Diogenes Laertius 9.78

ἔστιν οὖν ὁ Πυρρωνεύσιος λόγος μνήμη τις τῶν φαινομένων ἢ τῶν ὁπωσούν νοουμένων, καθ’ ἣν πάντα πάσι συμβάλλεται καὶ συγκρινόμενα πολλῇν

ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ ταραχὴν ἔχοντα εὐρίσκεται, καθά φησιν Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῇ εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια ὑποτυπώσει.

3 ἀνωμαλίαν Kühn. ἀνωφελῆτιαν codd.

Context: 25 A.

C Photius, Bibl 169b18–170b3

(1) ἀνεγνώσθη Αἰνησιδήμου Πυρρωνίων λόγοι ἡ'. ἡ μὲν ὅλη πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι οὐδὲν βέβαιον εἰς κατάληψιν, οὔτε δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' οὔτε μὴν διὰ νοήσεως. (2) διὸ οὔτε τοὺς Πυρρωνίους οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους εἰδέναι τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσίᾳ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ ἄλλην αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντας ἀγνοεῖν τε τὰλλα καὶ ἑαυτοὺς μάτην κατατρίβειν καὶ 5 δαπανᾶν συνεχέσις ἀνίαις, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐταῖς τῶν δοξάζοντων εἰς κατάληψιν ἐληλυθέναι κατείληπται. (3) ὁ δὲ κατὰ Πύρρωνα φιλοσοφῶν τὰ τε ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ σοφός ἐστι τοῦ μάλιστα εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ βεβαίως κατείληπται· ἃ δὲ καὶ εἰδείη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τῇ 10 καταφάσει ἢ τῇ ἀποφάσει γενναῖός ἐστι συγκατατίθεσθαι. (4) ἡ μὲν ὅλη τοῦ βιβλίου διελήψις ὃ βούλεται, εἴρηται. γράφει δὲ τοὺς λόγους Αἰνησιδήμος προσφωνῶν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας τινὶ συναιρεσιώτῃ Λευκίῳ Τοβέρωνι, γένος μὲν Ῥωμαῖω, δόξῃ δὲ λαμπρῷ ἐκ προγόνων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ τὰς τυχοῦσας μετιόντι. (5) ἐν μὲν ὄν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ διαφορὰν τῶν τε Πυρρωνίων καὶ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν εἰσάγων μικροῦ 15 γλώσση αὐτῇ ταῦτά φησιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας δογματικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ τὰ μὲν τίθενται ἀδιστακτικῶς, τὰ δὲ αἵρουσιν ἀναμφιβόλως, (6) οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Πύρρωνος ἀπορητικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ παντὸς ἀπαλελυμένοι δόγματος, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν τὸ παράπαν οὔτε ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἴρηκεν οὔτε καταληπτά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, ἢ τότε μὲν τοιαῦτα τότε δὲ οὐ 20 τοιαῦτα, ἢ ὧ μὲν τοιαῦτα ὧ δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα ὧ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ὄντα· οὐδὲ μὴν ἐφικτὰ πάντα κοινῶς ἢ τινα τούτων ἢ οὐκ ἐφικτὰ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐφικτὰ ἢ οὐκ ἐφικτὰ, ἢ τότε μὲν ἐφικτὰ τότε δ' οὐκέτι, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἐφικτὰ τῷ δ' οὐ. (7) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἀληθινὸν οὐδὲ ψεῦδος, οὐδὲ πιθανὸν οὐδ' ἀπίθανον, οὐδ' ὄν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐ μᾶλλον ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, ἢ 25 πιθανὸν ἢ ἀπίθανον, ἢ ὄν ἢ οὐκ ὄν, ἢ τότε μὲν τοιοῦν τότε δὲ τοιοῦν, ἢ ὧ μὲν τοιοῦνδ' ὧ δὲ καὶ οὐ τοιοῦνδ'. (8) καθόλου γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁ Πυρρώνιος ὀρίζει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲν διορίζεται· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχοντες, φησὶν, ὅπως τὸ νοούμενον ἐκλαλήσωμεν, οὕτω φράζομεν. (9) οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, φησὶ, καὶσι τῆς νῦν, καὶ Στωικοὶ συμφέρονται ἐνίοτε δόξαις, καὶ εἰ 30 χρή τάλῃθες εἰπεῖν, Στωικοὶ φαίνονται μαχόμενοι Στωικοῖς. δεύτερον περὶ πολλῶν δογματίζουσιν ἀρετὴν τε γὰρ καὶ ἀφροσύνην εἰσάγουσι, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποτίθενται, καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ψεῦδος, καὶ δὴ καὶ πιθανὸν καὶ ἀπίθανον καὶ ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἅλλα τε πολλὰ βεβαίως ἀρίζουσι, διαμφοισθητεῖν δὲ φησι περὶ μόνης τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας. (10) διὸ 35

οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Πύρρωνος ἐν τῷ μηδὲν ὀρίζειν ἀνεπίληπτοι τὸ παράπαν διαμένουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ Ἀκαδημαίων, φησίν, ὁμοίως τὰς εὐθύνas τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις ὑπέχουσι. (11) τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οἱ μὲν περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος διαπορούντες τὸ τε σύστασθαι διατηροῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὐ μάχονται, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς οὐ συνίστασι· τὸ γὰρ ἅμα τιθέναι τι καὶ αἶρειν ἀναμφιβόλως, ἅμα τε φάναι κοινῶς <μὴ> ὑπάρχειν καταληπτὰ, μάχην ὁμολογημένην εἰσάγει, ἐπεὶ πῶς οἶόν τε γινώσκοντα τὸδε μὲν εἶναι ἀληθές τὸδε δὲ ψεῦδος ἐτι διαπορεῖν καὶ δισπῆσαι, καὶ οὐ σαφῶς τὸ μὲν ἐλέσθαι τὸ δὲ περιστῆναι; (12) εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄγνοεῖται ὅτι τὸδε ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τὸδε μὲν ἀληθές τὸδε δὲ ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸδε μὲν ὄν τὸδε δὲ μὴ ὄν, πάντως ὁμολογητέον ἕκαστον ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι· εἰ δ' ἐναργῶς κατ' αἰσθῆσιν ἢ κατὰ νόησιν καταλαμβάνεται, καταληπτὸν ἕκαστον φατέον. (13) ταῦτα μὲν ἀρχόμενος τῶν λόγων καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν Πυρρωνίων καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν ὑποδεικνύς, ἀναγράφει ὁ Λίνησιδημος ὁ ἐξ Αἰγῶν· ἐφεξῆς δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἀγωγὴν ὡς τύπῳ καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς τῶν Πυρρωνίων παραδίδωσι λόγων.

28 φησὶν Βέλκει φασὶν udd 41 <μὴ> ὑπάρχειν καταληπτὰ Sandbach ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καταληπτὰ A' mg· ὑπάρχειν <ᾧ>κατάληπτα Hezel. (μὲν) ὑπάρχειν καταληπτὰ, (ἰδίῳ δ' ἕκαστα ἀκατάληπτα) Gluzet: ὑπάρχειν καταληπτὰ (τὰ πράγματα καὶ πάντως ἀκατάληπτα) Tzetzi exempti causa

Context: a work written by Photius to supply his brother with summaries of books he had not been able to read. Our excerpt continues at 72L. Cf. Janáček [636], who vindicates the basic authenticity of Photius' report.

27 Cf. IG for οὐδὲν ὀρίζειν as the sense of οὐ μάλλον according to Timon.

32–5 This description puts it beyond doubt that the reference is to the Philonian Academy (despite the inclusion of 29–46 by Luck [631], as fr. 54 of Antiochus). Philo certainly had his own set of doctrines, especially in ethics (cf. Stobaeus 2.39.19ff.), but, unlike Antiochus, never gave up his opposition to the φαντασία καταληπτική (cf. 68T U).

40–2 The supplement <μὴ> (suggested privately by Prof. Sandbach) makes μάχη refer to the conflict between the two ἅμα clauses. Tarrant [(628), 89–92 and [629], 59–61; see ap. crit.] prefers to emend in such a way as to locate the conflict within each ἅμα clause. But that seems to be ruled out by the closely parallel language of 17, where no conflict is intended.

D. Anon., *In Plat. Theaet.* 60.48–61.46

(1) ἐπεὶ ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐπερωτηθεὶς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, τί ἐστίν, εἶπεν "καὶ ὡς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται", ἀποδέχεται Σωκράτης ὅτι οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λέγειν ὃ φαίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ νομίζει εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος φησὶν τὸ Πυρρωνέιον, ὅτι οὐδὲν καθοριστικῶς ἂν τις δογματίζῃ, ἀλλὰ φησὶν φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ. (2) κατὰ γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κριτήριον οὔτε ἀληθὲς φαντασία οὔτε πιθανή οὔτε καταληπτική οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ φαίνεται. (3) εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀποφαίνεται, διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαι ἰσοκρατεῖς

εἶναι τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἐνα|τία λόγους, καὶ ἐξομα|λίζειν τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ
 μηδεμίαν ἐν| αὐταῖς ἀπολείπειν | διαφορὰν κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, 10
 πι|θανὸν ἢ ἀπι|θανον, | ἐναργές ἢ ἀμυδρόν, | καταληπτόν ἢ ἀκα|τάληπτον,
 ἀλλὰ πᾶ|σας εἶναι ὁμοίας, (4) οὐδὲ τοῦτο δογματίζοντος, ὡς ἐπεται, | τὸ
 διεξάγειν κατὰ | τὴν αἰ| προσπίπτου|σαν φαντασίαν, οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι | νῦν αὐτῷ φαίνεται.

Context: commentary on *Thi.* 151c4–5, where Socrates praises Theaetetus' willingness to stick his neck out and state his current belief. The commentator explains that Theaetetus' expression 'as it now appears [i.e. to me]' involves the epistemic use of 'appear' to express beliefs (νομίζει, 3), by contrast with the non-epistemic use of the term in Pyrrhonism (cf. vol. 1, 471). The text thus lends support to Burnyeat's interpretation of Pyrrhonist appearance as non-epistemic ([643]; [60], 230 n. 14). The commentary was long dated to the second century A.D., but Tarrant [633] has now made an impressive case for the first century B.C.

72 How to suspend judgement

A Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.31–9

(ἐν Ἱερὶ τῶν ὁλοσχερῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς.) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν
 ἐφάσκαμεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅπως ἡμῖν ἡ ἐποχὴ περιγίνεται.
 (1) γίνεται τοῖνυν αὕτη, ὡς ἂν ὁλοσχερέστερον εἴποι τις, διὰ τῆς
 ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ
 νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ, (2) οἷον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις, ὅταν 5
 λέγωμεν "ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ
 τετράγωνος", (3) νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα
 αὐτὶ ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθώμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν
 ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτου
 συνάγωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν· (4) νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ 10
 Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ (κατασκευάζοντι) λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν χιῶνα ἀντετίθει, ὅτι
 ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινά
 ἐστίν. (5) καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὅτε μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν,
 ὡς τὰ προειρημένα· ὅτε δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ μέλλουσιν, οἷον ὅταν
 τις ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ λόγον ὅν λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φάμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι, 15
 ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν μετέρχῃ,
 οὐδέπω ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιής ὢν ἐφαίνεται, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὡς πρὸς
 τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι
 νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκείσθαι μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω δ' ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι,
 ὥστε οὐδέπω χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ δακούντι νῦν ἰσχυρῶ εἶναι 20
 λόγῳ. (6) ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῖν ὑποπεσεῖν,
 καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσασθαι δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ
 πλήθους οὔτε περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γάρ

αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησαμένων. (7) (ὁ *Ἡερί* τῶν
 δέκα τρόπων.) παραδίδονται τοῖνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις 25
 Σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμὸν,
 οὓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἴη δέ οὗτοι, (8) πρῶτος
 ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 διαφυρὰν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφοροὺς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, 30
 τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ
 διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμειξίας, ἑβδομος ὁ παρὰ
 τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι,
 ἑννατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς
 ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς 35
 δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς. (9) ταύτων δὲ
 ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ
 πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρίνον ἢ ζῶον ἔστιν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἰσθησις καὶ
 ἐν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου (ἀνάγονται) ὁ ἑβδομος 40
 καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ
 ὄγδος καὶ ὁ ἑννατος. (10) πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι,
 ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκό-
 τας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν
 λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ταῦδε.

1. <κατασκευάζονται>: *constituntur* T 2v <ἀνάγονται> *Parrenheinn*

Context: following Sextus' account of the Pyrrhonist τέλος at PH 1.25–30.

We will not attempt comparison of Sextus' version of the modes with those of Diogenes Laertius (9.79–88) and Philo (*Ebr.* 169–202), a task usefully performed by Annas/Barnes [64]. We choose Sextus' version (A–K) as the fullest and most philosophically worthwhile, even though we recognize that not every word of it goes back to Aenesidemus himself.

B Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.40–61

(1) πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων οὐχ
 αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπαπίπτουσι φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα
 ἐκ τε τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰς συστάσεις
 τῶν σωματίων παραλλαγῆς. (2) περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζώων τὰ
 μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ' ἐκ συμπλοκῆς, καὶ τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως 5
 γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνους φαινόμενα
 ζωύφια, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κύνωπες, τὰ δ' ἐξ οἴνου τρεπόμενου ὡς
 σκνίπες, τὰ δ' ἐκ γῆς (ὡς ...). τὰ δ' ἐξ ἰλῶς ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ' ἐκ βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες,
 τὰ δ' ἐξ ὀνυαν ὡς κύνθοροι, τὰ δ' ἐκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμποι, τὰ δ' ἐκ καρπῶν ὡς οἱ ἐκ τῶν
 ἐρικρινῶν φῆνες, τὰ δ' ἐκ ζώων σηπομένων ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφήκες ἱππῶν· τῶν δ' 10
 ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς τὰ πλείστα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνομοιογενῶν
 ὡς ἡμίονοι. πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ζωοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ' ὠστοκεῖται

ὡς ὄντιες, τὰ δὲ σαρκοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄρκτοι. εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητας καὶ διαφορὰς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ αὐτοκράτον καὶ ἀνυάρμοστον καὶ μαχώμενον ἐκείθεν φερόμενας. (3) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ 15 διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων, μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων παραλλαγὴν. οἱ γοῦν ἱκτεριῶντες ὠχρά φασιν εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἰμαῶπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ὠχροῦς ἔχει τοὺς 20 ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροῖαν ἔχοντας, εἰκίς, αἷμαι, διάφορον αὐτοῖς τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι. . . (4) ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων λόγος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λεχθεῖ ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀφὴν τὰ τε ὑστρακιδέριμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῆ καὶ τὰ ἡκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; 25 πῶς δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντισταμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὰ τε στενωτάτον ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουητικὸν καὶ τὰ εὐρυτάτω τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ ὦτα καὶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα, ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν περαβύσαντες τὰ ὦτα, ἄλλως δὲ ἦν ἀπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα; . . (5) ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη τροφή ἀναδιδόμενη ὅπου μὲν 30 γίνεται φλέψ ὅπου δὲ ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὁστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑποδεχομένων αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη δύναμις, καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδόμενον εἰς τὰ δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ καρπὸς καὶ ἡδὴ σῆκον καὶ 35 βρούα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσουργοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξύ ὅπου δὲ βαρὺ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπέρεσις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου μὲν βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπου δὲ ὀξύν, οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διάφορα θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὴν κατασκευῇ τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζώων. (6) ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζώοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις 40 μὲν ἡδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάροις δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ, σφήκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσαν ἀναιρεῖ καταρραϊνόμενον· καὶ τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀήδης ἐστὶ πινόμενον καὶ φαρμακώδης, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἡδιστον καὶ πόσιμον. σῦες τε ἡδὴον βροβύρωι λύνονται δυσωδεστάτῳ ἢ ὕδατι διεσθῆναι καὶ καθαρῷ . . ἀλλ' ὅσα μὴ 45 μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκίμεν, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ἀηδὴ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ ἡδὴ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κεῖται, διάφοροι γίνονται τοῖς ζώοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασιῶν. (7) εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ὅποιον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ 50 γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνήσόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τὰς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι. (8) καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις γινομένων οὔτε μετ' ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ 55

εἶναι ἀποδείξιν ἴσως, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν, αὐτὴ ἢ λεγομένη ἀποδείξεις ἦται
 φαινόμενη ἡμῖν εἶσθαι τῇ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ
 πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προσιπόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν
 φαινομένων τοῖς ζώοις ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀποδείξεις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζώοις οὖσι,
 καὶ αὐτὴ ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό ἐστι φαινομένη. ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ
 ἀπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἢ βούλεται ἀποδεικνύειν, ἀπιστον δὲ ἢ ἀποδεικνύειν.
 οὐκ ἔχομεν ὅρα ἀποδείξιν δι' ἣν προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἐαυτῶν φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς
 ἀλόγοις καλουμένων ζώοις γινόμενων. (9) εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι
 παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξάλλαγήν, ὥς ἐπικρίναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν, ἐπέχειν
 ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

κ (ὡς μὲν) Fabricius: αἱ αἰα γ δὲ καὶ (ποπορὸν) Jubbantei Asinas/Barnes

18–19 For amplification of this popular fiction that people with jaundice see things yellow, see G 3.

30–9 Thus argument (cf. D 20.4) is criticized as flawed and out of place by Annas/Barnes [641], 42, but we find it both clear and apposite. It generalizes the previous examples into the point that sensory input is *processed* by the receiving organs, and that this may well involve modifications as radical and varied as those resulting from the processing of food by different organisms or bodily parts, wind by different musical instruments, etc.

39–45 A group of examples with a particularly rich history; see Annas/Barnes [641], 43–4. Those at 44–5 are from Heraclitus (22 B 61 and 13 DK).

C Sextus Empiricus. *PH* 1.79–91

(1) καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ
 ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἵνα γὰρ καθ'
 ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις, εὐρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν
 εἰσαγομένην. (2) δύο τοίνυν εἶναι λεγομένων ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἀνθρώπος,
 ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, ὅσον κατὰ
 σῶμα ταῖς τε μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις. διαφέρει μὲν γὰρ κατὰ
 μορφήν σῶμα Σκύθου Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ
 φασίν, ἡ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὶ δὲ τὴν διάφορον τῶν
 χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ
 πρώτῳ λόγῳ παρεστήσαμεν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς
 διαφορὰ πολλὴ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστίν· ἄλλοις γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἰνδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ' ἡμῖν, τὸ
 δὲ διαφορὸν χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλαγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας λαμβάνειν ἐστὶ
 μηχανικόν. (3) κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὡς ἐνίοις κρέα βότεια
 πετραίων ἰχθυοῦν ῥῶν πέττειν καὶ ὑπὸ Λεσβίου οἰναρίου εἰς χολέραν
 περιτρέπεσθαι. ἦν δέ, φασίν, γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὀκτὸς κωνείου
 ἀκινδύνως προσφερομένη, Λύσις δὲ καὶ μηχανεῖον τέσσαρας ὀκτὸς
 ἀλύτως ἐλάμβανεν. καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιὸς ἐν
 ἡλίῳ γινόμενος ἢ ἐν βαλανεῖῳ ἐρρίγουν, ἐν σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλπετο. . (4)

τοσαύτης οὖν παραλλαγῆς οὐσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα 20
 ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν
 εἰπόντες, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων τοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τίς ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥς καὶ ἡ
 φυσιογνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. (5) τὸ δὲ μέγιστον δείγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν
 διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῆς καὶ ἀπειρου διαφορᾶς ἡ διαφωνία τῶν 25
 παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίνα μὲν
 αἰρεῖσθαι προσήκει τίνα δὲ ἐκκλίνειν . . . (6) ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ
 ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἀγδισμῷ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθῆσει κείται
 καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἰρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον
 ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινούνται, ἐπεὶ 30
 ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἤρουντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον. (7) εἰ δὲ τὰ <αὐτὰ> διαφόρως κινεῖ
 παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰσάγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ
 ἐποχὴ, ὃ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὡς πρὸς ἑκάστην
 διαφορὰν ἴσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὡς πρὸς
 τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἷον τε ἄντων ἀποφύνασθαι. (8) ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς 35
 ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις
 ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν
 ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι
 Πλάτωνα, ὁ Ἐπικυρῆϊκος δὲ Ἐπικύρῳ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως
 ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες αὐθις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν. (9) ὁ 40
 δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι παιδαριωδῶδες τι
 προσίεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ
 διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐν τισιν ἐθνεσιν,
 ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν σπάνια τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ
 ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβαίοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ 45
 φαλαγγίων δακνόμενους μὴ ἀλγεῖν, τινὰς δὲ σπακίων ἀλγεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 ἐμπροσθεν εἰρημένῳ ἰδιοσυγκρισμῶν τὸ ἀνύλογον· ἀνγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχὴν . . . (10) ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοὶ τινες ὄντες οἱ
 δογματικοὶ φασὶ δεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ
 κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν 50
 (μέρος γὰρ εἰσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντες
 οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον
 συναρπάζουσιν, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες), ὅμως δ' οὖν ἵνα καὶ ἐπὶ
 ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν λόγον ἰσtάντες, οἷον τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄνειροπολουμένου
 σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντῶμεν, τὸν τρίτον τῇ τάξει τρόπον 55
 προχειρίζομεθα.

31 add. Bekker 39 Ἐπικυρῆϊκος Stephanus secundum T. Ἐπικυρῆϊκος codd. 52 τὸ ζητούμενον
 Mutschmann secundum T· τὰ φαινόμενα codd

79 Cf. 55Q.

21 **δογματικοῖς** Referring principally to medical writers, whose theories of 'humours' are heavily exploited in this mode.

40 8 For comparable objections to induction from a Stoic source, see 42G–H.

(1) τοῦτον δ' ἐλέγομεν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, πρὸδηλον. (2) αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὀφεί δοκοῦσιν εὐσυχὰς καὶ ἐσοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ μὲν γλῶττι ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τινων, τοῖς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἡδὺ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὁσφρησιν εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεύσιν ἀηδίζει. τὰ τε ὑσφύριον ἐπὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπηρὸν ἔστι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἄλυπὸν ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς ταῖς σώμασιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρὸν. τὸ τε ὁμβριον ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἔστιν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα τραχύνη, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς μὲν ἀκροῖς πρᾶσθεῖσα νερῶν πιεῖ, τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ σώματι ἄλυπως παρατίθεται. (3) διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἐκάστοτε δυνατόν εἰπεῖν. (4) καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἐνεσσι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ διατριβῶμεν, διὰ τὴν πρῆβσιν [τοῦ τρόπου, τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκείνη λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτει· δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἀδηλον οὖν πότερον ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητες, ἢ μονόποιον μὲν ἔστιν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευῇ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητες, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν. (5) μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐν αὐλοῖς καὶ σύμφεξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίσις ὀργάνοις· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μουσείδες μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον δὲ θιωμείσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων περὶ ᾧ γίνεται αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις. (6) πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιότητων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. ἐνοήσωμεν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἀφῆν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὁσφρησιν καὶ γεύσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὄρωντα. οὗτος τοῖνυν ὑπολήφεται μήτε ὁρατὸν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀμχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνᾳ ἐκείνᾳ τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιότητων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται. καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιότητων, ὧν ἔσμεν ἀντίληπτικοί· ὑποκείσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷον τέ ἐστι ποιότητας, ὑποπιπτούσας ἐτέρας αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετ'εσχήκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ' αὐτὰ αἰσθητῶν. (7) ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποῖα φύσις, διαφανίης τοσαύτης ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὐσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ' αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὰ τοῦτο εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἴη, ἄπιστος ἔσται κατ' αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὧν μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφανίης καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς ἀλλ' οὐ κριτής.

14 vecl. Mutschkarni 34 αὐτὰ Annas-Barnes οὐτός endl.

2 3 Cf. F 4, 1H 1.

16ff For the apple example, cf. 53K 2, and Annas-Barnes [641], 71ff

E Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.100-13

(1) ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶς ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἰσάντες τὸν λόγον, ἡ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις. θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτὸν φάμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν (ἔχειν), ἐν τῷ ἐργηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκυρεσμένους, παρὰ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, [ἢ] παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν. (2) οἷον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν φρενιζήζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ . . . καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμὴ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκὺ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν. (3) εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινῶν παραπλοκὴ ἀνοικείους φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα τῇ φύσει ὁποῖα φαίνεται τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν λεγομένοις, ἐτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τοῦτοις δὲ μὴ, πλοσματικὴν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων ἔχουσι, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσοῦντες παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, ὥστε ἀκείνοις πρὸς τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον. (4) παρὰ δὲ τὰ ὕπνῳ ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διαφόροι γίνονται φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὡς καθ' ὕπνου φανταζόμεθα, οὐ φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὡς φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὕπνους ἢ πρὸς ἐγρηγορεῖν, ἐκτύτως οὖν καθ' ὕπνους ὁρῶμεν ταῦτα ἃ εἰναι ἀνίπαρτα ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορεῖναι, οὐκ ἐν τῷ καθάπαξ ἀνίπαρτα ὄντα· ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ὕπνους, ὥσπερ τὰ ὕπνῳ ἔστιν κἄν μὴ ἢ καθ' ὕπνους. παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀῆρ τοῖς μὲν γέρονσι ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὐκρατος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν κατακαρρὲς, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἢ αὐτῇ τινὲς μὲν ἡμυρὰ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ' ἐξάκουστος. καὶ παρὰ τὰς αἰρίσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινεῖνται οἱ τοῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες παισὶ μὲν γάρ, εἰ τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσιν, οἱ ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἰρούνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες· ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διαφορὰ γίνονται φαντασίαι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων· καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἡλικίας. παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἐστῶτες ὁρῶμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦμεν . . . παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, ὅτι ἅπερ νήφοντες αἰσχυρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν μεθύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχυρὰ φαίνεται. παρὰ δὲ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγεῦσιν ἀξώϊδης φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ κάρυα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ . . . (5) τοσαύτης

οὐν οὐσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐν ταῖς
 διαθέσεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων γινομένων, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκει-
 μένων ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται ῥᾶδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔτι, ἐπεὶ 45
 καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως ἔστιν ἡ ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων ταύτην ἦτοι ἐν τισι
 τῶν πρηνειρημένων διαθέσεσιν ἔστιν ἢ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τὸ παράπαν ἐπὶ
 διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν, οἷον
 οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἡρεμεῖ, οὔτε ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ
 ἔστιν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, τελέως ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ 50
 ἐν τινι διαθέσει ὧν κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφανείας, καὶ
 ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλικρινῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἔσται κριτῆς διὰ τὸ
 τεβολῶσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν αἷς ἔστιν.

§ add. Mutschmann §α χρώμα. Bekker: θρώμα codd

Cf. Annas/Barnes [641], 85 for the interesting suggestion, on the strength of Sextus' exegesis of Protagorean relativism in very similar terms at *M.* 7.60–4, that the material in mode 4 was first collected by Protagoras. However, since *M.* 7.60–4 is itself probably derived from Aenesidemus (cf. the thoroughly Aenesidemean reworking of Gorgias at *M.* 7.65–87, and the extensive reliance throughout *M.* 7.46–262 on handbooks by Aenesidemus' contemporaries Antiochus and Posidonius), we find it more plausible that Aenesidemus had simply borrowed material from his own mode 4 to aid an exegesis of Protagoras based ultimately, like most of the ancient Protagorean doxography, on Plato (especially *The.* 157e–160a).

F Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.118–20

(1) πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς
 τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα
 φαίνεται. (2) οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρωμένη μείνους
 φαίνεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πλοῖον 5
 πύρρῳθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστῶς, ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον,
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πύρρῳθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ
 τετράγωνος. ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, (3) παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι
 τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκότῳ δὲ λαμπρόν, καὶ
 ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἐναλὸς μὲν κεκλασμένη ἐξαλὸς δὲ εὐθεία . . . (4) παρὰ δὲ τὰς
 θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν λεῖα φαίνεται, ποσιὺς δὲ 10
 ἐπινευομένη εἰσυχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν
 περισσότερων παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ
 χρώμα.

These are standard ancient examples of optical illusion. Cf. 16G for the tower (6 ?).

G Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.124–8

(1) ἔκτος ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμεγὰς, καθ' ὃν συνάγμεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ
 μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σὺν τινι, ὁποῖον

μέν ἐστι τὸ μίγμα ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ ὧ συνθεωρεῖται τάχα δυνατόν
 εἶπείν, ὅποιον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένον εἰλικρινῶς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν
 λέγειν. (2) ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκτὸς καθ' αὐτὸ υποσπίπτει ἀλλὰ πάντως σὺν
 τινι, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοιον θεωρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. τὸ γοῦν
 ἡμέτερον χρῶμα ἁλλοῖον μὲν ὁράται ἐν ἁλεινῷ ἀέρι, ἁλλοῖον δὲ ἐν τῷ
 ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἶπείν ὅποιον ἔστι τῇ φύσει τὸ χρῶμα ἡμῶν,
 ἀλλ' ὅποιον σὺν ἐκάστω τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἁλλοία μὲν
 φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι, ἁλλοία δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν
 βαλανείῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ
 τὸ αῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος μὲν περιεχομένου κούφον ἐστίν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρὺ.
 (3) ἵνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐξωθεν ἐπιμιξίας ἀποστώμεν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν
 ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτώνας καὶ ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν ὁρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀνευ τούτων
 θεωρεῖται, οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος
 ἀντιλαμβάνόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἐκτετικοὶ πάντα ὡχρὰ ὀρώσιν, οἱ δ'
 ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες ὕφαιμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν
 ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις, ἁλλοία δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ εἰλικσιδεῖς, καὶ ἁλλοία μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ
 ἀέρι, ἁλλοία δὲ ἐν τεθολομένῳ, εἰκοὶ ἐστὶ μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς·
 τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ σκοταῖα παρὰ ἴσιν καὶ στικτοῦπαρ καὶ ἀτμῶδες σιν ἀπικφορήσων, οἱ δὲ ἀπὶ τῶν
 περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσθαι λέγονται τόπων, τεθολομένα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεζωτήροι καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως τόποις ὁλοῦν ὑποκειμένων, μετ' ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβάνόμεθα τῶν
 γευστῶν καὶ τῶν ὀσφητῶν ἅλλ' οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ
 ἀντιλαμβάνονται ὅποια πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένα ἔστιν. (4) ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ
 διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὁδηγοὶ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλλονται· ἴσως δὲ
 καὶ αὐτὴ ἐπιμιξίαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
 ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι
 δοκοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, χυμοὺς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ
 ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὅτιδήποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζώου
 τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. (5) καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον ὁρώμεν,
 ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲν εἰπείν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν
 ἀναγκαζόμεθα.

H Sextius Empiricus, PH 1.129-32

(1) ἔβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν
 πραγμάτων, δηλον. (2) οἶον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος τῆς αἰγὸς
 φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀνευ συνθέσεως θεωρούμενα, συντιθέμενα
 δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργήρου [τὰ μέρη] τὰ
 ῥινήματα κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν ὅσα μέλανα φαίνονται, σὺν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς λευκὰ υποσπίπτει. καὶ τῆς
 Ταιναρίας λίθου· τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὁράται ὅταν λεασθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὅλοσχερὶ ξανθὰ
 φαίνεται. καὶ αἱ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδυσμέναι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται, ὡς
 σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἀπαλῶς κινουσί τὴν αἰυθῆσιν. καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβυρος λεπτός μὲν

καὶ χυνύδης προσφερόμενος πνευμάτων ἐπιφέρει, κρινώδης δὲ ὢν οὐκέτι. (3) καὶ ὁ πῖνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος βῶννυσιν ἡμᾶς, πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφή παραπλησίως παρὰ τὴν ποιότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται δυνάμιν πολλάκις γαῖν διὰ τὰ πολλὰ προσενηχθῆ-
 ναι καθαίρει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τε ἀπεψιών καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν. (4) ἔξομεν οὖν
 κἀναυθὰ λέγειν ὅποιόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος τὸ λεπτόν καὶ ὅποιον τὸ ἐκ
 πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν συγκείμενον, καὶ ὁποῖος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ μικρομερὴς ἀργυρος
 ὁποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρομερῶν συγκείμενος, καὶ ὁποῖα μὲν ἡ ἀκαριαία Ταινारीα λίθοι
 ὁποῖα δὲ ἡ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκιμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖν ψάμμων καὶ τοῖς ἑλλεθάρην καὶ
 τοῦ πῖνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρὸς τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνωμα-
 λίαν.

ἀντίκ. Mutu chianu

16 17 ἐστὶ . . . ἐστίν. See the useful remarks of Annas/Barnes [641]. 123 4 As they note, it is striking and odd that Sextus should not restrict himself to φαίνεται here. This might be used in support of Frede's view ([646], cf. [61]) that the Pyrrhonist is willing to assent to everyday, non-technical truth claims. On the other hand, the warning at 12 may be adequate explanation.

1 Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.135-40

(1) ὁδοὸς ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολίτως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. (2) ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐναυθὰ, ὡς περ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ "ἐστὶ" καταχρύμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ "φαίνεται", δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες "πρὸς τι πάντα φαίνεται." (3) τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἀπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς
 τὸ κρίνον (τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑπείκειμενον καὶ κρινώμενον πρὸς τὸ κρίνον
 φαίνεται), καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ δεξιὸν
 πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν. (4) ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐπὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ
 ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρίνον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸδε τὸ ζῆλον καὶ τόνδε τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς ταῖνδε
 περιστάσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμελίαν καὶ
 τόνδε τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν
 ἕκαστον φαίνεται. (5) καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς
 τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ὅτερον διαφέρει τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὐ,
 εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πάν
 τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν. (6) τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνωτάτων γένη κατὰ τοὺς
 λογματικούς, τὰ δ' ἔσχατα εἶδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη· πάντα δὲ ταυτὰ ἐστὶ
 πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα
 ὡς αὐτοὶ φαίνε, καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαίνόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων τὰ
 ἄδηλα· ὅπως γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδῆλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τα δὲ σημαίνον καὶ τε
 σημαίνόμενά ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πρὸς τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα· πρὸς ταῦτα τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν

ὁμοία τὰ δὲ ὀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἄνισα· ταῦτα δὲ εἴτι· πρὸς τι πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. (7) καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι βεβαιεῖ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσαι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται. (8) πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτως παριστάνουσιν ἡμῖν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, δηλόν ἐστι λοιπόν ὅτι ὅποιον ἐστί· ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εἰλικρινὺς λέγειν οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅποιον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι. ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

12 τόπου Paraphrasis. τρόπον could.

This mode is usefully discussed by Striker [640], and Annas/Barnes [641]. 128–45 (cf. their important remarks on the difference between relativism and scepticism at 96–8). We ourselves, however, disagree with Striker's interpretation (alluded to in vol. 1, 485–6), and our analysis in vol. 1 tries to represent the arguments as less sophisticated than Annas/Barnes take them to be. Annas/Barnes argue that this version of the mode derives from the later five modes of Agrippa (PH 1.164–9), and was grafted into its present place by Sextus. But we think it at least as likely that Agrippa himself borrowed from the Aenesidemean modes.

J Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.141–4

{1} περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις τρόπου, ὃν ἐννοοῦν ἐλέγουμεν εἶναι τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτα τινα διέξιμεν. {2} ὁ ἥλιος πολλῶν δῆπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν ἀστέρος κομήτην· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὁρώμεν, τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι ἐκπλησσύμεθα ὥστε καὶ διανοηθεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. εἰ μὲντοι γε ἐννοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον, σπανίως δὲ δυνόμενον, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα, πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιάζεσθαι ποιοῦντα, πολλὴν ἐκπληξιν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσωμεν. καὶ ὁ οἰσμός δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τοῖς τι πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περικυκλωμένοις καὶ τοῖς ἐνθεῖ τοῦτου γεγενημένοις. πόση δὲ ἐκπληξιν ἀνθρώπων φέρει θάλασσα πρῶτον ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρώπου πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκίνει μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐνθεῖ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι γένοιτο. {3} καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια τίμια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ σύντροφα ἡμῖν καὶ εὐπορα οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γοῦν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν τῶν τιμίων εἶναι δοκούτων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν φανείη. ἢ εἰ ἐνθυμηθώμεν τὸν χρυτὸν ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔρρωμένον πολλὴν παραπλησίως τοῖς λίθοις, τίμη δόξομεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατάκλειστον οὕτως; {4} ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους περιπτώσεις ὅτε μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ τίμια, ὅτε δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ὅποιον μὲν φαίνεται τοιούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ συνεχοῦς περιπτώσεως ἢ σπανίας ἴσως δυνησόμεθα λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὅποιον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἔσμεν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπέχομεν.

K Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.145–63

(1) δέκατος ἐστὶ τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει πρὸς τὰ ἠθικά, ὃ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. (2) ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἵρεσις βίου ἢ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλοὺς γινόμενη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας· (3) νόμος δὲ ἐστὶν ἐγγραφὸς συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, 5 ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δὲ ἡ συνθήκη (οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινὴ πράγματός τινος παραδοχὴ, ἣν ὁ παραβάς οὐ πάντως κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι. (4) μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων τε καὶ πεπλασμένων παραδοχὴ, οἷα ἐστὶν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου 10 μυθεύμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. (5) δογματικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παραδοχὴ πράγματος δι' ἀναλογισμοῦ ἢ τινος ἀποδείξεως κρατύνεσθαι δοκούσα, οἷον ὅτι ἄτομα ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ (<ἢ>) ἐλάχιστα ἢ τινα ἄλλα. (6) ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὅτε μὲν ἑαυτῷ, ὅτε δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστῳ. (7) οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει οὕτως· 15 τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν στίζουσι τὰ βρέφη, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ποδήρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπρεπές· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ ταῖς γυναῖξιν δημοσίᾳ μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγοῦνται. (8) νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως ἀντιτίθεμεν· παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὁ τῆς πατρὸς ἀποστάς νόμιος οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι τὰ 20 τοῦ πατρὸς χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις πάντως ἀποδίδωσαν· καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καλλιερεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀνθρωπον ἀπειρήται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι. (9) ἀγωγήν δὲ ἀγωγή, ὅταν τὴν Διογένης ἀγωγήν ἀντιτιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακωνῶν τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. (10) μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυθικῇ, ὅταν 25 ὅπου μὲν (λέγωμεν) τὸν Δία μυθεύεσθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, ὅπου δὲ τὸν Ὠκεανόν, λέγοντες “Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν”. (11) δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν ἐν εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν, τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοαῖ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ 30 καθ' ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως. (12) τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθεμεν, οἷον νόμῳ μὲν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι ἀρρενομισίας χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν. . . (13) ἀγωγή δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀναχωροῦντες μιγνύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖξιν, ὁ δὲ Κράτης τῇ 35 Ἰππαρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν Διογένης ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος περιήει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς εἰώθαμεν. (14) μυθικὴ δὲ πίστει, [ὡς] ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος κατήσθιεν αὐτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ἄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι παίδων· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν συνθήκη ὡς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεοὺς, τιτρωσκόμοι δὲ καὶ φθοροῖντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται. (15) 40 δογματικὴ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ἢ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὁ

δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει μὴ ἐπιστρέφειν αἱμῶν τὸ θεῖον . . . (16) πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶν καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παραδείγματα· ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τοῦτου τοῦ τρόπου δεικνυμένης, ὁποῖον μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκειμενὸν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται πρὸς τῆςδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς τόδε τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκαστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἐπέχειν ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη. (17) οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν δέκα τρόπων καταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν.

14 (8) σοι T 26 (λέγωμεν). Democritus T 37 ὡς σοι. T

13 14 The doctrines are respectively those of Epicurus (and Democritus), of Anaxagoras, and of Diodorus (111 3).

L Photius, Bibl. 170b3-35

(1) ἐν δὲ τῷ β' κατὰ μέρος ἤδη ἀρχόμενος ἐπεξίεναι τὰ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰρημένα, περὶ τε ἀληθῶν καὶ αἰτίων διαλαμβάνει καὶ παθῶν καὶ κινήσεως, γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ τῶν τοιούτοις ἐναντίων, κατὰ πάντων αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπορον τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον πυκνοῖς, ὡς οἴεται, ἐπιλογισμοῖς ὑποδεικνύς. (2) καὶ ὁ γ' δὲ αὐτῷ λόγος περὶ κινήσεως καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς ιδιωμάτων, τὰς ὁμοίας περιεργαζόμενος ἐναντιολογίας, εἰς τὸ ἀνέφικτον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ὑποφέρει καὶ αὐτά. (3) ἐν δὲ τῷ δ' σημεῖα μὲν ὡς περὶ τὰ φανερά φαμεν τῶν ἀφανῶν, οὐδ' ὅλως εἶναι φησιν, ἡπατῆσθαι δὲ κενὴ προσπαθεῖα τοὺς οἰομένους ἐγείρει δὲ τὰς ἐξ ἔθους ἐφεξῆς ἀπορίας περὶ τε ὅλης τῆς φύσεως καὶ κόσμου καὶ θεῶν, οὐδὲν <τού>των εἰς κατάληψιν πεσεῖν ἐντενόμενος. (4) προβάλλεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ ε' λόγος τὰς κατὰ τῶν αἰτίων ἀπορητικὰς λαβὰς, μὴδὲν μὲν μηδενὸς αἰτίον ἐνδιδοῦς εἶναι, ἡπατῆσθαι δὲ τοὺς αἰτιολογούντας φάσκων, καὶ τρόπους ἀριθμῶν καθ' οὓς οἴεται αὐτοὺς αἰτιολογεῖν ὑπαχθέντας εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην περινευχθῆναι πλάνην. (5) καὶ ὁ ε' δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ, καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ αἰρετὰ καὶ φευκτά, ἐτι δὲ προηγούμενά τε καὶ ἀποπροηγούμενα, εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς ἐρεσχελίας ἄγει τό γε ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς καταλήψεως ἡμῶν καὶ γνώσεως ἀποκλείων. (6) τὸν μὲντοι ζ' κατὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ὁπλίζει, διὰ κενῆς λέγων τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναπλάσαι δόξας, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀποβουκολεῖν ὡς εἰς τὴν τούτων εἴησαν πράξιν τε καὶ θεωρίαν ἀφικμένοι. (7) ὁ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦ τέλους ἐνίσταται, μήτε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε τὴν ἡδονὴν μήτε τὴν φρόνησιν μήτ' ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐπιχωρῶν εἶναι, ὅπερ ἂν τις τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἰρέσεων δοξάσειεν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς οὐκ εἶναι τέλος τὸ πᾶν ὑμνούμενον.

11 suppl. Sedley

Context: see on 71C.

M Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 1.180–5

ὥστερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους (τῆς) ἐποχῆς παραδίδωμεν, οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενται τινες, καθ' οὓς ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις διαπορούντες ἐπιστώμεν τοὺς δογματικούς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις αὐτοὺς μέγα φρονεῖν. (1) καὶ δὴ Αἰνυαῖδης οὕτως τρόπους παραδίδωσι καθ' οὓς οἶται πᾶσαν δογματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν ὡς μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφῆναι, (2) ὡν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι φησι καθ' ὃν [τρόπον] τὸ τῆς αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανέσει ἀναστρεφόμενον οὐχ ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν· (3) δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃν πολλάκις εὐεπιφορίας οὐσης δαψιλοῦς ὥστε πολυτρόπως αἰτιολογήσῃ τὸ ζητούμενον, καθ' ἓνα μόνον τρόπον τοῦτό τινες αἰτιολογοῦσιν· (4) τρίτον καθ' ὃν τῶν τεταγμένως γινομένων αἰτίας ἀποδιδόσῃ οὐδεμίαν τάξιν ἐπιφαινούσας· (5) τέταρτον καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομίζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατεληγμένα, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως· (6) πέμπτον καθ' ὃν πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν στοιχείων ὑποθέσεις ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τινος κοινὰς καὶ ὁμολογουμένας ἐφόδους αἰτιολογοῦσιν· (7) ἕκτον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις τὰ μὲν φωρατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι παραλαμβάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀντιπίπτοντα καὶ τὴν ἴσην ἔχοντα πιθανότητα παρατέμνουσιν· (8) ἑβδομον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ἀποδιδόσῃ αἰτίας οὐ μόνον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι μαχομένας· (9) ὄγδοον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν ἐπιζητούμενων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας. (10) οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὲ φησι καὶ κατὰ τινος ἐπιμέκτους τρόπους, ἡρτημένους ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, διαπίπτειν ἐνίοις ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις.

Context: following discussion of the modes of ἐποχή (including A–K). For comment, see especially Barnes [637].

7–9 Probably Epicurean-inspired criticism (cf. 18C 4), especially in view of the Epicurean term ἐπιμαρτύρησιν at 7. See also note on 71A 7–8.

N Sextus Empiricus, *M*. 9.237–40

(1) καὶ μὴν εἴ ἔστι τι αἷτιον, ἥτοι αὐτοτελὲς καὶ ἰδίᾳ μόνον προσχρώμενον δυνάμει τινός ἐστιν αἷτιον, ἥ συνεργοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο δέεται τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης, ὥστε τὸ ἀποτελεσμα κατὰ κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων νοεῖσθαι σύνδοον. (2) καὶ εἴ μὲν αὐτοτελὲς καὶ ἰδίᾳ προσχρώμενον δυνάμει ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν, ὥφειλε διὰ παντός ἑαυτὸ ἔχον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δύνανμιν πάντοτε ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτελεσμα καὶ μὴ ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἀπρακτεῖν. (3) εἰ δέ, ὡς φασι τινες τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ τῶν ἀπολελυμένων καὶ ἀφεστηκῶτων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς τῷ πάσχοντι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πάσχον πρὸς αὐτῷ, χεῖρόν τι ἀνακίψει. (4) εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τῷ ἑτέρῳ νοεῖται, ὡν τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν τὸ δὲ πάσχον, ἔσται μία μὲν ἔννοια, δυνεῖν δ' ὀνομάτων τεύξεται, τοῦ τε ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ

μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ πάσχειν ἐγκείσεται ἢ δραστήριος δύναμις. ὥς γὰρ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν χωρὶς τοῦ λεγομένου πάσχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ λεγόμενον πάσχειν δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας πάσχειν. (5) ὥσθ' ἔπεται τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ὑποκεῖσθαι τὴν δραστήριον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος δύναμιν. 15

10 ὡν Hervetus: οὐ codd

Context: critique of the notion of cause. Sextus indicates a borrowing from Aenesidemus, starting at *M.* 9.218, and probably, though not demonstrably, continuing to and beyond the excerpted passage.

4–6 This equation of true causes with sufficient conditions is Stoic in origin (SSA 2–3), relying on the Stoic notion of αἴτιον αὐτοτελές (SSI 2). It quickly came to serve non-Stoics as a weapon against other kinds of cause, especially προκαταρκτικά. That is how it was already being used in the middle of the third century B.C. by the doctor Erasistratus (*Celsus, Med. pr.* 54; Galen, *De causis procatarticiis*, passim), as well as by later Pyrrhonists.

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GENERAL

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 [19] J. C. B. Goshing, C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on pleasure* (Oxford, 1982)
 [20] A. Dihle, *The theory of will in classical antiquity* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1982)
 [21] R. R. K. Sorabji, *Necessity, cause and blame. perspectives on Aristotle's theory* (London, 1980)
 [22] R. R. K. Sorabji, *Time, creation and the continuum* (London, 1983)
 [23] J. Moreau, *L'Âme du monde de Platon aux stoïciens* (Paris, 1939)
 [24] S. Sambursky, *The physical world of the Greeks* (London, 1956)
 [25] G. E. R. Lloyd, *Greek science after Aristotle* (London, 1973)
 [26] P. Natorp, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum* (Stuttgart, 1884; repr. Hildesheim, 1965)
 [27] M. F. Burnyeat, 'Idealism and Greek philosophy: what Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', *Philosophical Review* 91 (1982), 3–40
 [28] P. M. Huby and G. C. Neale (edd.), *The criterion of truth. Studies in honour of George Kerkelidze on his seventieth birthday* (Liverpool, 1987)
 [29] E. Solmsen, *Kleine Schriften*, 3 vols. (Hildesheim, 1968–82)

The historiography of Hellenistic philosophy is discussed in a monumental, if somewhat dated, work:

- [30] R. Herzog, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1877–83) and 10
 [31] U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Antigonos von Karystos* (Berlin, 1881)
 [32] J. Mejer, *Dionysius Laertius and his Hellenistic background* (Wiesbaden, 1978)

On Cicero, see also

- [33] K. Bringmann, *Untersuchungen zum späten Cicero* (Göttingen, 1971)
 [34] O. Gigon, 'Cicero und die griechische Philosophie', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 1.4 (Berlin, 1972), 226–61
 [35] W. Görler, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1974)

The work of the important 'Socratic' forerunners of the Hellenistic philosophers is most conveniently available in

- [36] G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae*, 4 vols. (Naples, 1983–5)

See also, for individual Socratic schools,

- [37] K. Döring, *Die Megariker. Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien* (Amsterdam, 1972)
 [38] D. R. Dudley, *A history of Cynicism* (London, 1917)
 [39] J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes. A collection of the fragments with introduction and commentary* (Uppsala, 1976)
 and for their influence on Hellenistic philosophy, Sedley [11] and
 [40] G. Giannantoni (ed.), *Scuola socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica* (Bologna, 1977)

On the organization and fortunes, in the Hellenistic period, of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, see the outstanding studies

- [41] J.P. Lynch, *Aristotle's school* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1972)
- [42] J. Glücker, *Antiochus and the late Academy* (Göttingen, 1978)

Social, political and other aspects of Hellenistic civilization can be studied in Frischer [108], and in

- [43] P.M. Frazer, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1972)
- [44] R. Pfeiffer, *A history of classical scholarship*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1968)
- [45] F.W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic world* (London, 1981)
- [46] E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1984)

On Hellenistic science, see especially Lloyd [25], and

- [47] G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Observational error in later Greek science', in [6], 128-64
 - [48] G. Giannantoni, M. Vegetti (ed.), *La scienza ellenistica* (Naples, 1984)
 - [49] D.E. Hahm, 'Early Hellenistic theories of vision and the perception of colour', in P.K. Machamer, R.G. Turnbull (ed.), *Studies in perception: interrelations in the history of philosophy and science* (Columbus, 1978), 60-95
- and, for a fascinating glimpse of the level of technological sophistication reached in the applied mechanics of the period,
- [50] D. de Solla Price, *Gears from the Greeks* (New York, 1975)

General studies of ancient scepticism

The most detailed and reliable of the comprehensive studies is

- [51] M. Dal Pra, *Lo scetticismo greco*, 2 vols (first publ. 1950; ed. 2, Rome/Bari, 1975)

Still valuable is the classic work by

- [52] V. Brochard, *Les Sceptiques grecs* (first publ. 1887; ed. 2, Paris, 1923)

Other useful surveys include

- [53] C.L. Stough, *Greek skepticism* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1969)
- [54] J.-P. Dumont, *Le Scepticisme et le phénomène* (Paris, 1972)

For more specialized aspects, see

- [55] G. Striker, 'Über den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern', *Phronesis* 26 (1981), 153-71
- [56] F. Delella Cairati, 'Pirroniani ed accademici nel III secolo a. C.', in [8], 147-83
- [57] A.A. Long, 'Aristotle and the history of Greek scepticism', in D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Studies in Aristotle* (Washington, D.C., 1981), 79-106
- [58] M.F. Burnyeat (ed.), *The skeptical tradition* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1983)
- [59] D. Sedley, 'The motivation of Greek skepticism' in [58], 9-30
- [60] M.F. Burnyeat, 'The sceptic in his place and time', in R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner (ed.), *Philosophy in history* (Cambridge, 1984), 225-54
- [61] M. Frede, 'The sceptic's two kinds of assent and the question of the possibility of knowledge', in Rorty et al. (see previous entry), 255-78
- [62] G. Giannantoni (ed.), *Lo scetticismo antico*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1981)

This last, which includes a comprehensive bibliography, is reviewed by

- [63] M.R. Stopper, 'Schizzi pirroniani', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 265-97

1.3 EARLY PYRRHONISM

Texts and commentaries

For Pyrrho the authoritative collection of testimonia, with Italian translation and extensive commentary, is

- [64] F. Deleiva Carzzi, *Pirrone testimonianze* (Naples, 1981)

She discusses the methodology of selecting this material in

- [65] 'Prolegomeni ad una raccolta delle fonti relative a Pirrone di Elide' in [62], 95–128

For Timon of Phlius the best text, with brief annotation, is

- [66] H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Berlin, 1983), 368–95

Useful material on Timon is also to be found in the older editions of

- [67] C. Wachsmuth, *Corpusculum poesis epicae ludibundae*, vol. II: *De Timone Phliasio ceterisque sillographis commentatio* (Leipzig, 1885)

- [68] H. Diels, *Portorum philosophorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1903)

See also, for a general study of Timon's work,

- [69] A. A. Long, 'Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and satirist', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* N.S. 24 (1978), 68–91

Detailed interpretations

Older studies of the historical Pyrrho tend to suffer from a failure to distinguish his position from that of later Pyrrhonism. Much of value may still be found in Brochard [52]. Later studies, all written prior to the recent Italian focus on Pyrrho, include Dial Pra [51], Stough [53], Dumont [54], and

- [70] L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec* (Paris, 1944)

- [71] K. von Fritz, 'Pyrrhon', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* xxiv (1963), cols. 89–106

- [72] M. Conche, *Pyrrhon ou l'apparence* (Villiers-sur-Mer, 1973)

The differences between Pyrrho's scepticism and that of Arcelaus were the subject of an important study by

- [73] V. Cousin, 'L'origine et l'évolution de l'époxy', *Revue des Études Grecques* 42 (1929), 373–97

Pyrrho's philosophy and its historical background occupy a large part of the proceedings of a Rome conference [62], which includes a major study by

- [74] G. Reale, 'Ipotesi per una rilettura della filosofia di Pirrone di Elide', 245–336

This, along with other articles in the collection, is reviewed by M. R. Stopper [63], who is critical of the attempt to find antecedents to Pyrrho's scepticism among the philosophers who reject the principle of non-contradiction, according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics Γ*, as proposed by

- [75] E. Berti, 'La critica allo scetticismo nel IV libro della "Metafisica"' in [62], 63–79 and also considered by A. A. Long [57].

On Pyrrho's ethics, see

- [76] M. Pohlenz, 'Das Lebensziel der Skeptiker', *Hermes* 39 (1904), 15-29.
 [77] M. P. Burnyeat, 'Tranquillity without a stop: Timon frag. 68', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 30 (1980), 86-93.
 [78] G. A. Ferrari, 'L'immagine dell'equilibrio' in [62], 337-70.

On Timon's contributions to philosophical debates, see

- [79] F. Decleva Caizzi, 'Timone di Fliunte: 3 frammenti 74, 75, 76 Dicks', in F. Angelis (ed.), *La storia della filosofia come sapere critico: studi offerti a Mario Dal Pra* (Milan, 1984), 92-105.

Background studies

On the origins of the 'no more' formula, see

- [80] P. De Lacy, 'αὐ μᾶλλον and the antecedents of ancient scepticism', *Phronesis* 3 (1958), 59-71.
 [81] A. Graser, 'Demokrit und die skeptische Formel', *Hermes* 96 (1970), 300-17.

On Pyrrho and Democritus more specifically, see

- [82] F. Decleva Caizzi, 'Pirrone e Democrito: gli atomi: un "mito"?', *Elenchos* 5 (1984), 3-21.

On the Cynic background, see Long [69], 71-7, Kindstrand [39], and

- [83] A. Brancacci, 'La filosofia di Pirrone e le sue relazioni con il cinismo', in [62], 213-42.
 [84] F. Decleva Caizzi, 'Τῶρος contributo alla storia di un concetto', *Sandalion* 3 (1980), 53-66.

On Pyrrho's possible indebtedness to Indian thought, see

- [85] A. M. Freudenthal, 'Der griechische Skeptizismus und die indische Philosophie', *Bibliotheca Classica Orientalis* 4 (1958), 211-50.
 [86] E. Flintoff, 'Pyrrho and India', *Phronesis* 25 (1980), 88-108.

For Pyrrho's and Timon's background, see also Huxley [30] and

- [87] H. Krüger, 'Der Ausgang der antiken Skepsis', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 36 (1925), 100-16.
 [88] G. A. Ferrari, 'Due fonti sullo scetticismo antico: Diog. La. IX 66-108, Eus. Praep. ev. XIV 18, 1-20', *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 40 (1988), 200-24.

On the relation of Pyrrho to philosophical successions, see Glucker [42], and Giannantonio's introductory paper in his [62], 13-34.

4-25 EPICUREANISM

General

- [89] C. Bailey, *The Greek atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford, 1928).
 [90] E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1936). This massive work contains many valuable insights in spite of the author's excessive interest in establishing the influence of Aristotle's lost works.
 [91] N. W. de Witt, *Epicurus and his philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954), chiefly useful for its study of the organization of the Epicurean school.

- [92] W. Schmid, *Epicur, zu Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* v (1961), 681-819
- [93] B. Farrington, *The faith of Epicurus* (London, 1967); a Marxist interpretation
- [94] H. Steckel, 'Epicurus', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, suppl. xi (Stuttgart, 1968), cols. 579-652
- [95] J.-M. Rist, *Epicurus: an introduction* (Cambridge, 1972)
- [96] D. Pesce, *Saggio su Epicuro* (Rome/Bari, 1974)
- [97] D. Pesce, *Introduzione a Epicuro* (Rome/Bari, 1980)

Three major anthologies of work on Epicurus are

- [98] Association Guillaume Budé, *Actes du VIII^e congrès* (Paris, 1969)
- [99] J. Bollack, A. Laks (edd.), *Études sur l'épicurisme antique*, in *Cahiers de Philologie* 1 (1976)
- [100] *ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΕΙΣ*. Studi sull'epicureismo greco e latino offerti a Marcello Gigante, 2 vols. (Naples, 1983); vol. 2 contains an excellent bibliographical survey

For an earlier critical bibliography, see

- [101] H. Mette, 'Epicurus 1963-1978', *Lustrum* 21 (1978), 43-116

The articles of two eminent scholars are collected in

- [102] C. Di Leo, *Scritti epicurei* (Florence, 1974)
- [103] R. Philippson, *Studien zu Epicur und den Epikureern*, ed. C. J. Classen (Hildesheim, 1983)

Various historical aspects of Epicureanism are dealt with in

- [104] D. Sedley, 'Epicurus and his professional rivals', in [99], 219-59
- [105] D. Sedley, 'Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 6 (1976), 23-54
- [106] M. Gigante, *Scetticismo e epicureismo* (Naples, 1981)
- [107] D. Fowler, review of [106], in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 237-67
- [108] B. Frischer, *The sculpted word: Epicureanism and philosophical recruitment in ancient Greece* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1982)
- [109] D. Clay, 'Epicurus in the archives of Athens', *Hesperia* suppl. 19 (1982), 17-26
- [110] P.-M. Huby, 'Epicurus' attitude to Democritus', *Phronesis* 23 (1978), 80-6
- [111] G. Arrighetti, 'Un passo dell'opera "Sulla natura" di Epicuro, Democrito, e Colote', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 9 (1979), 5-10

For the location of the Epicurean Garden, as represented in vol. 1, 4, see

- [112] G. W. Donck, 'Εἰκουριστὰ Β', *Archaiologikon Deltaion* 26 (1971), 10-33

For prominent Epicureans at Rome, see

- [113] A. D. Momigliano, review of *Science and politics in the ancient world* by B. Farrington, *Journal of Roman Studies* 31 (1941), 149-57, repr. in his *Secondo contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (Rome, 1960)
- [114] P. Grimal, 'Les éléments philosophiques dans l'idée de monarchie à Rome à la fin de la République', in [8], 233-81

Texts, commentaries and translations

The fundamental collection of Epicurean material is still

- [115] H. Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887)

Other valuable editions of the primary texts are

- [110] P. von der Mühl, *Epicurus. Epistulae tres et ratior sententiae* (Leipzig, 1923)
- [117] C. Bailey, *Epicurus. The extant remains* (Oxford, 1926)
- [118] C. Diano, *Epicuri ethica et epistulae* (Florence, 1946, repr. 1974); also contains many fragments

The only comprehensive edition of Epicurus' own surviving work, including the papyrus fragments omitted by Usener [115], is

- [119] G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro opere* (first publ. Turin, 1960; ed. 2, 1973)

There is also an Italian translation, with commentary, of all the surviving works and important testimonia,

- [120] M. Inardi Panente, *Opere di Epicuro* (Turin, 1974)
- and another important annotated Italian translation is
- [121] E. Bignone, *Epicuro, opere, frammenti, testimonianze* (Bari, 1910)

Four editions by the idiosyncratic Lille school are

- [122] J. Bollack, M. Bollack, H. Wismann, *La Lettre d'Epicure* (Paris, 1973); the *Letter to Herodotus*
- [123] J. Bollack, *La Pensée du plaisir. Epicure: textes moraux, commentaires* (Paris, 1975); the *Letter to Menoeceus*, and other ethical writings
- [124] J. Bollack, A. Laks, *Epicure à Pythoclès* (*Cahiers de Philologie* 3, Lille, 1978)
- [125] A. Laks, 'Edition critique et commentée de la "vie d'Epicure" dans Diogène Laërte (x, c. 34)', in [99], 1-118

Editions of papyrus fragments of Epicurus, *On nature*

- [126] D. Sedley, 'Epicurus, *On nature* book xxviii', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 3 (1973), 5-83
- [127] C. Millon, 'Epicure de la nature livre xv', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 7 (1977), 9-39
- [128] G. Leone, 'Epicuro, *Della natura*, libro xiv', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 14 (1984), 17-107

For differing views on the structure of Epicurus' major work, *On nature*, see

- [129] G. Arrighetti, 'L'opera "Sulla natura" di Epicuro', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 1 (1971), 41-56
- [130] G. Arrighetti, 'L'opera "Sulla natura" e le lettere di Epicuro a Erodoto e Pitocle', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 5 (1975), 39-51
- [131] D. Sedley, 'The structure of Epicurus' *On nature*', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 4 (1974), 69-92
- [132] D. Sedley, 'The character of Epicurus' *On nature*', *Atti del XVII congresso internazionale di papirologia* (Naples, 1984), 381-7

A magnificent tool of research, which indexes much of the papyrological material and the secondary sources, is

- [133] H. Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum*, ed. by M. Gigante, W. Schmid (Rome, 1977)

Other early Epicureans

- [134] F. Longo Auricchio, 'La scuola di Epicuro', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 8 (1978), 21-37
- [135] A. Koerte, *Metrodori Epicurei fragmenta. Jahrbucher für Klassische Philologie*, suppl. 17 (1980)
- [136] A. Vogliani, 'Frammenti di un nuovo "glossologium epicureum"', *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 13 (1936), 268-81

- [137] K. Krohn, *Der Epikureer Hermarchos* (Berlin, 1871)
- [138] W. Cronert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (Leipzig, 1906), a study which also includes valuable papyrological material on early Hellenistic philosophers in general
- [139] R. Westman, 'Plutarch gegen Kolotes', in *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 7 (Helsinki, 1953)
- [140] A. Angeh, 'I frammenti di Idomeneo di Lampsaco', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 11 (1981), 41–101
- [141] G. Indelli, *Polistrato sul disprezzo irrazionale delle opinioni popolari* (Naples, 1978)
- For our own view on Polistratus' target, see
- [142] D. Sedley, review of [141] in *Classical Review* N.S. 33 (1983), 335–6

Epicureans of 2nd and 1st centuries B.C.

- [143] V. de Falco, *L'Epicoreo Demetrio Lacone* (Naples, 1923)
- [144] C. Romeo, 'Demetrio Lacone sulla grandezza del sole (PHerc. 1013)', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 9 (1979), 11–35
- [145] E. Puglia, 'Nuove letture nei PHerc. 1012 e 1786 (Demetrio Lacone opera incerta)', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 10 (1980), 25–53
- [146] A. Angela, M. Colaizzo, 'I frammenti di Zenone udomo', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 11 (1981), 47–113

The recent spate of work on Philodemus has produced a range of editions and studies too extensive to cover fully here, but see especially the seminal contributions and bibliography in

- [147] M. Gigante, *Ricerche filodemea* (ed. 2, Naples, 1983)

For works by Philodemus of primary relevance to this sourcebook, see Philippson [240], Henrichs [529], Sedley [243], and

- [148] T. Gomperz, *Philodem, über Freymüthigkeit* (Leipzig, 1866)
- [149] W. Scott, *Fragments Hierulaniensia* (Oxford, 1885), in which several important papyrus texts are edited
- [150] A. Olivieri, *Philodemo: I libri πρὸς ἑρμῆνους libellus* (Leipzig, 1914)
- [151] H. Dieis, *Philademo über die Götter* (hks 1, 1), 4th. Pruss. Akad. Wiss. 1915–16 (Berlin, 1916–17)
- [152] P. and E. De Lacy, *Philodemus, On methods of inference* (ed. 2, Naples, 1978)

For an accessible survey of Philodemus' work on literary themes, see

- [153] A.A. Long, in *Cambridge history of classical literature*, vol. 3 *Greek literature* (Cambridge, 1985), 628–30, 842–3

Lucretius

The standard text and commentary on the whole of *De rerum natura* is still the monumental, if somewhat dated, work by

- [154] C. Bailey, *Tin Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1947)
- Note that this supersedes Bailey's *Oxford Classical Text* (ed. 2, 1922). For a more recent text, with excellent translation and valuable annotation, see
- [155] W.H.D. Rouse, *Lucretius De rerum natura*, revised with new text, introduction, notes, and index by M.F. Smith, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass./London, 1975)

The following are also valuable:

- [156] H.A.J. Munro, commentary only (ed. 4, London, 1900)
- [157] A. Ernout, L. Robin, commentary only, 3 vols (Paris, 1925-8)
- [158] J. Martin, critical text only (Leipzig, 1934)
- [159] R. Heinze, text and commentary on book 3 (Leipzig, 1897)
- [160] E.J. Kenney, text and commentary on book 3 (Cambridge, 1971)

For studies of Lucretius' treatment of Epicureanism, see Konstan [253], and

- [161] P. Boyancé, *Lucreté et l'épicurisme* (Paris, 1963)
- [162] D. Clay, *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca/London, 1983)
and the anthology of articles
- [163] O. Gigon (ed.), *Lucreté*, Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* xxiv (Vandoeuvres/Geneva, 1978)

Other valuable studies include

- [164] G. Grassman, *Studi lucreziani* (Turin, 1896)
- [165] G. Müller, *Die Darstellung der Kinetik bei Lukrez* (Berlin, 1959)
- [166] K. Sallmann, 'Studien zum philosophischen Naturbegriff der Römer mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Lukrez', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 7 (1962), 140-284
- [167] D. West, 'Lucretius' methods of argument', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 25 (1975), 94-116
- [168] D.J. Furley, 'Lucretius and the Stoics', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 13 (1966), 13-33

whose scepticism about Lucretius' interest in the Stoics is contested by

- [169] J. Schmidt, *Lukrez und die Stoiker. Quellen und Untersuchungen zu De rerum natura* (Marburg, 1975)

Diogenes of Oenoanda

The standard text of fragments discovered prior to 1970 is

- [170] C.W. Chilton, *Diogenes Oenoandensis* (Leipzig, 1967)
For commentary and translation of these, see
- [171] C.W. Chilton, *Diogenes of Oenoanda. The fragments* (London/New York/Toronto, 1971)
For another edition of the same material, see
- [172] A. Grilli, *Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta* (Milan, 1960)

The new fragments are published as follows:

- [173] M.F. Smith, 'Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda discovered and rediscovered', *American Journal of Archaeology* 74 (1970), 51-62 (new fr. 1-4)
- [174] M.F. Smith, 'New fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *American Journal of Archaeology* 75 (1971), 357-89 (new fr. 5-16)
- [175] M.F. Smith, 'Two new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 92 (1972), 147-55 (new fr. 17-18)
- [176] M.F. Smith, 'New readings in the text of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 22 (1972), 159-62 (new fr. 1, 2, 7)
- [177] D. Clay, 'Sailing to Lampsacus: Diogenes of Oenoanda. New Fragment 7', *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 14 (1973), 49-59
- [178] M.F. Smith, 'Thirteen new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', in *Denkschrift Akad. Wien* 117 (1974) (new fr. 19-31)

- [179] M.F. Smith, 'Seven new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *Hermathena* 118 (1972), 110-29 (new fr. 32-8)
- [180] M.F. Smith, 'More new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', in [99], 279-318 (new fr. 39-51)
- [181] A. Laks, C. Milloc, 'Réexamen de quelques fragments de Diogène d'Oenoanda sur l'âme, la connaissance et la fortune', in [99], 321-57
- [182] A. Baragatti, 'Sui nuovi frammenti di Diogene d'Oenoanda', *Prometheus* 3 (1977), 1-20, 97-111
- [183] G. Arrighetti, 'Il nuovo Diogene di Oenoanda', *Atene e Roma* n.s. 23 (1978), 161-72
- [184] M.F. Smith, 'Diogenes of Oenoanda, New Fragment 24', *American Journal of Philology* 99 (1978) 329-31
- [185] M.F. Smith, 'Fifty-five new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *Anatolian Studies* 28 (1978), 39-92 (new fr. 32-106)
- [186] M.F. Smith, 'Eight new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *Anatolian Studies* 29 (1979), 69-89 (new fr. 107-14)
- [187] M.F. Smith, 'Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fragments 115-121', *Prometheus* 8 (1982), 193-212
- [188] R. Westman, 'Zu einigen new fragments des Diogenes von Oenoanda', in [100], 174-84
- [189] M.F. Smith, 'Diogenes of Oenoanda, new fragments 122-124', *Anatolian Studies* 34 (1984), 43-57

For details of other work on Diogenes of Oenoanda, see

- [100] M.F. Smith's bibliography in [100], 683-95

4-15 Epicurean physics

4-5 First principles

See Clay [162], Asmis [225], and

- [191] D. Clay, 'Epicurus' last will and testament', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55 (1973), 252-80
- [192] J. Brunschwig, 'L'argument d'Epicure sur l'immuabilité du tout', in *Permanence de la philosophie: mélanges offerts à Joseph Morron* (Neuchâtel, 1977), 127-50
- [193] F. Solmsen, 'Epicurus on void, matter and genesis', *Phronesis* 22 (1977), 263-81, repr. in [29] III, 333-51

5-6, 11 Void and motion

On the concept of void, see Solmsen [193], and

- [194] F. Adorno, 'Epicuro. *Epistola a Erodotto* 39,7-40,3', *Elenchos* 1 (1980), 243-75
- [195] B. Inwood, 'The origin of Epicurus' concept of void', *Classical Philology* 76 (1981), 273-85
- [196] D. Sedley, 'Two conceptions of vacuum', *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 175-93

On the relationship of motion to void, see Müller [165], Inwood [195], and

- [197] D. Furley, 'Aristotle and the atomists on motion in a void', in P.K. Machamer, R.G. Turnbull (edd.), *Motion and time, space and matter: interrelations in the history and philosophy of science* (Columbus, 1976), 83-100
- [198] J. Mau, 'Raum und Bewegung: zu Epikurs Brief zu Herodot 60', *Hermes* 82 (1954), 13

7 Secondary attributes, time, etc.

- The Lucretius text, **7A**, has been much discussed by editors, and in a helpful note by [199] K. Wellmley, 'Lucretius 1.469-70', *Classical Review* n.s. 13 (1963), 16-17.
- On the Epicurean treatment of time, cf. Sorabji [22], and
- [200] D. Puliga, 'χρόνος e θάνατος in Epicuro', *Eleusios* 4 (1983), 235-60
and the Epicurean papyrus text discussed in
- [201] R. Cantarella, G. Arrighetti, 'Il libro "Sul tempo" (Pap. Herc. 1413) dell'opera di Epicuro "Sulla natura"', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 2 (1972), 5-46
- [202] M. Isnardi Parente, 'χρόνος ἐπινοούμενος e χρόνος οὐ νοούμενος in Epicuro Pap. Herc. 1413', *Parola del Passato* 167 (1976), 168-75

8 Atoms

- See Leone [126] for Epicurus' critique of Plato's theory of the elements; and for some useful cautionary remarks about an Epicurean 'molecular' theory, see
- [203] R.B. Todd, review of Long [3], *Phoenix* 29 (1975), 295-9

9 Minimal parts

- Epicurus' theory has been most illuminatingly discussed by
- [204] D.J. Furley, *Two studies in the Greek atomism* (Princeton, 1967)
- Other contributions include Kramer [12], Sorabji [22], Sedley [105], Mueller [652¹], and
- [205] J. Man, *Zum Problem der Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten* (Berlin, 1954)
- [206] D. Konstan, 'Problems in Epicurean physics', *Isis* 70 (1979), 394-418, repr. in J.P. Anton, A. Preus (edd.), *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* 3 (Albany, 1983), 431-64
- [207] D. Konstan, 'Ancient atomism and its heritage: minimal parts', *Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1982), 60-75
and the unorthodox view of
- [208] G. Vlastos, 'Minimal parts in Epicurean atomism', *Isis* 56 (1965), 121-47

- For Diodorus Cronus' theory of minimal parts, cf. Sedley [11], Giannantoni [16], and
- [209] N. Denyer, 'The atomism of Diodorus Cronus', *Phronesis* 13 (1981), 33-45

10 Infinity

- [210] D.J. Furley, 'Aristotle and the atomists on infinity', in I. Düring (ed.), *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast* (Heidelberg, 1969), 83-96
- [211] D.J. Furley, 'The Greek theory of the infinite universe', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42 (1981), 371-85
- [212] H.B. Gottschalk, 'Lucretius 1.983', *Classical Philology* 70 (1975), 42-4
- [213] J. Avouin, 'On some Epicurean and Lucretian arguments for the infinity of the universe', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 33 (1983), 421-7
- [214] D. Konstan, 'Epicurus on "up" and "down"' (*Letter to Herodotus 60*), *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 269-78

11 Anti-teleology

- For Epicurus' doctrines concerning nature, chance and teleology, see Schwyzler [247], and
- [215] I. Solmsen, 'Epicurus and cosmological theories', *American Journal of Philology* 72 (1951), 1-23, repr. in his [29] I, 461-83

- [216] F. Solmsen, 'Epicurus on the growth and decline of the cosmos', *American Journal of Philology* 74 (1953), 34–57, repr. in his [29] i, 483–501.
- [217] P. De Lacy, 'Limit and variation in the Epicurean philosophy', *Phronesis* 23 (1980), 104–13.
- [218] J. Moreau, 'Le mécanisme épicurien et l'ordre de la nature', *Les Études Philosophiques* 30 (1975), 467–86.
- [219] A.A. Long, 'Chance and natural law in Epicureanism', *Phronesis* 22 (1977), 61–88.

14 Soul

The fullest modern discussion is

- [220] G.B. Kerferd, 'Epicurus' doctrine of the soul', *Phronesis* 16 (1971), 80–96.

15 Sensation etc.

For the mechanisms of sense perception, sleep and dreaming, see Asmus [225], Hahn [49], and

- [221] P.H. Schrijvers, 'La pensée d'Epicure et de Lucrèce sur le sommeil', in [99], 229–59.
- [222] D. Clay, 'An Epicurean interpretation of dreams', *American Journal of Philology* 101 (1980), 342–65.
- [223] I. Avotins, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias on vision in the atomism', *Classical Quarterly* 83.30 (1989), 429–54.
- [224] L. Asmus, 'Lucretius' explanation of moving dream figures at 4.76b–76', *American Journal of Philology* 102 (1981), 138–45.

16–19 Epicurean epistemology

The most comprehensive and scholarly treatment of this topic is

- [225] E. Asmus, *Epicurus' scientific method* (Ithaca/London, 1984).

For earlier accounts, cf. especially Bailey [10], and

- [226] F. Merbach, *De Epicuri ratione* (Leipzig, 1909).

16 Sensation

The thesis that all impressions are true is interestingly discussed by

- [227] G. Striker, 'Epicurus on the truth of sense impressions', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60 (1977), 125–42, although our own interpretation owes more to
- [228] C.C.W. Taylor, '"All perceptions are true"', in [3], 105–24. Epicurus' reaction to scepticism is examined by Gignante [126], Fowler [127], and
- [229] M.F. Burnyeat, 'The upside down back to front sceptic of Lucretius 4.72', *Philologus* 127 (1978), 197–206.

Further aspects are treated in

- [230] F. Solmsen, 'Aëtios in Aristotelian and Epicurean thought', in his [29] i, 612–33.
- [231] W. Detel, 'Aëtios und *λογισμός*: zwei Probleme der epikureischen Methodologie', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1975), 21–35.
- [232] A.A. Long, 'Aëtios, *prolepsis*, and linguistic theory in Epicurus', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 18 (1971), 124–33.
- [233] E.N. Lee, 'The sense of an object: Epicurus on seeing and hearing', in P.K. Machamer, R.G. Turnbull (eds.), *Studies in perception* (Columbus, 1978), 27–52.

- [234] D. K. Glidden, 'Epicurus on self-perception', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1979), 297-306.
 [235] D. K. Glidden, 'Sensus and sense perception in the *De rerum natura*', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 12 (1981), 155-81.
 [236] D. Sedley, 'Epicurus on the common sensibles', in [28].

17 The criteria of truth

- On the Epicurean criteria, especially 'preconception', see Long [232], Sedley [126], Striker [9], and
 [237] A. Manuwald, *Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs* (Bonn, 1972).
 [238] V. Goldschmidt, 'Remarques sur l'origine épicurienne de la préconception', in [41], 155-69.
 [239] D. K. Glidden, 'Epicurean prolepsis', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1985), 175-218.

18 Scientific methodology

- See Striker [9], De Lacy [152], Asmus [225], and
 [240] R. Philippson, *De Philodemii libro qui est *Περί σημείων και σημειώσεων** (Berlin, 1883).
 [241] D. J. Furley, 'Knowledge of atoms and void in Epicureanism', in J. P. Anton, G. L. Kustas (edd.), *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* 1 (Albany, 1971), 607-19.
 [242] A. Wasserstein, 'Epicurean science', *Hermes* 106 (1978), 484-94.
 [243] D. Sedley, 'On signs', in [6], 239-72.

For Epicurus' idiosyncratic doctrine on the size of the sun, see Sedley [105], Romeo [144].

19 Language

- Epicurus' theory of the origin of language has been much discussed. See especially Giussani [164], Cole [273], Sedley [126], Glidden [234], and
 [244] G. Vlastos, 'On the prelusory in Diodorus', *American Journal of Philology* 67 (1946), 51-9.
 [245] H. Dahlmann, *De philosophorum graecorum sententiis ad loquellae originem pertinentibus capita duo* (Leipzig, 1928).
 [246] C. W. Chilton, 'The Epicurean theory of the origin of language', *American Journal of Philology* 83 (1962), 139-67.
 [247] P. H. Schrijvers, 'La pensée de Lucrèce sur l'origine du langage', *Adhymosyne* 27 (1974), 337-64.
 [248] J. Brunschwig, 'Épicure et le problème du langage privé', *Revue des Sciences Humaines* 43 (1977), 157-77.

On the relation of language to epistemology, see Long [232], Manuwald [237], Sedley [126], Asmus [225], and

- [249] P. H. De Lacy, 'The Epicurean analysis of language', *American Journal of Philology* 60 (1939), 85-92.
 [250] D. K. Glidden, 'Epicurean semantics', in [100], 185-226.

20-5 Epicurean ethics

- For general treatments, see Bailey [89], Rist [95], Long [3]. Peste [97]. Ethics and moral psychology are treated in more detail by
 [251] M. Guyau, *La Morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines* (ed. S. Parné, 1910).

- [252] H. Steckel, *Epicurus: Prinzip der Einheit von Schmerzlosigkeit und Lust* (Göttingen, 1960)
 [253] D. Konstan, *Some aspects of Epicurean psychology* (Leiden, 1973)
 and with enormous learning in Diado [102], of which we cite separately
 [254] C. Diado, 'Note epicuree', *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 12 (1935), 61-86, 237-89

20 Free will

Important studies include Guyau [251] and Bailey [89], but new precision was injected into the discussion by Furley's study in [204]. In his wake, recent contributions have included Long [3] and

- [255] I. Avotins, 'The question of *mens* in Lucretius 2.289', *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 29 (1979), 95-100
 [256] M. Isnardi Parente, 'Stoici, epicurei e il "morosissime causa"', *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* 35 (1980), 23-31
 [257] K. Kleve, 'Id facit exiguum clinamen', *Symbolae Osloenses* 55 (1980), 27-30
 [258] D. Fowler, 'Lucretius on the *clinamen* and "free will" (II 251-93)', in [100], 329-52
 [259] T.J. Saunders, 'Free will and the atomic swerve in Lucretius', *Symbolae Osloenses* 59 (1984), 37-59

Our own view is more fully developed in

- [260] D. Sedley, 'Epicurus' refutation of determinism', in [100], 11-51

For an excellent critique of current scholarship on the matter, together with a novel interpretation, cf.

- [261] W.G. Engler, *Epicurus on the swerve and voluntary action* (Atlanta, Georgia, 1987)

For a useful assessment of Epicurus' historical importance on this issue, cf.

- [262] P.M. Huby, 'The first discovery of the free will problem', *Philosophy* 42 (1967), 353-62

21, 25 Pleasure, tranquillity

On pleasure and the foundations of Epicurean ethics, cf. Gosling/Taylor [19], and

- [263] J. Brunschwig, 'The cradle argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism', in [7], 113-44
 [264] J.M. Rist, 'Pleasure, 300-300 B.C.', *Phoenix* 28 (1974), 167-79
 [265] P. Merlan, *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle* (Wiesbaden, 1960), chapter 1
 [266] G. Giannantonio, 'Il piacere cinetico nell'etica epicurea', *Eleonchi* 5 (1984), 25-44
 [267] M. Hossenfelder, 'Epicurus' hedonist malgré lui', in [7], 245-63

On tranquillity, and the value of philosophy, cf.

- [268] D. Clay, 'Epicurus' *Κυρία Δόξα* XVII', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13 (1972), 59-66
 [269] A. Grilli, 'ΔΙΑΦΕΣΙΣ in Epicurus', in [100], 93-109
 [270] M. Nussbaum, 'Therapeutic arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle', in [7], 31-74
 [271] M. Gigante, 'Philosophia medicans in Filodemo', *Crusatche Ercolauri* 5 (1975), 53-61

22 Society

On friendship and society, cf.

- [272] R. Philippson, 'Die Rechtsphilosophie der Epikureer', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 23 (1910), 289-337, 433-46 = [103], 27-89
 [273] T. Cole, *Democritus and the origins of Greek anthropology* (Cleveland, 1967)
 [274] J. Bollack, 'Les maximes de l'amitié', in [98], 221-36

- [275] R. Müller, *Die epikureische Gesellschaftstheorie* (Berlin, 1972)
- [276] V. Goldschmidt, *La doctrine d'Epicure et le droit* (Paris, 1977)
- [277] J.M. Rist, 'Epicurus on friendship', *Classical Philology* 75 (1980), 121-9
- [278] D.J. Furley, 'Lucretius the Epicurean: On the history of man', in [163], 1-37
- [279] N. Denyer, 'The origins of justice', in [100], 133-52
- [280] A.A. Long, 'Pleasure and social utility: the virtues of being Epicurean', in [8], 283-324
- [281] P. Mitsis, 'Friendship and altruism in Epicureanism', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1987)

23 God

Epicurean theology has generated more than its fair share of scholarly literature. The following is a small selection. An outline of the view, which we advance was first offered by a Kantian

- [282] E.A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus* (ed. 2, Kurlahn, 1873) I, 70-7 and a version of it is adopted by Bollack [123]. A fascinating portrayal of the place of theology in Epicurus' system, in a brilliant book marred only by excessive reliance on extravagantly restored papyrus texts, is
- [283] A.J. Festugière, *Epicurus and his gods* (Engl. transl., Oxford, 1955; 2nd French ed., with revisions, Paris, 1968)

Two major recent contributions are

- [284] K. Kleve, *Circeus theon*, in *Symbolae Osloenses* suppl. 19 (Oslo, 1965)
- [285] D. Lemke, *Die Theologie Epikurs* (Munich, 1973)

Other important studies include chapter 2 of Merlan [265], Dicks [151], Henrich [529], and

- [286] W. Scott, 'The physical constitution of the Epicurean gods', *Journal of Philology* 12 (1883), 212-47
- [287] W. Schmid, 'Götter und Menschen in Theologie Epikurs', *Rheinisches Museum* 94 (1951), 97-156
- [288] G. Pflügersdorffer, 'Cicero über Epikurs Lehre vom Wesen der Götter (nat. deor. 1.49)', *Wiener Studien* 70 (1957), 235-63
- [289] J. Brunschwig, review of Kleve [284], *Revue des Études Grecques* 77 (1964), 352-6
- [290] K. Kleve, 'On the beauty of god: A discussion between Epicureans, Stoics and sceptics', *Symbolae Osloenses* 53 (1978), 69-83
- [291] D.D. Obbink, 'P. Oxy. 215 and Epicurean religious theory', *Atti del XVII congresso internazionale di papirologia* (Naples, 1984), 607-19

There is also much useful comparative material in Pease [329]

24 Death

Aspects of the Epicurean treatment of death are discussed in Sorabji [22], Pülga [200], and

- [292] M. Gigante, 'La chiusa del *De morte* di Filidemo', in [147]
- [293] J. Fallot, *Il piacere e la morte nella filosofia di Epicuro* (Turin, 1977)
- [294] D.J. Furley, 'Nothing to us?', in [7], 75-91

For a critique of Lucretius' argument in 24E, cf.

- [295] T. Nagel, *Mortal questions* (Cambridge, 1979), chapter 3

26-67 STOICISM

General

The most comprehensive short introduction is

- [296] F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London, 1975)

On Stoicism at Rome, much of value may still be learned from

- [297] E.V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge, 1911)

The most thorough general study, with valuable testimonia in the second volume, is

- [298] M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (ed. 2, Göttingen, 1959, later editions do not alter the main text)

More philosophically stimulating are

- [299] E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme* (ed. 2, Paris, 1951)
 [300] J. Christensen, *An essay on the unity of Stoic philosophy* (Copenhagen, 1962)
 [301] L. Edelstein, *The meaning of Stoicism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)

More specialized are

- [302] V. Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps* (ed. 4, Paris, 1979)
 [303] J.M. Rist, *Stoic philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969)

An important monograph which calls in question the influence of Aristotle is

- [304] F.H. Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics*. (*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, suppl. 10, 1985)

Four anthologies of articles on various aspects of Stoicism are

- [305] Association Guillaume Budé, *Actes du VII^e congrès* (Paris, 1964)
 [306] A.A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (London, 1971)
 [307] J.M. Rist (ed.), *The Stoics* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1978)
 [308] R. Epp (ed.), *Spindel Conference 1984, recovering the Stoics*. (*Southern Journal of Philosophy*, xxxiii suppl., 1985)

See in particular the survey articles

- [309] R. Epp, 'Stoicism bibliography', in [308] 125-82: a list of over 1,100 publications
 [310] J.M. Rist, 'Stoicism: some reflections on the state of the art', in [308], 1-11

Two fundamental studies, more comprehensive than their titles suggest, are

- [311] A. Bonhöffer, *Epiker und die Stoa* (Stuttgart, 1890)
 [312] A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiker* (Stuttgart, 1894)

Various historical aspects of Stoicism are treated in [305], especially in

- [313] P. Boyancé, 'Le stoïcisme à Rome', in [305], 218-55
 and also in
 [314] J.-M. André, *La Philosophie à Rome* (Paris, 1977)
 [315] A.A. Long, 'Stoa and sceptical Academy: origins and growth of a tradition', *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 5 (1980), 161-74
 [316] A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics* (Leiden, 1972)
 [317] M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des pères de l'Eglise: de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1957)

- [318] M. Spannecq, *Permanence du stoïcisme, de Zénon à Maïtraux* (Gembloux, 1973)
 [319] G. Verbeke, *The presence of Stoicism in medieval thought* (Washington, D.C., 1983)

Texts, commentaries and translations

The basic collection of material on Stoicism from Zeno to Stoic philosophers of the mid-second century B.C. is still

- [320] H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-5); vol. 4, indexes by M. Adler (Leipzig, 1924). Standardly abbreviated as *SVF*.

However, for all material relating to grammar and semantics, epistemology and logic, Arnim's selection has been eclipsed by the monumental collection, with German translation, by

- [321] K. Hülsen, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker* (forthcoming)
 An antiquated but still valuable study is
 [322] A.C. Pearson, *The fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* (London, 1891)

For Panaetius, the standard edition is

- [323] M. van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta* (ed. 3, Leiden, 1962)

For Posidonius, a collection based entirely on named fragments is

- [324] L. Edelstein, I.G. Kidd, *Posidonius. Vol. 1, the fragments* (Cambridge, 1972), vol. 2, a commentary by I.G. Kidd, will appear shortly

A further collection, which includes some unnamed fragments, and commentary is

- [325] W. Theiler, *Posidonios, die Fragmente*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1982)

For editions of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, see vol. 1 Index of sources. A number of further editions, most with commentary and some also with translation, have valuable notes on fragments of Chrysippus and other Stoics:

- [326] H. Cherniss, *Plutarch, Moralia XIII*, part II. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass./London, 1976).
 [327] P. De Lacy, *Galen On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (*Corpus medicorum Graecorum* V.4.12), 3 vols. (Berlin, 1978-84); the third volume, containing the notes, appeared too late for us to consult
 [328] J.S. Reid (ed.), *Cicero. Academica* (London, 1885)
 [329] A.S. Pease (ed.), *Cicero. De natura deorum*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1935-8)
 [330] A.S.L. Farquharson (ed.), *Marcus Aurelius. Meditations*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1944)
 [331] M. Billerbeck, *Epiktet von Kynismos* (Leiden, 1978)
 [332] R.B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic physics* (Leiden, 1976)
 [333] R.W. Sharples, *Alexander of Aphrodisias On fate* (London, 1983)
 [334] T. Dorandi, 'Filodemo, Gli stoici (PHerc. 155 e 339)', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 12 (1982), 91-

[33]

Studies of individual Stoic philosophers

Much of the recent research has focused, with the exception of Posidonius and Roman Stoicism, on concepts and arguments which it is easier to credit to Chrysippus or to early Stoicism in general than to other individual Stoics. There are, however, a good many studies which isolate, or seek to isolate, the contributions of Zeno, Cleanthes, and others.

We list these separately here - with cross-references, as appropriate, in the bibliography of topics.

Zeno

- [335] M. Pohlenz, 'Zeno und Chrysipp', *Notizblatt der Akad. der Wiss. in Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl. 12.9 (1938), 173-210.
- [336] M. Pohlenz, 'Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie', *Abh. der Göttingen Gesell.*, phil.-hist. Kl. 3.26 (1940), 1-122.
- [337] K. von Fritz, 'Zeno von Kitium', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, suppl. 10A.
- [338] H.C. Baldry, 'Zeno's ideal state', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 79 (1959), 3-15.
- [339] L. Scroux, *Vergleich und Metaphor in der Lehre des Zenon von Kitium* (Berlin, 1965).
- [340] A. Graeser, *Zenon von Kitium. Positionen und Probleme* (Berlin, 1975).
- [341] J. A. K. Hunt, *A physical interpretation of the universe. The doctrines of Zeno the Stoic* (Melbourne, 1976).
- [342] J. M. Rist, 'Zeno and Stoic consistency', *Phronesis* 22 (1977), 161-74, repr. in J. P. Anton, A. Preus (edd.), *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* 1 (Albany, 1983), 405-77.
- [343] J. M. Rist, 'Zeno and the origins of Stoic logic', in [411], 387-409.
- [344] J. Mansfeld, 'Zeno of Citium: critical observations on a recent study', *Mnemosyne* 31 (1978), 134-74 (review of [349]).
- [345] M. Schofield, 'The syllogisms of Zeno of Citium', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 31-58.

Aristo

His interesting and unorthodox contributions have been excellently studied by

- [346] A. M. Ioppolo, *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico* (Rome, 1980) which prompted two review articles,
- [347] M. Schofield, 'Ariston of Chios and the unity of virtue', *Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1984), 83-96.
- [348] N. White, 'Nature and regularity in Stoic ethics: a discussion of Anna Maria Ioppolo', *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico*, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1985), 289-306.

Erillo

- [349] A. M. Ioppolo, 'Lo stoicismo di Erillo', *Phronesis* 32 (1985), 58-74.

Cleanthes

In general, see Pearson [322], and

- [350] G. Verbeke, *Cleanthes van Assos* (Brussels, 1949).
- [351] J. D. Meerwaldt, 'Cleanthes' I and II, *Mnemosyne* 4 (1951), 40-69, 5 (1952), 1-12.

On his contributions to physics, see

- [352] F. Solmsen, 'Cleanthes or Posidonios? The basis of Stoic physics', in his [29] 1, 430-60.
- [353] A. A. Long, 'Heracleitus and Stoicism', *Philosophia* 516 (1975/6), 133-56.

His *Hymn to Zeus* has generated an extensive literature, including editions by Pearson [322], and

- [354] J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford, 1925), 227-9.
- [355] G. Zuntz, 'Zum Kleantes-Hymnus', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1956), 289-308 and discussions by Meerwaldt [351], Long [353], and

- [156] E. Neustadt, 'Der Zeushymnus des Kleantes', *Hermes* 66 (1931), 387-401
 [157] A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II* (Paris, 1949), 310-32
 [158] M. Marcovich, 'Zum Zeushymnus des Kleantes', *Hermes* 94 (1966), 245-50
 [159] G. Luntz, 'Vers 4 des Kleantes-Hymnus', *Rheinisches Museum* 122 (1979), 97-8
 [160] A. W. James, 'The Zeus hymns of Kleantes and Apollonius', *Antichthon* 6 (1972), 28-38
 [161] M. Dragouza-Monachou, 'Ο ὕμνος στὸ Δία καὶ τὰ Χρυσῶς ἐπη. Ἡ ποιητικὴ θεολογία τοῦ Κλεάνθη καὶ ἡ Ὀρφικο-Πυθαγορική παραδοσὴ', *Philosophia* 1 (1971), 139-78 (includes summary in English)

Chrysippus

- See especially Pohlenz [335], [336], Bréhier [299], Chernus [326], and
 [362] J. B. Gould, *The philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leiden, 1970)
 [363] D. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris, 1969)

Diegeis of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus

Much of the literature concerns their contributions to the doctrine of the ethical end (64), see [390] [593]

Panaetius

- In addition to van Straaten's collection of fragments [323], there are general studies by
 [364] A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt* (Berlin, 1892)
 [365] B. N. Tatakis, *Panétius de Rhodes le fondateur du moyen stoïcisme* (Paris, 1931)
 [366] M. van Straaten, *Panétius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine* (Amsterdam, 1946)
 See also
 [367] R. Philippson, 'Das Sittlich-schöne bei Panaetios', *Philologus* 85 (1930), 357-413
 [368] A. Giolla, 'Studi paneziani', *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 29 (1957), 31-97
 [369] F. A. Steimetz, *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaetius nach einer Analyse von Ciceros Laelius De amicitia* (Wiesbaden, 1967)
 [370] A. Dyck, 'The plan of Panaetius' *Ἡερὶ τοῦ κατ'ἑκόντος*', *American Journal of Philology* 190 (1979), 408-16
 [371] A. Dyck, 'On Panaetius' conception of μεγαλοψυχία', *Museum Helveticum* 38 (1981), 153-61

Posidonius

For collections of the fragments, see [324], [325].

The older German studies were based on an over-generous conception of Posidonius' presence in texts where he is not named. In spite of these shortcomings one such study is still important.

- [372] K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie: neue Untersuchungen über Posidonios* (Munich, 1926)
 A much more critical approach was developed by
 [373] L. Edelstein, 'The philosophical system of Posidonius', *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), 286-325
 and see also
 [374] J. F. Dobson, 'The Posidonius myth', *Classical Quarterly* 12 (1918), 179-93

The best comprehensive studies, for the present, are

- [375] A.D. Nock, 'Posidonius', *Journal of Roman Studies* 40 (1950), 1–16
 [376] M. Laffranque, *Posidonios d'Apamée* (Paris, 1964)

For study of details, see Pohlenz [336] and

- [377] G. Nebel, 'Zur Ethik des Posidonios', *Hermes* 74 (1939), 14–37
 [378] H.L. Hujmans, 'Posidonius' ethics', *Acta Classica* 2 (1959), 27–42
 [379] I.G. Kidd, 'Posidonius on emotions', in [306], 290–15
 [380] A. Dihle, 'Posidonius' system of moral philosophy', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 93 (1973), 30–7
 [381] I.G. Kidd, 'Posidonius and logic', in [411], 273–94
 [382] I.G. Kidd, 'Philosophy and science in Posidonius', *Antike und Abendland* 24 (1978), 7–15
 [383] I.G. Kidd, 'Eupnoctia – precursor to disease', in [546], 107–13

Stoics of the Roman imperial age

The Stoicism of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius cannot be covered adequately here. However, see especially Bonheffer [311], [312], Arnold [297], Sandbach [296], and

- [384] M.T. Griffin, *Seneca, a philosopher in politics* (Oxford, 1976)
 [385] A.A. Long, 'Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius', in T.J. Luce (ed.), *Ancient writers II* (New York, 1982), 985–1002
 [386] J. Xenakos, *Epictetus, philosopher therapist* (The Hague, 1969)
 [387] M. Dragona-Metachou, 'Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus', *Philosophia* 89 (1978), 265–310
 [388] P.A. Brunt, 'Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*', *JRS* 64 (1974), 1–29
 [389] J.M. Rist, 'Are you a Stoic? The case of Marcus Aurelius', in B.F. Meyer, L.P. Sanders (ed.), *Jewish and Christian self-definition III* (Philadelphia, 1982), 23–45

for Hierocles, see [374], [575].

26 The philosophical curriculum

See Kidd [381], [382], Kerferd [479], Long [429], and

- [390] A. Dihle, 'Philosophie, Fachwissenschaft, Allgemeinbildung', in [8], 185–231

27–30 Stoic ontology

Two pioneering studies on the concept of 'incorporeals' and 'something' are Goldschmidt [302] and

- [391] E. Bréhier, *La Théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1910)

For various aspects of Stoic metaphysics, see Rieth [551] and

- [392] A.C. Lloyd, 'Activity and description in Aristotle and the Stoa', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 56 (1970), 227–40

On existence and subsistence, cf. Long [426], 88–90, and

- [393] V. Goldschmidt, 'ἐμπόρεον et ἐφεστάναι dans la philosophie stoïcienne', *Revue des Études Grecques* 85 (1972), 331–44

What are called in this work the 'four genera', traditionally called the 'four categories', are discussed by

- [394] P.H. de Lacy, 'The Stoic categories as methodological principles', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Society* 76 (1945), 246-63
 [395] M.F. Resor, 'The Stoic concept of quality', *American Journal of Philology* 75 (1954), 40-58
 [396] M.F. Resor, 'The Stoic categories', *American Journal of Philology* 78 (1957), 63-82
 [397] M.F. Resor, 'Ποιον and ποιότης in Stoic philosophy', *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 279-85
 [398] J.-M. Rist, 'Categories and their uses', in [303], 152-72 and [306], 38-57 and suggestions about their connexion with parts of speech are made by
 [399] A.C. Lloyd, 'Grammar and metaphysics in the Stoa', in [306], 58-74

For an attempt to discover an alternative system of Stoic categories in Simplicius, see

- [400] A. Graeser, 'The Stoic categories', in [411], 199-222

Our interpretation of the theory of universals is also developed in

- [401] D. Sedley, 'The Stoic theory of universals', in [308], 87-92

For a full discussion of material treated in 28, see

- [402] D. Sedley, 'The Stoic criterion of identity', *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 255-75 and for parallel Aristotelian treatment of one of the central issues, cf
 [403] G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The principle of individuation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl. 27 (1953), 83-96, repr. in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (ed.), *Articles on Aristotle III* (London, 1979)

31-8 Stoic logic and semantics

For the texts and German translation, see Hülser [321]. Landmarks in the modern rediscovery and reappraisal of Stoic logic include the pioneering

- [404] B. Mates, *Stoic logic* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1953)
 [405] W. and M. Kneale, *The development of logic* (Oxford, 1962), 113-76
 [406] M. Mugnucci, *Il significato della logica stoica* (ed. 2, Bologna, 1967) and the most authoritative analysis of the formal logic,
 [407] M. Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen, 1974)

A valuable introduction to the subject is

- [408] I. Muelier, 'An introduction to Stoic logic', in [307], 1-26

See also

- [409] W.H. Hay, 'Stoic use of logic', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 51 (1969), 245-57

Recent work is surveyed by

- [410] V. Celluprica, 'La logica stoica in alcune recenti interpretazioni', *Eleonchos* 3 (1980), 123-50

For a rich collection of papers on all aspects of the subject, see

- [411] J. Brunschwig (ed.), *Les Stoiciens et leur logique* (Paris, 1978)

Our topic that still awaits full investigation is the growth of Stoic logic out of that of the Dialectical school. Some of our ideas on this are developed in Sedley [31], but we are also heavily indebted to a monograph which discerns evidence for the Dialectical school in some texts which scholars have previously taken to represent the Stoics themselves.

- [412] T. Ebert, *Dialektiker und frühe Stoaiker bei Sextus Empiricus* (forthcoming).

On contribution by individual Stoics, see Bast [343], Schofield [345], Kidd [381].

Stoic grammatical theory falls largely outside the scope of our collection. For evidence and discussions, see Lloyd [399], and

- [413] R. T. Schmidt, *Die Grammatik der Stoiker*, German transl. of the 1839 Latin edition by K. Hülsen, with new introduction and bibliography by U. Egh (Wiesbaden, 1979).
 [414] H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, 2 vols. (ed. 2, Berlin, 1890-2).
 [415] K. Barwick, *Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1957).
 [416] J. Pinborg, 'Historiography of linguistics: classical antiquity: Greece', in *Current Trends in Linguistics* 13 (The Hague, 1975), 69-126.
 [417] M. Frede, 'Some remarks on the origin of traditional grammar', in R. Bates, J. Hintikka (edd.), *Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science* (Dordrecht, 1976), 609-37.
 [418] M. Frede, 'Principles of Stoic grammar', in [307], 27-76.
 [419] D. L. Blank, *Ancient philosophy and grammar: the Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus* (Claremont, California, 1982).
 [420] P. Hadot, 'La notion de "cas" dans la logique stoïcienne', *Annales du XXX^e congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française* (Geneva, 1966), 109-12.

31-2 *Dialectic and rhetoric*

For the general philosophical significance of dialectic, see

- [421] A. A. Long, 'Dialectic and the Stoic sage', in [307], 101-24.
 [422] K. Hülsen, 'Expression and content in Stoic linguistic theory', in R. Bauerle, U. Egh, A. von Stechow (edd.), *Semantics from different points of view* (Heidelberg, 1979), 287-306.

On the Stoics' contributions to rhetoric, see Barwick [415], and

- [423] G. Kennedy, *The art of persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963).

32 *Definition and division*

See Rieth [551], 45-54, and cf. an interesting related study,

- [424] D. E. Hahn, 'The dialectic method and the purpose of Arius' doxography', in [446], 15-37.

33 *Sayables (lekta)*

The theory of the *lekton* has been extensively discussed in recent years. In addition to Mates [404], Kneale [405], Watson [464], Hadot [420], see

- [425] C. H. Kahn, 'Stoic logic and Stoic logos', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 51 (1969), 158-72.
 [426] A. A. Long, 'Language and thought in Stoicism', in [306], 75-113.
 [427] G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the proposition: Ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity* (Amsterdam, 1973).
 [428] J. D. G. Evans, 'The Old Stoa on the truth-value of oaths', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* N. S. 20 (1974), 43-7.
 [429] A. A. Long, 'The Stoic distinction between truth and the true', in [411], 297-316.
 [430] A. Graeser, 'The Stoic theory of meaning', in [307], 77-100.
 [431] U. Egh, 'Stoic syntax and semantics', in [411], 135-54.
 [432] G. B. Kerferl, 'The problem of *synkatartesis* and *katalepsis*', in [411], 451-72.

- [433] W. Detel, R. Hulser, G. Krüger, W. Lorenz, 'Λεγὸν ἐλάττω in der stoischen Sprachphilosophie', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 62 (1980), 276–88

There has been much interest in the thesis that the object of a practical impulse is a predicate [33H]. See Kerferd [603], Inwood [547], chapter 3, and

- [434] A. A. Long, 'The early Stoic concept of moral choice', in *Images of man in ancient and medieval thought: Studies presented to G. Verbeke* (Louvain, 1976), 77–92

34 Simple propositions

Following on the seminal discussion of this topic in Frede [407], see now also

- [435] P. Pacht, 'La deixis selon Zénon et Chrysippe', *Phronesis* 20 (1975), 241–6
 [436] A. C. Lloyd, 'Definite propositions and the concept of reference', in [411], 285–96
 [437] R. Goulet, 'La classification stoïcienne des propositions simples', in [411], 171–98

35 Non-simple propositions

For various aspects of this topic, see Frede [407], Verbeke [483], Burnyeat [484], Sedley [243], and

- [438] J. B. Gould, 'Chrysippus: on the criteria for the truth of a conditional proposition', *Phronesis* 12 (1967), 152–61
 [439] J. Brunschwig, 'Le modèle conjonctif', in [411], 58–86
 [440] D. Sedley, 'The negated conjunction in Stoicism', *Elenchos* 5 (1984), 311–36

36 Arguments

See Frede [407], Schofield [345], Burnyeat [484], and

- [441] J. Mueller, 'Stoic and Peripatetic logic', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 51 (1969), 173–87
 [442] M. Frede, 'Stoic vs. Aristotelian syllogistic', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 56 (1974), 1–32
 [443] J. Gould, 'Deduction in Stoic logic', in J. Corcoran (ed.), *Ancient logic and its modern interpretations* (Boston, 1974), 151–66
 [444] J. Brunschwig, 'Proof defined', in [5], 125–60
 [445] J. Barnes, 'Proof destroyed', in [5], 161–81
 [446] M. Nasti di Vincentis, 'Logica selettiva e implicazione stoica', in [62], 501–32
 [447] M. Nasti di Vincentis, 'Stopper on Nasti's contention and Stoic logic', *Phronesis* 29 (1984), 313–24 (a reply to [63])

For the suggestion of a Peripatetic background to the Stoic indemonstrables, see

- [448] J. Barnes, 'Theophrastus and hypothetical syllogistic', in W. W. Fortenbaugh, P. M. Huby, A. A. Long (edd.), *Theophrastus of Eresus: On his life and work* (New Brunswick/Oxford, 1985), 125–42

37 Fallacy

On the origins and history of various Stoic logical paradoxes, cf. Sedley [11].

The Sorites has aroused much recent discussion, cf. Connors [625], and

- [449] G. Siliotti, 'Alcune considerazioni sull'aporia del sorite', in [40], 75–92
 and the outstanding studies by
 [450] J. Barnes, 'Medicine, experience and logic', in [6], 24–58
 [451] M. F. Burnyeat, 'Gods and heaps', in M. Schofield, M. Nussbaum (edd.), *Language and*

logos: studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge, 1982), 315–31^{ff}

For a history of the Lying Argument, see

- [452] A. Rüstow, *Der Lügner. Theorie, Geschichte, und Auflösung* (Leipzig, 1910)

Stoic treatments of ambiguity are covered in

- [453] R. B. Edlow, *Galen on language and ambiguity* (Lندن, 1977)
 [454] S. Ebbesen, *Commentaries and commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi*, 3 vols. (Lندن, 1981)

38 Modality

The most comprehensive treatment is

- [455] P.-M. Schuhl, *Le Dominateur et les possibles* (Paris, 1969)
 For more sophisticated discussions, especially in relation to the Master Argument, see Kneale [405], and
 [456] A. N. Prior, 'Diodoran modalities', *Philosophical Quarterly* 5 (1955), 205–13, 8 (1958), 226–30
 [457] M. Mugnoli, 'Sur la logique modale des stoiciens', in [413], 317–46
 [458] P. L. Donati, 'Crispino e la nozione del possibile', *Rivista di Filologia* 101 (1973), 333–51
 [459] R. Sorabji, 'Causation, laws, and necessity', in [5], 250–82 (a version of which also appears as chapter 4 of his [21])
 [460] V. Celluprica, 'L'argomento dominatore di Diodoro Crono e il concetto di possibile di Crisippo', in [40], 55–74
 [461] V. Celluprica, 'Necessità megarica e fatalità stoica', *Elenchos* 3 (1982), 361–85
 [462] G. Giannantonio, 'Η κρυπτικὴ λόγος δι' Διοδόρου Κρόνον', *Elenchos* 2 (1981), 239–72
 [463] N. C. Denyer, 'Time and modality in Diodorus Cronus', *Theoria* 47 (1981), 31–53

39–42 Epistemology: Stoics and Academics

The most wide-ranging study of Stoic concepts, though one which deals only briefly with the 'cognitive impression', is

- [464] G. Watson, *The Stoic theory of knowledge* (Belfast, 1966)

For general study of the controversy between Stoics and Academics, see Dal Pra [51], Strough [43], Long [315].

Two outstanding contributions, which first clearly established the nature of the dialectical encounter between Stoics and Academics, are Courissin [73], and

- [465] P. Courissin, 'Le stoicisme de la nouvelle Académie', *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie et d'Histoire Générale de la Civilisation* 36 (1929), 241–76, English trans. in [58], 31–63

Of older studies, valuable material is still to be found in Cicero [624], and

- [466] H. Hartmann, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit. der Streit zwischen Stoa und akademischer Skepsis* (Halle, 1927)

For an innovative study of the history of Academic arguments against Stoics, see

- [467] G. Striker, 'Sceptical strategies', in [5], 54–83

39 Impressions

There is a masterly article on this subject, and on Stoic and Academic epistemology more generally, by

- [468] M. Frede, 'Stoics and skeptics on clear and distinct impressions', in [38], 65–93

See also

- [469] E.P. Arthur, 'Stoic analysis of the mind's reactions to presentations', *Hermes* 111 (1983), 69–78

On 'common conceptions' and 'preconceptions', see the basic study by

- [470] I. H. Sandbach, 'Ennoia and prolepsis' in [306], 22–37 (first publ. in *Classical Quarterly* 24 (1930), 45–51)

and also Watson [464], 22–37, Long [429], 304–9, and

- [471] M. Schofield, 'Preconception, argument and god', in [3], 283–308
[472] R.B. Todd, 'The Stoic common notions', *Symbolae Osloenses* 48 (1973), 47–75

For the use to which the Stoic theory of impressions was put in aesthetics, cf.

- [473] C. Inbert, 'Stoic logic and Alexandrian poetics', in [3], 182–216

40 The criteria of truth

Stoicism is covered in Striker [9], see also Rist [101], chapter 8, Graeser [340], 39–68, and

- [474] F.H. Sandbach, 'Phantasia kataleptike', in [306], 9–21
[475] J. Annas, 'Truth and knowledge', in [3], 84–104
[476] H. von Staden, 'The Stoic theory of perception and its "Platonic" critics', in P.K. Machamer, R.G. Turnbull (edd.), *Studies in perception* (Columbus, 1978), 96–136

For some later developments, see Long [631], and

- [477] A.A. Long, 'Ptolemy On the criterion: an epistemology for the practising scientist', in [28]

41 Knowledge and opinion

For various aspects, see Long [3], 126–31, [429], [426], 99–104; Annas [475]; Arthur [460]; and

- [478] G.B. Kerferd, 'What does the wise man know?', in [307], 125–36
[479] W. Götter, 'Ἀποφύξις ἀσυκκατάθεσσις, zur stoischen Erkenntnistheorie', *Würzburger Jahrbuch für die Altertumswissenschaft* N.F. 3 (1977), 93–92

On the text of 41D, see

- [480] H. von Arnim, 'Über einen stoischen Papyrus der Herculaneischen Bibliothek', *Hermes* 25 (1890), 473–95
[481] M. Capasso, 'Il saggio infallibile (PHerc. 1020 col. 1)', in *La regione sotterranea del Vesuvio* (Naples, 1982), 455–69, which corrects the unfounded reference to Aristotle proposed by
[482] W. Crönert, 'Die *ΛΟΓΙΚΑ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ* des Chrysippos', *Hermes* 36 (1901), 348–79

42 Scientific methodology

For issues relating to the Stoic use of signs, see Long [426], Brunschwig [443], De Lacy [152], Giddell [633], Ebert [412], Sedley [243], and

- [483] G. Verbeke, 'La philosophie du signe chez les stoiciens', in [411], 401–24 and for a seminal study of the theory and its background,
 [484] M. F. Burnyeat, 'The origins of non-deductive inference', in [6], 193–238

For two contrasting views on the extent of Stoic interest in astrology, see

- [485] A. A. Long, 'Astrology: arguments pro and contra', in [6], 165–92
 [486] A. M. Ioppolo, 'L'astrologia nello stoicismo antico', in [48], 75–91

In defence of the Stoic theory of divination, cf

- [487] N. Denyer, 'The case against divination: an examination of Cicero's *De divinatione*', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* N.S. 31 (1985), 1–16

43–55 Stoic physics

The most comprehensive study is

- [488] D. E. Hahm, *The origins of Stoic cosmology* (Columbus, 1977)
 See also

- [489] I. Bloos, *Probleme der stoischen Physik* (Hamburg, 1973)

For an important pioneering work, which suggests interesting analogies between Stoic and modern physics, see

- [490] S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London, 1959)

A useful introduction to the subject is

- [491] M. Lapidge, 'Stoic cosmology', in [307], 161–86

For Heraclitus' influence, see Long [353], for Plato's, Moreau [23], and for that of Platonism, Kötter [12], 108–36

44–5 Principles and body

The most thorough study of the evidence is

- [492] M. Lapidge, 'Archai and stoicheia: a problem in Stoic cosmology', *Phronesis* 18 (1973), 240–78

See also Sandbach [296], 71–5, Graeser [340], 89–118, Hunt [341], 17–26, and

- [493] H. B. Taski, 'Menism and immanence: foundations of Stoic physics', in [307], 157–66

Valuable testimonia are contained in

- [494] J. H. Waszink, *Caledonius in Timaeum* (*Corpus Platoniacum medium*, London/Leiden, 1962)

46 God, fire, cosmic cycle

For cosmogony, see Lapidge [491], and

- [495] D. E. Hahm, 'The Stoic theory of change', in [308], 39–56

For the dialectical background to the cosmic cycle, cf Hahm [488], and the excellent study by

- [496] J. Mansfeld, 'Providence and the destruction of the universe in early Stoic thought', in M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic religions* (Leiden, 1979), 129–88

but we dissent from Mansfeld's view that the conflagration is the best state for the world; see

- [497] A. A. Long, 'The Stoics on world-conflagration and everlasting recurrence' in [168], 13–38.

On the evidence for Zeno from Alexander Tricapolis, see

- [498] P. W. van der Horst, J. Mansfeld, *An Alexandrian Platonist against dualism* (Leiden, 1974).

For god as nature, see

- [499] F. Solmsen, 'Nature as craftsman in Greek thought', in [29], 1, 332–55.

On the Stoic concept of the world-soul, see Morreau [23]. On Zeno's arguments against the eternity of the world, see Graeser [349], 187–296, who follows up the early work of

- [500] E. Zeller, 'Der Streit Thalesphrastis gegen Zenon über die Ewigkeit der Welt', *Heimath* 11 (1876), 422–4.

47. Elements: breath, wind, aether

For the history of the concept of breath, see Solmsen [523], and

- [501] G. Verbeke, *L'Essence de la doctrine du pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustin* (Paris, 1945).
[502] F. Solmsen, 'The vital heat, the inborn pneuma and the aether', in [29], 1, 605–11.

On the elements, and their transformations, there are studies by Hahm [495], and

- [503] J. Longrigg, 'Elementary physics in the Lyceum and Stoa', *Ios* 66 (1973), 211–29.

On the role of Cleanthes in developing Stoic physics, cf. Solmsen [352], and Long [353].

For the concept of tensorial movement, see Sambursky [490], 21–48.

48. Mixtus

For the main evidence, and commentary on it, see Todd [332], and for further discussion

- [504] J. Mansfeld, 'Zeno and Aristotle on mixture', *Mnemosyne* 36 (1983), 306–19.
[505] M. J. White, 'Can unequal quantities of stuffs be really blended?', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* (forthcoming).

49. Place and void

The principal discussion is Hahm [488], 103–25. See also Sambursky [490], 108–15, and Furley [168], 20–1.

50. Continuum

Many issues concerning the continuum, as discussed by the Stoics and their adversaries, are illuminated by Sorabji [22] and Mueller [162]. There is some challenging speculation in

- [506] J. Mansfeld, 'Incommensurism and formalism: Zeno's definition of geometry in a fragment of L. Calpurnius Taurus', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 59–74, although his central contention has now been refuted by
[507] H. Tarrant, 'Zeno on knowledge or on geometry? The evidence of anon. *In Thraetiton*', *Phronesis* 29 (1984), 96–9.

For further interpretations, partly different from our own, see Sambursky [490], Mansfeld [344], 158^f, and

- [508] D. E. Hahm, 'Chrysippus' solution to the Democritean dilemma of the cone', *Ios* 83 (1972), 205–20.

- [509] R. B. Todd, 'Chrysippus on infinite divisibility', *Apeiron* 7 (1973), 121-34.
 [510] J.-P. Darront, 'Mou geometriacus, nou physion', in [411], 121-34.
 [511] M. J. White, 'Zeno's arrow, divisible infinitesimals, and Chrysippus', *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 219-54.

51-2 Time and everlasting recurrence

Major discussions of the evidence on Stoic theories of time include Goldschmidt [302], and Sorabji [22], 17-32; see also Lloyd [392], Rist [303], chapter 15, and

- [512] M. J. White, 'Time and determinism in the Hellenistic philosophical schools', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65 (1983), 40-62.

On everlasting recurrence, see Mattheïd [490], and Long [497] who defends the logical coherence of the doctrine against the interpretation offered by

- [513] J. Barnes, 'La doctrine du retour éternel', in [411], 1-20.

See also

- [514] M. J. White, 'Cosmic cycles, time, and determinism', in his *Agency and integrality: philosophical themes in the ancient discussions of determinism and responsibility* (Basel, 1985), 173-214.

On calculations of the duration of the 'great year', see

- [515] B. L. van der Waerden, 'Das grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr', *Helveta* 80 (1952), 129-37.

For modern discussions of closed or circular time, see

- [516] A. N. Prior, *Past, present and future* (Oxford, 1967).
 [517] W. Newton-Smith, *The structure of time* (London, 1980).

On everlasting recurrence in Nietzsche, see

- [518] A. Nehamas, 'The eternal recurrence', *Philosophical Review* 89 (1980), 331-50.

53 Soul

Stoic psychology, apart from epistemology and ethics, has only recently become a major subject of discussion. Of the older literature, the best work is that of Bonhöffer [311], which refers to an invaluable range of material, though the discussion of this is not always reliable as history or philosophy.

An important advance in the understanding of elementary animal psychology and mental motivation was achieved with the publication of the papyrus fragments of Hierocles by von Arnim [572]. On these see the study by Pembroke [564], and also Inwood [575].

Two attempts to give a comprehensive account of the Stoic concept of mind are

- [519] R. Philippson, 'Zur Psychologie der Stoa', *Rheinisches Museum* 86 (1937), 140-79.
 [520] A. A. Long, 'Soul and body in Stoicism', *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 34-57.

One subject which has been discussed with considerable success is the unification of all mental faculties and the psychology of action to which this gave rise. This is an important theme in Inwood [547], and also treated in

- [521] B. Inwood, 'The Stoics on the grammar of action', in [308], 75-86.

Other related studies include chapters 2, 3, 12, 14 of Rust [303], Long [434], and

- [522] A.J. Voelke, *L'idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme* (Paris, 1973).

- [523] F. Solmsen, 'Greek philosophy and the discovery of the nerves', *Museum Helveticum* 18 (1961), 150-97, repr. in [29], 1, 536-82.

For suggestions about the Stoics' contribution to a debate on self-consciousness, see

- [524] A.C. Lloyd, 'Noûce tripsum and conscientia', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 46 (1964), 188-200.

The soul's survival is the subject of

- [525] R. Hoven, *Stoïcisme et stoïcisme face au problème de l'au-delà* (Paris, 1971).

On the doctrine of the world-soul, see Moreau [23].

For the mechanics of vision, there are Hahn [49], and

- [526] H.-G. Ingenkamp, 'Zur stoischen Lehre vom Sehen', *Rheinisches Museum* 114 (1971), 240-6.

- [527] R.B. Todd, 'Senecians and the Stoic theory of perception', *Grazer Beiträge* 2 (1974), 251-61.

5d Theology

The nearest to a comprehensive study of Stoic theology, and one which takes the story well beyond the period covered in this work, is

- [528] M. Dragona-Monachou, *The Stoic arguments for the existence and the providence of the gods* (Athens, 1976).

A vast amount of primary evidence is collected by Pease [329]. See also the important text, probably by Philodemus, edited in

- [529] A. Hirrichs, 'Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im Plierc. 1428', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 4 (1973), 5-32.

The historical background is explored by Moreau [23] and Hahn [488]. On dialectical aspects of Stoic theology, see the excellent studies by Schofield [345], [471]. Cf. also

- [530] P. Boyancé, 'Les preuves stoïciennes de l'existence des dieux d'après Cicéron', *Hermes* 90 (1962), 46-71.

On the relation of Stoic theology to Academic counterarguments, see Courissin [625] and Burnyeat [451].

For Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, see [322], and [354]-[361].

On providence in relation to the destruction of the world, see the differing views of Mansfield [496] and Long [497].

For Stoic theodicy, see

- [531] A.A. Long, 'The Stoic concept of evil', *Philosophical Quarterly* 18 (1968), 329-42.

- [532] G.B. Kerferd, 'The origin of evil in Stoic thought', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 60 (1978), 482-94.

- [533] M. Dragona-Monachou, 'Providence and fate in Stoicism and prae-Neoplatonism: Calcidius as an authority on Cleanthes' theodicy (SVF 2.933)', *Philosophia* 3 (1973), 262-306

55 Causation and fate

The Stoic view of causation is explained in the seminal study by

- [534] M. Frede, 'The original notion of cause', in [6], 217-49 and also touched on in Barnes [637]

The large literature on Stoic 'fate' includes [455]-[463], Sorabji [21], [459], Isnardi Parente [256], White [512], [514] ch. 4, and

- [535] A.A. Long, 'Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action', in [306], 173-99
 [536] J.B. Gould, 'The Stoic conception of fate', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35 (1974), 17-32, repr. in J.P. Anton, A. Preus (edd.), *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy II* (Albany, 1983), 478-94
 [537] P.L. Donini, 'Fato e volontà umana in Crisippo', *Atti dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 109 (1975), 187-230
 [538] M.E. Reesor, 'Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy', in [307], 187-202
 [539] C. Stough, 'Stoic determinism and moral responsibility', in [307], 203-31
 [540] R.W. Sharples, 'Necessity in the Stoic doctrine of fate', *Symbolae Osloenses* 16 (1981), 81-97

On Alexander's important critique of the Stoic theory, see especially the edition by R.W. Sharples [333], which incorporates the results of his earlier writings on the same work. Other contributions include

- [541] A.A. Long, 'Stoic determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias *De fato* (I-xiv)', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), 247-68
 [542] P.L. Donini, 'Stoici e megarici nel *de fato* di Alessandro di Afrodisia', in [40], 173-94
 [543] D. Frede, 'The dramatization of determinism: Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Fato*', *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 276-98

56-67 Stoic ethics

The most comprehensive study, which digests much of the recent work, is

- [544] M. Förschner, *Die stoische Ethik. über die Zusammenhang von Natur-Sprach- u. Moralphilosophie im alexandrischen System* (Stuttgart, 1981)
 An older book, which still contains much of value, is
 [545] A. Dyroff, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa* (Berlin, 1897)

For introductory accounts, see Pohlenz [298], Long [3], Sandbach [296].

Books which give detailed discussions of many of the topics we handle here include Bonhöffer [312], Rist [303], Schofield/Striker [7], and

- [546] W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic ethics. The work of Aron Didymus* (New Brunswick/London, 1983)

On moral psychology there is an outstanding monograph by

- [547] B. Inwood, *Ethics and human action in early Stoicism* (Oxford, 1985)

The doxography of Stoic ethics is studied in a work which contains a mass of valuable information, even if the author's thesis of a unitary doxographical source is dubious:

- [548] M. Gousta, *I dossografi di etica*, 2 vols. (Turin, 1964-7)

Aristotelian influence on Stoic ethics is perceived by Rist [303], chapter 1, and

- [549] A.A. Long, 'Aristotle's legacy to Stoic ethics', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 15 (1968), 72-85,

and contested by Sandbach [304]. See also

- [550] E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa* (Berlin, 1932; repr. Berlin/Zürich/Dublin, 1966)

Other studies which cover many aspects of Stoic ethics are White [348], Irwin [394], and

- [551] O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1953)

- [552] G. Rodier, 'La cohérence de la morale stoïcienne', in *Etudes de philosophie grecque* (Paris, 1926; repr. 1957)

- [553] H. Reiner, 'Der Streit um die stoische Ethik', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 21 (1967), 261-81, published in revised form in

- [554] H. Reiner, 'Die ethische Weisheit der Stoiker heute', *Gymnasium* 76 (1969), 310-7

- [555] A.A. Long, 'The logical basis of Stoic ethics', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 71 (1970/1), 85-104

- [556] D. Tsekourakis, *Studies in the terminology of early Stoic ethics* (Wiesbaden, 1974)

- [557] A.A. Long, 'Greek ethics after Machiavere and the Stoic community of reason', *Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1983), 184-99

- [558] W. Gürtler, 'Pflicht und "Lust" in der Ethik der alten Stoa', *Actes du VIII^e congrès de la F.I.E.C.* II (Budapest, 1983), 397-413

- [559] N.P. White, 'The role of physics in Stoic ethics', in [308], 57-74

- [560] M. Forschner, 'Das Gute und die Güter. Zur Aktualität der stoischen Ethik', in [8], 325-59

56 The division of ethical topics

See Dyroff [545], Gousta [548], Hahn [424], and

- [561] A.A. Long, 'Arius Didymus and the exposition of Stoic ethics', in [546], 41-66

- [562] N.P. White, 'Comments' on A.A. Long [561], in [546] 67-74

- [563] P. Hadot, 'Une clé des pensées de Marc Aurèle: les trois *topoi* philosophiques selon Epictète', *Etudes Philosophiques* 33 (1978), 65-83

57 Impulse and appropriateness

The significance of these concepts was first adequately appreciated by Pohlenz [336], and further light has been shed on them in a brilliant study,

- [564] S.G. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis' in [306], 114-49

See also Brunschwig [263], Long [555], [557], and

- [565] R. Philippson, 'Das "erste Naturgemässe"', *Philologus* 87 (1932), 445-66

- [566] C.O. Brink, 'οἰκείωσις and oikeiōtēs: Theophrastus and Zeno on nature in moral theory', *Phronesis* 1 (1956), 123-45

- [567] G.B. Kerferd, 'The search for personal identity in Stoic thought', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 55 (1972), 177-96

- [568] A. Graeser, 'Zürke' oder Deduktion? Zur Begründung der stoischen Ethik', *Kant Studien* 63 (1972), 213-24, in part a rejoinder to Long [555]

- [569] N.P. White, 'The basis of Stoic ethics', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 83 (1979), 143–78.
 [570] G. Striker, 'The role of oikeiosis in Stoic ethics', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983), 145–67.
 [571] T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Discovering the good: *oikeiosis* and *kathēkonta* in Stoic ethics', in [7], 145–83.

For the text of Hierocles, see

- [572] H. von Arnim, *Hierocles. Ethische Elementarlehre*, Berliner Klassikertexte Heft 4 (Berlin, 1906).

Hierocles' work as a Stoic philosopher is studied by

- [573] K. Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoaer* (Leipzig, 1901).
 [574] R. Philippson, 'Hierokles der Stoaer', *Rheinisches Museum* 83 (1933), 97–114.
 [575] B. Inwood, 'Hierocles: theory and argument in the second century A.D.', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 151–84.

For appropriation (*oikeiosis*) in Antiochus and later Peripatetic ethics, see

- [576] H. Görgemanns, 'Oikeiosis in Arius Didymus', in [546], 165–89, with comments by [577] B. Inwood, in [546], 190–202.

For appropriation (*oikeiosis*) in the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, see Tarrant [633], 180, Inwood [575], 168n.

58 Value and indifference

The material studied in this and the previous section spills over into other sections, especially 59, 60 and 64. For introductory treatments of it all, see Long [3], 184–205. Sandbach [296], 28–48. Specialized reading on the ancient controversies stimulated by the concept of indifferent 'things in accordance with nature' is given in the bibliography to 64. The best scholarly starting-point is an article by

- [578] I.G. Kidd, 'Stoic intermediates and the end for man', in [306], 150–72, first published in *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 3 (1955), 181–94.
 See also Dyroff [545], 100–25, Grunmach [550], Rieth [551], 95–108, Reiser [553], [554], and
 [579] M.E. Reesor, 'The "indifferents" in the Old and Middle Stoa', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 82 (1951), 102–10.
 [580] G.B. Kerferd, 'Cicero and Stoic ethics', in J.R.C. Martyn (ed.), *Cicero and Virgil: studies in honour of Harold Hunt* (Amsterdam, 1972), 60–74.
 [581] W. Gierler, 'Zum virtus-Fragment des Lucilius (1326–1338 Marx) und zur Geschichte der stoischen Güterlehre', *Hermes* 112 (1984), 445–68.

For the unorthodox positions of Aristo and Hierilis, see Ioppolo [346], [349].

59 Proper functions

On the interpretation of this concept scholarly opinions have varied widely, and in our view there is still no study which can be regarded as definitive. The most detailed modern treatment, with ample discussion of alternative interpretations, is Tsakourakis [556], 1–60. See also Kidd [578], Long [549], [557], Rust [303], chapter 6, Engberg-Pedersen [571], and

- [582] I.G. Kidd, 'Moral actions and rules in Stoic ethics' in [307], 247–58,
and also, among earlier studies,
[583] G. Nebel, 'Der Begriff des *KATHKON* in der alten Stoa', *Hermes* 70 (1935), 439–60
[584] W. Wiersma, 'Telos und Kathekon in der alten Stoa', *Mnemosyne* 5 (1937), 219–28

60 *Good and bad*

The terminology the Stoics used for elucidating their concept of 'good' is studied most thoroughly by Tiekoutrakis [556], 61–84. See also Rietz [551], 29–35, Göbler [581], and Reimer [553], [554], whose articles are discussed by

- [585] A. Graeser, 'Zur Funktion des Begriffes "Gut" in der stoischen Ethik', *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 26 (1972), 417–23
to whom Reimer in turn responded in
[586] A. Reimer, 'Zum Begriff des Guten (Agathon) in der stoischen Ethik', *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 28 (1974), 228–34
See also
[587] M.E. Reesor, 'On the Stoic goods in Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2', in [546], 75–84
with comments by
[588] D. Sedley in [546], 85–6

For three views on the relationship between Stoic and Aristotelian goods, see Long [549], Irwin [594], and

- [589] A.M. Ioppolo, 'La dottrina stoica dei beni esterni e i suoi rapporti con l'etica aristotelica', *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* 29 (1974), 303–85

61 *Virtue and vice*

The concept of virtue, though discussed in all extended accounts of Stoic ethics, has received surprisingly little detailed treatment. For the unity of the virtues, see Ioppolo [546], and Schofield [347]. For vice, in its relation to the Stoic concept of evil, see Long [531] and Kerferd [532].

62 *Moral responsibility*

See Voelke [522], and studies collected under '55 Causation and fate', [535]–[540].

63–4 *The end*

For a pioneering treatment of the material in both these sections, cf

- [590] O. Rietz, 'Über des Telos der Stoiker', *Hermes* 69 (1934), 13–45

Our own view on the debate between Antipater and Carneades stems from

- [591] A.A. Long, 'Carneades and the Stoic telos', *Phronesis* 12 (1967), 59–90
but the issue is controversial, and readers should also consult
[592] M. Soreth, 'Die zweite Telosformel des Antipater von Tarsos', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 50 (1968), 48–72
[593] G. Striker, 'Antipater, or the art of living', in [7], 185–204

See also Long [549], Rist [342], Reimer [553], [554], Göbler [581], and

- [594] T.H. Irwin, 'Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of happiness', in [7], 205–44

For the technical distinction between ends and targets, see

[595] R. Aipert-Göelz, *Der Begriff 'Skopos' in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte* (Hildesheim, 1978)

65 *The passions*

The philosophical interest of the Stoic doctrine is particularly well brought out by Inwood [547], chapter 5, and by

[596] A.C. Lloyd, 'Emotion and decision in Stoic psychology', in [507], 233-46

[597] M. Frede, 'The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul', in [7], 93-110

Good feelings (*eupatheiai*) and the wise man's emotional disposition are discussed by Long [549], Rist [607], and Görler [558]. For the more specific problems associated with pleasure, see Rist [503], chapter 3, Goshing/Taylor [19], 415-27, and

[598] R.P. Haynes, 'The theory of pleasure in the old Stoa', *American Journal of Philology* 83 (1962), 412-19

See also Gould [362], 181-96, and

[599] I.M. Ioppolo, 'La dottrina delle passioni in Crisippo', *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* 27 (1972), 251-69

[600] M. Daraks-Mallet, 'Les fonctions psychologiques du logos', in [411], 87-120

[601] K. Abel, 'Das Propathia-theorem: ein Beitrag zur stoischen Affektenlehre', *Hermes* 113 (1983), 78-97

[602] C.J. Gill, 'Did Chrysippus understand Medea?', *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 336-49

The representation of the passions as illnesses is well discussed in

[603] G.B. Kerferd, 'Two problems concerning impulses', in [546], 87-98

On the Platonizing views of Posidonius, see Kidd [379], [383].

66 *Ethics in action*

For a general appraisal, see Long [557], and especially the interesting study by

[604] P.A. Brunt, 'Aspects of the social thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 8.5-10 (1973), 9-34

For the concept of progress, see

[605] O. Luschkat, 'Das Problem der ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa', *Philologus* 102 (1958), 178-214

Studies of the middle Stoa's work on applied ethics include Hijmans [378], Kidd [582], and, on Panaetius,

[606] P.H. De Lacy, 'The four Stoic personae', *Illinois Classical Studies* 2 (1977), 163-72

For a sympathetic view of the wise man's conduct, see

[607] J.M. Rist, 'The Stoic concept of detachment', in [507], 259-72

The best treatment of the Stoics' attitude to suicide is Rist [303], chapter 11

67 *Political theory*

The surviving fragments of Zeno's controversial *Republic* are well studied by Baldry [338]. See also Dorandi [334]

For Stoic political theory more generally, see

- [608] M. E. Reesor, *The political theory of the old and middle stoics* (New York, 1931)
[609] E. L. Devine, 'Stoicism on the best regime', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 31 (1970), 123–36
and for a judicious treatment of Stoic cosmopolitanism, Balady [17]

On Stoicism and natural law, see

- [610] G. Watson, 'The natural law and Stoicism', in [306], 216–38
[611] J. Finnis, *Natural law and natural rights* (Oxford, 1982)

For the influence of Stoicism on political life, see Grimal [114], and

- [612] L. Hadot, 'Tradition stoïcienne et idées politiques au temps des Gracques', *Revue des Études Latines* 48 (1979), 133–79

The continuity of Platonic and Stoic political thought is stressed by

- [613] M. Knardo Parente, 'La politica della Stoa antica', *Sandalion* 3 (1980), 67–98

68–70 THE ACADEMICS

The epistemological debates between the Academics and the Stoics are covered in Cournot [73], [465], Sedley [402], Hartmann [466], Striker [467], Frede [468] and von Staden [476], and their ethical debates in Bremer [53], [534], Long [391], Soroth [392], and Striker [393]. General treatments of the character of Academic scepticism will be found in Brochard [52], Dal Pra [51], Striker [65], Glucker [42], and

- [614] L. Cordano, *La scetticismo degli accademici* (Rome, 1889, repr. Milan, 1985)
[615] O. Gigon, 'Zur Geschichte der sogenannten Neuen Akademie', *Museum Helveticum* 1 (1944), 47–64

For Cicero's place in and contribution to the history of Academic scepticism, see

- [616] A. Wersche, *Cicero und die Neue Akademie. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Geschichte der antiken Skeptizismus* (Münster, 1961)
[617] W. Burkert, 'Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker. Zum Platonverständnis der "Neuen Akademie"', *Gymnasium* 72 (1965), 175–200

Testimonia for the New Academy from Arcesilaus to Clitomachus are collected in two articles which came to our notice only when our book was already in proof:

- [618] H. J. Mette, 'Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor und Arkesilaos', *Leisner* 26 (1982), 7–94
[619] H. J. Mette, 'Weitere Akademiker heute: von Lakysdes bis zu Krintonios', *Leisner* 27 (1983), 39–146

On Arcesilaus' philosophical background and the perspective in which his criticism of the Stoics should be viewed, there is a fine study by

- [620] A. M. Ioppolo, 'Doxa ed epoché in Arcesilaos', *Filologia* 5 (1982), 117–61

See also Cournot [71], [465], Kramer [12], and

- [621] A. M. Ioppolo, 'Premessa di enologia nella filosofia di Arcesilaos', in [62], 141–61
[622] A. A. Long, 'Diongenius Laertius' life of Arcesilaus', *Eleusis* 7 (1986), 429–49

For discussion and criticism of the interpretation of Arcesilaus as a crypto-dogmatist, see Glucker [42], 296–306, and

- [623] C. Lévy, 'Scepticisme et dogmatisme dans l'Académie: "l'Ésotérisme de Arcésilas"', *Revue des Études Latines* 56 (1978), 335-48.

For Carneades the only collection of testimonia, prior to Mette [619], was the seriously incomplete

- [624] B. Wisniewski, *Karneades, Fragmente* (Wrocław/Warsaw/Krakow, 1970).
On aspects of his philosophy, see Long [3], 94-106, [591], Soroth [592], Burnyeat [451], and
[625] P. Coissin, 'Les sources de Carnéade contre le polychéisme', *Revue des Études Grecques* 54 (1941), 43-57.
[626] S. Peri, *Carneade* (Padua, 1978).
[627] A.M. Ioppolo, 'Carneade e il terzo libro delle *Tusulanarum*', *Elenchos* 1 (1980), 76-91.

The work of Philo of Larissa is extensively covered by Gucker [42], and the highly original studies of

- [628] H. Tarrant, 'Agreement and the self-evident in Philo of Larissa', *Dionysius* 5 (1981), 66-97.
[629] H. Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism? The philosophy of the Fourth Academy* (Cambridge, 1985).

On the grounds for his rift with Antiochus, cf.

- [630] D. Sedley, 'The end of the Academy', *Phronesis* 26 (1981), 67-75.

The testimonia for Antiochus himself are collected and discussed by

- [631] G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Bern/Stuttgart, 1953).
See also Gucker [42], and
[632] J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977).

An important text from the sceptical Academy is discussed in Tarrant [629], and

- [633] H. Tarrant, 'The date of action. In *Theaetetus*', *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 33 (1983), 161-87.

71-2 THE PYRRHONIST REVIVAL

Much of the modern scholarship on later Pyrrhonism is to be found under 'General studies of ancient Pyrrhonism' ([41]-[61] above).

On Aenesidemus, there is important material in Dal Pra [51] and Tarrant [629]. See also Natorp [26], and

- [634] P. Natorp, 'Untersuchungen über die Skepsis im Alterthum. Aenesidem', *Rheinische Museum* 38 (1883), 28-61.
[635] K. Janáček, 'Aenesidemus und Sextus Empiricus', *Erzene* 17 (1940), 5-16.

On the status of the primary text on Aenesidemus in Photius, see also

- [636] K. Janáček, 'Zur Interpretation des Photius Alschmütz über Aenesidemus', *Erzene* 14 (1976), 93-100.

Aenesidemus' critique of causation is illuminatingly studied in

- [637] J. Barnes, 'Ancient scepticism and causation', in [58], 249-273.

For the problem of Aenesidemus' alleged Heracliteanism, see

- [638] J. M. Rist, 'The Heracliteanism of Aenesidemus', *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 309–19
 - [639] U. Burkhard, *Die angebliche Heraklit-Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem* (Bonn, 1973)
- Little has been written on the ten modes, but the situation has now radically improved with
- [640] G. Striker, 'The ten tropes of Aenesidemus', in [58], 95–115
and the first-rate translation and philosophical commentary by
 - [641] J. Annas, J. Barnes, *The modes of Scepticism* (Cambridge, 1985)

There is some useful comparative material in the earlier studies of

- [642] F. Pappenhenn, *Die Tropen der griechischen Skeptiker* (Berlin, 1885)
- [643] A. F. Chazarilysandros, *Geschichte der skeptischen Tropen* (Munich, 1970)

Important light is shed on the history of the school's title in

- [644] K. Janáček, 'Das Wort *Skeptikos* in Philons Schriften', *Česky Filologický* 101 (1979), 65–8
although there is an important qualification to his findings in Tarrant [629], 22–9

Most of the best recent philosophical discussion of later Pyrrhonism focuses on Sextus Empiricus, whose work falls outside the immediate scope of our book but bears directly on the interpretation of Aenesidemus. See especially the important debate on sceptic 'appearances' involving Burnyeat [60], Frede [61], and

- [645] M. F. Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?' in [5], 29–51, and [58], 117–48
- [646] M. Frede, 'Des Skeptikers Meinungen', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 15/16 (1979), 102–29
- [647] J. Barnes, 'The beliefs of a Pyrrhonist', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 8.5–28 (1982), 1–29, and *Elenchos* 4 (1983), 5–43
- [648] C. Stough, 'Sextus Empiricus on non-assertion', *Phronesis* 29 (1984), 137–64

Other studies include Burnyeat [10], and

- [649] W. Heintz, *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus* (Halle, 1932)
- [650] R. M. Chisholm, 'Sextus Empiricus and modern empiricism', *Philosophy of Science* 8 (1941), 371–84
- [651] A. A. Long, 'Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of truth', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 25 (1978), 35–49
- [652] I. Mueller, 'Geometry and scepticism', in [6], 69–93
- [653] D. Glidden, 'Skeptical semiotics', *Phronesis* 28 (1983) 213–55
- [654] J. Annas, 'Doing without objective values: ancient and modern strategies', in [7], 3–29

Help on some important Pyrrhonist terminology can be found in

- [655] K. Janáček, *Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical methods* (Prague, 1972)